The Supreme Court ruled that the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing criminal complaints against a public official, Atty. Terencia S. Erni-Rivera, for lack of probable cause. The Court emphasized that the Ombudsman’s determination of probable cause is discretionary and will be respected unless tainted by grave abuse. This decision reinforces the principle that the Ombudsman’s investigatory and prosecutorial powers are broad but not absolute, subject to judicial review only when exercised arbitrarily.
Navigating the Nuances: When Does Disagreement Become Abuse of Power?
The case revolves around a Petition for Certiorari filed by the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) against the Office of the Ombudsman and Atty. Terencia S. Erni-Rivera. PAO sought to annul the Ombudsman’s Resolution and Order dismissing criminal complaints against Atty. Rivera for alleged violations of Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees), Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), and Article 171(4) of the Revised Penal Code (Falsification by a Public Officer). The central question is whether the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in finding no probable cause to indict Atty. Rivera.
The complaints stemmed from allegations that Atty. Rivera, while serving as Public Attorney V for PAO Regional Office No. III, engaged in private practice by accepting payment for handling an annulment case, causing undue injury and giving unwarranted benefits, and falsifying her Certificate of Service. The initial complaint was filed by Hazel F. Magabo, who claimed Atty. Rivera received P93,000.00 for an annulment case that was never filed. Atty. Rivera countered that the money was entrusted to her to find a private practitioner for Magabo’s brother and that she eventually returned the funds.
Subsequently, a formal administrative complaint was filed against Atty. Rivera with the Department of Justice (DOJ). While the DOJ found her liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and suspended her, Magabo submitted an Affidavit of Desistance, stating the issue stemmed from a misunderstanding. Furthermore, discrepancies arose regarding Atty. Rivera’s Certificate of Service for November 2006. While she certified that she performed her duties for the entire month, District Public Attorney Emilio G. Aclan certified that she only reported for work from November 13 to 24, 2006.
Based on these allegations, the PAO Designated Resident Ombudsman filed criminal complaints against Atty. Rivera. However, the Ombudsman dismissed these complaints for lack of probable cause. PAO argued that the Ombudsman exceeded its mandate by demanding evidence sufficient to prove Atty. Rivera’s guilt, rather than evidence sufficient to establish probable cause. The Supreme Court disagreed, clarifying that probable cause requires only such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty.
The Court emphasized the distinction between probable cause and proof beyond reasonable doubt. Probable cause does not require absolute certainty, but it must be based on more than mere suspicion or conjecture. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. The Court cited Philippine Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Casimiro, stating:
x x x [Probable cause] does not mean “actual or positive cause” nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.
The Court found no evidence that the Ombudsman demanded a higher quantum of proof. Instead, the Ombudsman dismissed the complaints because the evidence failed to establish that Atty. Rivera committed the alleged acts. Specifically, there was insufficient evidence that she solicited or accepted money in the course of her official duties or that she habitually held herself out as a lawyer in private practice.
PAO also argued that the Court’s ruling in Ramos v. Imbang precluded the dismissal of the complaints. However, the Court distinguished the two cases. In Imbang, the evidence established that the respondent, a PAO lawyer, received appearance fees for hearings that never occurred. In the present case, the evidence supporting the complaints was weak, relying heavily on Magabo’s initial allegations, which she later recanted in her Affidavit of Desistance.
Regarding the falsification charge, the Court noted that Atty. Rivera’s Certificate of Service and DPA Aclan’s Certification were not necessarily contradictory. Atty. Rivera certified that she performed her duties for the entire month of November 2006, while DPA Aclan certified that she physically reported to the PAO Region IV-B office from November 13 to 24, 2006. The Court found the discrepancies more apparent than real. Atty. Rivera was able to account for the remaining days in November, explaining that she was either on leave, attending official business, or during weekends.
Building on this principle, the Supreme Court reiterated the Ombudsman’s discretionary power to determine whether to file a criminal case. The Court in Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Desierto has consistently refrained from interfering with the constitutionally mandated investigatory and prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman. It may dismiss the complaint forthwith should he find it to be insufficient in form or substance, or he may proceed with the investigation if, in his view, the complaint is in due and proper form and substance.
Thus, if the Ombudsman, using professional judgment, finds the case dismissible, the Court shall respect such findings, unless the exercise of such discretionary powers is tainted by grave abuse of discretion.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman. The Court emphasized that a petition for certiorari is limited to correcting errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. As such, the Court affirmed the Ombudsman’s Resolution and Order dismissing the criminal complaints against Atty. Rivera.
FAQs
What was the key issue in this case? | The key issue was whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing criminal complaints against Atty. Rivera for lack of probable cause. PAO argued that the Ombudsman demanded a higher standard of proof than necessary to establish probable cause. |
What is probable cause? | Probable cause is defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty. It does not require absolute certainty or proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but it must be based on reasonable belief and not mere suspicion. |
What laws were allegedly violated by Atty. Rivera? | Atty. Rivera was accused of violating Section 7(b)(2) and (d) of RA 6713, Section 3(e) of RA 3019, and Article 171(4) of the RPC. These laws pertain to engaging in private practice while in public service, causing undue injury or giving unwarranted benefits, and falsification by a public officer, respectively. |
Why did the Ombudsman dismiss the complaints? | The Ombudsman dismissed the complaints due to a lack of sufficient evidence to establish probable cause. The evidence failed to prove that Atty. Rivera solicited or accepted money in her official capacity or that she habitually engaged in private practice. |
What was the significance of the Affidavit of Desistance? | The Affidavit of Desistance filed by Hazel F. Magabo, the initial complainant, weakened the case against Atty. Rivera. Magabo stated that the complaint stemmed from a misunderstanding and that the money entrusted to Atty. Rivera had been returned. |
How did the Court distinguish this case from Ramos v. Imbang? | In Ramos v. Imbang, there was clear evidence that the respondent received appearance fees for hearings that never took place. In this case, the evidence was based on allegations that were later recanted, making it insufficient to establish probable cause. |
What was the discrepancy regarding the Certificate of Service? | Atty. Rivera’s Certificate of Service stated she performed her duties for the entire month of November 2006, while another certification indicated she only reported to the PAO office from November 13 to 24, 2006. The Court found these discrepancies more apparent than real, as Atty. Rivera accounted for the remaining days. |
What is the role of the Supreme Court in reviewing decisions of the Ombudsman? | The Supreme Court can review decisions of the Ombudsman, but only to determine if there was grave abuse of discretion. The Court respects the Ombudsman’s discretionary powers and will not interfere unless the exercise of those powers is arbitrary or despotic. |
This case underscores the principle of prosecutorial discretion vested in the Ombudsman and the limited scope of judicial review in such matters. The Supreme Court’s decision emphasizes that while the Ombudsman’s powers are broad, they are not unlimited and are subject to review when exercised with grave abuse of discretion. This ensures a balance between the Ombudsman’s independence and accountability.
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Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: PUBLIC ATTORNEY’S OFFICE VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, G.R. No. 197613, November 22, 2017
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