The Supreme Court declared Department of Justice (DOJ) Circular No. 41 unconstitutional, affirming the primacy of the right to travel. The Court held that the DOJ overstepped its authority by issuing the circular, which allowed the DOJ Secretary to issue Hold Departure Orders (HDOs) and Watchlist Orders (WLOs), thereby restricting individuals’ freedom of movement without a sufficient legal basis. This decision underscores the importance of protecting constitutional rights against administrative actions that lack explicit legislative authorization, ensuring that restrictions on fundamental freedoms are grounded in law and not merely in administrative discretion. This safeguards individual liberties against potential governmental overreach, reinforcing the principle that freedom to travel can only be impaired under specific conditions defined by law.

The Right to Roam: When DOJ’s Watchlist Authority Tramples Constitutional Boundaries

The cases of Efraim C. Genuino, et al. v. Hon. Leila M. De Lima, et al. and Ma. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo v. Hon. Leila M. De Lima, et al. revolved around the constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 41, which consolidated rules for issuing HDOs, WLOs, and Allow Departure Orders (ADOs). Petitioners, including former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and her family, challenged the circular after being subjected to travel restrictions based on pending criminal complaints. The central legal question was whether the DOJ had the authority to issue such a circular, effectively restricting the constitutional right to travel without explicit statutory authorization.

The Supreme Court, in resolving these consolidated petitions, emphasized the fundamental nature of the right to travel as enshrined in the Philippine Constitution. Citing Section 6, Article III, the Court noted that while the right to travel is not absolute, its impairment is strictly limited to instances involving national security, public safety, or public health, and only when provided by law. The Court stressed that liberty is the rule, and restraint is the exception, thus requiring any restrictions on fundamental liberties to be heavily guarded against unreasonable interference.

The Court scrutinized the DOJ’s claim that DOJ Circular No. 41 was validly issued under its rule-making powers as outlined in Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292, also known as the Administrative Code of 1987. It found that the cited provisions did not explicitly authorize the DOJ to curtail the right to travel through the issuance of WLOs and HDOs. The Court emphasized that administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative powers only within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers.

Furthermore, the Court highlighted that even with a valid delegation of legislative power, the delegation must be complete in itself, setting forth the policy to be executed, and must fix a standard that sufficiently determines the limits to which the delegate must conform. The provisions relied upon by the DOJ, Sections 1 and 3, Book IV, Title III, Chapter 1 of E.O. No. 292, were deemed too general to justify the restriction of a fundamental right. Specifically, the Court noted that Section 1 is merely a declaration of policy, while Section 3 outlines broad powers and functions of the DOJ without explicitly granting the authority to restrict travel.

“Succinctly, a declaration of policy contained in a statute is, like a preamble, not a part of the substantive portions of the act. Such provisions are available for clarification of ambiguous substantive portions of the act, but may not be used to create ambiguity in other substantive provisions.”

The Court further clarified that the issuance of HDOs and WLOs does not fall under the inherent power of the executive department. Thus, an existing law, complete and sufficient in itself, must expressly authorize the concerned agency to promulgate rules. The DOJ’s reliance on police power was also rejected, as this power primarily belongs to the legislature and can only be exercised by the Executive or administrative boards by virtue of valid delegation. The Court stated that even with the best intentions, the DOJ cannot sacrifice individual liberties because of a perceived good. The DOJ’s contention that the resulting infringement of liberty is merely incidental was deemed insufficient to legitimize a desecration of a fundamental right.

Moreover, the Court found DOJ Circular No. 41 to be vague and overbroad, particularly regarding the distinction between HDOs and WLOs, which violated the due process clause. The circular’s language did not provide fair notice of the conduct to avoid, leaving law enforcers with unbridled discretion. Additionally, the DOJ had assumed powers that were not conferred to it by attempting to supplement issuances of the Supreme Court concerning HDOs. The Court pointed out that Circular No. 39-97 intentionally limited the issuance of HDOs to criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC to balance the state’s interest in prosecution and the individual’s right to travel.

“That there is a risk of flight does not authorize the DOJ to take the situation upon itself and draft an administrative issuance to keep the individual within the Philippine jurisdiction so that he may not be able to evade criminal prosecution and consequent liability. It is an arrogation of power it does not have; it is a usurpation of function that properly belongs to the legislature.”

In summary, the Supreme Court declared DOJ Circular No. 41 unconstitutional, emphasizing that the right to travel can only be impaired in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as provided by law. The decision reinforces the principle that administrative issuances cannot unduly restrict constitutional rights without explicit statutory authorization, safeguarding individual liberties against potential governmental overreach. While it understood the government’s concern, the Court firmly stated that the Executive branch must act within legal and constitutional boundaries.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether the Department of Justice (DOJ) had the authority to issue DOJ Circular No. 41, which allowed the restriction of an individual’s right to travel through Hold Departure Orders (HDOs) and Watchlist Orders (WLOs). The petitioners argued that the circular was unconstitutional.
What did the Supreme Court decide?	The Supreme Court declared DOJ Circular No. 41 unconstitutional. The Court held that the circular lacked a sufficient legal basis and infringed upon the constitutional right to travel.
What is the constitutional basis for the right to travel?	The right to travel is guaranteed under Section 6, Article III of the Philippine Constitution. This provision states that the right to travel shall not be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
Can the right to travel be restricted?	Yes, the right to travel can be restricted, but only under specific circumstances outlined in the Constitution and by law. These circumstances include national security, public safety, or public health.
What is a Hold Departure Order (HDO)?	A Hold Departure Order (HDO) is an order issued by a court or other competent authority that prevents a person from leaving a country. It aims to ensure that the individual remains within the jurisdiction for legal proceedings.
What is a Watchlist Order (WLO)?	A Watchlist Order (WLO) is an order directing immigration authorities to monitor and prevent the departure of an individual. It is often used when there are concerns that the person may attempt to evade legal proceedings or investigations.
Why was DOJ Circular No. 41 deemed unconstitutional?	DOJ Circular No. 41 was deemed unconstitutional because it allowed the DOJ to restrict the right to travel without a sufficient legal basis. The circular overstepped its authority and infringed upon a constitutionally protected right.
What are the implications of this ruling?	This ruling reinforces the importance of protecting constitutional rights against administrative overreach. It clarifies that restrictions on fundamental freedoms must be grounded in law and not merely in administrative discretion.
What recourse does the government have to prevent suspected criminals from fleeing the country?	As clarified in Justice Carpio’s Separate Concurring Opinion, the government may cancel passports in cases of crimes against national security or public safety and may also apply for precautionary warrants of arrest.

This landmark decision safeguards the constitutional right to travel, preventing administrative bodies from unduly restricting this freedom without proper legal authorization. By affirming the primacy of constitutional rights, the Supreme Court has set a clear boundary for governmental actions affecting individual liberties. While the state has legitimate interests in law enforcement and public safety, these interests must be pursued within the bounds of the law, respecting the fundamental rights that underpin a democratic society.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Genuino v. De Lima, G.R. No. 197930, April 17, 2018