The Supreme Court affirmed the Commission on Elections’ (COMELEC) authority to disqualify nuisance candidates to maintain the integrity of elections. However, the Court emphasized that this power must be exercised with due process and based on substantial evidence. The COMELEC cannot arbitrarily declare a candidate a nuisance without providing a fair opportunity to be heard and without sufficient factual basis. This decision balances the need to prevent mockery of the electoral process with the protection of every individual’s right to seek public office, ensuring a more equitable and credible election system.

David vs. Goliath: Can the COMELEC Disqualify Underfunded Senatorial Aspirants?

Angelo Castro De Alban, an independent candidate for senator, challenged the COMELEC’s decision to declare him a nuisance candidate based on his perceived lack of financial capacity and political machinery. The COMELEC, acting motu proprio (on its own initiative), argued that De Alban’s candidacy lacked a bona fide intention to run for public office, potentially confusing voters and undermining the electoral process. De Alban countered that his platforms, online presence, and personal resources demonstrated his genuine intent to serve. The core legal question was whether the COMELEC’s disqualification of De Alban was a legitimate exercise of its power under Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), or an infringement on his right to seek public office.

The Supreme Court, while acknowledging that the 2019 elections had rendered the specific case moot, proceeded to address the constitutional issues raised due to their potential for recurrence. The Court emphasized the importance of resolving the questions surrounding nuisance candidates and the COMELEC’s authority to ensure rational and orderly elections. The Court first addressed De Alban’s argument that Section 69 of the OEC did not apply to senatorial candidates, as the OEC predated the 1987 Constitution and its bicameral legislature. The Court dismissed this argument, citing Section 2 of the OEC, which states that it “shall govern all elections of public officers and, to the extent appropriate, all referenda and plebiscites.” The Court further referenced several Republic Acts (RAs) that explicitly maintained the OEC’s applicability in subsequent elections.

The Court then tackled the alleged conflict between Section 69 of the OEC and RA No. 6646, which De Alban claimed impliedly repealed the COMELEC’s motu proprio authority to declare nuisance candidates. Section 69 of the OEC empowers the COMELEC to act on its own initiative or upon a verified petition, while Section 5 of RA No. 6646 outlines procedures for petitions filed by registered candidates. The Court clarified that the omission of “motu proprio” in RA No. 6646 did not constitute an implied repeal, as such repeals are disfavored absent an irreconcilable conflict. Furthermore, legislative deliberations revealed that RA No. 6646 was intended to supplement, not supplant, the COMELEC’s existing authority.

Building on this principle, the Court underscored that even before the enactment of Section 69 of the OEC, the COMELEC possessed the inherent power to refuse due course to CoCs filed in bad faith, stemming from its mandate to ensure free, orderly, and honest elections. The Court referenced past decisions that upheld the permissibility of limiting ballot access to candidates with a “bona fide” intention to run for office, emphasizing the logistical benefits and the need to prevent confusion among voters. The Court also addressed De Alban’s contention that the phrase “by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention” in Section 69 of the OEC was unconstitutionally vague. The Court noted that a law couched in imprecise language remains valid if clarified through judicial construction.

The Court explained that Section 69 enumerated specific instances of nuisance candidacy, including filings intended to mock the election process, cause voter confusion, or lacking a bona fide intent to seek office. The Court emphasized that the objective of such filings is to prevent a faithful determination of the people’s true will. The Court further clarified that the inclusion of “clearly” before “demonstrate” in the law’s wording was an important safety net for ensuring that COMELEC only denies due course to CoCs when the absence of bona fide intention to run for public office is evident. The Court also rejected De Alban’s argument that Section 69 violated the equal protection clause and the right of suffrage. The Court reiterated that the right to seek public office is a privilege subject to legal limitations, and that the equal protection clause allows for reasonable classifications based on real and substantial distinctions.

The Court then turned to the critical issue of procedural due process. While affirming the COMELEC’s motu proprio authority, the Court stressed that this power must be exercised fairly. Citing Cipriano v. Comelec, the Court emphasized the COMELEC’s ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge CoCs filed in due form. However, the Court stated that when canceling a CoC, the COMELEC performs a quasi-judicial function, requiring the observance of procedural due process. This necessitates providing the candidate with notice and an opportunity to be heard. The Court found that the COMELEC Law Department failed to provide substantial evidence demonstrating De Alban’s lack of bona fide intention.

The COMELEC Law Department’s reliance on De Alban’s profession as a “lawyer teacher” and a generalized assertion of insufficient financial capability, without concrete evidence, was deemed insufficient. The Court cited Marquez v. Comelec, which held that “financial capacity to sustain the financial rigors of waging a nationwide campaign” cannot, by itself, be used to declare a candidate a nuisance. The Court also highlighted that the COMELEC did not require all senatorial candidates to prove their financial capacity, raising concerns about equal protection. The Court further noted that non-membership in a political party, lack of nationwide recognition, or low probability of success do not, by themselves, indicate a lack of bona fide intention.

Finally, the Court criticized the COMELEC for requiring De Alban to demonstrate his “capacity to wage a nationwide campaign” immediately after filing his CoC. The Court found this approach premature and dismissive. In contrast, De Alban had presented evidence of his campaign plans, including social media engagement and website maintenance. The Court acknowledged the growing influence of social media in shaping voter preferences. In conclusion, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the COMELEC’s authority to disqualify nuisance candidates, but found that the COMELEC had gravely abused its discretion in De Alban’s case, due to an erroneous interpretation of the law and a lack of supporting evidence. The Court underscored that a candidate’s bona fide intention is not subject to any property qualifications, nor is it dependent on political affiliation, popularity, or likely success in the elections.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether the COMELEC properly exercised its authority to declare Angelo Castro De Alban a nuisance candidate, based on his perceived lack of financial capacity and political machinery. The Supreme Court examined if this action was constitutional and in accordance with due process.
What is a ‘nuisance candidate’ according to the law?	A nuisance candidate is someone who files a certificate of candidacy to mock the election process, cause confusion among voters, or without a genuine intention to run for office. The aim of this provision is to prevent the subversion of the electorate’s true will.
Can the COMELEC disqualify a candidate on its own initiative?	Yes, the COMELEC has the authority to act motu proprio (on its own initiative) to disqualify nuisance candidates. However, this power must be exercised with due process and based on substantial evidence, ensuring fairness to the candidate.
Is financial capacity a requirement to run for public office?	No, the Supreme Court has consistently held that financial capacity is not a requirement to run for public office. Requiring a certain level of wealth would be akin to a property qualification, which is inconsistent with the principles of social justice and a republican system.
What kind of evidence is needed to declare someone a nuisance candidate?	The COMELEC must present clear and substantial evidence demonstrating that the candidate lacks a bona fide intention to run for office. General allegations or assumptions are insufficient; there must be specific acts or circumstances that clearly indicate a lack of genuine intent.
Does membership in a political party affect whether someone is considered a nuisance candidate?	No, membership in a political party is not a determining factor. The focus is on the candidate’s genuine intention to run for office, regardless of their political affiliation or lack thereof.
What is the significance of ‘due process’ in disqualifying a candidate?	Due process requires that the candidate be given notice of the proceedings against them and an opportunity to be heard. This means they must be allowed to present evidence and arguments in their defense before the COMELEC makes a decision.
How does social media factor into a candidate’s bona fide intention to run?	A candidate’s active use of social media can be considered as evidence of their intention to campaign and engage with voters. However, the COMELEC must assess this evidence in the context of the overall circumstances and not rely solely on a lack of traditional political machinery.

This case clarifies the COMELEC’s role in safeguarding the electoral process by preventing nuisance candidates while reinforcing the importance of protecting the fundamental right to seek public office. The ruling serves as a reminder that COMELEC must strike a balance between administrative efficiency and individual rights, ensuring that all candidates are treated fairly and with due process.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Angelo Castro De Alban v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 243968, March 22, 2022