The Supreme Court ruled that an elective official’s dismissal from office, even if appealed, constitutes an involuntary interruption of their term, preventing the application of the three-term limit rule. This means that if a local official is removed from their position due to an administrative decision, even temporarily, they are not considered to have fully served that term and can run for the same office again. This decision clarifies the conditions under which the three-term limit applies, particularly when an official faces administrative sanctions during their term.

Can a Dismissed Governor Circumvent the Three-Term Limit?

This case revolves around Edgardo A. Tallado, who served as the Governor of Camarines Norte for three consecutive terms. During his third term, he faced administrative charges that led to his dismissal from office by the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB). Although Tallado appealed these decisions, the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) implemented the OMB’s orders, requiring him to vacate his position. The central legal question is whether these dismissals interrupted his term, thus allowing him to run for a fourth term, or whether the three-term limit applied, disqualifying him from seeking re-election. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) initially ruled against Tallado, but the Supreme Court reversed this decision, leading to a significant clarification of the three-term limit rule.

The Supreme Court’s decision hinged on interpreting the phrase “fully served three consecutive terms” within the context of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code (LGC). The Court emphasized that for the three-term limit to apply, an official must not only be elected for three consecutive terms but must also fully serve those terms. An involuntary interruption, such as a dismissal from office, breaks the continuity of service, even if the dismissal is later appealed.

The Court distinguished between an interruption of the term and an interruption of the full continuity of the exercise of powers. Interruption of term involves the involuntary loss of title to the office, whereas interruption of the full continuity of the exercise of powers refers to the failure to render service. The case of Aldovino v. COMELEC was cited to emphasize that an interruption occurs when the office holder loses the right to hold the office, which cannot be equated with simply failing to render service.

The COMELEC argued that because Tallado’s dismissals were not yet final due to pending appeals, he retained his title to the office. However, the Supreme Court disagreed, asserting that the OMB’s Rules mandate that decisions in administrative cases are immediately executory despite any pending appeals. Even the 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (2017 RACCS) imposes the separation of the guilty civil servant from his or her title to the office by explicitly providing in its Section 56(a), viz.:

Section 56. Duration and Effect of Administrative Penalties. — The following rules shall govern the imposition of administrative penalties:

a. The penalty of dismissal shall result in the permanent separation of the respondent from the service, without prejudice to criminal or civil liability.

The Court highlighted that Tallado was twice fully divested of his powers and responsibilities as Governor. The DILG transferred the discharge of the office of Governor and the exercise of the functions and powers thereof to Vice Governor Pimentel, who took his oath of office as Governor and unconditionally assumed and discharged such office. This, according to the Court, resulted in Tallado’s loss of title to the office of Governor. The length of time of the involuntary interruption was deemed immaterial, reinforcing the principle that any involuntary loss of title, however short, constitutes an effective interruption.

The Court also addressed the COMELEC’s reliance on Section 44 of the LGC, which pertains to permanent vacancies. The COMELEC contended that because Tallado’s dismissals were not final, the vacancy was only temporary, and Section 46 of the LGC, regarding temporary vacancies, should apply. However, the Supreme Court clarified that the DILG’s opinion on the applicable provision was not binding. The DILG, as the implementor of the decisions, had no legal competence to interpret the succession ensuing from the dismissals. The Court also emphasized that a permanent vacancy arises whenever an elective local official is removed from office, as directed by the OMB’s decisions.

Moreover, the Court dismissed the argument that developments in Tallado’s appeals changed the fact that he was dismissed. The fact that the DILG fully implemented the decisions of dismissal immediately carried legal repercussions that no developments in relation to Tallado’s appeals could change or undo. Tallado effectively lost his title to the office when the DILG directed Pimentel to take his oath of office as Governor, and Pimentel assumed and discharged the functions of that office.

The impact of this decision is significant, as it clarifies the circumstances under which the three-term limit rule applies. It establishes that an involuntary interruption, such as a dismissal from office, even if appealed, breaks the continuity of service. This ruling provides a clear framework for future cases involving administrative sanctions and the three-term limit, ensuring a consistent application of the law.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether Governor Tallado’s dismissals from office due to administrative charges constituted an involuntary interruption of his term, thereby allowing him to run for a fourth consecutive term.
What is the three-term limit rule?	The three-term limit rule, as enshrined in the Constitution and the Local Government Code, prevents local elective officials from serving more than three consecutive terms in the same position.
What constitutes an interruption of a term?	An interruption of a term occurs when an elective official involuntarily loses their title to office, breaking the continuity of their service. This can include dismissal from office, even if the decision is appealed.
Why did the COMELEC initially cancel Tallado’s Certificate of Candidacy?	The COMELEC initially cancelled Tallado’s COC because they believed his dismissals were not final and did not interrupt his term, thus disqualifying him under the three-term limit rule.
How did the Supreme Court rule in this case?	The Supreme Court ruled that Tallado’s dismissals constituted an involuntary interruption of his term, making him eligible to run for a fourth term.
What is the effect of an Ombudsman’s decision pending appeal?	The Ombudsman’s Rules mandate that decisions in administrative cases are immediately executory despite any pending appeals.
What is the difference between a temporary and permanent vacancy?	A permanent vacancy arises when an official is permanently unable to discharge the functions of their office, while a temporary vacancy occurs during leave of absence or suspension, where the official expects to return.
What was the basis for the dissent in this case?	The dissenting justices argued that Tallado’s removal was only temporary, he was able to reassume the gubernatorial post.
Does this ruling reward bad behavior?	It was argued that this ruling may reward recidivists and wrongdoers in public service by allowing a fresh three-year term after the interruptions.

This decision clarifies that an involuntary loss of title to office, even if temporary, constitutes an interruption of a term for the purposes of the three-term limit rule. This provides a clear framework for future cases involving administrative sanctions and the three-term limit.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Governor Edgardo A. Tallado v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 246679, September 10, 2019