The Supreme Court affirmed the power of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to regulate campaign activities, even if it means restricting the use of pre-existing commercial advertisements featuring candidates. This decision means that individuals who enter into endorsement deals and later decide to run for office may be required to remove advertisements to ensure fair elections, preventing those with greater resources from gaining an unfair advantage.

From Product Endorsement to Political Promotion: Can Billboards Be Forced Down?

This case revolves around Francisco I. Chavez, who, prior to filing his candidacy for Senator, had endorsement agreements with various companies. Billboards featuring Chavez promoting products like clothing and plastics were displayed prominently. When Chavez became a candidate, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6520, which mandated the removal of campaign materials, including advertisements displaying a candidate’s image. Chavez challenged this resolution, arguing that it violated the non-impairment clause of the Constitution, exceeded COMELEC’s authority, and constituted an ex post facto law. He claimed his billboards were product endorsements, not campaign propaganda, and thus should not be subject to election regulations. However, the central legal question was whether COMELEC’s regulatory powers extend to pre-existing commercial advertisements that inadvertently promote a candidate’s image.

The Court first addressed whether COMELEC’s action constituted a valid exercise of **police power**. It emphasized that police power allows the government to regulate activities to promote public welfare. In this case, COMELEC aimed to prevent premature campaigning and equalize opportunities for candidates, addressing concerns highlighted in National Press Club v. COMELEC, which recognized the importance of leveling the playing field in a country with significant income disparities.

The Court determined that the billboards, though initially commercial endorsements, took on a political character upon Chavez’s candidacy. According to the Omnibus Election Code, an **election campaign** includes actions designed to promote or defeat a candidate, including indirectly soliciting votes. By allowing the billboards to remain, Chavez would gain an unfair advantage over other candidates without similar commercial exposure. The Court referenced Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution, highlighting COMELEC’s authority to regulate media to ensure equal opportunity and fair elections.

Addressing the **non-impairment clause**, the Court stated that this constitutional provision yields to the greater public interest. Fair elections, it argued, outweigh the protection of private contracts. Contracts affecting public interest inherently include an implied reservation of police power, enabling the government to modify or even abrogate them for the sake of public welfare. Crucially, the endorsement contracts themselves stipulated that Chavez’s image would be used in a manner “in keeping with norms of decency, reasonableness, morals and law.”

Chavez also argued that Resolution No. 6520 was an ex post facto law, penalizing actions that were legal when committed. The Court refuted this, clarifying that the offense was not the initial placement of the advertisements but the **failure to remove them** after the resolution took effect. The resolution operated prospectively, not retroactively.

Finally, Chavez contended that the resolution violated the Fair Elections Act by restricting lawful election propaganda and was excessively broad. The Court clarified that the resolution did not prohibit billboards outright but regulated their use to prevent premature campaigning. The Fair Elections Act grants COMELEC the authority to supervise and regulate all election propaganda. The provision was limited in time and scope, only disallowing the continued display of propaganda materials after the filing of candidacy and before the campaign period, featuring the candidate’s name and image.

Therefore, the Supreme Court ultimately upheld the validity and constitutionality of Section 32 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520, effectively ordering Chavez to remove the billboards.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether COMELEC could require a candidate to remove existing commercial endorsements to prevent premature campaigning and ensure fair elections.
What is the non-impairment clause?	The non-impairment clause protects the obligations of contracts from being weakened by subsequent laws. However, it is subject to the state’s police power for public welfare.
What is an ex post facto law?	An ex post facto law is one that retroactively punishes actions that were legal when committed or increases the penalty for a crime after it was committed.
What is police power?	Police power is the inherent authority of the state to enact laws and regulations to promote public health, safety, morals, and general welfare.
What does the Fair Elections Act say about billboards?	The Fair Elections Act allows billboards as a form of election propaganda but subjects them to COMELEC’s supervision and regulation.
What was Section 32 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520?	Section 32 required candidates to remove any propaganda materials or advertisements featuring their name or image within three days of becoming a candidate.
What is premature campaigning?	Premature campaigning refers to engaging in election-related activities, such as soliciting votes, outside the designated campaign period.
Why did COMELEC issue Resolution No. 6520?	COMELEC issued the resolution to prevent premature campaigning and level the playing field for all candidates, ensuring fairer elections.

The Supreme Court’s decision reinforces COMELEC’s authority to regulate election-related activities to maintain fairness and equality. Candidates must consider the implications of their pre-existing commercial agreements when running for public office, as these endorsements can be subject to election laws.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Francisco I. Chavez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 162777, August 31, 2004