The Supreme Court addressed the authority of the Office of the President (OP) to cancel a Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) in Narra Nickel Mining and Development Corporation v. Redmont Consolidated Mines Corporation. The Court ruled that the OP’s act of canceling an FTAA is an administrative function, not a quasi-judicial one, meaning the Court of Appeals (CA) lacked jurisdiction to review the OP’s decision. This distinction is crucial because it clarifies the process and forum for challenging such cancellations, protecting the investments and rights of mining contractors while ensuring adherence to constitutional and legal standards.

Mining Deals Under Scrutiny: Did the Court of Appeals Overstep Its Bounds?

This case arose from a dispute between Narra Nickel Mining and Development Corporation, Tesoro Mining and Development, Inc., and McArthur Mining, Inc. (collectively, “Narra Nickel”), and Redmont Consolidated Mines Corporation. Redmont sought to explore mining areas in Palawan, but discovered that Narra Nickel already held rights to those areas through Mineral Production Sharing Agreements (MPSAs) that were converted into FTAA applications. Redmont then filed petitions to deny Narra Nickel’s MPSA and EP applications, arguing that Narra Nickel was controlled by a 100% Canadian-owned corporation, MBMI Resources, Inc., making them ineligible for mining rights under Philippine law. Simultaneously, Redmont sought the cancellation of the FTAA before the Office of the President (OP), arguing that the agreement was anomalous and irregular.

The OP granted Redmont’s petition, canceling the FTAA, finding that Narra Nickel misrepresented itself as a qualified Filipino corporation. Narra Nickel appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the OP’s decision. The CA held that the OP had the authority to cancel the FTAA due to misrepresentations by Narra Nickel, as per the agreement’s terms. This led Narra Nickel to elevate the issue to the Supreme Court, questioning whether the CA correctly affirmed the OP’s cancellation of the FTAA.

The Supreme Court reversed the CA’s decision, focusing on the critical issue of jurisdiction. The Court emphasized that the CA’s appellate jurisdiction extends only to judgments or final orders of quasi-judicial agencies acting in their quasi-judicial functions. The pivotal question was whether the OP’s cancellation of the FTAA constituted an exercise of quasi-judicial authority. The Court defined quasi-judicial power as the authority of an administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of persons before it, essentially acting in a judicial manner when performing executive or administrative duties. Citing established jurisprudence, the Court highlighted the essence of adjudication as the act of judging, deciding, or settling disputes in a judicial or judicial-like capacity.

“‘Adjudicate‘ as commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, or settle. The dictionary defines the term as ‘to settle finally (the rights and duties of parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: x x x to pass judgment on: settle judicially: x x x act as judge.’”

The Supreme Court held that the OP’s cancellation of the FTAA did not qualify as an adjudication. Instead, it was an administrative action taken by the President, through the OP, to exercise the Republic’s contractual right under the FTAA. The Court emphasized that an FTAA is a contract governed by the same laws and regulations as contracts between private individuals. The power of the President to enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving technical or financial assistance is enshrined in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Since the FTAA is a contract, its terms, conditions, and warranties are subject to negotiation, as provided in Section 36 of RA 7942. It is a public contract that is “generally subject to the same laws and regulations which govern the validity and sufficiency of contracts between private individuals.” Sargasso Construction & Development Corporation v. Philippine Ports Authority, 637 Phil. 259, 277 (2010).

In the landmark case of La Bugal-Oposa Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, the Supreme Court distinguished an FTAA from a mere license. The court clarified that an FTAA involves contract or property rights protected by the due process clause of the Constitution. Therefore, an FTAA cannot be revoked arbitrarily without due regard to the contractor’s investments. An FTAA is significantly different from timber licenses, where the licensee’s investment is not as substantial, emphasizing the financial interests of the contractor party to an FTAA needs fair protection.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court referenced Celestial Nickel Mining Exploration Corporation v. Macroasia Corporation, stating that the DENR Secretary, not the Panel of Arbitrators (POA), has the authority to cancel mineral agreements because the power of the DENR Secretary stems from administrative authority, supervision, management, and control over mineral resources under Section 2, Chapter I, Title XIV of Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. The authority to enter into mineral agreements implies the power to cancel them, as outlined in Sections 8 and 29 of RA 7942. The Court also cited that a petition for the cancellation of an existing mineral agreement based on alleged violations is not a ‘dispute’ involving a mineral agreement under Section 77 (b) of RA 7942.

The Supreme Court found that the OP’s cancellation/revocation was an exercise of a contractual right that is purely administrative in nature. The Court held that it cannot be treated as an adjudication as the OP could not have adjudicated on the matter in which it is an interested party. The ruling also considered the specific procedures for FTAA conversion and cancellation. Section 45 of DENR Administrative Order No. 2010-21 outlines the process for converting an existing mineral agreement, such as an MPSA, into an FTAA, including the requirements for publication and addressing adverse claims, protests, or oppositions. The opposition by Redmont to the FTAA conversion was made beyond the prescribed course of procedure.

Article 1308. The contracts must bind both contracting parties; its validity or compliance cannot be left to the will of one of them.

The Supreme Court also reiterated that the Panel of Arbitrators (POA) has exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear and decide mining disputes as provided in Section 77 of RA 7942. A mining dispute includes disputes involving rights to mining areas, mineral agreements, FTAAs, or permits, and disputes involving surface owners, occupants, and claimholders/concessionaires. However, the Court clarified that the POA’s jurisdiction is limited to mining disputes that raise questions of fact or require the application of technological knowledge and experience, and it does not extend to cases involving the determination of a contract’s validity. The OP canceled/revoked the subject FTAA based on its finding that petitioners misrepresented, inter alia, that they were Filipino corporations qualified to engage in mining activities. The Supreme Court observed that Redmont’s recourse to the OP was outside the correct course procedure since the relevant laws do not authorize the OP to conduct quasi-judicial proceedings involving FTAA cancellation petitions from third parties.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court determined that the CA lacked jurisdiction over the case because the OP’s cancellation of the FTAA was an administrative action, not a quasi-judicial one. As such, the CA’s decision affirming the OP’s cancellation was null and void. This ruling clarifies the scope of appellate jurisdiction in cases involving mining agreements and underscores the importance of adhering to proper legal procedures.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether the Court of Appeals (CA) had jurisdiction to review the Office of the President’s (OP) decision to cancel a Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA).
What did the Supreme Court decide?	The Supreme Court ruled that the CA lacked jurisdiction because the OP’s cancellation of the FTAA was an administrative function, not a quasi-judicial one. Therefore, the CA’s decision was null and void.
What is a Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA)?	An FTAA is a contract involving financial or technical assistance for the large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of mineral resources. It is entered into by the President of the Philippines on behalf of the State.
Is an FTAA considered a contract?	Yes, an FTAA is explicitly characterized as a contract under Section 3(r) of Republic Act No. 7942 (the Philippine Mining Act of 1995). It is treated as a government or public contract, subject to the same laws and regulations as contracts between private individuals.
What is quasi-judicial power?	Quasi-judicial power is the authority of an administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of persons before it. It involves performing acts that are essentially executive or administrative in nature but are carried out in a judicial manner.
What is the role of the Panel of Arbitrators (POA) in mining disputes?	The Panel of Arbitrators (POA) has exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear and decide mining disputes, including those involving rights to mining areas, mineral agreements, FTAAs, and disputes between surface owners and claimholders. However, the POA’s jurisdiction is limited to factual and technical issues, not legal questions.
Can a third party question the validity of an FTAA?	According to the ruling, the proper procedure for questioning the validity of an FTAA usually involves commencing a case before the ordinary courts of law, particularly if the issue involves misrepresentation or fraud. The Supreme Court emphasized that third parties like Redmont do not have standing to directly petition the OP for FTAA cancellation outside the established procedures.
Does the OP have the power to cancel an FTAA?	The Supreme Court clarified that the Office of the President (OP) can cancel an FTAA, but it must be done according to contractual rights and administrative functions, rather than as a quasi-judicial adjudication. This means that any cancellation must be based on a breach of contract or other legal grounds, not on the OP’s discretion.

This Supreme Court decision offers essential guidance on the scope of executive authority in mining agreements. By clarifying that the OP’s cancellation of an FTAA is an administrative, not quasi-judicial, act, the Court has outlined the boundaries of power. This delineation ensures adherence to due process and contractual rights, promoting stability and fairness in the mining sector.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: NARRA NICKEL MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS. REDMONT CONSOLIDATED MINES CORPORATION, G.R. No. 202877, December 09, 2015