This Supreme Court case clarifies the critical distinction between “actual residence” and “domicile” when determining the proper venue for filing libel cases. The Court ruled that for venue purposes in libel actions, “residence” refers to a person’s actual, physical habitation—where they are currently living—rather than their legal domicile, which is their permanent home. This distinction is crucial because it affects where a libel case can be filed, potentially impacting the convenience and accessibility of justice for both parties involved. The decision emphasizes that a person’s temporary or habitual residence, even if different from their domicile, is the determining factor for venue.

Libel in Las Piñas or Cagayan: Where Does Justice Reside?

The case of Ang Kek Chen v. Spouses Atty. Eleazar S. Calasan and Leticia B. Calasan arose from a libel complaint filed by the Calasan spouses in Aparri, Cagayan, against Ang Kek Chen. The core issue revolved around whether Aparri was the proper venue for the case, considering that Atty. Calasan, while domiciled in Aparri, also maintained a residence in Las Piñas, Metro Manila. Ang Kek Chen argued that the libel case should have been filed in Metro Manila, where Atty. Calasan actually resided. The initial ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Aparri, Cagayan, favored Ang Kek Chen, dismissing the complaint due to improper venue. However, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed this decision, leading to the Supreme Court appeal.

At the heart of the legal debate was the interpretation of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, which governs the venue for libel cases. This provision states that libel cases can be filed in the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published, or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the offense. The Supreme Court emphasized the significance of the term “actually resides,” differentiating it from “domicile.”

The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense x x x

The Court referenced the landmark case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, which elucidated the distinction between actual residence and domicile. According to Garcia Fule, “resides” connotes “actual residence” as opposed to “legal residence or domicile.” The Supreme Court highlighted that residence, in the context of venue statutes, signifies a person’s personal, actual, or physical habitation—their actual residence or place of abode.

[T]he term “resides” connotes ex vi termini “actual residence” as distinguished from “legal residence or domicile.” … In the application of venue statutes and rules—x x x residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. … In other words, “resides” should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.

Building on this principle, the Court noted that while Atty. Calasan’s domicile was indeed in Aparri, Cagayan, his actual residence at the time of the alleged libel was in Las Piñas, Metro Manila. This determination was based on the fact that he maintained a house in Las Piñas where he and his family lived, and he also held a Community Tax Certificate (CTC) indicating his address in Las Piñas.

The Court contrasted the terms “residence” and “domicile,” citing Saludo, Jr. v. American Express International, Inc., where residence for venue purposes was defined as “the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode…signifying physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat.” The Court also cited Koh v. Court of Appeals, emphasizing that a person may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another, and that residence requires only bodily presence as an inhabitant, while domicile also requires the intention to make it one’s domicile. Thus, maintaining a residence in Las Piñas did not necessitate abandoning his domicile in Aparri.

The Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals erred in equating “residence” with “domicile” for the purpose of determining venue in the libel case. The trial court was correct in its initial assessment that the respondents actually resided in Las Piñas during the relevant period, despite their legal domicile being in Aparri. Therefore, the proper venue for the libel case was Metro Manila, not Aparri, Cagayan. The ruling emphasized the importance of the offended party’s actual residence at the time of the alleged libel, rather than their legal domicile, in determining the appropriate venue.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision and reinstated the trial court’s order dismissing the complaint due to improper venue. This decision reaffirms the distinction between residence and domicile and its importance in determining the proper venue for libel cases. It serves as a reminder to litigants and legal practitioners alike to carefully consider the actual residence of the parties involved when choosing the correct venue for filing a case.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was determining the proper venue for a libel case, specifically whether “residence” in Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code refers to actual residence or legal domicile.
What is the difference between residence and domicile?	Residence refers to a person’s actual, physical habitation or place of abode, while domicile refers to a person’s fixed, permanent home to which they intend to return. A person can have multiple residences but only one domicile.
Why is the distinction between residence and domicile important in this case?	The distinction is crucial because Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code states that libel cases can be filed where the offended party “actually resides,” which the Court interpreted as actual residence, not legal domicile, for venue purposes.
Where did the offended party (Atty. Calasan) actually reside at the time of the alleged libel?	The Court determined that Atty. Calasan actually resided in Las Piñas, Metro Manila, at the time of the alleged libel, even though his legal domicile was in Aparri, Cagayan.
What was the Court’s ruling in this case?	The Supreme Court ruled that the proper venue for the libel case was Metro Manila, where Atty. Calasan actually resided, not Aparri, Cagayan, where he was domiciled.
What is the practical implication of this ruling?	The ruling clarifies that for libel cases, the venue is determined by the offended party’s actual residence at the time of the offense, not their legal domicile. This affects where the case can be filed.
How did the Court interpret the term “actually resides” in Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code?	The Court interpreted “actually resides” as the personal, actual, or physical habitation of a person, which signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat, rather than legal residence or domicile.
What previous cases did the Supreme Court cite in its decision?	The Court cited Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, Saludo, Jr. v. American Express International, Inc., and Koh v. Court of Appeals to support its interpretation of “residence” and “domicile.”
Can a person have a residence different from their domicile?	Yes, a person can have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence simply requires bodily presence in a place, while domicile requires both bodily presence and the intention to make it one’s permanent home.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in Ang Kek Chen v. Spouses Atty. Eleazar S. Calasan provides a clear distinction between “residence” and “domicile” in the context of determining venue for libel cases. This clarification ensures that libel cases are filed in locations most relevant to the parties involved, considering their actual living arrangements at the time of the alleged offense.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Ang Kek Chen v. Spouses Atty. Eleazar S. Calasan and Leticia B. Calasan, G.R. No. 161685, July 24, 2007