In Domingo v. Zamora, the Supreme Court addressed the scope of the President’s authority to reorganize government functions. The Court ultimately dismissed the petition as moot due to subsequent legislation, but clarified the President’s power to reorganize the Executive Branch. This authority, derived from the Administrative Code of 1987, allows the President to transfer functions between departments and agencies to achieve efficiency and economy. The ruling underscores the balance between executive power and legislative prerogative in shaping national policies, particularly in sectors like sports development.

Shifting Fields: Can Executive Orders Redefine Sports Governance?

This case arose from Executive Order No. 81 (EO 81), issued by former President Joseph Estrada, which transferred sports development programs from the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) to the Philippine Sports Commission (PSC). Consequently, DECS issued memoranda reassigning Bureau of Physical Education and School Sports (BPESS) personnel, actions challenged by the petitioners, arguing that EO 81 constituted undue legislation and violated the principle of separation of powers. The petitioners further contended that the DECS memoranda infringed upon their right to security of tenure.

At the heart of the legal challenge was the question of whether the President exceeded his authority by issuing EO 81. Petitioners asserted that such a transfer of functions amounted to an impermissible encroachment on legislative powers. However, the respondents maintained that the President acted within his authority to reorganize the executive branch for the sake of efficiency. Before the Supreme Court could resolve this dispute, Republic Act No. 9155 (RA 9155), the “Governance of Basic Education Act of 2001,” was enacted, explicitly abolishing the BPESS and transferring the DECS’s sports-related functions to the PSC. This development significantly altered the legal landscape, prompting the Supreme Court to evaluate the case’s continued relevance.

The enactment of RA 9155 led both parties to acknowledge that the original issues presented were effectively moot and academic. The petitioners conceded that it was no longer feasible to challenge the PSC’s assumption of BPESS functions, given the new law’s explicit mandate. Furthermore, they acknowledged that RA 9155 protected the tenure of BPESS personnel who were not transferred to the PSC. Consequently, the Supreme Court’s analysis shifted from directly addressing the validity of EO 81 and the DECS memoranda to examining the broader implications of executive reorganization powers.

Despite the mootness of the immediate issues, the Supreme Court underscored the significance of the case by addressing the President’s authority to reorganize the Office of the President. Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292 (EO 292), also known as the Administrative Code of 1987, explicitly grants the President continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. Specifically, Section 31(2) and (3) empower the President to transfer functions to the Office of the President from other Departments and Agencies, and vice versa.

“SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office. – The President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. For this purpose, he may take any of the following actions:

(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including the immediate Offices, the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Support System, by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another;

(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of the President from other Departments and Agencies; and

(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other department or agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from other Departments or Agencies.”

The Court clarified that EO 81, resting on the President’s continuing authority under Section 31(2) and (3) of EO 292, was a legitimate exercise of delegated power. The power ensures that the President can adapt the administrative structure of the Office of the President to meet evolving needs and policy objectives. It’s crucial to differentiate between the President’s power to reorganize the Office of the President Proper under Section 31(1) and the broader power to reorganize offices outside the Office of the President but still within the Executive Branch under Section 31(2) and (3).

This distinction carries significant implications for the security of tenure of affected employees. The abolition of an office results in the employee’s cessation in office. However, the transfer of functions ensures their continued employment within the government structure, albeit in a different office or agency. In this case, the BPESS employees who were not transferred to the PSC were reassigned to other offices of the DECS. Furthermore, RA 9155 now mandates that these employees “shall be retained by the Department.”

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The central issue was the validity of Executive Order No. 81, which transferred sports development programs from the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) to the Philippine Sports Commission (PSC), and whether it constituted undue legislation.
Why was the petition ultimately dismissed?	The petition was dismissed as moot and academic because Republic Act No. 9155, the Governance of Basic Education Act of 2001, was enacted during the pendency of the case, which explicitly abolished the BPESS and transferred the DECS’s sports-related functions to the PSC.
What is the basis for the President’s authority to reorganize the Executive Branch?	The President’s authority to reorganize the Executive Branch stems from Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292, also known as the Administrative Code of 1987, which grants the President continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President.
How does the Court distinguish between reorganizing the Office of the President Proper and other offices?	The Court differentiates the President’s power to reorganize the Office of the President Proper under Section 31(1) by abolishing, consolidating, or merging units, from the broader power under Section 31(2) and (3) to transfer functions or agencies to and from the Office of the President.
What happens to employees when an office is abolished or its functions are transferred?	When an office is abolished, the employee’s position ceases, but when functions are transferred, employees are typically reassigned to other offices within the government structure, ensuring their continued employment.
What impact did RA 9155 have on BPESS personnel?	RA 9155 mandated that BPESS personnel not transferred to the PSC would be retained by the Department of Education, thus safeguarding their right to security of tenure.
Was the transfer of functions a violation of security of tenure?	No, the transfer of functions from DECS to PSC did not violate the security of tenure of the employees affected. Reassignments to other offices within DECS or transfer to PSC ensured continued employment within the government structure.
Did the Supreme Court explicitly rule on the constitutionality of EO 81?	While the Supreme Court acknowledged that the issues were moot due to the passage of RA 9155, it nevertheless opined that EO 81 was a valid exercise of the President’s delegated power to reorganize the Office of the President, based on Section 31 of EO 292.

In conclusion, Domingo v. Zamora offers insights into the President’s reorganization powers and the importance of legislative action in shaping governmental structures. The ruling provides a framework for understanding the balance between executive authority and legislative prerogative in directing national policy, particularly in areas like sports development and education.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Domingo v. Zamora, G.R. No. 142283, February 06, 2003