In a construction dispute between ASEC Development Construction Corporation and Toyota Alabang, Inc., the Supreme Court reiterated the binding nature of arbitral awards. It emphasized that courts should generally defer to the factual findings of the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) due to its specialized expertise. The Court found that the Court of Appeals overstepped its bounds by modifying CIAC’s factual findings, especially when the integrity of the arbitral process was not compromised. This case reinforces the principle that courts should protect the arbitration process and only intervene on limited grounds, ensuring finality and respect for the expertise of arbitral tribunals.

Two Tribunals, Conflicting Verdicts: When Can Courts Intervene in Construction Arbitration?

The dispute began with a bidding process for the Toyota Alabang Showroom Project, where ASEC Development submitted a bid that was accepted by Toyota. A point of contention arose regarding the type of glass to be used for the project’s doors and windows. ASEC Development claimed its bid was for tempered glass, while Toyota believed it was for Low-E glass, leading to disagreements over the contract price deduction when Toyota decided to award the glass and aluminum works to another contractor. This disagreement led ASEC Development to file a request for arbitration before the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC).

CIAC Case Number 07-2014 ensued, where the arbitral tribunal ruled in favor of ASEC Development, stating that only P32,504,329.98 should have been deducted from the scope of works. Toyota, dissatisfied with this decision, filed a Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals. Subsequently, Toyota terminated its contract with ASEC Development, leading to a second request for arbitration by ASEC Development, this time to determine the final payment for several progress billings and variation works. This second case was docketed as CIAC Case No. 03-2015. A significant point of contention arose: can a second arbitral tribunal overturn the decision of a previous co-equal tribunal?

After hearings and evidence presentation, the second arbitral tribunal rendered a Final Award, differing from the first by stating that P51,022,240.00 should be deducted for glass and aluminum works. This discrepancy set the stage for a legal battle that reached the Supreme Court, as ASEC Development contested the Second Arbitral Award. The Court of Appeals consolidated Toyota’s and ASEC Development’s Petitions for Review, ultimately setting aside the First Arbitral Award and affirming the Second Arbitral Award.

ASEC Development then elevated the case to the Supreme Court, asserting that the Court of Appeals erred in supplanting the factual findings of the First Arbitral Award. The Supreme Court, in its analysis, highlighted the importance of respecting the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission’s expertise and the binding nature of arbitral awards. Citing Section 19 of Executive Order No. 1008, the Construction Industry Arbitration Law, the Court underscored that:

The arbitral award shall be binding upon the parties. It shall be final and inappealable except on questions of law which shall be appealable to the Supreme Court.

This provision emphasizes the intent to provide finality to arbitration decisions, limiting judicial intervention to questions of law. The Supreme Court acknowledged the tension between this provision and Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows appeals on questions of fact, law, or mixed questions of fact and law. However, the Court clarified that appeals of arbitral awards should generally be limited to questions of law, reinforcing the principle of deference to arbitral tribunals’ expertise.

The Supreme Court cited several precedents, including CE Construction Corporation v. Araneta, which highlighted the wide latitude afforded to CIAC arbitral tribunals due to their technical expertise. This case emphasized that courts must defer to factual findings unless the integrity of the arbitral tribunal is compromised. The Court also noted that arbitral awards are treated as final and binding, and that Executive Order No. 1008 does not provide grounds to vacate an award. This is to preserve the integrity of the arbitration process.

To address the lack of specific grounds for vacating CIAC awards, the Court referred to Section 24 of Republic Act No. 876, the Domestic Arbitration Law, which provides grounds such as:

(1) the award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means; (2) there was evident partiality or corruption of the arbitrators or of any of them; (3) the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; (4) one or more of the arbitrators were disqualified to act as such under section nine of Republic Act No. 876 and willfully refrained from disclosing such disqualifications or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been materially prejudiced; or (5) the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them, that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted to them was not made.

These grounds provide a narrow scope for judicial review, focusing on the integrity and fairness of the arbitral process. This approach contrasts with a broader review of factual or legal errors, which the courts are generally precluded from undertaking. The Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the First Arbitral Award and substituting its own interpretation of the contract terms related to tempered glass and Low-E glass.

Building on this principle, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of conflicting arbitral awards, stating that the Second Arbitral Award should be vacated in part because it reversed the First Arbitral Award. The Court emphasized that the two arbitral tribunals were coequal bodies and could not overturn each other’s decisions on the same issue. This situation created a paradox, as the second tribunal essentially reversed the final resolution of the first on the amount properly deductible from ASEC Development’s scope of work. This undermined the finality and integrity of the arbitration process.

The Supreme Court noted that the finding in the First Arbitral Award that only P32,540,329.98 was deductible from ASEC Development’s scope of works was a factual finding that the Court would not disturb. The tribunal had thoroughly explained its reasoning, considering the parties’ positions and the contract’s provisions. Even if the specification was low-e glass, Respondent could only deduct the unit rate specified by the Claimant in the amount of P 25,451,311.98. Since Respondent had deducted P52 Million from Claimant’s scope of work, the consequence of this holding is that the P32,540,329.98 must be deducted from the P52 million and the differential amount of P19[M] must be returned to the Claimant.

The second arbitral tribunal was aware of the First Arbitral Award, and the issues in the second arbitration case were related to those in the first, such that any ruling in the second would affect the First Arbitral Award. This created a conflict that the Supreme Court sought to resolve by reinstating the First Arbitral Award’s finding on the deductible amount. This decision underscores the importance of preserving the arbitration process and preventing parties from incessantly filing requests for arbitration until they achieve a favorable award.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Arbitral Award on other issues, such as the validity of contract termination and the payment of variation orders. It emphasized that courts should not review the merits of an arbitral award or substitute their judgment for that of the arbitral tribunal. Such an approach would encroach upon the independence of the arbitral tribunal and undermine the integrity of the arbitration process.

Therefore, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission to recompute the parties’ final claims, taking into account the reinstated First Arbitral Award’s finding on the deductible amount for glass and aluminum works. This decision reaffirms the principles of deference to arbitral expertise, finality of arbitral awards, and the limited scope of judicial review in construction disputes.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether the Court of Appeals erred in modifying the factual findings of the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission’s arbitral tribunals, particularly regarding the deductible amount for glass and aluminum works. Additionally, the Court addressed whether a second arbitral award should be set aside for reversing the factual findings of a coequal arbitral tribunal.
What is the significance of the CIAC’s expertise?	The CIAC possesses specialized knowledge in construction-related matters, making its factual findings highly authoritative. Courts must defer to these findings unless there is evidence of corruption, fraud, or other undue influence in the arbitral process, ensuring that its decisions are respected.
Under what circumstances can a court review an arbitral award?	Courts can review arbitral awards only on limited grounds, such as corruption, fraud, evident partiality, or misconduct by the arbitrators. The review is generally restricted to questions of law, and factual findings are typically binding and not subject to judicial alteration.
What did the First Arbitral Award decide?	The First Arbitral Award determined that only P32,540,329.98 should have been deducted from ASEC Development’s scope of work for glass and aluminum works. This amount was based on the tribunal’s interpretation of the contract stipulations and bidding documents.
Why did the Supreme Court partially vacate the Second Arbitral Award?	The Supreme Court partially vacated the Second Arbitral Award because it reversed the factual findings of the First Arbitral Award, which had already determined the deductible amount for glass and aluminum works. The Court emphasized that coequal arbitral tribunals cannot overturn each other’s decisions on the same issue.
What is the impact of this ruling on the construction industry?	This ruling reinforces the importance of respecting the arbitration process and the expertise of arbitral tribunals in resolving construction disputes. It provides greater certainty and stability for parties involved in construction contracts, limiting the scope of judicial intervention and promoting the finality of arbitral awards.
What is the role of the Court of Appeals in reviewing CIAC decisions?	The Court of Appeals can review CIAC decisions but should primarily focus on questions of law rather than re-evaluating factual findings. The Court must defer to the CIAC’s expertise unless there are compelling reasons to believe that the arbitral process was compromised.
What does the ruling mean for the final amount due to the parties?	The case was remanded to the CIAC to recompute the final award due to the parties. It is after taking into account the reinstated First Arbitral Award’s finding on the deductible amount for glass and aluminum works. This ensures that the final amount reflects the proper deductions and payments as determined by the appropriate arbitral findings.

The Supreme Court’s decision in this case provides a clear message: courts must respect the arbitral process and the expertise of the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission. This approach ensures the finality and stability of arbitral awards, fostering a more efficient and reliable dispute resolution mechanism for the construction industry.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: ASEC DEVELOPMENT CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION vs. TOYOTA ALABANG, INC., G.R. Nos. 243477-78, April 27, 2022