In People of the Philippines v. Jojo Sumilhig, et al., G.R. No. 178115, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of Jojo Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli for two counts of murder and two counts of frustrated murder. The Court emphasized that positive identification by witnesses holds more weight than alibis presented by the accused. Furthermore, the Court found that the coordinated actions of the assailants indicated a conspiracy, and the sudden, unexpected attack on the victims demonstrated treachery, thus qualifying the killings as murder.
When a Vendetta Turns Deadly: Unpacking Conspiracy and Treachery in the Santander House Strafing
The case revolves around the tragic events of October 31, 1998, in Kiblawan, Davao del Sur, where the house of Eugenio Santander was strafed, resulting in the deaths of Cresjoy and Rolly Santander, and serious injuries to Marissa and Micel Santander. Jojo Sumilhig, Ricardo Sumilhig (deceased during the appeal), Pasot Saloli, and several others were charged with double murder and double frustrated murder. The prosecution’s case hinged on the testimony of Jerry Masaglang and Mario Santander, who positively identified the appellants as the perpetrators of the crime.
The defense presented alibis, with Jojo claiming he was at his in-laws’ house, and both Carding and Pasot asserting they were elsewhere at the time of the shooting. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) initially convicted the appellants of the complex crime of double murder with double frustrated murder, but the Court of Appeals (CA) modified this to two counts of murder and two counts of frustrated murder. The Supreme Court then took up the matter to resolve issues surrounding conspiracy, treachery, and the validity of the convictions.
At the heart of the Supreme Court’s decision was the principle that positive identification by credible witnesses outweighs the defense of alibi. The Court noted that Jerry Masaglang was only six meters away from the assailants during the strafing, the moon was bright, and he was familiar with all the accused, some of whom were his relatives. Mario Santander also knew Jojo Sumilhig since he was a child, further solidifying the identification. As the Court stated,
“[t]ime-tested is the rule that between the positive assertions of prosecution witnesses and the negative averments of the accused, the former undisputedly [deserve] more credence and [are] entitled to greater evidentiary weight.”
This firmly establishes the legal preference for direct, credible eyewitness testimony over an accused’s claim of being elsewhere.
The Court also addressed the issue of conspiracy, which is defined in Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code as:
“[C]onspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.”
While there was no direct evidence of a prior agreement, the Court inferred conspiracy from the coordinated actions of the accused. They were all armed, approached the house surreptitiously, simultaneously opened fire, and fled together. This implied a joint purpose and concerted action, leading the Court to conclude that the accused acted in conspiracy. This inference is permissible under the law, which does not require direct proof of a prior agreement but allows conspiracy to be established through circumstantial evidence.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court upheld the finding of treachery, as defined in Article 14(16) of the Revised Penal Code:
“There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure the execution, without risk to himself arising from [any] defense which the offended party might make.”
The sudden and unexpected nature of the attack, where the victims were caught off guard and unable to defend themselves, constituted treachery. The victims were unaware of the impending assault, leaving them vulnerable to the hail of bullets fired at close range. This element qualified the killings as murder, as treachery elevates a simple killing to a more heinous crime.
With the presence of treachery, the killings of Cresjoy and Rolly Santander were correctly categorized as murder. The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death. Since there were no aggravating circumstances other than treachery, the Court affirmed the CA’s imposition of reclusion perpetua for each count of murder, but clarified that the appellants were not eligible for parole, in accordance with Republic Act No. 9346. This clarifies the strict application of penalties for heinous crimes and the limitations on parole eligibility.
Regarding Marissa and Micel Santander, who sustained gunshot wounds, the Court agreed with the CA that these were frustrated murders. The Medico Legal report and Certificate of Treatment/Confinement confirmed the seriousness of their injuries, which would have resulted in death without timely medical intervention. The penalty for frustrated murder is one degree lower than that of murder, which is reclusion temporal. The Court then applied the Indeterminate Sentence Law to determine the specific prison terms, setting the minimum penalty at six years and one day of prision mayor and the maximum at fourteen years, eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal for each count of frustrated murder.
Finally, the Court addressed the matter of damages. For the murders of Cresjoy and Rolly, the Court increased the civil indemnity to P75,000.00 for each death, in line with prevailing jurisprudence. The awards for moral damages (P50,000.00 each) and exemplary damages (P30,000.00 each) were deemed proper. Furthermore, the Court awarded temperate damages of P25,000.00 for each death in lieu of actual damages, acknowledging the difficulty in proving actual pecuniary loss. The Court also adjusted the amounts for moral and exemplary damages for the frustrated murders of Marissa and Micel, reducing them to P40,000.00 and P20,000.00, respectively, and awarding temperate damages of P25,000.00 each. All damages were subjected to a 6% per annum interest from the date of finality of the judgment until fully paid, ensuring that the victims’ families receive just compensation.
FAQs
What was the key issue in this case? | The key issue was whether the accused were guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and frustrated murder, considering their defenses of alibi and the prosecution’s evidence of conspiracy and treachery. |
What is the significance of positive identification in this case? | The positive identification of the accused by credible witnesses was crucial. The Supreme Court gave more weight to the witnesses’ testimonies than to the alibis presented by the defense. |
How did the Court define conspiracy in this context? | The Court defined conspiracy as an agreement between two or more persons to commit a felony. Though no direct evidence was present, it was inferred from the coordinated actions of the accused. |
What constitutes treachery under the Revised Penal Code? | Treachery exists when the offender employs means to ensure the execution of the crime without risk to themselves, arising from any defense the offended party might make. |
What penalties were imposed for the crime of murder in this case? | The penalty imposed for each count of murder was reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole, in accordance with existing laws and jurisprudence. |
What were the penalties for frustrated murder? | For each count of frustrated murder, the accused were sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. |
What types of damages were awarded to the victims? | The damages awarded included civil indemnity, moral damages, exemplary damages, and temperate damages. The amounts varied based on whether the victim was killed or injured. |
What happened to Ricardo Sumilhig’s case after his death? | Due to Ricardo Sumilhig’s death during the pendency of the appeal, his criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto were extinguished, and the case against him was dismissed. |
This case underscores the importance of eyewitness testimony, the legal implications of coordinated criminal actions, and the severity of penalties for crimes committed with treachery. The Supreme Court’s decision serves as a reminder that positive identification and circumstantial evidence can establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, even in the absence of direct proof.
For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.
Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: People v. Sumilhig, G.R. No. 178115, July 28, 2014
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