The Supreme Court has affirmed that a final conviction carrying the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification overrides the Local Government Code’s provisions on eligibility for holding local office. This means that individuals convicted of crimes resulting in perpetual disqualification cannot run for local office, even after serving their sentence, unless expressly pardoned from this specific disqualification. The ruling clarifies the interplay between the Revised Penal Code and the Local Government Code, ensuring that those deemed unfit due to serious criminal convictions remain ineligible for public office, safeguarding the integrity of the electoral process.

Romeo’s Run: Can a Commuted Sentence Erase a Lifetime Ban from Public Office?

This case revolves around Romeo G. Jalosjos’s attempt to run for mayor of Zamboanga City despite a prior conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness, which carried the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification. Jalosjos argued that Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code (LGC) removed this disqualification, as it allows individuals to run for local office two years after serving a sentence for offenses involving moral turpitude. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disagreed, canceling his certificate of candidacy (CoC) based on his existing perpetual disqualification and failure to meet voter registration requirements. This prompted Jalosjos to seek recourse with the Supreme Court, questioning the COMELEC’s authority and the continued applicability of his disqualification.

At the heart of the matter lies the conflict between two legal provisions: Section 40(a) of the LGC and Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Section 40(a) seemingly provides a path for prior convicts to re-enter local politics after a waiting period. However, Article 30, in conjunction with Article 41 of the RPC, imposes perpetual absolute disqualification as an accessory penalty for certain grave offenses, barring individuals from holding public office. The Supreme Court needed to determine whether the LGC effectively amended or superseded the RPC in cases involving perpetual disqualification. This is a crucial point that shapes the boundaries of who is eligible to seek and hold public office.

The Court emphasized the principle of statutory construction, stating that new laws should harmonize with existing ones on the same subject matter. It clarified that Section 40(a) of the LGC applies generally to those convicted of offenses involving moral turpitude, but it does not override the specific provisions of the RPC that impose perpetual disqualification. This distinction is critical because the RPC’s provisions directly address the fitness of individuals convicted of serious crimes to hold public office, reflecting a policy decision that such individuals should be permanently excluded from governance. The Court highlighted that allowing the LGC to supersede the RPC in these cases would undermine the integrity of public service and the public’s trust in elected officials.

“Even without a petition under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or under Section 40 of the Local Government Code, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction.”

The Court also addressed the COMELEC’s authority to motu proprio (on its own initiative) cancel Jalosjos’s CoC. It distinguished between the COMELEC’s quasi-judicial and administrative functions. While quasi-judicial functions require a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc, administrative functions do not. In this case, the Court held that the COMELEC was exercising its administrative function of enforcing election laws by canceling Jalosjos’s CoC based on his existing perpetual disqualification. This is because the fact of his disqualification was already established by a final judgment, making the COMELEC’s action a ministerial duty rather than a quasi-judicial determination.

Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification remains in effect even if the principal penalty is commuted, unless expressly remitted in the pardon. In Jalosjos’s case, his prison term was commuted, but the disqualification was not lifted. Thus, he remained ineligible to run for public office. This reinforces the idea that the disqualification is a separate and distinct consequence of the conviction, intended to protect the public interest by preventing individuals deemed unfit from holding positions of power. By upholding this principle, the Court ensures that serious criminal convictions have lasting consequences for an individual’s ability to participate in governance.

“The accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification takes effect immediately once the judgment of conviction becomes final. The effectivity of this accessory penalty does not depend on the duration of the principal penalty, or on whether the convict serves his jail sentence or not.”

The Supreme Court ultimately dismissed Jalosjos’s petition, affirming the COMELEC’s decision to cancel his CoC. The Court ruled that Section 40(a) of the LGC did not remove the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification imposed on Jalosjos. Therefore, his attempt to run for mayor was barred by his prior conviction and the resulting disqualification. This decision underscores the enduring consequences of criminal convictions on an individual’s right to hold public office and reaffirms the COMELEC’s authority to enforce election laws and ensure the integrity of the electoral process. This also highlights the principle that the COMELEC can act on its own to enforce these laws.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The primary issue was whether a prior conviction carrying the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification could be overridden by the Local Government Code’s provisions allowing individuals to run for local office after serving their sentence.
What crimes led to Jalosjos’s disqualification?	Jalosjos was convicted of two counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness, which resulted in the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification from holding public office.
What is perpetual absolute disqualification?	Perpetual absolute disqualification is an accessory penalty that permanently deprives a convicted individual of the right to vote and to be elected or appointed to any public office.
Did the commutation of Jalosjos’s sentence remove his disqualification?	No, the commutation of Jalosjos’s sentence only reduced his prison term but did not remove the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification.
What is the significance of Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code?	Section 40(a) of the LGC disqualifies those sentenced by final judgment for offenses involving moral turpitude or punishable by imprisonment of one year or more, within two years after serving the sentence; however, it does not override perpetual disqualifications under the Revised Penal Code.
What was the COMELEC’s role in this case?	The COMELEC canceled Jalosjos’s certificate of candidacy based on his existing perpetual disqualification and failure to meet voter registration requirements, acting in its administrative capacity to enforce election laws.
What is the difference between the COMELEC’s quasi-judicial and administrative functions?	The COMELEC’s quasi-judicial functions involve resolving disputes and making decisions based on evidence and legal arguments, while its administrative functions involve implementing and enforcing election laws.
Can the COMELEC cancel a certificate of candidacy on its own initiative?	Yes, the COMELEC can cancel a certificate of candidacy on its own initiative (motu proprio) when the grounds for cancellation are already established by a final judgment, such as a prior conviction resulting in perpetual disqualification.
What is the principle of lex specialis derogat generali?	This principle means that a special law prevails over a general law on the same subject matter. In this case, the specific provisions of the Revised Penal Code on perpetual disqualification take precedence over the general provisions of the Local Government Code.

The Supreme Court’s decision in this case reaffirms the importance of upholding the integrity of public office and ensuring that those who hold positions of power are of the highest moral character. It underscores the enduring consequences of criminal convictions and the COMELEC’s authority to enforce election laws to protect the public interest. The ruling provides clarity on the interplay between different legal provisions and serves as a reminder that perpetual disqualification is a serious penalty that cannot be easily circumvented.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: ROMEO G. JALOSJOS v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205033, June 18, 2013