The Supreme Court has affirmed that either spouse, regardless of their psychological state, can file a petition to nullify their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, provided they allege the psychological incapacity of either or both parties to fulfill essential marital duties. The doctrine of unclean hands does not bar a psychologically incapacitated spouse from seeking nullification. This decision emphasizes the need for clear and convincing evidence, focusing on the enduring personality traits that prevent a spouse from meeting marital obligations, rather than requiring strict medical proof.

Clavecilla vs. Clavecilla: Can a Spouse’s Own Psychological Incapacity Be Grounds for Annulment?

The case of Fernando C. Clavecilla v. Marivic V. Clavecilla, G.R. No. 228127, decided on March 6, 2023, delves into the complexities of psychological incapacity as grounds for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Philippine law. At the heart of the matter is whether a spouse can invoke their own psychological incapacity as a basis for annulling the marriage, and the evidentiary standards required to prove such incapacity.

The petitioner, Fernando C. Clavecilla, sought to nullify his marriage with Marivic V. Clavecilla, initially faulting her for being psychologically incapacitated. However, psychological evaluation revealed that Fernando himself suffered from Narcissistic Personality Disorder (NPD), which he then argued as an alternative ground for nullity. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) initially granted the petition, but the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed this decision, holding that Fernando failed to adequately prove psychological incapacity on either his or Marivic’s part.

One of the key procedural issues raised was the validity of the petition’s verification and certification against forum shopping, which was signed by Fernando’s attorney-in-fact. Marivic argued that Fernando’s failure to personally sign these documents rendered the petition fatally defective. However, the Supreme Court clarified the rules on verification and certification, citing Altres v. Empleo:

As to verification, [noncompliance] therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby.

The Court noted that while personal signing is generally required, an attorney-in-fact can sign on behalf of the principal party if authorized by a Special Power of Attorney (SPA), especially when the principal is unable to sign personally due to valid reasons. In this case, Fernando was stationed in Hungary as a finance officer, justifying his attorney’s signature.

Another significant legal question was whether Fernando, as the allegedly incapacitated spouse, could initiate the petition for nullity. Marivic argued that the principle of unclean hands should bar Fernando from seeking annulment based on his own misconduct. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, emphasizing that Article 36 of the Family Code does not prohibit the psychologically incapacitated spouse from initiating the action.

A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriages at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.

The Court further clarified that culpability is not a factor in cases of psychological incapacity, as the condition is not deliberate or intentional. Therefore, the doctrine of unclean hands, which applies to cases of inequity, does not apply to petitions for nullity based on psychological incapacity. The court highlighted the intent of the framers of the Family Code to allow either party to file a petition for annulment on the ground of psychological incapacity, unlike other grounds where only an innocent party can initiate the action. It is crucial to understand, the focus remains on establishing the incapacity itself, irrespective of who initiates the petition.

Turning to the substantive issue of psychological incapacity, the Supreme Court reiterated the standards for proving such incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Initially, the case of Republic v. Molina laid down strict guidelines for determining psychological incapacity, requiring medical or clinical identification, proof of existence at the time of marriage, and incurability. However, subsequent cases like Ngo Te v. Yu-Te and Tan-Andal v. Andal relaxed these requirements, emphasizing a case-to-case interpretation and recognizing that expert evidence is not always necessary.

The prevailing standards, as articulated in Tan-Andal, focus on establishing the durable or enduring aspects of the spouse’s personality structure, manifesting as clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermine the family. The element of incurability is determined from a legal, not medical, point of view, focusing on whether the personality structure is so incompatible that it inevitably leads to the breakdown of the marriage. The Court in Cayabyab-Navarrosa v. Navarrosa, refined the requisites of juridical antecedence, incurability, and gravity:

With regard to the requisite of incurability, it must now be recognized that psychological incapacity is incurable only in the legal (not medical) sense in that the incapacity is “so enduring and persistent with respect to a specific partner, and contemplates a situation where the couple’s respective personality structures are so incompatible and antagonistic that the only result of the union would be the inevitable and irreparable breakdown of the marriage.

Applying these standards to the present case, the Supreme Court found that Fernando failed to present clear and convincing evidence of psychological incapacity, either on his or Marivic’s part. His claims against Marivic were unsubstantiated and insufficient to establish her inability to perform essential marital obligations. While Dr. Tayag’s report diagnosed Fernando with NPD, it lacked specific instances of his behavior inconsistent with that of a husband who is always present, loving, faithful, respectful, and supportive towards Marivic. The court requires more than just a diagnosis; it needs concrete evidence showing how the disorder specifically impairs the ability to fulfill marital duties.

Moreover, Fernando failed to demonstrate that his NPD impaired his ability to discharge the essential marital obligations under Arts. 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Therefore, the Court affirmed the CA’s decision, holding that the totality of the evidence presented by Fernando failed to establish that his enduring personality structure rendered him incapable of comprehending and discharging his marital obligations.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether a spouse can invoke their own psychological incapacity as grounds for nullifying their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, and what evidence is required to prove such incapacity.
Can a psychologically incapacitated spouse file a petition for nullity?	Yes, the Supreme Court affirmed that either spouse, regardless of their psychological state, can file a petition to nullify their marriage based on psychological incapacity.
What is the doctrine of unclean hands and does it apply in this case?	The doctrine of unclean hands prevents a party who has acted inequitably from seeking equitable relief. The Court held that this doctrine does not apply in cases of psychological incapacity because the condition is not intentional.
What are the key requirements for proving psychological incapacity?	The key requirements include proving that the incapacity is grave, juridically antecedent (existing at the time of marriage), and incurable. These must be demonstrated through clear and convincing evidence.
Does the court require expert medical testimony to prove psychological incapacity?	While expert testimony can be helpful, it is not always required. The Court emphasized that the focus should be on clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermine the family.
What evidence did the petitioner fail to provide in this case?	The petitioner failed to provide specific instances of behavior that demonstrated his inability to perform essential marital obligations, despite a diagnosis of Narcissistic Personality Disorder.
What is the significance of the Tan-Andal ruling in cases of psychological incapacity?	The Tan-Andal ruling relaxed the strict evidentiary standards set in Republic v. Molina, focusing on the legal, rather than medical, aspects of incurability and emphasizing the need for clear and convincing evidence.
What are the essential marital obligations under the Family Code?	The essential marital obligations include living together, observing mutual love, respect, and fidelity, rendering mutual help and support, fixing the family domicile, providing support, and managing the household.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in Clavecilla v. Clavecilla clarifies the rights of spouses in cases of psychological incapacity and emphasizes the importance of providing clear and convincing evidence to support claims of nullity. While the Court allows either spouse to initiate the petition, it maintains a high standard for proving that the psychological incapacity genuinely prevents the fulfillment of essential marital obligations. Moving forward, legal practitioners must focus on gathering comprehensive evidence that demonstrates the enduring personality traits and behaviors that render a spouse incapable of meeting their marital duties.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Clavecilla v. Clavecilla, G.R. No. 228127, March 06, 2023