The Supreme Court of the Philippines has ruled that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) cannot disqualify a senatorial candidate solely based on their perceived lack of financial capacity to wage a nationwide campaign. This decision protects the principle that the right to be voted for should not depend on wealth, ensuring equal access to opportunities for public service. This ruling emphasizes that while the state has a legitimate interest in orderly elections, financial capacity cannot be a prerequisite for candidacy.

Can You Afford to Run? When Financial Capacity Becomes a Disqualification for Senator

The case of Norman Cordero Marquez v. Commission on Elections arose after Marquez, a real estate broker and animal welfare advocate from Mountain Province, filed his candidacy for senator. The COMELEC Law Department, acting on its own initiative, sought to declare Marquez a nuisance candidate. Their argument hinged on two points: Marquez’s relative obscurity on a national scale and his presumed inability, without proof of substantial financial resources, to sustain the demands of a nationwide campaign.

Marquez countered by highlighting his extensive work with Baguio Animal Welfare (BAW), his consultations with government offices on animal welfare, media appearances, and the potential for support from animal lovers and donors. He argued that the limitations on campaign expenses under Republic Act No. 7166 (RA 7166) were ceilings, not mandatory spending requirements. Furthermore, he emphasized the cost-effectiveness of social media in modern campaigns.

The COMELEC First Division initially canceled Marquez’s Certificate of Candidacy (CoC), citing the case of Martinez III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Benhur L. Salimbangon (Martinez III). The COMELEC argued that the logistical challenges posed by nuisance candidates justified eliminating those without the apparent financial capacity for a nationwide campaign. Marquez’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the COMELEC En Banc, leading him to petition the Supreme Court.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the COMELEC, argued that the issue involved the COMELEC’s judgment, not grave abuse of discretion, and was therefore not reviewable under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The OSG maintained that the COMELEC acted within its jurisdiction under Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), which allows for the disqualification of nuisance candidates. The OSG claimed that Marquez failed to prove his financial capability or substantiate his social media strategy.

The Supreme Court, however, granted Marquez’s petition, holding that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. The Court acknowledged that the May 13, 2019 elections had already concluded, typically rendering the case moot. However, it invoked the exception for cases capable of repetition yet evading review, recognizing that the COMELEC’s practice of disqualifying candidates based on financial capacity could recur in future elections. The Court cited the U.S. Supreme Court case of Southern Pacific Terminal Company v. Interstate Commerce Commission, noting that the issues were likely to be repeated but evaded review.

The Court emphasized the precedent set in Maquera v. Borra (Maquera), which prohibits conditioning the right to be voted for on a candidate’s wealth. Requiring proof of financial capacity, the Court reasoned, effectively imposes a property qualification, which is unconstitutional. The COMELEC’s actions were deemed inconsistent with the Republican system and the principle of social justice enshrined in the Constitution.

The Constitution, in providing for the qualification of Congressmen, sets forth only age, citizenship, voting and residence qualifications. No property qualification of any kind is thereunder required. Since the effect of Republic Act 4421 is to require of candidates for Congress a substantial property qualification, and to disqualify those who do not meet the same, it goes against the provision of the Constitution which, in line with its democratic character, requires no property qualification for the right to hold said public office.

The Court acknowledged that while there is no constitutional right to run for public office, it is a privilege subject to legal limitations. However, these limitations must be constitutionally sound. The COMELEC argued that Section 69 of BP 881, which allows for the disqualification of nuisance candidates, provided the basis for its decision. However, the Court noted that Section 69 and its implementing rules are silent on any financial capacity requirement.

Furthermore, the Court rejected the COMELEC’s reliance on Section 13 of RA 7166, which sets limits on campaign expenses. The Court clarified that this section does not establish a financial threshold for candidacy, and failure to prove the ability to meet these limits is not grounds for disqualification. The COMELEC’s selective application of a financial capacity requirement, without explicit rules or guidelines, was deemed a violation of equal protection rights. The court noted the COMELEC’s use of a “cookie-cutter motion” to cancel candidacy. This puts an unfair and impermissible burden upon the candidate.

Sec. 13. Authorized Expenses of Candidates and Political Parties. – The agreement amount that a candidate or registered political party may spend for election campaign shall be as follows:
(a) For candidates. – Ten pesos (P10.00) for President and Vice-President; and for other candidates Three Pesos (P3.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency where he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That a candidate without any political party and without support from any political party may be allowed to spend Five Pesos (P5.00) for every such voter; and
(b) For political parties. – Five pesos (P5.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency or constituencies where it has official candidates.

The Court distinguished the bona fide intention to run from a financial capacity requirement, asserting that the COMELEC must demonstrate a reasonable correlation between the two. It cited U.S. Supreme Court rulings in Bullock v. Carter and Lubin v. Panish, which invalidated filing fees that disproportionately burdened indigent candidates. The Court quoted Lubin v. Panish on the matter of the genuineness of candidacy:

Filing fees, however large, do not, in and of themselves, test the genuineness of a candidacy or the extent of the voter support of an aspirant for public office. A large filing fee may serve the legitimate function of keeping ballots manageable but, standing alone, it is not a certain test of whether the candidacy is serious or spurious.

The Court also clarified that its prior rulings in Pamatong and Martinez III did not support the COMELEC’s decision. Pamatong only required a “significant modicum of support” and Martinez III focused on confusion caused by similar names, not financial capacity. The court held that any measure should not be arbitrary, oppressive and contravene the Republican system ordained in our Constitution. The COMELEC’s standard fell short of what is constitutionally permissible.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The central issue was whether the COMELEC can disqualify a senatorial candidate based solely on a lack of proven financial capacity to run a nationwide campaign.
What did the Supreme Court decide?	The Supreme Court ruled that the COMELEC cannot disqualify a candidate solely based on financial capacity, as it effectively imposes an unconstitutional property qualification.
What is a ‘nuisance candidate’ according to the law?	A nuisance candidate is someone who files a certificate of candidacy to mock the election process, cause confusion among voters, or demonstrates no genuine intention to run.
Does Republic Act 7166 require a minimum financial capacity to run for office?	No, RA 7166 sets limits on campaign spending but does not require candidates to prove they can meet those limits as a condition of candidacy.
Why did the Supreme Court invoke the ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review’ exception?	The Court used this exception because the COMELEC’s practice of disqualifying candidates based on financial capacity could recur in future elections but might not be promptly challenged.
What was the COMELEC’s justification for disqualifying Marquez?	The COMELEC argued that Marquez lacked the financial resources to sustain a nationwide campaign and was therefore a nuisance candidate who would cause logistical difficulties.
How did the Court use the ruling in Maquera v. Borra?	The Court emphasized the precedent set in Maquera v. Borra, which prohibits conditioning the right to be voted for on a candidate’s wealth.
What is the practical impact of this Supreme Court decision?	The ruling protects the right of individuals, regardless of their wealth, to run for senator, ensuring that elections are not limited to the financially privileged.

This decision reinforces the constitutional principle that the opportunity to seek public office should be equally available to all citizens, regardless of their financial status. By preventing the COMELEC from using financial capacity as a primary disqualifying factor, the Supreme Court has upheld a more democratic and inclusive electoral process.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: NORMAN CORDERO MARQUEZ VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 244274, September 03, 2019