In Project Builders, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court clarified the nature of financing transactions under Republic Act No. 5980, also known as the Financing Company Act. The court ruled that assigning contracts to sell to a financing company falls within the purview of the Act, and the foreclosure of a real estate mortgage does not preclude the financing company from collecting interests from the assigned contracts. This means that even after a property is foreclosed, the debtor may still be liable for deficiencies and interests arising from the assigned credits.

Beyond Loans: How Project Builders Defined Financing Agreements and Debtor Responsibilities

This case arose from a dispute between Project Builders, Inc. (PBI), a developer, and Industrial Finance Corporation (IFC), a financing company. PBI had secured a credit line from IFC and, as part of the agreement, assigned several contracts to sell with their corresponding accounts receivable to IFC. These contracts were related to condominium units PBI was developing. When PBI defaulted on its payments, IFC foreclosed on the real estate mortgage provided as security. However, IFC claimed a deficiency even after the foreclosure and redemption of the property, leading to a legal battle that reached the Supreme Court. The central question before the court was whether the transaction between PBI and IFC was a simple loan or a financing transaction governed by Republic Act No. 5980.

The court determined that the transaction was indeed a financing agreement, falling squarely within the definition provided by the Financing Company Act. This Act defines financing companies as entities extending credit facilities by discounting or factoring commercial papers or accounts receivable. According to Section 3 of R.A. No. 5980:

“(a) ‘Financing companies,’ x x x organized for the purpose of extending credit facilities to consumers and to industrial, commercial, or agricultural enterprises, either by discounting or factoring commercial papers or accounts receivable, or by buying and selling contracts, leases, chattel mortgages, or other evidences of indebtedness or by leasing of motor vehicles, heavy equipment and industrial machinery, business and office machines and equipment, appliances and other movable property.”

The assignment of contracts to sell by PBI to IFC fit this definition precisely. The court also referenced the Act’s definition of credit, which includes “any contract to sell, or sale or contract of sale of property or service, either for present or future delivery, under which, part or all of the price is payable subsequent to the making of such sale or contract.” This underscored that the assignment was a legitimate financial transaction covered by the law.

The Supreme Court clarified that an assignment of credit involves transferring the rights of the assignor (PBI) to the assignee (IFC), enabling the latter to pursue the debtor for payment. The Court emphasized that the consent of the debtor is not required for the assignment to be valid. The debtor’s awareness of the assignment affects only the validity of payments made; payments made before notification of the assignment are considered valid. The Court quoted Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals to support this:

“We have ruled in Sison & Sison v. Yap Tico and Avanceña, 37 Phil. 587 [1918] that definitely, consent is not necessary in order that assignment may fully produce legal effects. Hence, the duty to pay does not depend on the consent of the debtor.”

The fact that IFC, the financing company, did not directly communicate with the condominium unit buyers to collect payments did not invalidate the assignment. The court noted that the assignment was made “with recourse,” meaning that PBI remained liable if the debtors defaulted. The foreclosure on the mortgaged properties did not prevent IFC from collecting interest on the assigned contracts to sell from the period between the foreclosure and the property’s redemption. This right stemmed from the original financing agreement and the terms stipulated in the contracts to sell, which allowed for interest charges on late payments.

A critical point of contention was PBI’s argument that IFC was imposing excessive interest and charges beyond what the Financing Company Act permits. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, explaining that the 14% limit on purchase discounts under Section 5 of the Act is exclusive of interest and other charges. Section 5 of R.A. 5980 states:

“SEC. 5. Limitation on purchase discount, fees, service and other Charges.— In the case of assignments of credit or the buying of installment papers, accounts receivables and other evidences of indebtedness by financing companies, the purchase discount, exclusive of interest and other charges, shall be limited to fourteen (14%) per cent of the value of the credit assigned or the value of the installment papers, accounts receivable and other evidence of indebtedness purchased based on a period of twelve (12) months or less…”

The Court clarified that a purchase discount is the difference between the receivable’s value and the net amount paid by the finance company, not including fees, service charges, or interest. This is similar to a “time price differential,” which accounts for the expenses of credit transactions. The court thus found no violation of usury laws.

In essence, the Supreme Court’s decision affirmed that the financing company was entitled to the deficiency and interest payments, even after the foreclosure. The court underscored the validity and enforceability of the assignment of credit, highlighting that the debtor’s consent is not required for the assignment’s perfection, and the financing company’s rights extend to collecting interest as stipulated in the assigned contracts. The distinction between purchase discounts and interest charges was crucial in determining the legitimacy of the financial arrangements, reinforcing the protections afforded to financing companies under the Financing Company Act.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The central issue was whether the transaction between Project Builders, Inc. and Industrial Finance Corporation was a simple loan or a financing transaction governed by the Financing Company Act. The court determined it was a financing transaction.
What is a financing company according to Republic Act No. 5980?	A financing company is an entity that extends credit facilities to consumers and enterprises by discounting or factoring commercial papers, buying and selling contracts, or leasing movable property. This definition is crucial for understanding the scope of the Act.
Is the debtor’s consent required for the assignment of credit?	No, the debtor’s consent is not required for the assignment of credit to be valid. However, the debtor must be notified of the assignment to ensure payments are made to the correct party.
What is the significance of an assignment made “with recourse”?	An assignment “with recourse” means that the assignor (the original creditor) remains liable if the debtor defaults on payments. This provision was relevant in determining the liabilities of Project Builders, Inc.
Does foreclosing a mortgage preclude a financing company from collecting interest on assigned credits?	No, foreclosing a mortgage does not necessarily prevent a financing company from collecting interest on assigned credits. The financing company can still claim interest as stipulated in the assigned contracts.
What is a purchase discount, and how does it differ from interest?	A purchase discount is the difference between the value of the receivable purchased and the net amount paid by the finance company, excluding fees, service charges, and interest. It is similar to a “time price differential.”
What is the limit on purchase discounts under the Financing Company Act?	The Financing Company Act sets a limit of 14% on purchase discounts, but this limit is exclusive of interest and other charges related to the extension of credit. This distinction is crucial in determining compliance with usury laws.
What was the outcome of the case?	The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision, which ordered Project Builders, Inc. to pay the deficiency and interest to Industrial Finance Corporation. The court sided with the financing company.

This case illustrates the importance of understanding the nuances of financing transactions and the rights and obligations of parties involved in assignments of credit. The Supreme Court’s decision provides clarity on the application of the Financing Company Act, ensuring that financing companies are adequately protected while also setting clear boundaries for the imposition of interest and charges.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Project Builders, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 99433, June 19, 2001