The Supreme Court ruled that a party not directly involved in a contract cannot be subjected to a writ of preliminary attachment based on that contract. This decision clarifies that contractual obligations primarily bind only the parties who agreed to them, safeguarding third parties from being unduly burdened by agreements they didn’t enter. This protection ensures fairness and predictability in contractual relationships, preventing unintended legal liabilities for those outside the original agreement.

Beyond the Paper: Can Shipping Firms Be Forced to Pay Debts of Their Service Providers?

Lorenzo Shipping Corporation (LSC) found itself entangled in a legal battle not of its own making. The dispute originated from a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between Cebu Arrastre and Stevedoring Services Corporation (CASSCOR), represented by its President, Guerrero Dajao, and Florencio Villarin, concerning the operation of stevedoring services for LSC’s vessels. When CASSCOR allegedly failed to remit Villarin’s shares of the proceeds, Villarin sought legal recourse, including a writ of preliminary attachment against LSC, despite LSC not being a direct party to the MOA. The central legal question was whether LSC, as a non-party to the MOA, could be subjected to the provisional remedies sought by Villarin.

The trial court initially granted Villarin’s motion, extending the writ of preliminary attachment to include LSC, a decision that the Court of Appeals (CA) upheld. The CA reasoned that LSC benefitted from the contract between Villarin and CASSCOR, thus making it subject to the writ. LSC challenged this ruling, arguing that it had no contractual relationship with Villarin and was merely a nominal defendant in the case. The Supreme Court granted LSC’s petition, reversing the CA’s decision and clarifying the limits of contractual obligations and the application of provisional remedies.

Building on this, the Supreme Court emphasized the nature and purpose of a writ of preliminary attachment. As a provisional remedy, it allows a court to seize a defendant’s property as security for a potential judgment. The Court cited Adlawan v. Judge Tomol, emphasizing that this remedy ensures the defendant cannot dispose of assets, thereby securing the satisfaction of any judgment the plaintiff might obtain.

A writ of preliminary attachment is a provisional remedy issued upon order of the court where an action is pending to be levied upon the property or properties of the defendant therein, the same to be held thereafter by the Sheriff as security for the satisfaction of whatever judgment might be secured in said action by the attaching creditor against the defendant.

The Court then delved into the grounds for issuing a writ of attachment, particularly focusing on Section 1(d) of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court. This rule pertains to actions against a party guilty of fraud in contracting a debt or incurring an obligation. The key here is that the fraud must relate to the execution of the agreement itself, inducing the other party to enter the contract. As the Supreme Court highlighted in Ng Wee v. Tankiansee, the fraud should be committed upon contracting the obligation being sued upon. Moreover, it requires a deliberate intention not to pay at the time of contracting the debt, which can be inferred from the circumstances.

To sustain an attachment [under this section], it must be shown that the debtor in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation intended to defraud the creditor. The fraud must relate to the execution of the agreement and must have been the reason which induced the other party into giving consent which he would not have otherwise given.

Applying these principles, the Supreme Court found that LSC could not be held liable for fraud in the context of the MOA because it was not a party to that agreement. Article 1311 of the New Civil Code dictates that contracts only bind the parties, their assigns, and heirs, except where rights and obligations are non-transferable. Since LSC never entered into an agreement with Villarin, it could not be subjected to an attachment writ based on Section 1(d). The MOA, therefore, could only bind Dajao and CASSCOR, the original parties involved.

Villarin argued for the existence of an implied trust relationship with LSC, asserting that LSC was aware of the subcontracting arrangement under the MOA. He claimed that this created a quasi-contract or implied contract, requiring fairness and good faith. However, the Court clarified that even if a constructive trust existed, it would not justify the issuance of a writ of attachment under Section 1(b) of Rule 57. This section pertains to actions for money or property embezzled by a person in a fiduciary capacity. A constructive trust, as defined in Philippine National Bank v. CA, lacks both a promise and a fiduciary relationship, thereby excluding it from the scope of Section 1(b).

In a constructive trust, there is neither a promise nor any fiduciary relation to speak of and the so-called trustee neither accepts any trust nor intends holding the property for the beneficiary.

The Supreme Court also addressed the CA’s reliance on Sta. Ines Melale Forest Products Corporation v. Macaraig. The Court clarified that Sta. Ines still required a juridical tie between the parties, which was absent between Villarin and LSC. LSC’s refusal to directly remit payments to Villarin was justified by the principle of privity of contract, as LSC’s contractual obligation was solely with CASSCOR.

In addition to the attachment case, the Supreme Court also addressed the propriety of the Order to Deposit issued against LSC. While acknowledging that Philippine courts have the power to issue deposit orders as provisional remedies under Rule 135 of the Rules of Court, these orders are extraordinary and typically used to ensure restitution to the party ultimately deemed entitled. The Court categorized provisional deposit orders into two types: one where the demandability of the money is uncontested, and another where a party regularly receives money from a non-party during the case.

However, the Court found that neither category applied to LSC’s situation. LSC was not a party to the MOA that Villarin sought to enforce, and the nature of the specific performance case allowed LSC to contest its liability. Moreover, the amount to be deposited came from LSC’s funds and was not regularly received from a non-party. Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that the provisional deposit order was improperly issued against LSC, as there was no juridical tie between LSC and Villarin that could serve as its basis.

The Supreme Court’s decision underscores the importance of contractual privity and the limitations on provisional remedies. It prevents the unjust imposition of obligations on parties not directly involved in a contract, reinforcing the principle that contracts primarily bind only those who agree to them. This ruling provides clarity and fairness in the application of legal remedies, ensuring that businesses are not unduly burdened by obligations they did not voluntarily assume.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether a party not directly involved in a contract (LSC) could be subjected to a writ of preliminary attachment or a deposit order based on that contract. The Supreme Court ruled that it could not, emphasizing the importance of contractual privity.
What is a writ of preliminary attachment?	A writ of preliminary attachment is a provisional remedy that allows a court to seize a defendant’s property as security for a potential judgment. It prevents the defendant from disposing of assets before a final decision is made.
What does ‘privity of contract’ mean?	Privity of contract means that only the parties to a contract are bound by its terms and can enforce its obligations. Third parties typically do not have rights or obligations under a contract they did not enter.
Under what circumstances can a writ of attachment be issued?	A writ of attachment can be issued when there is evidence of fraud in contracting a debt, embezzlement, or a breach of fiduciary duty. The specific grounds are outlined in Rule 57 of the Rules of Court.
What is a constructive trust?	A constructive trust is a legal concept where a court imposes a trust-like obligation on a party who has obtained property unjustly. It is created by operation of law to prevent unjust enrichment.
What is a provisional deposit order?	A provisional deposit order is a court order requiring a party to deposit money or property into the custody of the court during a legal proceeding. It is typically used to ensure restitution to the rightful party after the case is resolved.
Can a court issue a deposit order even if it’s not explicitly mentioned in the Rules of Court?	Yes, courts have the inherent power to issue auxiliary writs and processes necessary to carry their jurisdiction into effect, as stated in Rule 135 of the Rules of Court. This includes the power to issue deposit orders in appropriate cases.
What was the basis for Villarin’s claim against LSC?	Villarin claimed that LSC benefitted from the contract between Villarin and CASSCOR, and that this created an implied trust relationship. However, the Supreme Court rejected this argument, emphasizing that LSC was not a party to the contract and had no juridical tie with Villarin.
Why did the Supreme Court reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision?	The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision because LSC was not a party to the MOA, there was no evidence of fraud on LSC’s part, and no juridical tie existed between LSC and Villarin to justify the writ of attachment or the deposit order.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Lorenzo Shipping Corporation v. Florencio O. Villarin serves as a critical reminder of the importance of contractual privity and the limitations on provisional remedies. The decision reaffirms the principle that contracts primarily bind only those who agree to them, protecting third parties from being unduly burdened by agreements they did not enter. This reinforces fairness and predictability in contractual relationships within the Philippine legal system.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Lorenzo Shipping Corporation vs. Florencio O. Villarin, G.R. Nos. 175727 and 178713, March 06, 2019