The Supreme Court clarified the admissibility of evidence in partnership disputes when one partner is deceased. The Court ruled that the “Dead Man’s Statute” does not bar testimony from the surviving partner or their witnesses under specific circumstances, particularly when the deceased’s estate files a counterclaim. This decision affirms that verbal partnership agreements can be legally recognized, and it outlines the conditions under which evidence can be presented to prove such agreements even after a partner’s death. This has significant implications for business relationships and estate settlements, ensuring that legitimate partnership claims are not automatically dismissed due to the death of a partner.

Proving Partnership: Can Verbal Agreements Stand the Test of Death?

This case revolves around a dispute over the existence of a partnership between Lamberto T. Chua (respondent) and the deceased Jacinto L. Sunga. Chua claimed that he and Sunga had verbally agreed to a partnership in 1977 for the distribution of Shellane Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG), operating under the business name SHELLITE GAS APPLIANCE CENTER, registered solely under Sunga’s name. After Sunga’s death, his wife, Cecilia Sunga, and daughter, Lilibeth Sunga-Chan (petitioners), took over the business. Chua sought an accounting, appraisal, and recovery of his shares, leading to a legal battle where the petitioners contested the existence of the partnership and invoked the “Dead Man’s Statute” to exclude Chua’s testimony.

The central legal question is whether the testimony of the surviving partner and his witnesses is admissible to prove the existence of a verbal partnership agreement after the death of one of the partners, and if the “Dead Man’s Statute” bars such testimony. The petitioners relied heavily on the “Dead Man’s Statute,” arguing that Chua’s testimony and that of his witness, Josephine, should not be admitted to prove claims against the deceased, Jacinto. They contended that, in the absence of a written partnership agreement, the court should not have considered testimonies presented three years after Jacinto’s death. This argument was aimed at preventing Chua from substantiating his claim of a partnership with the deceased, thereby protecting the estate from potential liabilities.

However, the Supreme Court disagreed with the petitioners’ interpretation and application of the “Dead Man’s Statute.” The Court emphasized that a partnership can be constituted in any form, provided that immovable property or real rights are not contributed; in such cases, a public instrument is necessary. The critical elements to establish a partnership are mutual contribution to a common stock and a joint interest in the profits. In this context, the absence of a written agreement necessitated the presentation of documentary and testimonial evidence by Chua to prove the partnership’s existence. The Court then addressed the applicability of the “Dead Man’s Statute,” which, under Section 23, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, typically disqualifies parties from testifying about facts occurring before the death of an adverse party.

The Court outlined the four conditions necessary for the successful invocation of the “Dead Man’s Statute.” These conditions include that the witness is a party to the case, the action is against a representative of the deceased, the subject matter is a claim against the estate, and the testimony relates to facts occurring before the death. The Supreme Court identified two primary reasons why the “Dead Man’s Statute” did not apply in this specific case. First, the petitioners filed a compulsory counterclaim against Chua in their answer before the trial court. This act effectively removed the case from the scope of the “Dead Man’s Statute” because when the estate’s representatives initiate the counterclaim, the opposing party is allowed to testify about events before the death to counter said claim. As the defendant in the counterclaim, Chua was not barred from testifying about facts predating Jacinto’s death, as the action was initiated not against, but by, the estate.

Second, the testimony of Josephine was not covered by the “Dead Man’s Statute” because she was not a party or assignor of a party to the case. Although Josephine testified to establish the partnership between Chua and Jacinto, she was merely a witness for Chua, who was the plaintiff. The Court also addressed the petitioners’ contention that Josephine’s testimony lacked probative value due to alleged coercion by Chua, her brother-in-law. The Court found no basis to conclude that Josephine’s testimony was involuntary, and the fact that she was related to Chua’s wife did not diminish her credibility as a witness. The Court reiterated that relationship alone, without additional factors, does not affect a witness’s credibility.

Building on this, the Court affirmed the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that a partnership existed between Chua and Jacinto. This determination was based not only on testimonial evidence but also on documentary evidence presented by Chua. The Court highlighted that the petitioners failed to present any evidence in their favor during the trial, reinforcing the strength of Chua’s case. Moreover, the petitioners did not object to the admissibility of Chua’s documentary evidence during the trial, precluding them from later challenging its admissibility and authenticity on appeal. The Court emphasized that factual findings, such as the existence of a partnership, are generally not subject to review by the Supreme Court.

Addressing the petitioners’ claim that laches or prescription should have extinguished Chua’s claim, the Court agreed with the lower courts that Chua’s action for accounting was filed within the prescribed period. The Civil Code provides a six-year prescriptive period for actions based on oral contracts. Furthermore, the right to demand an accounting of a partner’s interest accrues at the date of dissolution, unless otherwise agreed. Since the death of a partner dissolves the partnership, Chua had the right to an account of his interest against the petitioners following Jacinto’s death. While Jacinto’s death dissolved the partnership, the legal personality of the partnership continued until the winding up of its business was completed.

Finally, the petitioners argued that the partnership, with an initial capital of P200,000.00, should have been registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as required by the Civil Code. The Court acknowledged that Article 1772 of the Civil Code mandates registration for partnerships with a capital of P3,000.00 or more. However, it clarified that this registration requirement is not mandatory and that failure to register does not invalidate the partnership. Article 1768 of the Civil Code explicitly states that the partnership retains its juridical personality even without registration. The primary purpose of registration is to provide notice to third parties, and the members of the partnership are presumed to be aware of the contract’s contents. Therefore, the non-compliance with this directory provision did not invalidate the partnership between Chua and Jacinto.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether a partnership existed between the respondent and the deceased, and whether the respondent could present evidence to prove this partnership despite the “Dead Man’s Statute.”
What is the Dead Man’s Statute?	The Dead Man’s Statute generally prevents a party from testifying about transactions with a deceased person if the testimony would be against the deceased’s interests, aiming to prevent fraudulent claims.
Why didn’t the Dead Man’s Statute apply in this case?	The statute didn’t apply because the petitioners filed a compulsory counterclaim, opening the door for the respondent to testify, and because a key witness was not a direct party to the case.
Is a written partnership agreement required for a partnership to be valid?	No, a written agreement is not always required. A verbal agreement can establish a partnership, especially if there’s evidence of mutual contribution and profit-sharing.
What happens when a partner in a partnership dies?	The death of a partner dissolves the partnership, but the partnership continues to exist until its affairs are wound up, including accounting and distribution of assets.
Does a partnership need to be registered with the SEC to be valid?	While registration is required for partnerships with capital over a certain amount, failure to register does not invalidate the partnership itself, mainly affecting its standing with third parties.
What evidence can be used to prove a verbal partnership agreement?	Evidence can include testimonies from witnesses, financial records showing contributions, and any documents indicating profit-sharing arrangements.
What is a compulsory counterclaim, and how did it affect this case?	A compulsory counterclaim is a claim a defendant must raise in response to a plaintiff’s claim. In this case, it allowed the plaintiff to present evidence that would otherwise be barred by the Dead Man’s Statute.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in this case clarifies the circumstances under which a partnership can be established and proven, even after the death of one of the partners. The ruling provides important guidelines on the admissibility of evidence and the application of the “Dead Man’s Statute,” ensuring fairness and equity in resolving partnership disputes. This decision underscores the importance of clear and documented agreements but also recognizes the validity of verbal partnerships when sufficient evidence exists.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Lilibeth Sunga-Chan and Cecilia Sunga vs. Lamberto T. Chua, G.R. No. 143340, August 15, 2001