In Benjamin Romualdez v. Ombudsman, the Supreme Court ruled that the prescriptive period for offenses under special laws, such as violations of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), is not suspended by the accused’s absence from the Philippines, unless the special law explicitly states otherwise. This means that even if an accused individual leaves the country, the clock continues to run on the time the government has to file charges, potentially leading to the dismissal of cases due to prescription, which significantly affects how long the state has to prosecute individuals for specific crimes.

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Kokoy Romualdez: Can Absence from the Philippines Erase Past Offenses?

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The case revolves around Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez, who faced multiple charges for violating Section 7 of RA 3019 for failing to file his Statements of Assets and Liabilities during his tenures as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and as Technical Assistant in the Department of Foreign Affairs. These alleged offenses spanned from 1963 to 1985. The central legal question was whether the prescriptive period for these offenses had lapsed, especially considering Romualdez’s absence from the Philippines from 1986 to 2000.

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Romualdez argued that the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion by reviving cases previously dismissed by the Sandiganbayan and that the offenses had already prescribed. The Ombudsman and the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) countered that the prescriptive period was interrupted by the initial filing of complaints and Romualdez’s subsequent absence from the country. The Supreme Court had to determine if the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman was valid and whether the offenses had indeed prescribed.

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The Court reiterated its stance that the preliminary investigation was valid, notwithstanding the prior dismissal of the cases due to the informations being filed by an unauthorized party. It cited Section 6, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, which states that an order sustaining a motion to quash does not bar another prosecution for the same offense unless the motion was based on grounds of extinction of criminal liability or double jeopardy. The Court emphasized that the dismissal was due to a procedural defect—an unauthorized party filing the informations—not on the merits of the case.

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Building on this principle, the Court addressed the issue of prescription. It acknowledged that the accused can invoke the defense of prescription even before a trial on the merits. Citing Domingo v. Sandiganbayan, the Court outlined the factors to consider: the prescriptive period, when it begins to run, and when it is interrupted. For violations of Section 7 of RA 3019, the prescriptive period is 10 years for offenses committed before March 16, 1982, and 15 years for those committed afterward, based on amendments to RA 3019 by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195.

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The prescriptive period begins to run from the day of the commission of the violation, or if unknown, from the discovery thereof, according to Section 2 of Act No. 3326. The Court determined that the prescriptive period began on May 8, 1987, the date the complaint was filed with the PCGG by former Solicitor General Francisco Chavez. However, the crucial point of contention was whether Romualdez’s absence from the Philippines interrupted this period.

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The Court disagreed with the argument that Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, which states that the term of prescription should not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago, applied suppletorily. It emphasized that Act No. 3326 is silent on this matter, and this silence is interpreted to mean that the legislature did not intend such an interruption. The principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius—the express mention of one thing excludes all others—was invoked.

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Even with Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code making the Code suppletory to special laws, the Court maintained that Act No. 3326 prevails. Act No. 3326 specifically addresses prescription for offenses under special laws, while the Revised Penal Code applies only when the special laws are silent. To illustrate this, the Court noted that in cases where the Revised Penal Code has been applied suppletorily, the special laws in question lacked provisions on the specific matter at hand, unlike the comprehensive framework provided by Act No. 3326 regarding prescription.

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The Court also addressed concerns about the implications of allowing an accused to benefit from their absence. It acknowledged that the role of the judiciary is to interpret the law, not to question its wisdom or effects. The Court underscored that any ambiguity in the law on prescription should be resolved in favor of the accused, as prescription is an act of amnesty and liberality on the part of the state.

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Furthermore, the Court discussed the nature of prescription, emphasizing that it is not merely a statute of process but an amnesty that the state grants, surrendering its right to prosecute after a certain time. This perspective aligns with the principle that penal statutes should be liberally construed in favor of the defendant. The exceptions to the running of or causes for interruption of the prescriptive periods should not be implied but must be explicitly provided by law.

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Consequently, the Court concluded that the applicable prescriptive periods were not interrupted, and the offenses committed by Romualdez for the years 1963-1982 prescribed on May 8, 1997, while those from 1983-1985 prescribed on May 8, 2002. Thus, when the Office of the Special Prosecutor initiated the preliminary investigation on March 3, 2004, the alleged offenses had already prescribed, and the State had lost its right to prosecute.

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FAQs

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What was the key issue in this case?	The central issue was whether the prescriptive period for offenses under RA 3019 was interrupted by the accused’s absence from the Philippines. The Court had to determine if the principle in Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code applied suppletorily.
What is the prescriptive period for violations of Section 7 of RA 3019?	The prescriptive period is 10 years for offenses committed before March 16, 1982, and 15 years for those committed afterward, based on amendments introduced by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195. This depends on the date the offense was allegedly committed.
When does the prescriptive period begin to run?	According to Section 2 of Act No. 3326, the prescriptive period starts from the day of the commission of the violation or, if unknown, from the discovery thereof. In this case, it was determined to be May 8, 1987.
Does an accused’s absence from the Philippines interrupt the prescriptive period?	The Supreme Court ruled that the accused’s absence does not interrupt the prescriptive period for offenses under special laws unless the law explicitly states otherwise. Act No. 3326, governing prescription for special laws, does not include such a provision.
What is the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius?	This principle means that the express mention of one thing excludes all others. In this context, since Act No. 3326 does not mention absence from the Philippines as a reason to interrupt the prescriptive period, it is excluded.
How does Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code apply in this case?	Article 10 makes the Revised Penal Code supplementary to special laws unless the latter provide to the contrary. However, since Act No. 3326 specifically addresses prescription, it takes precedence over the general provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
What was the Court’s rationale for its decision?	The Court emphasized that prescription is an act of amnesty and liberality by the state, and any ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the accused. The judiciary’s role is to interpret the law, not to question its wisdom.
What happened to the criminal cases against Romualdez?	The Supreme Court ordered the dismissal of Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-231857-04-231860 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, as the alleged offenses had already prescribed.

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This case underscores the importance of clear legislative intent and the specific provisions of special laws in determining the application of prescriptive periods. It clarifies that unless a special law explicitly states that an accused’s absence from the Philippines tolls the prescriptive period, the period continues to run, potentially barring prosecution. This ruling has significant implications for the prosecution of offenses under special laws, requiring the state to act promptly, even when the accused is outside the country.

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For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

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Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: BENJAMIN (