The Supreme Court, in Henry T. Go v. Sandiganbayan, addressed the liability of private individuals conspiring with public officials under Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Court ruled that private individuals can be held liable under this section when they conspire with public officials to enter into contracts that are manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government. This decision clarifies the scope of the anti-graft law, emphasizing that it aims to prevent corruption involving both public officers and private persons, ensuring accountability in government transactions and preventing abuse of power.

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The case stemmed from the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) project. After the Supreme Court nullified the contracts between the government and PIATCO, a complaint was filed, leading to charges against Vicente C. Rivera, then DOTC Secretary, and Henry T. Go, Chairman and President of PIATCO, for violating Section 3(g) of RA 3019. Go, a private individual, sought to quash the information, arguing that the provision applies only to public officers entering into contracts on behalf of the government. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion, prompting Go to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court.

The central issue before the Supreme Court was whether a private individual, like Go, could be held liable under Section 3(g) of RA 3019, which penalizes a public officer who enters “on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same.” Go argued that as a private person, he could not enter into a contract “on behalf of the government,” and therefore, could not be charged under this provision. He also contended that the Information lacked specific details of his participation in the alleged conspiracy.

The Supreme Court disagreed with Go’s narrow interpretation. It emphasized the policy of RA 3019, as stated in Section 1, which aims to repress corrupt practices of both public officers and private persons. The Court cited Luciano v. Estrella, where it was established that Section 3(g) applies to both public officers and private persons. Moreover, Section 9 of RA 3019 provides penalties for “any public officer or private person” committing unlawful acts under Sections 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the Act. This reinforced the Court’s view that the anti-graft law extends to private individuals conspiring with public officers.

Building on this principle, the Court highlighted the significance of conspiracy in holding private individuals accountable. The Court referenced Singian, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, which involved a private person charged with violations of Section 3(e) and (g) of RA 3019 in connection with behest loans. The Supreme Court underscored that private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public officers, can be indicted and held liable under Section 3(g) of RA 3019. This principle was further supported by Domingo v. Sandiganbayan, where a private individual was convicted for conspiring with a public officer in violation of Section 3(h) of RA 3019.

This approach contrasts with Go’s reliance on Marcos v. Sandiganbayan, where former First Lady Imelda Marcos was acquitted of violating Section 3(g) of RA 3019. The Court clarified that Marcos’ acquittal was based on the fact that she signed the lease agreement as a private person, not as a public officer. However, in Go’s case, he was charged in conspiracy with Rivera, a public officer. The Court thus distinguished Go’s case, emphasizing that the element of a public officer was present due to Rivera’s involvement. The Supreme Court thus established that private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of RA 3019.

Furthermore, the Court addressed the dissenting opinion’s argument that the Information lacked specificity regarding Go’s participation in the conspiracy. The Court stated that specific acts and details of Go’s involvement are evidentiary matters that need not be set forth in the Information. According to the Court, to establish conspiracy, direct proof of an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and the decision to commit it is not necessary. It may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during, or after the commission of the crime, revealing a community of criminal design. The specific acts of petitioner Go in the alleged conspiracy with Rivera in violating Section 3(g) of RA 3019 as well as the details on how petitioner Go had taken part in the planning and preparation of the alleged conspiracy need not be set forth in the Information as these are evidentiary matters and, as such, are to be shown and proved during the trial on the merits.

The Supreme Court emphasized that, for purposes of the Information, it is sufficient that the requirements of Section 8, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court are complied with. An accused may file a motion to quash the Information under Section 3(a) of Rule 117 on the grounds that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. In such a case, the fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the material averments of an Information is whether or not the facts alleged therein, which are hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime defined by law.

In essence, the Supreme Court underscored that private individuals cannot escape liability for corrupt practices simply because they are not public officers. When they actively conspire with public officials to engage in transactions that are grossly disadvantageous to the government, they become equally culpable under the anti-graft law. The specific participation and intent are matters to be proven during trial, but the mere fact that a private individual is involved does not automatically shield them from prosecution.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether a private individual could be held liable under Section 3(g) of RA 3019 for conspiring with a public officer to enter into a contract that is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government.
What is Section 3(g) of RA 3019?	Section 3(g) of RA 3019 penalizes a public officer who enters, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.
Can a private individual be charged under RA 3019?	Yes, RA 3019 applies to both public officers and private persons, especially when the private person is acting in conspiracy with a public officer to commit acts of graft and corruption.
What does conspiracy mean in this context?	Conspiracy, in this context, means that the private individual and the public officer acted together with a common design to commit an unlawful act, in this case, entering into a disadvantageous contract.
What was the Court’s ruling in Marcos v. Sandiganbayan?	In Marcos v. Sandiganbayan, the Court acquitted former First Lady Imelda Marcos because she signed the subject lease agreement as a private person, not as a public officer, and her co-accused was acquitted, thus, the element of a public officer was lacking in her case.
What must be proven to establish conspiracy?	To establish conspiracy, direct proof of an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and the decision to commit it is not necessary; it may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during, or after the commission of the crime.
What did Henry Go argue in his defense?	Henry Go argued that as a private individual, he could not enter into a contract on behalf of the government, and therefore, could not be charged under Section 3(g) of RA 3019. He also claimed the information lacked specific details of his involvement.
What is the significance of the ARCA in this case?	The Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA) is central to the case, as it allegedly contained terms that were more beneficial to PIATCO and manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government, thus forming the basis of the charge under Section 3(g).

The Supreme Court’s decision in Henry T. Go v. Sandiganbayan serves as a crucial reminder that the fight against corruption requires holding both public officials and their private collaborators accountable. By clarifying that private individuals can be held liable under Section 3(g) of RA 3019 when they conspire with public officers, the Court has strengthened the legal framework for combating graft and ensuring transparency in government transactions.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: HENRY T. GO, VS. THE FIFTH DIVISION, SANDIGANBAYAN AND THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, G.R. NO. 172602, April 13, 2007