The Supreme Court ruled that former COMELEC Commissioners whose ad interim appointments were not confirmed by the Commission on Appointments are not entitled to the five-year lump sum gratuity under Republic Act No. 1568. This benefit is reserved for those who retire after completing their full term of office. The decision clarifies the distinction between serving a ‘term of office’ and merely holding a ‘tenure,’ emphasizing that unconfirmed ad interim appointments do not equate to a completed term, thus disqualifying the petitioners from receiving the gratuity.

Ad Interim Appointments: Does Non-Confirmation Equal a Completed Term for Retirement Benefits?

This case revolves around former COMELEC Commissioners Evalyn I. Fetalino and Amado M. Calderon, whose ad interim appointments were not acted upon by the Commission on Appointments (CA). They sought to claim a five-year lump sum gratuity under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1568, which provides this benefit to COMELEC officials upon retirement after completing their term. The central legal question is whether the non-confirmation of their appointments can be considered equivalent to completing a term of office, thus entitling them to the gratuity.

The petitioners argued that the non-renewal of their ad interim appointments qualifies as retirement under the law. They believed that an initial Comelec resolution granting the gratuity was final and created a vested right. In contrast, the COMELEC contended that R.A. No. 1568 requires completion of the full term, not partial service. The COMELEC relied on the distinction between ‘term’ and ‘tenure,’ asserting that an ad interim appointment that lapses by inaction of the CA does not constitute a term of office. This difference is crucial, as the law specifically requires ‘having completed his term of office’ to qualify for the benefits.

To fully understand the issues, it’s essential to examine the relevant statutory provision. Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568 states:

Sec. 1. When the Auditor General or the Chairman or any Member of the Commission on Elections retires from the service for having completed his term of office or by reason of his incapacity to discharge the duties of his office, or dies while in the service, or resigns at any time after reaching the age of sixty years but before the expiration of his term of office, he or his heirs shall be paid in lump sum his salary for one year, not exceeding five years, for every year of service based upon the last annual salary that he was receiving at the time of retirement, incapacity, death or resignation, as the case may be: Provided, That in case of resignation, he has rendered not less than twenty years of service in the government; And, provided, further, That he shall receive an annuity payable monthly during the residue of his natural life equivalent to the amount of monthly salary he was receiving on the date of retirement, incapacity or resignation.

The Supreme Court emphasized that to be entitled to the five-year lump sum gratuity, one of the following must occur: retirement after completing the term, incapacity, death while in service, or resignation after reaching 60 years of age but before term expiration. The Court dismissed the arguments for incapacity and resignation, focusing on whether the termination of the ad interim appointments could be considered retirement after completing the term of office.

The Court distinguished between ‘term’ and ‘tenure,’ concepts with well-defined meanings in law. In Topacio Nueno v. Angeles, the Court articulated:

The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds the office. The term of office is not affected by the hold-over. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent. There is no principle, law or doctrine by which the term of an office may be extended by reason of war.

Building on this principle, the Court cited Matibag v. Benipayo, stating that while an ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment that takes effect immediately, an ad interim appointment that lapses by inaction of the Commission on Appointments does not constitute a term of office. Therefore, the period from the ad interim appointment to its lapse is neither a fixed term nor an unexpired term.

The petitioners relied on Ortiz v. COMELEC, where the Court granted retirement benefits to a COMELEC Commissioner despite not completing the full term. However, the Supreme Court distinguished the factual situation in Ortiz. The appointment in Ortiz was a regular appointment under the 1973 Constitution, which did not require CA concurrence, whereas the petitioners’ appointments were ad interim under the 1987 Constitution, requiring CA confirmation. Therefore, the circumstances in Ortiz were unique and could not be directly applied.

The Court emphasized that R.A. No. 1568 is clear and unambiguous, leaving no room for liberal construction. Strict compliance with the law’s requirements is necessary. The Court stated that in the absence of compelling reasons, a liberal interpretation would amount to judicial legislation, violating the constitutional separation of powers. The Court made it clear, it does not have the power to create exemptions not explicitly stated in the law. The Court also noted that the initial resolution granting the gratuity did not attain finality, and the petitioners were not denied due process, as they actively participated in the proceedings.

Ultimately, the Court concluded that the petitioners did not have vested rights over the retirement benefits. These benefits are purely gratuitous, unlike pensions where employee participation is mandatory, leading to vested rights. Therefore, their due process argument failed.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The central issue was whether former COMELEC Commissioners, whose ad interim appointments were not confirmed, were entitled to a five-year lump sum gratuity under R.A. No. 1568. The Court clarified if non-confirmation equated to completing a term of office.
What does ‘ad interim’ appointment mean?	An ad interim appointment is made by the President during a recess of Congress. It is effective immediately but requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments to become permanent.
What is the difference between ‘term’ and ‘tenure’?	‘Term’ refers to the fixed period during which an officer may claim the right to hold office. ‘Tenure’ represents the period during which the incumbent actually holds the office, which may be shorter than the full term.
Why were the petitioners not entitled to the gratuity?	The petitioners did not complete the full seven-year term required by the Constitution. The Court ruled that their unconfirmed ad interim appointments did not constitute a ‘term of office’ as defined by R.A. No. 1568.
What was the basis of the Court’s decision?	The Court based its decision on the clear language of R.A. No. 1568, which requires completion of the term of office for entitlement to the gratuity. It also distinguished the present case from a prior case, Ortiz v. COMELEC, due to differing facts.
Did the Court consider equity in its decision?	While the petitioners argued for equitable considerations, the Court emphasized that strict compliance with the law was necessary. It found no compelling reasons to deviate from the clear requirements of R.A. No. 1568.
What is judicial legislation, and why did the Court avoid it?	Judicial legislation occurs when a court adds to or alters the meaning of a law beyond its plain language. The Court avoided judicial legislation to respect the separation of powers and the legislative function of Congress.
Were the petitioners denied due process?	The Court found no denial of due process because the petitioners actively participated in the proceedings. They were given the opportunity to present their arguments, satisfying the requirements of due process.

This case clarifies that for COMELEC officials to be eligible for the five-year lump sum gratuity under R.A. No. 1568, completion of the full term of office is mandatory. The Supreme Court’s ruling underscores the significance of distinguishing between an ad interim appointment and a completed term, ensuring the benefit is reserved for those who fulfill the statutory requirements.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Fetalino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191890, December 04, 2012