The Supreme Court declared that a provincial governor does not have the power to declare a state of emergency and exercise powers such as imposing curfews, conducting general searches and seizures, and calling upon the armed forces. The Court emphasized that these powers are exclusively vested in the President of the Philippines as the commander-in-chief. This decision safeguards constitutional rights by preventing local executives from overstepping their authority and potentially infringing on individual liberties during perceived emergencies, ensuring that only the President can exercise such extensive powers under constitutional limitations.

Sulu’s Stand: Can a Governor Wield Emergency Powers?

The case of Kulayan v. Tan revolves around the extent of a local governor’s authority to declare a state of emergency and exercise broad powers in response to a crisis. In January 2009, members of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were kidnapped in Sulu. In response, Governor Abdusakur M. Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009, declaring a state of emergency in the province. The proclamation authorized the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF) to set up checkpoints, impose curfews, conduct general searches and seizures, and make arrests to ensure public safety. Several individuals were arrested under this proclamation, leading to a petition questioning its legality.

The petitioners argued that Governor Tan’s proclamation was ultra vires, meaning beyond his legal power, and violated the Constitution by infringing on fundamental freedoms. They contended that only the President of the Philippines has the authority to exercise emergency powers and call upon the armed forces. The respondents, led by Governor Tan, countered that the proclamation was issued under Sections 16 and 465 of the Local Government Code, which empower the governor to carry out emergency measures during calamities and disasters and to call upon law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder. They also asserted that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Sulu had authorized the declaration of a state of emergency.

The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of the hierarchy of courts, noting that while the Court of Appeals (CA) and Regional Trial Courts (RTC) have concurrent jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari and prohibition, the Court could take cognizance of the case due to its transcendental public importance. According to the Court in Chavez v. PEA-Amari,

PEA and AMARI claim petitioner ignored the judicial hierarchy by seeking relief directly from the Court. The principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally to cases involving factual questions. As it is not a trier of facts, the Court cannot entertain cases involving factual issues. The instant case, however, raises constitutional questions of transcendental importance to the public. The Court can resolve this case without determining any factual issue related to the case. Also, the instant case is a petition for mandamus which falls under the original jurisdiction of the Court under Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution.  We resolve to exercise primary jurisdiction over the instant case.

Building on this, the Court emphasized that the case involved acts of a public official pertaining to restrictive custody and thus warranted the relaxation of the general rule. The Court underscored the importance of judicial review in cases concerning restrictive custody, highlighting the need to defend civilian liberties against potential abuses of state power under the guise of an emergency.

Delving into the substantive issues, the Court reaffirmed that executive power is vested solely in the President of the Philippines. This principle, established in Villena v. Secretary of Interior, means that only the President can exercise emergency powers and calling-out powers under the Constitution. The Court cited Justice Jose P. Laurel’s statement in Villena:

With reference to the Executive Department of the government, there is one purpose which is crystal-clear and is readily visible without the projection of judicial searchlight, and that is the establishment of a single, not plural, Executive. The first section of Article VII of the Constitution, dealing with the Executive Department, begins with the enunciation of the principle that “The executive power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines.” This means that the President of the Philippines is the Executive of the Government of the Philippines, and no other.

The Court emphasized the exceptional character of Commander-in-Chief powers, noting that these powers, including the power to call out the armed forces, are exclusive to the President. This is because the President, as a civilian, is mandated by Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution to ensure that civilian authority is supreme over the military, making the President the nation’s supreme military leader.

The Supreme Court also addressed the argument that Section 465 of the Local Government Code authorized Governor Tan’s actions. The Court clarified that Section 465, in relation to Section 16, does not grant local governors the power to declare a state of emergency and exercise powers such as conducting general searches and seizures. The Court emphasized that the constitutional proscription on general search warrants and seizures must be upheld. As emphasized in the Constitution,

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

The Court found that Governor Tan had arrogated powers exceeding even the martial law powers of the President, as the Constitution explicitly states that martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution or authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts over civilians when civil courts are functioning. Consequently, the Court ruled that there was no provision in the Local Government Code that justified the actions sanctioned under Proclamation 1-09.

Additionally, the Court determined that Governor Tan was not authorized to convene the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF). Section 24 of Article XVIII of the Constitution mandates the dismantling of private armies and other armed groups not recognized by duly constituted authority, reinforcing the national policy of establishing one police force. The creation of the CEF, therefore, was deemed unconstitutional.

In essence, the Supreme Court’s decision in Kulayan v. Tan reinforces the principle of checks and balances by limiting the emergency powers of local executives and upholding the President’s exclusive authority in matters of national security. It underscores the importance of safeguarding constitutional rights and preventing the potential abuse of power during times of crisis. The decision clarifies the scope of local government authority and reaffirms the supremacy of civilian authority over the military, ensuring that emergency measures are implemented within constitutional limits.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The central issue was whether a provincial governor has the authority to declare a state of emergency and exercise broad powers, such as imposing curfews and conducting general searches and seizures, in response to a crisis.
What did the Supreme Court rule?	The Supreme Court ruled that a provincial governor does not have the authority to declare a state of emergency and exercise such powers. The Court emphasized that these powers are exclusively vested in the President of the Philippines.
What is the significance of the "calling-out powers"?	The "calling-out powers" refer to the President’s authority to call upon the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. This power is discretionary and solely vested in the President, as the commander-in-chief.
Can local government units create their own police forces?	No, the Constitution mandates that the State shall establish and maintain one police force, national in scope and civilian in character. Local executives exercise operational supervision over the police but do not have unbridled control, especially in emergency situations.
What is the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF), and why was its creation deemed invalid?	The CEF was a group of armed civilians convened by the Governor of Sulu. Its creation was deemed invalid because the Constitution prohibits the organization of private armed groups not recognized by duly constituted authority.
Does the Local Government Code allow a governor to conduct general searches and seizures during an emergency?	No, the Local Government Code does not authorize a governor to conduct general searches and seizures. Such actions would violate the constitutional proscription on general search warrants and seizures.
What constitutional provision was at the forefront of this case?	Article VII Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
How does this ruling affect local government units?	The ruling clarifies that local government units cannot exercise powers inherently vested in the National Government, especially those granted by the Constitution to the President in matters of security and defense.

This landmark decision solidifies the separation of powers and reinforces the constitutional framework that safeguards individual liberties. The Supreme Court’s ruling ensures that emergency measures are implemented within the bounds of the Constitution, preventing potential abuses of power and protecting the rights of citizens.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: JAMAR M. KULAYAN, ET AL. VS. GOV. ABDUSAKUR M. TAN, ET AL., G.R. No. 187298, July 03, 2012