The Supreme Court has affirmed that the prescriptive period for graft offenses begins upon the discovery of the unlawful acts, especially when government officials conspire to conceal fraudulent transactions. This ruling emphasizes that the government cannot be penalized for failing to detect crimes committed secretly by those in positions of trust. It upholds that the prosecution of public officials for corrupt practices remains viable as long as legal proceedings commence within the prescribed period after the discovery of the offense, thus reinforcing accountability in public service.

Unveiling Corruption: When Does the Prescription Clock Really Start?

In the case of Panfilo O. Domingo v. Sandiganbayan, the central question revolved around whether the criminal charges against Domingo, former President of the Philippine National Bank (PNB), for violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, had been extinguished by prescription. Domingo was accused of facilitating a U.S. $40 Million Letter of Credit for the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP), allegedly causing undue injury to PNB. The issue arose because of the time lapse between the alleged commission of the offense in 1980 and the filing of charges in 1992. Domingo argued that the prescriptive period had commenced in 1980 and was only tolled when he was impleaded in 1992, exceeding the ten-year prescriptive period under Republic Act No. 3019.

The Supreme Court, however, ruled against Domingo, clarifying when the prescriptive period for offenses under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act begins. The Court emphasized that if the commission of the crime is not known at the time it was committed, the prescriptive period starts to run only from the discovery of the offense. This is particularly relevant in cases of corruption where public officials may conspire to conceal their illegal activities. The Court reasoned that it was nearly impossible for the government to have known about the violations at the time the transactions were made because the parties involved allegedly conspired to perpetrate fraud against the government.

The alleged anomalous transactions could only have been discovered after the EDSA Revolution in February 1986 when President Ferdinand Marcos was ousted from office. Prior to that date, questioning the legality or propriety of those transactions was difficult. Hence, the counting of the prescriptive period would commence from the date of discovery of the offense, which the Court determined to be between February 1986 and May 26, 1987, when the initial complaint was filed. Whether the prescriptive period was tolled on September 1, 1987, when Domingo was impleaded as an accused, or on July 30, 1992, when the information against him was filed with the Sandiganbayan, the Court deemed immaterial; only about one to six years, respectively, had elapsed from the date of discovery of the alleged offense.

Building on this principle, the Court addressed the contention that the facts charged in the information did not constitute an offense. The fundamental test is whether the facts asseverated would establish the essential elements of the crime defined in the law. In this examination, matters aliunde (from another source) are not considered. As a general proposition, a motion to quash on the ground that the allegations of the information do not constitute the offense charged should be resolved based alone on those allegations, whose truth and veracity are hypothetically admitted. The informations need only state the ultimate facts; the reasons could be proven during the trial.

Domingo was charged with a violation of Section 3(e), in relation to Section 4(a), of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. Section 3(e) penalizes public officers who cause undue injury to any party, including the government, or give any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of their official functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. The elements of the offense are as follows:

SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.- In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing laws, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

…

(e). Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

The Court found that the information specifically stated that Domingo was a public officer as the president of PNB and that he committed the offense in relation to his office. It alleged that he facilitated the passage of Resolution No. 144, causing undue injury to PNB, which was unjustly forced to assume CDCP’s obligation. Additionally, it was alleged that Domingo acted with evident bad faith and manifest partiality. Thus, the Court concluded that the facts alleged in the information constituted a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended.

Furthermore, Domingo invoked the ruling in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, arguing that the delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation violated his right to a speedy trial. The concept of speedy disposition of cases is a relative term. Factors such as the length of delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay must be considered. However, the Court found that Domingo’s right to speedy trial was not violated, because the Office of the Special Prosecutor adequately explained the reason for the delay, noting that the delay was partly due to affording Domingo the opportunity to submit his counter-affidavit, after the initial subpoena was unserved.

FAQs

What was the central issue in this case?	The central issue was whether the charges against Domingo had prescribed due to the time elapsed between the alleged offense and the filing of the information, and whether the information sufficiently alleged the elements of the crime.
When does the prescriptive period for graft offenses begin according to this ruling?	According to this ruling, the prescriptive period begins upon the discovery of the offense, especially in cases of concealed corruption where public officials conspired to hide their illicit acts.
What were Domingo’s main arguments in his motion to quash?	Domingo primarily argued that the criminal action had been extinguished by prescription and that the facts charged in the information did not constitute an offense under Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
What is the significance of the EDSA Revolution in determining the start of the prescriptive period?	The EDSA Revolution was significant because the Court recognized it as the point after which questioning the legality of previous government transactions became feasible, thereby marking the discovery of potential offenses.
What are the key elements of the offense under Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019?	The key elements are that the accused is a public officer, commits prohibited acts during their official duties, causes undue injury to any party, grants unwarranted benefits, and acts with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence.
Why did the Supreme Court reject Domingo’s claim of a violation of his right to a speedy trial?	The Court rejected this claim because the delay was partly attributed to providing Domingo an opportunity to submit his counter-affidavit, which he eventually did, and the filing of the information followed in due time.
What was the legal basis for the Court’s decision regarding the prescriptive period?	The legal basis was Section 2 of Act No. 3326, which states that prescription begins to run from the day of the commission of the violation, or if not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings.
How does this ruling affect public officials suspected of corruption?	This ruling holds public officials accountable for their actions even after a considerable time has passed, provided the discovery of the corrupt acts and the commencement of legal proceedings fall within the prescribed period.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Domingo v. Sandiganbayan underscores the importance of prosecuting corrupt officials and clarifies the conditions under which the prescriptive period for graft offenses begins. By affirming that prescription starts upon discovery of the offense, especially when hidden through conspiracy, the ruling serves as a deterrent against corruption in public service. As a consequence, the Sandiganbayan was directed to try and decide Criminal Case No. 17847 with purposeful dispatch. The court emphasized that the prosecution of public officials for corrupt practices remains viable as long as legal proceedings commence within the prescribed period after the discovery of the offense, thus reinforcing accountability in public service.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: PANFILO O. DOMINGO v. THE SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R No. 109376, January 20, 2000