The Supreme Court has affirmed that a co-owner cannot mortgage an entire property without the consent of all other co-owners, limiting the mortgage to their proportionate share. This ruling protects the rights of co-heirs to inherited property and ensures that a mortgage by one heir does not automatically encumber the entire inheritance. This decision reinforces the principle that no one can give what they do not have, preserving the interests of rightful owners against unauthorized transactions.

Inheritance Divided: Can One Heir Mortgage All?

This case revolves around a parcel of land in Manjuyod, Negros Oriental, originally owned by Edras Nufable. Upon his death, the land was bequeathed to his four children: Angel Custodio, Generosa, Vilfor, and Marcelo. The crux of the issue arose when Angel Custodio, one of the heirs, mortgaged the entire property to the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) without the consent of his siblings. This mortgage led to foreclosure, and eventually, Angel’s son, Nelson Nufable, purchased the property from DBP. Generosa, Vilfor, and Marcelo then filed a complaint to annul the transaction, claiming their rights as co-owners were violated. The central legal question is whether Angel Custodio had the right to mortgage the entire property, thereby affecting the rights of his co-heirs.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, recognizing Generosa, Vilfor, and Marcelo as rightful co-owners of the property. Petitioners challenged the appellate court’s decision, arguing that the probate of Esdras Nufable’s will was not controlling and that DBP’s ownership, from whom Nelson Nufable acquired the land, should first be nullified. The Supreme Court emphasized that while probate proceedings generally focus on the extrinsic validity of a will, the agreement among the heirs regarding the disposition of their shares was crucial in this case. The agreement, approved by the probate court, stipulated that the land would remain undivided under co-ownership, respecting the conditions in the will.

Central to the Court’s decision is the principle of successional rights, which, according to Article 777 of the Civil Code, are transmitted from the moment of the decedent’s death. Therefore, when Angel Nufable mortgaged the property, his siblings already possessed rights to their respective shares. The will of Esdras Nufable explicitly stated that the property should remain undivided, further restricting Angel’s ability to mortgage the entire land. According to Article 870 of the Civil Code, such restrictions on division are valid only up to twenty years.

The Supreme Court underscored that Angel Nufable only had the right to mortgage his ¼ pro indiviso share. As a co-owner, his ability to sell, assign, or mortgage was limited to his portion upon termination of the co-ownership. Quoting established jurisprudence, the Court reiterated that “a co-owner can only alienate his pro indiviso share in the co-owned property.”

“Article 493 of the Civil Code spells out the rights of co-owners over a co-owned property. Pursuant to said Article, a co-owner shall have full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto. He has the right to alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment. As a mere part owner, he cannot alienate the shares of the other co-owners. The prohibition is premised on the elementary rule that ‘no one can give what he does not have.’”

Furthermore, the Court noted the respondents’ lack of awareness and consent regarding the mortgage, reinforcing the principle that a co-owner does not lose their share when another co-owner mortgages the property without their knowledge. The Deed of Sale dated June 17, 1966, executed by Angel and Aquilina Nufable in favor of Generosa, Vilfor, and Marcelo, selling back the ¾ portion of the property, further supports the claim of co-ownership. This deed was acknowledged by Nelson Nufable, strengthening the argument for co-ownership rights.

The petitioners argued that DBP acquired ownership through foreclosure and consolidation, and therefore, any challenge to the property should be directed at DBP. The Supreme Court clarified that Angel Custodio could only mortgage his ¼ pro indiviso share. Foreclosure and sale can only transmit the title if the seller possesses the ability to convey ownership. Thus, the remaining ¾ pro indiviso share was held in trust for Generosa, Vilfor, and Marcelo.

Moreover, the Court cited Article 1451 of the Civil Code, stating that a trust is established when inherited land is titled in another’s name, benefiting the true owner. Article 1456 further reinforces this by stating that property acquired through mistake or fraud is held in trust for the person from whom it came. Thus, DBP, as the winning bidder, held the ¾ portion in trust for the private respondents, and Nelson, upon purchasing the property, merely stepped into DBP’s shoes, acquiring the associated rights and obligations. As the Supreme Court emphasized in Noel vs. Court of Appeals, a buyer at public auction acquires only the interest corresponding to the share of the judgment debtor, with the remaining portion impressed with a constructive trust for the benefit of the other heirs.

The Court then addressed the issue of whether DBP should have been impleaded as a party-defendant. The Court noted that because the legality of the foreclosure and subsequent sale to DBP was not in question, and DBP had already transferred its rights and obligations to Nelson, DBP was not an indispensable party. This means that a resolution could be achieved without DBP’s presence. An indispensable party is one whose interest is such that a final decree cannot be made without affecting that interest or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The central issue was whether a co-owner could mortgage an entire property without the consent of the other co-owners, thereby affecting their rights.
What does “pro indiviso” mean?	“Pro indiviso” refers to an undivided share in a co-owned property. Each co-owner has a right to a portion of the whole, but the property isn’t physically divided.
What is the significance of Article 777 of the Civil Code?	Article 777 states that rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of the decedent’s death, meaning the heirs’ rights are established immediately upon the death of the property owner.
Can a co-owner sell their share of a co-owned property?	Yes, a co-owner can sell, assign, or mortgage their pro indiviso share. However, they cannot alienate the shares of the other co-owners.
What happens if a co-owner mortgages the entire property without consent?	The mortgage is only valid to the extent of the mortgaging co-owner’s share. The shares of the non-consenting co-owners are not affected.
What is a constructive trust?	A constructive trust is created by law to prevent unjust enrichment. In this case, it meant that DBP held the portion of the property exceeding Angel Nufable’s share in trust for the other heirs.
Was DBP required to be a party in the case?	No, DBP was not an indispensable party because the legality of the foreclosure was not being questioned, and DBP had already transferred its rights to Nelson Nufable.
What is the effect of registering property under one co-owner’s name?	Registration does not automatically grant ownership. The property is still subject to the rights of all co-owners.
What if the co-owners were not aware of the mortgage?	A co-owner does not lose his part ownership of a co-owned property when his share is mortgaged by another co-owner without the former’s knowledge and consent.

The Supreme Court’s decision reinforces the importance of protecting the rights of co-owners, particularly in inherited properties. It clarifies that individual actions cannot undermine the established rights of other co-heirs, safeguarding the integrity of co-ownership arrangements.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Nelson Nufable, et al. vs. Generosa Nufable, et al., G.R. No. 126950, July 2, 1999