In Spouses Mamaril vs. Boy Scout of the Philippines, the Supreme Court clarified that property owners aren’t automatically liable for vehicle losses on their premises, even with security. The ruling emphasizes that negligence must be directly attributable to the property owner, and contractual obligations don’t automatically extend to third parties. This means businesses providing parking spaces aren’t insurers; liability rests on proving their direct negligence, shifting responsibility to negligent security services and their employees.

Who Pays When a Parked Car Goes Missing? Tracing Liability in the BSP Case

The case revolves around Spouses Benjamin and Sonia Mamaril, who had been parking their jeepneys at the Boy Scout of the Philippines (BSP) compound in Manila for a monthly fee. One morning, one of their vehicles was missing. The security guards on duty, employed by AIB Security Agency, Inc. (AIB), admitted that they allowed someone familiar to them to drive the jeepney out of the compound. The spouses Mamaril filed a complaint for damages against BSP, AIB, and the security guards, Cesario Peña and Vicente Gaddi, arguing that the loss was due to the guards’ negligence. The central legal question is: Who is liable for the loss of the vehicle – the security agency, the security guards, or the Boy Scout of the Philippines, on whose property the vehicle was parked?

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) initially ruled in favor of the spouses Mamaril, holding BSP, AIB, and the security guards jointly and severally liable. The RTC reasoned that the security guards’ negligence, combined with the Guard Service Contract between BSP and AIB, extended protection to all properties within the BSP premises. However, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed this decision concerning BSP, finding that the Guard Service Contract was solely between BSP and AIB, and there was no evidence of negligence on the part of BSP itself. The CA also characterized the agreement between the spouses Mamaril and BSP as a contract of lease, where BSP provided parking slots but wasn’t responsible for insuring the vehicles.

The Supreme Court upheld the CA’s decision, emphasizing that liability for negligence rests on proving a direct causal link between the act or omission and the resulting damage. Article 20 of the Civil Code states that every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same. Similarly, Article 2176 provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.

In this case, the Supreme Court agreed that the proximate cause of the vehicle’s loss was the negligence of the security guards, Peña and Gaddi. As the Court noted, “Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury or loss, and without which the result would not have occurred.” The security guards failed to properly verify the identity and authorization of the person who drove the vehicle away, directly leading to the loss. However, the Court found no evidence of negligence on the part of BSP itself.

The Court also addressed the issue of vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which holds employers liable for the acts of their employees. However, the security guards were employees of AIB, not BSP. The Court cited the case of Soliman, Jr. v. Tuazon, emphasizing that the security agency, not the client, is the employer of the security guards. As a general rule, a client or customer of a security agency has no hand in selecting who among the pool of security guards or watchmen employed by the agency shall be assigned to it; the duty to observe the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of the guards cannot, in the ordinary course of events, be demanded from the client whose premises or property are protected by the security guards.

The spouses Mamaril argued that BSP should be held liable based on the Guard Service Contract between BSP and AIB, claiming that it constituted a stipulation pour autrui – a stipulation in favor of a third person. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, citing Article 1311 of the Civil Code, which states that contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns, and heirs, except in cases where the contract contains a stipulation in favor of a third person. The Court emphasized that for a third person to benefit from such a stipulation, several requisites must be met, including a clear and deliberate conferment of a favor, which was absent in this case. The Court stated that “[i]t is undisputed that Sps. Mamaril are not parties to the Guard Service Contract. Neither did the subject agreement contain any stipulation pour autrui. And even if there was, Sps. Mamaril did not convey any acceptance thereof. Thus, under the principle of relativity of contracts, they cannot validly claim any rights or favor under the said agreement.”

Furthermore, the Supreme Court agreed with the CA’s assessment that the agreement between the spouses Mamaril and BSP was a contract of lease, where BSP provided parking space in exchange for a fee. Under Article 1654 of the Civil Code, the lessor is obliged to deliver the thing which is the object of the contract in such a condition as to render it fit for the use intended; to make on the same during the lease all the necessary repairs in order to keep it suitable for the use to which it has been devoted, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary; and to maintain the lessee in the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease for the entire duration of the contract. BSP fulfilled its obligations by providing a parking space and hiring security guards. The loss was due to the negligence of the security guards, for which BSP could not be held directly liable.

Finally, the Court addressed the exculpatory clause in the parking ticket, which stated that the “Management shall not be responsible for loss of vehicle or any of its accessories or article left therein.” The Court acknowledged that contracts of adhesion are not void per se, and the spouses Mamaril, having accepted the terms of the parking arrangement for an extended period, were bound by the clause. Additionally, the minimal parking fee did not imply that BSP was undertaking to insure the safety of the vehicles. This case underscores the importance of carefully reviewing the terms and conditions of parking agreements and understanding the limitations of liability.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was determining who was liable for the loss of a vehicle parked at the Boy Scout of the Philippines (BSP) compound: the BSP, the security agency (AIB), or the security guards.
Why was the Boy Scout of the Philippines (BSP) initially held liable?	The Regional Trial Court (RTC) initially held BSP liable because of the Guard Service Contract with AIB and the belief that it extended protection to all properties on the premises.
On what grounds was BSP absolved from liability by the Court of Appeals (CA)?	The CA absolved BSP because the Guard Service Contract was purely between BSP and AIB, with no indication of liability to third parties like the vehicle owners, and there was no evidence of negligence by BSP.
How did the Supreme Court characterize the agreement between the vehicle owners and BSP?	The Supreme Court agreed with the CA that the agreement was a contract of lease, where BSP provided parking space in exchange for a fee but was not an insurer of the vehicles.
What is a stipulation pour autrui, and why didn’t it apply in this case?	A stipulation pour autrui is a stipulation in a contract that benefits a third party. It didn’t apply here because the Guard Service Contract didn’t clearly and deliberately confer a favor on the vehicle owners, and they didn’t express acceptance of any such benefit.
Why wasn’t the principle of vicarious liability applied to BSP?	Vicarious liability, where an employer is liable for the acts of employees, didn’t apply because the security guards were employees of AIB Security Agency, not of BSP.
What was the effect of the exculpatory clause in the parking ticket?	The exculpatory clause, stating that the management wasn’t responsible for loss, was upheld because the agreement was a contract of adhesion accepted by the vehicle owners, and the parking fee didn’t imply insurance coverage.
Who was ultimately held liable for the loss of the vehicle?	The security guards and their employer, AIB Security Agency, were ultimately held liable due to the guards’ negligence in allowing an unauthorized person to drive the vehicle away.

This case serves as a reminder that liability for negligence hinges on establishing a direct causal link and that contractual obligations don’t automatically extend to third parties. Property owners who hire security services are not automatically liable for losses occurring on their premises unless they are directly negligent. The primary responsibility rests with the negligent parties and their employers.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Spouses Benjamin C. Mamaril and Sonia P. Mamaril, Petitioners, vs. The Boy Scout of the Philippines, AIB Security Agency, Inc., Cesario Peña, and Vicente Gaddi, G.R. No. 179382, January 14, 2013