The Supreme Court ruled that a Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) exceeded her authority by issuing a writ of execution and possession while an appeal was pending, thus violating the principles of due process. This decision underscores the importance of adhering to procedural rules within the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) system and safeguards the rights of landowners facing agrarian reform. The court emphasized that execution of a judgment or order should only occur once it has become final and executory, unless specific conditions for execution pending appeal are met. This ruling protects individuals from premature or unlawful dispossession of their properties under agrarian laws.

Agrarian Dispute: When Does an Adjudicator’s Power End?

Rosario Berenguer-Landers and Pablo Berenguer, the complainants, initiated a disbarment complaint against Atty. Isabel E. Florin, Atty. Marcelino Jornales, and Atty. Pedro Vega, the respondents. The Berenguers, registered owners of a 58-hectare land in Sorsogon, faced a notice of coverage from the DAR under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). They protested, seeking exclusion based on their land’s use for livestock, as allowed under DAR regulations. Despite this pending application for exclusion, the DAR Secretary cancelled the Berenguers’ land titles and issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) to members of the Baribag Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Development Cooperative (BARIBAG). Aggrieved, the Berenguers appealed, setting the stage for a legal battle concerning the extent and limits of agrarian reform adjudication.

While the Berenguers’ appeal was pending, BARIBAG petitioned the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) for the implementation of the earlier order. Atty. Florin, acting as RARAD, granted this petition and directed the issuance of a writ of possession, a move that the Berenguers contested, arguing that they had not been properly notified of BARIBAG’s petition. The subsequent denial of their motion for reconsideration and the issuance of the writ of possession propelled the Berenguers to appeal to the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB). Despite this appeal, Atty. Florin proceeded to grant BARIBAG’s motion for the appointment of a special sheriff and ordered the execution of the writ of possession. This series of actions prompted the Berenguers to file multiple petitions for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, ultimately leading to the disbarment complaint against the involved attorneys, alleging conspiracy and unjust actions.

The central issue revolved around whether Atty. Florin, as RARAD, acted with impropriety by issuing a writ of execution and possession while the Berenguers’ appeal was pending before the DAR Secretary. The complainants argued that Atty. Florin knowingly rendered unjust judgments and resolutions, issued orders ex-parte without proper certification of finality, and interfered in lawyer-client relationships. Conversely, Atty. Florin defended her actions by stating that the writ of possession was based on the CLOAs issued by the Register of Deeds, not on a final and executory decision that would necessitate a certification of finality. She also refuted claims of hiding the writ and asserted that her actions were within her authority as RARAD. Attys. Jornales and Vega, in their defense, denied any direct involvement in the issuance of the writ and emphasized the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties as DAR lawyers. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) investigated the matter, leading to a recommendation for Atty. Florin’s suspension, which was later modified by the IBP Board of Governors.

The Supreme Court’s analysis hinged on the principle that a lawyer holding a government office may be disciplined for misconduct if it violates their oath as a lawyer. This principle is vital because it underscores that public servants, particularly lawyers, are held to a higher standard of conduct. This expectation is articulated in Atty. Vitriolo v. Atty. Dasig, where the Court emphasized that a lawyer in public office is a “keeper of the public faith” and bears a heightened degree of social responsibility. In the specific context of agrarian disputes, the Court referenced Section 29 of DAR Administrative Order No. 06-00, which dictates that an appeal to the DAR Secretary stays the order being appealed unless the Secretary directs execution pending appeal. Furthermore, Rule XX of the 2009 Rules of the DARAB specifies that execution can only occur upon a final order or decision, or pending appeal with a sufficient bond posted by the movant.

Applying these principles to the facts, the Court found that Atty. Florin’s actions constituted ignorance of the law. The Court emphasized that the order denying the Berenguers’ application for exclusion from CARP was not final because it was appealed to the DAR Secretary. The Court also found no evidence that BARIBAG had posted a bond as required by the Rules. Therefore, the issuance of the writ of execution and possession was deemed premature and unlawful, directly contravening established legal procedures. The Supreme Court underscored that while judicial officers are not to be disciplined for mere errors of judgment, Atty. Florin’s actions demonstrated a conscious and deliberate intent to cause injustice. The facts indicated that she ordered the issuance of the writs despite the pending appeal, an act that the IBP Commissioner aptly described as improper. The Supreme Court quoted Cabang v. Basay, emphasizing that a writ of execution is issued only after a judgment or order has become final and executory.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court concurred with the IBP’s findings but adjusted the penalty imposed on Atty. Florin. While acknowledging that this was her first administrative offense and that there was no explicit evidence of malice or bad faith, the Court emphasized that her actions still resulted in an injustice to the Berenguers. The Court held that issuing the writ of execution and possession was not simply an error in judgment, but an obstinate disregard of applicable laws and jurisprudence. Citing Rallos v. Judge Gako, Jr., the Court deemed it reasonable to impose a suspension of three months from the practice of law. This penalty was intended to address the gravity of the misconduct while also considering mitigating factors. Regarding Attys. Jornales and Vega, the Court affirmed the IBP’s dismissal of the complaints against them, citing a lack of sufficient evidence to substantiate the charges.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The central issue was whether a Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) could issue a writ of execution and possession while an appeal was pending before the DAR Secretary. This involved questions of procedural compliance and the limits of adjudicative authority.
What was the basis for the disbarment complaint?	The disbarment complaint was based on allegations that Atty. Florin, as RARAD, knowingly rendered unjust judgments, issued orders ex-parte without proper certification, and interfered in lawyer-client relationships. The complainants argued that these actions violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Why did the Supreme Court find Atty. Florin liable?	The Supreme Court found Atty. Florin liable because she issued a writ of execution and possession while the Berenguers’ appeal was pending, which contravened DAR rules and jurisprudence. This demonstrated a disregard for proper legal procedures, warranting disciplinary action.
What is the significance of DAR Administrative Order No. 06-00?	DAR Administrative Order No. 06-00 states that an appeal to the DAR Secretary stays the order being appealed unless the Secretary directs execution pending appeal. This provision was central to the case because it highlighted that Atty. Florin’s actions were premature in light of the pending appeal.
Did the Supreme Court find malice or bad faith on the part of Atty. Florin?	The Supreme Court acknowledged that there was no explicit evidence of malice or bad faith on the part of Atty. Florin. However, the Court emphasized that her actions still resulted in an injustice to the Berenguers, justifying the imposition of a penalty.
What penalty did the Supreme Court impose on Atty. Florin?	The Supreme Court imposed a suspension of three months from the practice of law on Atty. Florin. This penalty was deemed appropriate given the gravity of the misconduct and the need to uphold proper legal procedures within the agrarian reform system.
Why were the complaints against Attys. Jornales and Vega dismissed?	The complaints against Attys. Jornales and Vega were dismissed because there was a lack of sufficient evidence to substantiate the charges against them. The IBP and the Supreme Court found no concrete proof that they had conspired or acted improperly.
What does this case say about the responsibilities of lawyers in government service?	This case underscores that lawyers in government service are held to a higher standard of conduct and must uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times. They are expected to adhere to the Code of Professional Responsibility, regardless of their public office.

This case serves as a crucial reminder of the importance of adhering to established legal procedures, especially within the context of agrarian reform. The Supreme Court’s decision emphasizes that administrative convenience cannot override the fundamental principles of due process and the right to appeal. By suspending Atty. Florin, the Court reinforced the necessity for adjudicators to act within the bounds of their authority, ensuring fairness and justice in agrarian disputes.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Rosario Berenguer-Landers and Pablo Berenguer vs. Atty. Isabel E. Florin, Atty. Marcelino Jornales and Atty. Pedro Vega, A.C. No. 5119, April 17, 2013