In Garcia v. Sesbreño, the Supreme Court affirmed the disbarment of a lawyer previously convicted of homicide, establishing that a conviction for homicide can involve moral turpitude depending on the circumstances. This ruling underscores the high ethical standards required of members of the legal profession, emphasizing that actions reflecting moral depravity can disqualify an individual from practicing law, even if the criminal act itself does not always equate to moral turpitude.

From Homicide to Disbarment: Can Past Crimes Define a Lawyer’s Future?

The case began with two disbarment complaints filed by Dr. Melvyn G. Garcia against Atty. Raul H. Sesbreño. These complaints, A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457, were consolidated by the Court. Garcia alleged that Sesbreño’s prior conviction for homicide in Criminal Case No. CBU-31733, and his subsequent release on parole, should disqualify him from continuing to practice law. Central to Garcia’s argument was the assertion that homicide, under the circumstances of Sesbreño’s case, constituted a crime involving moral turpitude.

Sesbreño countered that his sentence had been commuted and that the disqualifying accessory penalties were either removed or no longer applicable. He further argued that homicide, in general, does not involve moral turpitude. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) investigated the matter, focusing on the critical question of whether Sesbreño’s homicide conviction involved moral turpitude. The IBP-CBD reviewed the facts of the homicide case, where Sesbreño, without provocation, fired a rifle at two individuals, killing one. The IBP-CBD found that the circumstances surrounding the death of Luciano Amparado bore the “earmarks of moral turpitude,” leading to a recommendation for Sesbreño’s disbarment, which the IBP Board of Governors adopted.

The Supreme Court agreed with the IBP’s findings, emphasizing Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which allows for disbarment or suspension of an attorney convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. The Court reiterated that moral turpitude involves acts of baseness, vileness, or depravity that violate the duties one owes to society. The critical point, as the Court noted in International Rice Research Institute v. NLRC, is that not all convictions of homicide involve moral turpitude; it depends on the degree of the crime and the surrounding circumstances.

This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of homicide do not involve moral turpitude. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances.

In Sesbreño’s case, the Court scrutinized the details of the homicide and concurred with the IBP-CBD that Sesbreño’s actions reflected moral turpitude. The Court highlighted that the victim and his companion were merely passing by Sesbreño’s house and did nothing to provoke the attack. Sesbreño’s decision to fire a rifle at them without any justification demonstrated a severe lack of moral character and fitness to practice law.

Sesbreño argued that the executive clemency he received restored his full civil and political rights, citing In re Atty. Parcasio. However, the Court distinguished Sesbreño’s case, noting that the executive clemency granted to Atty. Parcasio was “absolute and unconditional,” restoring all his rights. In contrast, Sesbreño’s commutation of sentence did not explicitly restore his accessory penalties. A commutation only reduces the penalty, it does not fully extinguish criminal liability. Moreover, the Final Release and Discharge specified that any accessory penalties not expressly remitted would remain in effect.

The Court firmly rejected Sesbreño’s argument, stating that even if a pardon had been granted, the records did not indicate it was full and unconditional. The Court also emphasized that the practice of law is a privilege, not a right, and is granted only to those who possess good moral character. A violation of the high moral standards required of legal professionals justifies imposing appropriate penalties, including disbarment. In conclusion, the Supreme Court found that Sesbreño’s conviction for homicide, given the circumstances, involved moral turpitude, warranting his disbarment.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether Atty. Raul H. Sesbreño’s prior conviction for homicide involved moral turpitude, which would warrant his disbarment. The Supreme Court examined the circumstances of the crime to determine if it met the threshold for moral turpitude.
What is moral turpitude?	Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a person owes to fellow men or to society in general, and is contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. It involves inherently immoral or flagrant offenses that shock the moral conscience of the community.
Why was Atty. Sesbreño disbarred?	Atty. Sesbreño was disbarred because the Supreme Court found that his conviction for homicide involved moral turpitude, given the circumstances of the crime. He fired a rifle at two individuals without provocation, leading to the death of one, which reflected a severe lack of moral character.
Did the executive clemency affect the disbarment?	No, the executive clemency did not prevent the disbarment. The Court clarified that the commutation of his sentence did not restore his full civil and political rights and that any accessory penalties not expressly remitted would remain in effect.
Is a homicide conviction always grounds for disbarment?	No, a homicide conviction is not always grounds for disbarment. The Court noted that whether homicide involves moral turpitude depends on the degree of the crime and the surrounding circumstances; it is a case-by-case determination.
What is the significance of Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court?	Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court allows the Supreme Court to disbar or suspend an attorney if they are convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. This rule is central to maintaining the ethical standards of the legal profession.
What was the IBP’s role in this case?	The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) investigated the disbarment complaints against Atty. Sesbreño. The IBP-CBD reviewed the facts of the homicide conviction and recommended disbarment, which was then adopted by the IBP Board of Governors.
What is the difference between commutation and pardon?	Commutation is a reduction of the penalty imposed for a crime but does not fully extinguish criminal liability. Pardon, on the other hand, may be full and unconditional, restoring all civil and political rights, or conditional, depending on the terms set forth.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Garcia v. Sesbreño reaffirms the importance of maintaining high moral standards within the legal profession. This ruling serves as a stark reminder that actions reflecting moral depravity, even if they occurred in the past, can have severe consequences on an attorney’s career. The case highlights the Court’s commitment to ensuring that only individuals of good moral character are allowed to practice law, thereby upholding the integrity of the legal system.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: MELVYN G. GARCIA VS. ATTY. RAUL H. SESBREÑO, G.R No. 58936, February 03, 2015