In People v. Fabro, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of Zenaida Fabro for Serious Illegal Detention, emphasizing that the unlawful deprivation of a minor’s liberty does not require physical restraint. The ruling clarifies that even if a child is not physically confined, taking them to an unfamiliar place against their will constitutes illegal detention. The Court underscored the vulnerability of minors and the presumption of their inability to give informed consent, reinforcing protections against those who exploit that vulnerability.

When a ‘Favor’ Becomes a Felony: Examining the Illegal Detention of a Minor

The case began with an Information dated March 6, 2006, accusing Zenaida Fabro of Serious Illegal Detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, in relation to Republic Act No. 7610. The charge stemmed from the events of March 2, 2006, when Zenaida Fabro allegedly took a 9-year-old girl, AAA, from her school, XXX Elementary School in YYY, and detained her in Nueva Ecija until March 5, 2006. The prosecution presented evidence that Fabro, purportedly AAA’s aunt, fetched her from school, but instead of taking her home, she transported her to Nueva Ecija against her will, ignoring her pleas to return home and her parents’ phone calls. Fabro claimed she had the consent of AAA’s mother and teacher, but the court found her guilty, a decision later affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

At the heart of this case is Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and penalizes kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Specifically, the law states:

Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. – Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained, or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer.

The elements of the crime are clear: the offender must be a private individual who kidnaps or detains another, thereby depriving them of their liberty. The act must be illegal, and the victim must be a minor. The Court found that all these elements were present in Fabro’s actions. Crucially, the duration of the detention is immaterial when the victim is a minor, underscoring the heightened protection afforded to children under the law. This legislative approach reflects the State’s commitment to safeguarding the welfare of children, recognizing their vulnerability and the potential for exploitation.

Fabro argued that AAA was not deprived of her liberty because she was not physically restrained and was free to interact with others. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, citing established jurisprudence that curtailment of liberty does not require physical restraint. As the Court stated in People v. Bisda, the victim’s liberty can be compromised even without physical barriers:

…to accept a child’s desire for food, comfort as the type of will or consent contemplated in the context of kidnapping would render the concept meaningless.

In this context, the court emphasized the psychological and emotional control exerted by the abductor over the child. The court illustrated this point by noting that AAA was taken to an unfamiliar place where she did not know the way home, effectively placing her freedom at the mercy and control of Fabro. The court also referenced People v. Acosta, stating that “because of his tender age and the fact that he did not know the way back home, he was then and there in a way deprived of his liberty.”

The defense further challenged AAA’s credibility, pointing to inconsistencies between her sworn statement and her testimony. However, the Court dismissed this argument, stating that discrepancies between affidavits and court testimonies are common and do not necessarily discredit a witness. The court, citing People v. Dayaday, emphasized that ex parte affidavits are often incomplete and considered inferior to testimony given in open court. Any inconsistencies, the court argued, serve to strengthen the witness’s credibility by dispelling any suspicion of rehearsed testimony. Ultimately, the essence of kidnapping lies in the deprivation of liberty and the intent to effect such deprivation, both of which were evident in Fabro’s actions.

The Court also rejected Fabro’s claim that she had the consent of AAA’s mother, citing the immediate police report and the mother’s plea for AAA’s return as evidence to the contrary. Furthermore, the Court stated that the consent of a minor is irrelevant in cases of illegal detention, as minors are presumed incapable of giving informed consent. This legal principle underscores the protective stance of the law towards children, recognizing their vulnerability and the potential for exploitation.

Fabro’s defense of denial was also deemed insufficient by the court. Denial is considered a weak defense, particularly when faced with the credible testimony of prosecution witnesses who have no apparent motive to lie. The Court highlighted that AAA’s testimony was consistent and corroborated by the circumstances of the case, further undermining Fabro’s defense.

The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision, finding Fabro guilty of Serious Illegal Detention and sentencing her to reclusion perpetua. Additionally, the Court adjusted the monetary awards, reducing moral damages to PhP75,000 and adding a civil indemnity of PhP75,000 and exemplary damages of PhP75,000, all subject to a six percent interest rate per annum from the finality of the decision until fully paid. This adjustment reflects the Court’s commitment to ensuring adequate compensation for the victim while aligning the awards with prevailing jurisprudence.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether Zenaida Fabro unlawfully deprived a minor, AAA, of her liberty, constituting serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. The court examined whether the absence of physical restraint negated the element of deprivation of liberty.
What are the elements of serious illegal detention?	The elements include: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) they kidnap or detain another, depriving them of liberty; (3) the act is illegal; and (4) the victim is a minor. If the victim is a minor, the duration of detention is immaterial.
Did the court consider AAA’s consent to going with Fabro?	No, the court did not consider AAA’s supposed consent as valid because, as a minor, she was presumed incapable of giving informed consent. The law presumes a lack of consent when the victim is a minor.
Why were discrepancies in AAA’s statements not fatal to the prosecution’s case?	The court explained that discrepancies between affidavits and court testimonies are common and often due to the incomplete nature of affidavits. Such discrepancies do not automatically discredit a witness, especially when their testimony remains consistent in essential details.
What was the significance of Fabro taking AAA to an unfamiliar place?	Taking AAA to Nueva Ecija, a place unfamiliar to her, was significant because it effectively placed her freedom under Fabro’s control. The court noted that being in an unfamiliar location where she did not know the way home constituted deprivation of liberty.
What was Fabro’s defense, and why did it fail?	Fabro’s defense was that she had AAA’s mother’s consent and that AAA was not physically restrained. This defense failed because the court found no credible evidence of the mother’s consent and emphasized that physical restraint is not required for illegal detention.
What penalty did Fabro receive?	Fabro was sentenced to reclusion perpetua, which is imprisonment for life. She was also ordered to pay moral damages, civil indemnity, and exemplary damages to the victim.
How did the court address the issue of intent in this case?	The court stated that the specific intent in kidnapping or illegal detention is to deprive the victim of their liberty. The prosecution established that Fabro intended to deprive AAA of her freedom, as well as her parents’ custody of her, by taking her to Nueva Ecija against her will.

This case reinforces the importance of protecting children from exploitation and unlawful detention. The ruling serves as a reminder that depriving a minor of their liberty, even without physical restraint, is a serious offense with severe consequences. The court’s decision reaffirms the principle that the welfare of children is paramount and that their vulnerability must be safeguarded by the full force of the law.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: People of the Philippines vs. Zenaida Fabro or Zenaida Manalastas y Viñegas, G.R. No. 208441, July 17, 2017