The Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of Section 5 of the Anti-Graft Law, which penalizes certain relatives of high-ranking officials who intervene in government transactions. The Court held that the law is not vague and does not violate due process, emphasizing that its provisions can be understood through standard statutory construction. This ruling reinforces the government’s ability to combat corruption by holding accountable those who abuse their familial connections to influence government dealings, ensuring that public service remains untainted by nepotism and self-interest. This decision underscores the importance of clear, enforceable laws in maintaining integrity in government and protecting public resources.

Alfredo Romualdez and the Anti-Graft Law: Can Family Ties Be a Crime?

This case revolves around Alfredo T. Romualdez, brother-in-law of former President Ferdinand Marcos, who was charged with violating Section 5 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The prosecution alleged that Romualdez intervened in a contract between the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation (NASSCO) and the Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Company (BASECO), a private corporation with Marcos as the majority stockholder. Romualdez sought to dismiss the charges, arguing that Section 5 of the Anti-Graft Law was unconstitutional due to vagueness and that his right to due process was violated during the preliminary investigation. The key legal question is whether Section 5 of Republic Act 3019 is impermissibly vague, violating Romualdez’s rights to due process and to be informed of the nature of the accusation against him.

The Sandiganbayan denied Romualdez’s motions to dismiss, leading him to file a Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of Section 5 of RA 3019, a crucial element in the fight against corruption. The Court emphasized that statutes are presumed valid, and the burden of proving unconstitutionality lies with the challenger. In this case, Romualdez failed to overcome that presumption. The Court referenced previous rulings to establish the test for vagueness, stating that a statute must define an offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited.

“[A] statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that species of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction.”

Building on this principle, the Court found that Section 5 of RA 3019 adequately answers the question, “What is the violation?” The elements of the violation, as outlined by the Court, are:

1. The offender is a spouse or relative within the third civil degree of specified high-ranking officials.
2. The offender intervened directly or indirectly in any business, transaction, contract, or application with the government.

The Court addressed Romualdez’s claim that the term “intervene” is vague, explaining that the absence of a statutory definition does not render the law void for vagueness if the meaning can be determined through judicial construction. Words are to be construed in their ordinary and usual meaning. Thus, “intervene” should be understood in its ordinary acceptation, which is to “to come between.” Therefore, anyone covered by Section 5 of RA 3019 who intervenes in any manner in any business, transaction, contract, or application with the government is criminally liable.

This approach contrasts with Romualdez’s argument that the law must specify every possible act of intervention. The Court reasoned that it is impossible for the law to provide such details in advance, given the uniqueness of each case. However, courts can assess those details once the trial concludes. Therefore, the alleged vagueness of “intervene” is not a valid ground to quash the information before the commencement of the trial. The Court reinforced that the overbreadth and void-for-vagueness doctrines are not applicable in this case, as they primarily apply to free-speech cases.

Furthermore, the Court addressed Romualdez’s argument that the Information itself was unconstitutionally vague because it did not specify the acts of intervention he supposedly performed. The Court clarified that when allegations in the information are vague or indefinite, the remedy is not a motion to quash, but a motion for a bill of particulars under Section 9 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court. The rule merely requires the information to describe the offense with sufficient particularity as to apprise the accused of what they are being charged with, enabling the court to pronounce judgment. Matters of evidence need not be averred in the information; only facts essential to the nature of the offense must be stated.

“Section 9.  Bill of particulars. — The accused may, before arraignment, move for a bill of particulars to enable him properly to plead and prepare for trial.  The motion shall specify the alleged defects of the complaint or information and the details desired.”

The Supreme Court pointed out that the Information sufficiently stated the elements of a violation of Section 5 of RA 3019 and described the offense with such particularity as to enable Romualdez to prepare a defense. Details of the acts he committed are evidentiary matters that need not be alleged. Regarding the issue of the preliminary investigation, the Court noted that Romualdez had already raised this issue previously. The Sandiganbayan suspended the trial and afforded him a reinvestigation by the Ombudsman, following the proper procedure. The failure to conduct a valid preliminary investigation does not warrant the quashal of an information; instead, the trial should be held in abeyance while the preliminary investigation is conducted or completed.

Concerning prescription, the Court stated that this issue should be disregarded since Romualdez failed to challenge the Sandiganbayan’s ruling within the 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari. Additionally, the Court explained that the prescriptive period for cases involving RA 3019 committed before the February 1986 EDSA Revolution should be reckoned from the discovery of the violation. The Court cited Republic v. Desierto, emphasizing that it was well-nigh impossible for the State to have known the violations at the time the transactions were made because officials allegedly conspired with the beneficiaries.

“In the present case, it was well-nigh impossible for the government, the aggrieved party, to have known the violations committed at the time the questioned transactions were made because both parties to the transactions were allegedly in conspiracy to perpetuate fraud against the government.”

Finally, the Court rejected Romualdez’s argument that he enjoyed derivative immunity as a naval aide-de-camp of former President Marcos, relying on Section 17 of Article VII of the 1973 Constitution. The Court pointed out that the immunity amendment became effective only in 1981, while the alleged crime occurred in 1975. Executive immunity applies only during the incumbency of a President and cannot shield a non-sitting President or their close relatives from prosecution for alleged criminal acts done while in office. The Court concluded that Romualdez failed to show that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion, and therefore, the petition was dismissed.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether Section 5 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019) is unconstitutional for being vague, thereby violating Alfredo Romualdez’s right to due process. Romualdez argued that the term “intervene” was not clearly defined.
What is Section 5 of the Anti-Graft Law?	Section 5 of RA 3019 prohibits certain relatives of high-ranking government officials from intervening directly or indirectly in any business, transaction, contract, or application with the government. This provision aims to prevent abuse of power and conflicts of interest.
What does the term “intervention” mean in this context?	The Court defined “intervention” as “to come between,” understanding it in its ordinary and usual sense. This means any act by a prohibited relative that influences or affects a government transaction.
Why did Romualdez argue the law was unconstitutional?	Romualdez argued that the law was unconstitutionally vague because the term “intervene” was not specifically defined, violating his right to be informed of the nature of the accusation against him. He claimed this vagueness infringed on his due process rights.
What was the Court’s response to the vagueness argument?	The Court held that the law was not vague because the term “intervene” could be understood through simple statutory construction and in its ordinary sense. The Court emphasized that statutes are presumed valid unless proven otherwise.
What is a “bill of particulars” and why is it relevant?	A bill of particulars is a motion made by the accused to request more specific details about the charges if the information is vague. The Court noted that Romualdez should have requested a bill of particulars rather than a motion to quash.
What did the Court say about the preliminary investigation?	The Court noted that Romualdez had already been afforded a reinvestigation by the Ombudsman, addressing his concerns about the preliminary investigation. The Court held that any defects in the initial investigation were cured by the subsequent reinvestigation.
What was the Court’s ruling on the issue of prescription?	The Court ruled that the prescriptive period should be counted from the discovery of the offense, not the date of commission, because the alleged violations were concealed. Thus, the filing of the information was within the prescriptive period.
Did Romualdez’s position as a naval aide-de-camp grant him immunity?	No, the Court rejected Romualdez’s claim of derivative immunity, noting that the immunity amendment in the 1973 Constitution was not yet in effect when the alleged crime occurred. Executive immunity applies only to a sitting President.

This case clarifies the scope and constitutionality of Section 5 of the Anti-Graft Law, ensuring that those in positions of power and their relatives are held accountable for actions that undermine public trust and integrity. By upholding the law, the Supreme Court has reinforced the importance of ethical conduct in government and the need to prevent corruption at all levels.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Alfredo T. Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152259, July 29, 2004