In a controversial decision, the Supreme Court of the Philippines addressed the criminal liabilities arising from the Mamasapano incident. The Court ultimately ruled that there was no probable cause to charge former President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, former PNP Chief Alan LM. Purisima, and former PNP-SAF Director Getulio P. Napeñas with reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide. This decision underscores the complexities of assigning blame in military operations and the high burden of proof required to establish criminal negligence, especially when intervening factors play a significant role.

Oplan Exodus: Who Bears Responsibility for the Mamasapano Tragedy?

The case stems from the tragic events of January 25, 2015, in Mamasapano, Maguindanao, where 44 members of the Special Action Force (SAF) of the Philippine National Police (PNP) lost their lives during an operation known as “Oplan Exodus.” The mission aimed to apprehend two internationally wanted terrorists, Zulkifli Bin Hir @ Marwan and Ahmad Akmad Batabol Usman @ Basit Usman. The operation led to a bloody confrontation with hostile forces, including members of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), and other Private Armed Groups (PAGs). This resulted in significant loss of life and sparked public outcry, leading to investigations and subsequent charges against high-ranking officials.

At the heart of the legal battle was whether the deaths of the 44 SAF troopers were a direct result of negligence on the part of Aquino, Purisima, and Napeñas. The complainants, mostly parents of the fallen SAF members, argued that the respondents’ deliberate acts of imprudence, inexcusable negligence, and lack of foresight led to the tragic outcome. They contended that Aquino, as the Commander-in-Chief, failed to provide adequate support to the troops, Purisima overstepped his authority while under suspension, and Napeñas executed a poorly planned operation.

The Ombudsman initially dismissed the complaints for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide against all private respondents. However, the Ombudsman found probable cause to charge Aquino with violation of Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code (Usurpation of Official Functions) and Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), in conspiracy with Purisima and Napeñas. The Ombudsman argued that the proximate cause of the deaths was the intentional act of shooting by hostile forces, constituting an efficient intervening cause that broke the causal connection between any negligence of the respondents and the resulting deaths.

The Supreme Court undertook a thorough review of the case. The Court emphasized that under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution. The central question was whether the actions or inactions of the respondents directly led to the death of the SAF members.

Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.

The Court focused on the concept of proximate cause. It cited Vallacar Transit, Inc. v. Catubig, which defines proximate cause as the cause that, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. The Ombudsman had argued that the intentional shooting by hostile forces was an efficient intervening cause, thereby absolving the respondents of direct responsibility. Petitioners countered that the presence and actions of the hostile forces were foreseeable and could have been mitigated with proper planning.

In its analysis, the Court distinguished between the roles of the three respondents. It identified Napeñas, as the director of the SAF, as the primary actor responsible for the planning and execution of Oplan Exodus. The Court noted that the operation had been conceived within the SAF, with the first mission to capture Marwan predating Purisima’s appointment as PNP Chief. Thus, while negligence in planning and execution may have been present, the Court found that the confluence of factors, particularly the intense firefight with hostile forces, played a critical role. The Court explored the circumstances, such as the lack of prior coordination with the AFP and the existing peace talks with the MILF at the time.

The Court addressed the concept of command responsibility, a critical aspect argued by the Senate. The Court clarified that the President of the Philippines is not part of the chain of command of the PNP.

Under Section 26 of Republic Act No. 6975, the command and direction of the PNP is vested in the Chief of the PNP.

The Court cited Carpio v. Executive Secretary, stating that the President’s power over the PNP is subsumed in his general power of control and supervision over the executive department, not as a commander-in-chief. Citing Saez v. Macapagal-Arroyo, the Court emphasized that command responsibility requires a superior-subordinate relationship, knowledge of the impending or committed crime, and failure to prevent or punish the perpetrators. It concluded that Aquino, though exercising control over the PNP, did not have the requisite knowledge or direct involvement to be held criminally liable under this doctrine.

Regarding Purisima, the Court found that his actions, such as attending briefings and communicating with Napeñas, did not directly cause the deaths of the SAF members. While his involvement raised questions of authority, it did not establish a causal link to the tragic outcome. The court noted that even though Purisima gave instructions to Napeñas that “Huwag mo munang sabihan iyong dalawa. Saka na pag nandoon na. Ako na ang bahala kay General Catapang” It was not his original strategy.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court affirmed the Ombudsman’s decision, finding no probable cause to charge any of the respondents with reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide. The Court acknowledged the negligence in the operation’s planning and execution, particularly on the part of Napeñas, but emphasized that the intervention of hostile forces, combined with other operational failures, broke the chain of causation. As such, holding any of the respondents criminally liable would be unjust.

FAQs

What was the central legal issue in this case?	The key issue was whether the deaths of the 44 SAF troopers in Mamasapano were a direct result of negligence on the part of Aquino, Purisima, and Napeñas, or whether intervening factors broke the chain of causation.
Who was primarily responsible for planning Oplan Exodus?	Getulio P. Napeñas, as the director of the SAF, was identified as the primary actor responsible for the planning and execution of Oplan Exodus. He had also been the head of the previous failed operations.
What is the legal definition of “reckless imprudence” used in this case?	Reckless imprudence, according to Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution.
What does “proximate cause” mean in the context of this case?	Proximate cause refers to the cause that, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.
How did the Court view the role of hostile forces in the Mamasapano incident?	The Court viewed the intentional shooting by hostile forces as an efficient intervening cause that broke the causal connection between any negligence of the respondents and the resulting deaths.
Is the President part of the PNP’s chain of command?	No, the Supreme Court clarified that the President of the Philippines is not part of the chain of command of the PNP. The command and direction of the PNP is vested in the Chief of the PNP.
What is “command responsibility” and how did it apply in this case?	Command responsibility refers to the doctrine where a superior is held liable for the actions of subordinates if they knew or should have known about the actions and failed to prevent or punish them. The Court ruled it did not apply to Aquino as he was not in the PNP chain of command.
What was the final ruling of the Supreme Court?	The Supreme Court affirmed the Ombudsman’s decision, finding no probable cause to charge any of the respondents with reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide.

The Mamasapano case serves as a sobering reminder of the complexities of military operations and the challenges of assigning legal responsibility in the aftermath of tragedy. While the Supreme Court’s decision provides clarity on the specific liabilities of the individuals involved, the case continues to provoke reflection on the importance of thorough planning, clear command structures, and respect for the rule of law in all government actions.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: NACINO v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, G.R. Nos. 234789-91, September 03, 2019