The Supreme Court held that a consultant providing services to a government entity is not considered a government employee. This means prior dismissals from government service, which carry disqualifications for future employment, do not automatically bar individuals from being engaged as consultants. The ruling clarifies the distinction between holding a public office and providing contractual services, affecting the scope of disqualifications for individuals previously penalized in government service. The decision emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between an employer-employee relationship and a client-professional relationship.

Consultant or Public Officer? When a Prior Dismissal Doesn’t Disqualify

This case revolves around Edward Thomas F. Joson’s complaint against Governor Aurelio M. Umali and several other officials of Nueva Ecija. Joson alleged that Governor Umali unlawfully appointed Ferdinand R. Abesamis as a consultant, despite Abesamis’ prior dismissal from his position as Senior State Prosecutor due to “conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.” This dismissal, Joson argued, carried a perpetual disqualification from re-employment in government service, making Abesamis’ consultancy contract illegal. The core legal question is whether a consultancy contract constitutes ‘government service’ and therefore falls under the purview of disqualifications arising from prior administrative penalties.

Joson’s complaint centered on alleged violations of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), concerning unlawful appointments. He argued that the consultancy contracts between the Province of Nueva Ecija and Abesamis, executed in 2007 and 2008, were invalid because Abesamis was disqualified from holding any government position due to his prior dismissal. Joson further contended that the retroactive effectivity of the second contract was illegal and that the payment of honoraria to Abesamis constituted unwarranted benefit, causing damage to the taxpayers of Nueva Ecija.

Governor Umali countered that the consultancy services provided by Abesamis did not constitute government service under the Civil Service Law, Rules and Regulations. He emphasized that Abesamis was engaged for a short duration, paid honoraria instead of a salary, and did not receive benefits typically enjoyed by government employees. Umali also stated he sought legal advice from the Provincial Legal Office, which assured him there was no legal impediment to engaging Abesamis’ services. Furthermore, he explained the discrepancy in the contract’s execution date as an inadvertent error.

The Office of the Ombudsman dismissed Joson’s criminal and administrative complaints, finding insufficient evidence to indict the respondents. The Ombudsman reasoned that Abesamis was not appointed to a public office through the consultancy contracts because his rights, authority, and duties arose from the contract, not law. He was not vested with sovereign authority, and the contracts were of limited duration. Moreover, Abesamis did not receive government employee benefits and service contracts were not considered government service under the Revised Omnibus Rules on Appointments and other Personnel Actions.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Ombudsman’s decision, emphasizing the broad discretion of the Ombudsman in determining probable cause. The Court found no grave abuse of discretion in the Ombudsman’s dismissal of the charges. Probable cause requires only evidence showing that a crime has likely been committed and that the accused likely committed it; it does not demand clear and convincing evidence of guilt. The Court cited Vergara v. The Hon. Ombudsman, stating:

Probable cause is defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, or on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt, but it certainly demands more than bare suspicion and can never be left to presupposition, conjecture, or even convincing logic.

The Court agreed with the Ombudsman’s assessment that the consultancy contracts did not constitute an appointment to public office. This distinction is crucial because disqualifications arising from administrative penalties generally apply to government employment, not contractual services. The Court referred to Posadas v. Sandiganbayan, which held that consultancy services are not considered government service:

Pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 93-1881 dated May 25, 1993, a contract for consultancy services is not covered by Civil Service Law, rules and regulations because the said position is not found in the index of position titles approved by DBM. Accordingly, it does not need the approval of the CSC. xxx A “consultant” is defined as one who provides professional advice on matters within the field of his specific knowledge or training. There is no employer-employee relationship in the engagement of a consultant but that of client-professional relationship.

The Supreme Court also noted that Abesamis did not take an oath of office, a requirement for all public officers and employees. This further supported the conclusion that his engagement was contractual rather than an appointment to a public office. Moreover, the Court emphasized that the Ombudsman found no undue injury to the government, as Abesamis performed his contractual duties, justifying the payment of his honoraria. The Ombudsman also noted that Governor Umali acted in good faith, relying on opinions from the Civil Service Commission, DILG, and the Provincial Legal Office.

The Court reiterated its policy of non-interference with the Ombudsman’s exercise of investigatory and prosecutory powers, absent grave abuse of discretion. It emphasized that a finding of probable cause, or lack thereof, is a factual finding generally not reviewable by the Court. Additionally, the Court observed that the administrative charge of gross misconduct had attained finality because Joson failed to file a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA).

Ultimately, the Supreme Court upheld the Ombudsman’s decision, finding no basis to overturn it. The distinction between a consultant and a public officer is crucial in determining the applicability of disqualifications arising from prior administrative penalties. Individuals previously dismissed from government service may still be engaged as consultants, provided their engagement does not create an employer-employee relationship and is governed by a contractual agreement.

FAQs

What was the central issue in this case?	The key issue was whether a consultancy contract with the government constitutes ‘government service,’ thereby subjecting the consultant to disqualifications arising from prior administrative penalties.
Who was Ferdinand R. Abesamis?	Ferdinand R. Abesamis was a former Senior State Prosecutor who had been dismissed from service. He was later engaged as a consultant by the Province of Nueva Ecija.
What was Edward Thomas F. Joson’s complaint?	Joson alleged that Governor Umali unlawfully appointed Abesamis as a consultant, despite his prior dismissal, which Joson claimed carried a perpetual disqualification from re-employment in government service.
What did the Ombudsman decide?	The Ombudsman dismissed Joson’s criminal and administrative complaints, finding insufficient evidence to indict the respondents. They reasoned that Abesamis was not appointed to a public office.
What did the Supreme Court rule?	The Supreme Court affirmed the Ombudsman’s decision, holding that a consultancy contract does not constitute ‘government service’ and that Abesamis’ prior dismissal did not disqualify him from being engaged as a consultant.
What is the difference between a consultant and a public officer?	A consultant provides professional advice based on a contractual agreement, while a public officer holds a position created by law and exercises sovereign authority. The key difference lies in the nature of the relationship and the source of their authority.
Why didn’t Abesamis taking an oath of office matter?	The absence of an oath of office reinforced the idea that Abesamis was engaged contractually rather than appointed to a public office. Taking an oath is mandatory for all appointed employees.
What does this ruling mean for individuals previously dismissed from government service?	This ruling clarifies that prior dismissals do not automatically bar individuals from being engaged as consultants, provided their engagement does not create an employer-employee relationship and is governed by a contractual agreement.

This case highlights the importance of clearly defining the nature of engagements with government entities. The Supreme Court’s decision provides valuable guidance on distinguishing between government employment and contractual services, particularly in the context of disqualifications arising from prior administrative penalties. Moving forward, government agencies should carefully structure consultancy contracts to ensure they do not inadvertently create employer-employee relationships, thereby avoiding potential legal challenges.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Edward Thomas F. Joson v. The Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 210220-21, April 06, 2016