The Supreme Court affirmed Marvin Mercado’s conviction for carnapping, emphasizing that penalties under special laws like the Anti-Carnapping Act are distinct from those under the Revised Penal Code. The Court clarified that the appellate court correctly increased the penalty, and the case did not require certification to the Supreme Court as the penalty was not strictly reclusion perpetua. This decision underscores the importance of understanding how penalties are applied and reviewed in cases involving special laws versus the general penal code, directly impacting how such cases are handled in the Philippine justice system.

Beyond a Joyride: When is Taking a Vehicle Considered Carnapping?

Marvin Mercado was convicted along with several others for violating Republic Act No. 6538, the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972. The Court of Appeals increased Mercado’s penalty, leading him to argue that the case should have been certified to the Supreme Court, given the increased penalty. The central legal question was whether the appellate court erred in increasing the penalty and not certifying the case, and whether the facts supported a conviction for carnapping.

In denying Mercado’s petition, the Supreme Court aligned with the Court of Appeals, holding that the provision of Sec. 13, Rule 124, of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure applies only when the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher as a single indivisible penalty. The penalty imposed by the appellate court was in accordance with Sec. 14 of RA 6538, which is not considered reclusion perpetua for the purposes of Sec. 13, Rule 124. The Court relied on People v. Omotoy where the Supreme Court observed that it entertains appeals in criminal cases only where “the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher,” meaning the penalty is at least reclusion perpetua.

Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code defines reclusion perpetua as imprisonment for twenty years and one day to forty years. While the thirty-year period assigned by the Court of Appeals to the maximum penalty falls within that range, the Supreme Court clarified that reclusion perpetua is a single indivisible penalty, which cannot be divided into different periods. The thirty-year period for reclusion perpetua is only relevant for purposes of successive service of sentence under Art. 70 of the Revised Penal Code. This distinction is crucial because it clarifies the procedural requirements for appeals involving severe penalties.

Moreover, the crime committed by Mercado is penalized under RA 6538, a special law, not the Revised Penal Code. The Supreme Court referenced the cases, People v. Canoy and Gabucan, 92 Phil 1076 (1953) and People v. Simon, G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994, 234 SCRA 555, 573, stated that unless otherwise specified, it is an error to designate penalties under special penal laws with terms provided for in the Revised Penal Code, as those terms apply only to penalties imposed by the Penal Code, not to those in special penal laws. Special laws generally provide their own specific penalties, which are not derived from or refer to those in the Revised Penal Code. The Court emphasized that the penalty under RA 6538 does not correspond directly to penalties in the Revised Penal Code, except when the owner, driver, or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which is penalized with reclusion perpetua to death.

The Supreme Court found no error in the appellate court’s reliance on a footnote in Omotoy to affirm the conviction. Although the substance of the footnote may not be the ratio decidendi of the case, it still constitutes an essential part of the decision since it enunciates a fundamental procedural rule in the conduct of appeals. The Court clarified that where the Court of Appeals finds that the imposable penalty is at least reclusion perpetua, death, or life imprisonment, it should impose the penalty, refrain from entering judgment, and certify the case to the Supreme Court for review.

The Court also addressed the factual issue of whether there was a violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act. The evidence showed that Leonardo Bhagwani parked the subject Isuzu Trooper in front of his house, and the following day, it was missing. Bhagwani reported the vehicle’s disappearance, leading to the issuance of an Alarm Sheet. A neighbor disclosed that the accused had stolen the vehicle. The accused admitted to taking the vehicle, but claimed it was with Bhagwani’s consent. The Court of Appeals affirmed their conviction and increased the penalty.

Mercado argued that the accused were motivated by fun and merely took the vehicle for a joyride, lacking the intent to steal it. The Supreme Court emphasized that this was a petition for review on certiorari, where only questions of law, not questions of fact, may be raised. Findings of fact of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon the Supreme Court. This rule may be disregarded only when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to the findings and conclusions of the trial court, or are not supported by the evidence on record. This case did not present such grounds for exception.

However, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals on the imposed penalty. The Court referenced Sec. 14 of RA 6538:

Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is defined in Section Two of this Act, shall irrespective of the value of the motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and not more than seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon things; and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things…

The evidence showed that the accused broke a quarter window of the Isuzu Trooper to gain access, indicating force was used. However, the Supreme Court held this did not merit the full penalty. With the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty was reduced to an indeterminate prison term of seventeen years and four months to twenty-two years.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether the Court of Appeals erred in increasing Marvin Mercado’s penalty for carnapping and not certifying the case to the Supreme Court, and whether the facts supported his conviction under the Anti-Carnapping Act.
What is the difference between penalties under the Revised Penal Code and special laws?	Penalties under special laws, like the Anti-Carnapping Act, are distinct and not interchangeable with those under the Revised Penal Code. Special laws provide their own specific penalties, which are not derived from or refer to those in the Revised Penal Code.
When should a case be certified to the Supreme Court from the Court of Appeals?	A case should be certified to the Supreme Court when the Court of Appeals finds that the imposable penalty is at least reclusion perpetua, death, or life imprisonment. The appellate court should impose the penalty but refrain from entering judgment, elevating the entire record for review.
What does reclusion perpetua mean under the Revised Penal Code?	Under Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, reclusion perpetua is imprisonment for twenty years and one day to forty years. It is considered a single indivisible penalty, and the thirty-year period is only relevant for successive service of sentences under Art. 70.
What constitutes carnapping under the Anti-Carnapping Act?	Carnapping, as defined in the Anti-Carnapping Act, involves the taking of a motor vehicle without the owner’s consent. The penalty varies depending on whether the act was committed with violence, intimidation, or force.
What is the significance of the Indeterminate Sentence Law in this case?	The Indeterminate Sentence Law allows for the imposition of a penalty with a minimum and maximum term, providing the court with flexibility in determining the appropriate sentence. In this case, it allowed the Supreme Court to reduce the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals.
What type of questions can be raised in a petition for review on certiorari?	A petition for review on certiorari can only raise questions of law, not questions of fact. The Supreme Court generally defers to the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals unless there is a clear error or inconsistency.
How did the Court determine if force was used in the carnapping?	The Court determined that force was used because the accused broke a quarter window of the Isuzu Trooper to gain access to it. This act demonstrated the use of force upon the vehicle, which is a factor in determining the appropriate penalty under the Anti-Carnapping Act.

This case clarifies important distinctions between penalties under the Revised Penal Code and special laws, as well as the procedural requirements for appeals. It also reinforces the principle that factual findings of lower courts are generally binding on the Supreme Court. Understanding these principles is crucial for both legal professionals and individuals navigating the Philippine justice system.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: MARVIN MERCADO v. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 149375, November 26, 2002