In the Philippines, a purchaser in a foreclosure sale is generally entitled to possession of the foreclosed property after the redemption period expires. However, this right is not absolute. If a third party is in possession of the property, and their claim is adverse to that of the mortgagor (the original borrower), the court must first determine the nature of that possession. This determination is crucial to ensure the writ of possession is enforced only against properties rightfully belonging to the debtor. The Supreme Court’s decision clarifies that not all third-party possessions are considered adverse, particularly if the third party’s claim is derived from or connected to the mortgagor’s rights. This protects the integrity of land titles and ensures that mortgagees can enforce their rights without being unduly hindered by dubious or related claims.

Foreclosure Impasse: Can a Tenant Block a Bank’s Right to Possess Foreclosed Property?

This case involves a dispute over nineteen parcels of land in San Juan, Metro Manila, originally owned by Kwong-on Trading Corporation (KTC). KTC mortgaged these properties to Planters Development Bank (Plantersbank) to secure a loan. When KTC defaulted, Plantersbank foreclosed the mortgage and became the highest bidder at the auction sale. After KTC failed to redeem the properties, Plantersbank obtained new titles in its name and sought a writ of possession from the Regional Trial Court (RTC). However, AQA Global Construction Inc. (AQA), occupying the properties, and Je-an Supreme Builders and Sales Corporation (Je-An), claiming ownership, intervened, seeking to be excluded from the writ of possession. The central legal question is whether AQA and Je-An’s claims of possession were truly adverse to KTC’s rights, thus preventing Plantersbank from taking possession of the foreclosed properties.

The RTC initially sided with AQA and Je-An, excluding them from the writ of possession. However, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed this decision, finding that the RTC had gravely abused its discretion. The CA held that Plantersbank, as the purchaser in the foreclosure sale, was entitled to possession. This ruling led AQA and Je-An to file separate petitions with the Supreme Court, which ultimately affirmed the CA’s decision.

The Supreme Court’s analysis hinges on Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which provides an exception to the general rule regarding the purchaser’s right to possession. This section states that possession should be given to the purchaser unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor. The key here is the term “adversely.” The Court clarified that adverse possession must be in the third party’s own right, not merely as a successor or transferee of the mortgagor’s right of possession. For example, co-owners, agricultural tenants, or usufructuaries who possess the property independently could be considered adverse possessors. This contrasts with entities whose claims are derived from the mortgagor or who are privy to the mortgagor’s transactions.

In this case, Je-An’s claim of ownership was based on a Contract to Sell dated January 15, 2003. The Court emphasized that a Contract to Sell does not transfer ownership; it merely grants an inchoate right, meaning an incomplete or contingent right. Without a deed of conveyance from Little Giant, the original owner, Je-An’s claim remained legally insufficient to establish ownership. Furthermore, Je-An’s representative, Achurra, had executed a Deed of Assignment in favor of KTC, the mortgagor, effectively making Je-An privy to the conveyance to KTC. This undermined Je-An’s claim of adverse possession against KTC.

Additionally, the Court noted that when KTC mortgaged the properties to Plantersbank on February 28, 2003, the titles were already in KTC’s name, without any annotation of Je-An’s Contract to Sell. Similarly, when Plantersbank consolidated its title in 2011, there was no registered adverse claim based on the Contract to Sell or the purported rescission of the Deed of Assignment. This lack of registration further weakened Je-An’s position, as unregistered claims are generally not binding on third parties like Plantersbank who act in good faith.

Turning to AQA’s claim, the Court dismissed the argument that its status as a tenant rendered its possession adverse to Plantersbank. The Court distinguished between agricultural tenants, who have specific legal protections under laws like Presidential Decree No. 1038 and Republic Act No. 3844, and civil law tenants. A civil law lease, like the one between Je-An and AQA, creates a mere personal right. Such a right is only binding on third parties if it is registered on the title of the lessor, which was not the case here. Therefore, AQA’s unregistered lease with Je-An did not create a right enforceable against Plantersbank.

Building on these points, the Court reiterated the importance of protecting the integrity of the Torrens system of land registration. Allowing Je-An’s inchoate right to obstruct the writ of possession would undermine the indefeasibility of Plantersbank’s title. In essence, the Court prioritized the rights of the mortgagee, Plantersbank, who had followed the proper legal procedures for foreclosure and consolidation of title. The Court quoted St. Dominic Corp. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, stating:

The right of the respondent to the possession of the property is clearly unassailable. It is founded on the right of ownership. As the purchaser of the properties in the foreclosure sale, and to which the respective titles thereto have already been issued, the petitioner’s rights over the property has become absolute, vesting upon it the right of possession of the property which the court must aid in affecting its delivery. After such delivery, the purchaser becomes the absolute owner of the property.

Despite upholding the CA’s decision, the Supreme Court clarified the remedies available to third parties claiming ownership or possession of foreclosed property. While the CA limited these remedies to a terceria (a third-party claim) and an independent separate action, the Supreme Court emphasized that third parties could also invoke the RTC’s supervisory power to enjoin the enforcement of the writ of possession. However, the Court cautioned that the RTC’s role in such instances is limited to determining whether the possession is truly adverse to the judgment obligor, not to resolving the question of title with finality. This supervisory power ensures fairness in the execution process but does not override the mortgagee’s established rights.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The central issue was whether AQA and Je-An’s claims of possession were truly adverse to KTC’s rights, preventing Plantersbank from taking possession of the foreclosed properties. The court needed to determine if these third parties had a legitimate, independent claim to the property.
What is a writ of possession?	A writ of possession is a court order directing the sheriff to place a person in possession of real or personal property. It is commonly issued after a foreclosure sale to allow the purchaser to take control of the property.
What does “adverse possession” mean in this context?	“Adverse possession” refers to a situation where a third party holds the property in their own right, independently of the mortgagor’s rights. This possession must be more than just a transfer or succession of the mortgagor’s rights.
Why was Je-An’s claim of ownership rejected?	Je-An’s claim was based on a Contract to Sell, which does not transfer ownership until a deed of conveyance is executed. Additionally, Je-An’s representative had previously executed a Deed of Assignment in favor of KTC, the mortgagor, undermining their claim of adverse possession.
Why was AQA’s claim as a tenant rejected?	AQA’s lease was unregistered, meaning it was not binding on Plantersbank, who had no notice of the lease. The Court distinguished between civil law tenants and agricultural tenants, the latter having greater legal protections.
What is the significance of the Torrens system in this case?	The Torrens system is a land registration system that aims to provide certainty and indefeasibility of title. The Court emphasized that allowing unregistered claims to obstruct the writ of possession would undermine the integrity of this system.
What remedies are available to third parties claiming rights over foreclosed property?	Third parties can file a terceria (third-party claim), an independent separate action, or invoke the RTC’s supervisory power to enjoin the enforcement of the writ of possession. However, the RTC’s role is limited to determining whether the possession is truly adverse.
What is the main takeaway from this case?	The main takeaway is that a purchaser in a foreclosure sale is generally entitled to possession unless a third party has a truly adverse claim, independent of the mortgagor’s rights. Unregistered claims and claims derived from the mortgagor are unlikely to succeed in blocking the writ of possession.

This case underscores the importance of clear and registered property rights in the context of mortgage foreclosures. It provides guidance on what constitutes adverse possession and clarifies the remedies available to third parties seeking to challenge a writ of possession. The ruling reinforces the rights of mortgagees and protects the integrity of the Torrens system, ensuring that foreclosure proceedings are not unduly hindered by unsubstantiated claims.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: AQA Global Construction, Inc. vs. Planters Development Bank, G.R. No. 211742, August 12, 2015