The Supreme Court ruled that a corporate officer acquitted of violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22), the Bouncing Checks Law, cannot be held civilly liable for the value of the dishonored corporate check, even if they signed it. This decision clarifies that civil liability only attaches if the officer is convicted of the crime. This protects corporate officers from personal liability when the corporation’s debts lead to bounced checks, provided they are not found criminally liable.

Beyond the By-Laws: Who Really Signs the Check?

This case revolves around George Rebujio, the finance officer of Beverly Hills Medical Group, Inc. (BHMGI), and Dio Implant Philippines Corporation (DIPC). Rebujio signed a Security Bank check on behalf of BHMGI, payable to DIPC, for PHP 297,051.86. The check bounced due to insufficient funds, leading to a criminal charge against Rebujio for violating BP 22. While Rebujio was acquitted on reasonable doubt, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) still held him civilly liable for the check’s value. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) reversed this decision, but the Court of Appeals (CA) reinstated the MeTC’s ruling, leading Rebujio to elevate the case to the Supreme Court. At the heart of the issue is whether Rebujio, as a finance officer acquitted of the crime, can be held personally liable for the corporate debt.

The Supreme Court anchored its decision on Section 1 of BP 22, which explicitly states that “the person or persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.” The Court emphasized that this provision makes no distinction based on the signatory’s position within the corporation. It states:

Section 1.Checks without sufficient funds. – Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.

. . . .

Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.

Building on this principle, the Supreme Court cited the landmark case of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Duque, which established that the civil liability of a corporate officer for a bouncing corporate check attaches only if they are convicted of violating BP 22. Conversely, acquittal discharges the officer from any civil liability arising from the worthless check. This ruling highlights a critical protection for corporate officers acting in their official capacity.

The Court of Appeals had distinguished Rebujio’s case by arguing that as a finance officer, he was not a corporate officer as defined by the Revised Corporation Code, specifically Section 24, which enumerates specific positions like president, treasurer, and secretary. However, the Supreme Court rejected this narrow interpretation, clarifying that BP 22 itself defines who is considered a “corporate officer” in the context of bouncing corporate checks: the person who actually signed the check on behalf of the corporation. The Supreme Court stresses that the Revised Corporation Code does not define the liabilities under BP 22.

To further illustrate this point, the Supreme Court referenced its previous rulings in Navarra v. People and Gosiaco v. Ching, emphasizing that the focus is on the act of signing the check, regardless of whether the signatory holds a position explicitly listed in the Corporation Code or the corporation’s by-laws. The court pointed out that in Pilipinas Shell, the proprietor, who is not considered a corporate officer under the Revised Corporation Code, was similarly absolved of civil liability upon acquittal.

Moreover, holding an acquitted corporate signatory liable would violate the doctrine of separate juridical personality. The Court highlighted that a corporation has a distinct legal identity separate from its officers and stockholders, meaning corporate debts are not automatically the debts of its officers unless there is a valid legal basis, such as a guilty verdict in a BP 22 case, or proof that the corporate veil was used to perpetrate fraud.

The subject check was issued to pay for dental and cosmetic merchandise purchased from DIPC. Although there were disputes on whether BHMGI actually authorized the transaction, what remains clear is that Rebujio did not personally incur this obligation. Furthermore, there was no evidence indicating that Rebujio had bound himself to pay or that he used the corporate structure for fraudulent purposes. Therefore, there was no legal basis to hold him accountable for BHMGI’s debt.

The Court stated that

Holding the acquitted corporate signatory, who is not a corporate officer as defined by the Revised Corporation Code, liable for the obligation of the corporation violates the doctrine of separate juridical personality, which provides that a corporation has a legal personality separate and distinct from that of people comprising it. Thus, being an officer or a stockholder of a corporation does not make one’s property the property also of the corporation nor the corporate debt the debt of the stockholders or officers.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court overturned the Court of Appeals’ decision, reinstating the Regional Trial Court’s ruling. Rebujio, as a mere signatory of BHMGI’s corporate check, cannot be held civilly liable following his acquittal, without prejudice to DIPC’s right to pursue a separate civil action against the corporation to recover the amount owed.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether a corporate finance officer, acquitted of violating BP 22, could be held civilly liable for the value of a dishonored corporate check he signed.
What is Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22)?	BP 22, also known as the Bouncing Checks Law, penalizes the issuance of checks without sufficient funds. It aims to maintain confidence in the banking system.
Who is considered a ‘corporate officer’ under BP 22?	Under BP 22, a corporate officer is the person or persons who actually signed the check on behalf of the corporation, regardless of their official title.
What is the doctrine of separate juridical personality?	This doctrine states that a corporation is a legal entity separate from its stockholders and officers, meaning the corporation’s debts are not automatically the debts of its officers.
What happens to civil liability if a corporate officer is acquitted of violating BP 22?	If a corporate officer is acquitted of violating BP 22, their civil liability arising from the issuance of the dishonored check is extinguished.
Can the creditor still recover the debt if the corporate officer is acquitted?	Yes, the creditor can still pursue a separate civil action against the corporation to recover the debt, even if the officer who signed the check is acquitted.
Why did the Supreme Court overturn the Court of Appeals’ decision?	The Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals incorrectly applied the definition of corporate officers from the Revised Corporation Code to a BP 22 case, and failed to recognize the separate juridical personality of the corporation.
What was the basis for the acquittal in this case?	The court acquitted Rebujio on reasonable doubt.

This case reinforces the principle that corporate officers are shielded from personal liability for corporate debts when they act in their official capacity and are acquitted of criminal charges related to those debts. However, creditors retain the right to pursue the corporation itself for the outstanding obligations.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: George Rebujio v. DIO Implant Philippines Corporation, G.R. No. 269745, January 14, 2025