In the Philippines, a buyer in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is generally entitled to a writ of possession as a matter of right, reflecting the ministerial duty of the court. This entitlement arises after the consolidation of ownership, which occurs if no redemption is made within one year from the registration of the sale. However, this seemingly straightforward process encounters a significant exception: the presence of a third party holding the property adversely to the debtor/mortgagor. The Supreme Court, in this case, clarifies the extent to which courts must investigate such adverse claims before issuing a writ of possession, balancing the rights of the mortgagee with those of third-party possessors.

Darcen Heirs vs. Gonzales Credit: When Does a Claim Disrupt a Writ of Possession?

The case revolves around a dispute over properties mortgaged by Flora de Guzman, now deceased, to V. R. Gonzales Credit Enterprises, Inc. Flora had obtained loans secured by these properties after they were registered solely in her name. Subsequently, upon Flora’s failure to pay, the properties were foreclosed, and V. R. Gonzales Credit Enterprises sought a writ of possession. The Darcen heirs, children of Flora and Mamerto Darcen, opposed the writ, claiming that their mother’s signatures on the mortgage contracts were forged. They also asserted rights as co-owners through their deceased father’s estate, arguing that an earlier Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Waiver, which transferred ownership solely to Flora, contained forged signatures of the heirs.

The central question before the Supreme Court was whether the Darcen heirs qualified as adverse third-party claimants whose possession would prevent the issuance of a writ of possession. Petitioners argued that, as heirs with claims to the property predating the mortgage, their adverse claim should have prevented the ministerial duty of the court to issue the writ. They heavily relied on the principle that a writ of possession ceases to be ministerial when a third party holds the property under a claim adverse to that of the debtor/mortgagor, citing previous jurisprudence that supported this view.

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, underscoring that not every third-party possession disrupts the issuance of a writ of possession. To qualify as an exception, the possession must be truly adverse to the debtor/mortgagor. This adversity, according to the Court, involves a claim of ownership or right independent of the mortgagor. The Court emphasized that an opportunity was granted to the petitioners to present their claims of adverse possession during the hearing set by the RTC. However, they failed to submit pertinent documents, such as the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Waiver, to substantiate their assertions of forgery and co-ownership.

Furthermore, the Court pointed out that the petitioners had previously annotated their hereditary claim on the titles issued to Flora, which indicated their awareness and implicit consent to the extrajudicial settlement. This annotation, far from asserting adverse possession, acknowledged Flora’s title while protecting their potential claims against the estate, as provided under Section 4 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. Thus, these actions undermined their argument that they were unaware of or opposed to Flora’s sole ownership.

The Supreme Court cited China Banking Corporation v. Lozada, clarifying the meaning of a “third party who is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor.” The Court stated:

Where a parcel levied upon on execution is occupied by a party other than a judgment debtor, the procedure is for the court to order a hearing to determine the nature of said adverse possession. Similarly, in an extrajudicial foreclosure of real property, when the foreclosed property is in the possession of a third party holding the same adversely to the defaulting debtor/mortgagor, the issuance by the RTC of a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser of the said real property ceases to be ministerial and may no longer be done ex parte. For the exception to apply, however, the property need not only be possessed by a third party, but also held by the third party adversely to the debtor/mortgagor.

The Court highlighted that the RTC’s decision to grant the writ of possession was primarily influenced by the certificates of title being exclusively in Flora’s name. Despite the heirs claiming forgery of their mother’s signature in the mortgage contracts, they had delayed challenging the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Waiver until after the foreclosure threats. Moreover, they had allowed Flora to secure substantial loans using the properties as collateral, indicating a degree of acquiescence. The Court also noted the annotation on the new titles issued to Flora, which referenced potential claims against Mamerto Darcen’s estate under Section 4 of Rule 74. This indicated the petitioners’ awareness and implicit consent to Flora’s acquisition of the properties, further weakening their claim of adverse possession.

The Supreme Court emphasized that the petitioners were given due process. The RTC scheduled a hearing to assess the nature of their claimed adverse possession, allowing them to present evidence and arguments. Despite this opportunity, they failed to provide sufficient documentation to support their claims, relying instead on bare assertions of forgery and co-ownership. The Court found that the totality of circumstances—including the title being in Flora’s name, the petitioners’ delayed challenge to the extrajudicial settlement, their annotation of claims on the title, and their failure to present key documents during the hearing—did not establish a genuine adverse claim that would override the mortgagee’s right to a writ of possession.

Finally, the Court addressed the mootness of the petition due to the writ of possession already being served and executed. By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the Darcen heirs had been evicted from the properties, and the respondent company had been placed in possession. Given these developments, the Court deemed any declaration on the matter would be of no practical value, especially considering the pending appeal in the CA regarding the validity of the mortgages and ownership of the lots. The Court clarified that any restoration to possession could be sought in the pending appeal in Civil Case No. 333-M-2007, if justified.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether the Darcen heirs qualified as adverse third-party claimants whose possession would prevent the issuance of a writ of possession to V. R. Gonzales Credit Enterprises, Inc.
What is a writ of possession?	A writ of possession is a court order directing the sheriff to place someone in possession of a property. In extrajudicial foreclosures, it is typically issued to the winning bidder after the redemption period expires and ownership is consolidated.
When is the issuance of a writ of possession considered ministerial?	The issuance of a writ of possession is ministerial when the purchaser has consolidated ownership of the foreclosed property, and there are no adverse third-party claimants. In such cases, the court has a duty to issue the writ as a matter of course.
What is an adverse third-party claim?	An adverse third-party claim exists when someone other than the debtor/mortgagor possesses the property under a claim of ownership or a right independent of the mortgagor. This claim must be genuinely adverse to the debtor/mortgagor’s interests.
What happens when there is an adverse third-party claim?	When an adverse third-party claim is raised, the court must conduct a hearing to determine the nature of the possession. If the claim is genuinely adverse, the issuance of the writ of possession ceases to be ministerial.
What evidence did the Darcen heirs fail to provide?	The Darcen heirs failed to provide the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Waiver, which they claimed contained forged signatures, to support their claim of co-ownership.
Why was the annotation on the title significant?	The annotation on the title, referencing potential claims against Mamerto Darcen’s estate, indicated the heirs’ awareness and implicit consent to Flora’s acquisition of the properties, weakening their claim of adverse possession.
What was the outcome of the case?	The Supreme Court denied the petition, upholding the issuance of the writ of possession. It emphasized that the Darcen heirs did not sufficiently establish their adverse claim and that the writ had already been executed, rendering the issue moot.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Darcen v. V. R. Gonzales Credit Enterprises, Inc. underscores the balancing act courts must perform when evaluating petitions for writs of possession. While the right of a mortgagee who has consolidated ownership is generally protected, the presence of adverse third-party claims necessitates a careful inquiry. This case serves as a reminder that third-party claims must be substantiated with credible evidence and demonstrate genuine adversity to the debtor/mortgagor’s interest to disrupt the ministerial duty of issuing a writ of possession.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Teodoro Darcen, et al. vs. V. R. Gonzales Credit Enterprises, Inc., G.R. No. 199747, April 03, 2013