The Supreme Court ruled that a conviction for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22), also known as the Bouncing Checks Law, involves moral turpitude and disqualifies a person from running for public office. This decision emphasizes that issuing worthless checks demonstrates deceitful conduct that negatively affects one’s moral character and the public interest. The ruling reinforces the integrity of the electoral process by preventing individuals convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude from holding public office, unless they receive a plenary pardon or amnesty.

Dishonored Checks, Tarnished Character: Can a B.P. 22 Conviction Bar a Congressional Run?

Pablo C. Villaber sought to nullify the Commission on Elections’ (COMELEC) resolutions disqualifying him as a candidate for Congressman in the First District of Davao del Sur. The COMELEC based its decision on Villaber’s prior conviction for violating B.P. Blg. 22. The core issue before the Supreme Court was whether a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude, which would disqualify him under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code explicitly states who are disqualified from running for any office. It provides that:

“Sec. 12. Disqualifications. – Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months, or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.“

The provision unequivocally lists conviction of crimes involving moral turpitude as grounds for disqualification from seeking public office. The term “moral turpitude” is defined, by the Court, adopting the definition in Black’s Law Dictionary, as “an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.” The Court has also clarified that not every criminal act involves moral turpitude and that determining whether a crime involves moral turpitude is a question of fact.

In this case, the Court examined the elements of B.P. Blg. 22. The elements of the offense are:

1. The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to account or for value;
2. The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and
3. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or it would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.

The Court emphasized the second element, highlighting that knowledge of insufficient funds at the time of issuance demonstrates a conscious disregard for one’s obligations. The Supreme Court referenced its ruling in People vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda, asserting that a B.P. 22 conviction “imports deceit” and directly affects a person’s moral character. The Court cited the landmark case of Lozano vs. Martinez, explaining the issuance of a bad check transcends private interests. It injures the public by polluting trade and commerce, harming the banking system, and hurting society. Such actions go against justice, honesty, and good morals.

Villaber argued that the Tuanda ruling should not apply to him because he is not a lawyer. He stated that the pronouncement is only applicable to members of the Bar. The Court dismissed this argument, clarifying that the Tuanda case made no distinction between lawyers and non-lawyers. The ethical implications of violating B.P. Blg. 22 extend to all individuals, regardless of their profession. Further, the Court also addressed Villaber’s argument that the penalty of imprisonment in B.P. Blg. 22 cases has been modified, thereby changing the nature of the offense. He cited Rosa Lim vs. People of the Philippines and Vaca vs. Court of Appeals, where the Court deleted the prison sentence and imposed only a fine. However, the Court clarified that these cases did not alter the determination of moral turpitude. The modification of the penalty did not change the inherent nature of the offense as one involving deceit and a disregard for financial obligations. The Supreme Court found no grave abuse of discretion by the COMELEC and upheld its decision to disqualify Villaber. The petition was subsequently dismissed.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether a conviction for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22), the Bouncing Checks Law, involves moral turpitude, thereby disqualifying an individual from running for public office under the Omnibus Election Code.
What is moral turpitude?	Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity that violates the accepted standards of justice, honesty, and good morals in society. It encompasses actions that demonstrate a disregard for one’s duties to fellow citizens.
What are the elements of violating B.P. 22?	The elements of violating B.P. 22 are: (1) making, drawing, or issuing a check; (2) knowing at the time of issuance that there are insufficient funds; and (3) the check is subsequently dishonored due to insufficient funds.
Why does violating B.P. 22 involve moral turpitude?	Violating B.P. 22 involves moral turpitude because it implies deceit and a deliberate disregard for one’s financial obligations. The act of knowingly issuing a worthless check is seen as an act against public interest.
Did the Court make a distinction between lawyers and non-lawyers in this ruling?	No, the Court did not distinguish between lawyers and non-lawyers in determining whether a B.P. 22 violation involves moral turpitude. The ruling applies to all individuals, regardless of their profession.
Does a fine instead of imprisonment change the determination of moral turpitude?	No, the modification of the penalty from imprisonment to a fine does not change the determination of moral turpitude. The inherent nature of the offense remains one involving deceit and a disregard for financial obligations.
What was the basis for the COMELEC’s decision to disqualify Villaber?	The COMELEC disqualified Villaber based on his prior conviction for violating B.P. 22, which they determined involved moral turpitude, thus disqualifying him under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code.
What is the effect of a plenary pardon or amnesty?	A plenary pardon or amnesty can remove the disqualification resulting from a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. This allows the individual to be eligible to run for and hold public office.

The Supreme Court’s decision reinforces the importance of honesty and integrity in public office. By disqualifying individuals convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude, the Court aims to protect the public interest and maintain the integrity of the electoral process. This ruling serves as a reminder that public officials must adhere to high ethical standards and that actions that demonstrate a disregard for these standards can have significant consequences.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Pablo C. Villaber vs. Commission on Elections and Rep. Douglas R. Cagas, G.R. No. 148326, November 15, 2001