In the case of Advincula-Velasquez v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that agricultural lands reclassified for residential, commercial, or industrial use by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) or its predecessors before June 15, 1988, do not require further conversion clearance from the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). This ruling clarifies the jurisdiction over land conversion and affects landowners and tenants, specifying which agency’s decisions take precedence based on the timing of reclassification. It underscores the principle that land use classifications established prior to CARL’s enactment are to be respected, promoting stability and predictability in land management and agrarian reform processes.

From Rice Fields to Residences: Who Decides the Fate of the Land?

The petitions for review before the Supreme Court stemmed from a protracted dispute over a parcel of land initially used for agriculture. The core issue revolved around whether Justina Advincula-Velasquez, as an agricultural lessee, had the right to redeem the property from Remman Enterprises, Inc., which sought to develop the land into a residential subdivision. The land’s reclassification from agricultural to residential prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. 6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), was a key factor. The case involved a challenge to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board’s (DARAB) jurisdiction and highlighted the conflicting claims over land use authority.

Building on this principle, the Supreme Court examined whether the reclassification of the landholding from agricultural to residential was valid, particularly without the express approval of the DAR. The court underscored the timeline of key events, noting that as early as 1981, the land was reclassified as a low-density residential zone under Metro Manila Zoning Ordinance No. 81-01. This reclassification occurred well before Rep. Act No. 6657 took effect on June 15, 1988. Furthermore, the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), then known as the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC), had already issued a preliminary approval and location clearance, as well as a development permit to Remman Enterprises, Inc. on December 2, 1986. By January 15, 1987, HSRC also issued a license allowing Remman to sell subdivision lots, classifying the property as a second-class housing project.

This early classification significantly influenced the Court’s decision. The Court cited its previous ruling in Natalia Realty, Inc. and Estate Developers and Investors Corp. v. Department of Agrarian Reform, et al., which addressed similar circumstances. The Natalia Realty case established that lands not devoted to agricultural activity, and previously converted to non-agricultural uses by government agencies other than the DAR before the effectivity of CARL, fall outside the ambit of CARL. Specifically, the DAR’s own rules defined agricultural land as not classified in town plans and zoning ordinances approved by the HLURB and its preceding competent authorities before June 15, 1988, for residential, commercial, or industrial use.

In support of this position, the Court referenced Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, which clarified that the DAR’s authority to approve conversions of agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses could only be exercised from June 15, 1988—the date of CARL’s effectivity. Following this opinion, the DAR itself issued Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1994, stating that lands already classified as non-agricultural before the enactment of Rep. Act No. 6657 no longer required conversion clearance. The Supreme Court emphasized that the principle established in Natalia case was not limited solely to agricultural lands within townsite reservations, but applied to lands converted to non-agricultural uses by government agencies other than the DAR before CARL’s enactment.

Therefore, the Supreme Court ultimately determined that Remman Enterprises, Inc. was not obligated to secure any post facto approval from the DAR, given the prior reclassification. Because the land had been reclassified as residential property, the DARAB had no jurisdiction over Advincula-Velasquez’s petition for redemption. Consequently, the petitioner could not claim the right to redeem the property under Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 3844, as amended, in relation to Rep. Act No. 6389. The Court emphasized the timeline and jurisdictional boundaries established by law.

The Supreme Court clarified the application of the hierarchy of courts regarding petitions for certiorari and prohibition. While it acknowledged that both the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA) have concurrent jurisdiction over such petitions, it reaffirmed the principle that petitions should generally be filed with the RTC in cases involving first-level courts. This is to maintain a becoming regard for judicial hierarchy. The Supreme Court dismissed Advincula-Velasquez’s petition for certiorari and prohibition, citing her failure to adhere to the principle of hierarchy of courts by filing directly with the CA.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The main issue was whether the DAR or HLURB had jurisdiction over the land in question and whether the prior conversion by HLURB exempted the land from DAR’s jurisdiction under CARL.
When was the land reclassified to residential use?	The land was reclassified as early as 1981 under Metro Manila Zoning Ordinance No. 81-01 before Rep. Act No. 6657 took effect on June 15, 1988.
What was the significance of DOJ Opinion No. 44?	DOJ Opinion No. 44 clarified that the DAR’s authority to approve land conversions applied from the date of CARL’s effectivity, June 15, 1988, influencing subsequent administrative orders.
What did the Supreme Court say about following the ‘hierarchy of courts?’	The Supreme Court reinforced the need to respect the hierarchy of courts, instructing that petitions for certiorari against lower courts should generally be filed with the Regional Trial Court.
What was the effect of failing to file a timely appeal with the DARAB?	The failure to file a timely appeal to the DARAB rendered the PARAD decision final and executory, preventing the DARAB from assuming appellate jurisdiction.
Is this agricultural land can be convert in residential area without a clear DAR approval?	If land has been reclassified from agricultural to non-agricultural prior to CARL’s enactment, conversion is valid even without DAR approval.
Can a second motion for recon be considired a Notice of Appeal?	The PARAD’s error in treating the Velasquez’ second motion for reconsideration is unallowed because the motion was a prohibited motion.
What shall applies is the CA files of Certiorari?	What should apply is Section 54 of Rep. Act No. 6657, which reads: is Rule XIV, Section 1 of the DARAB rules.

The ruling in Advincula-Velasquez v. Court of Appeals offers critical insights into the interplay between land use regulations and agrarian reform, clarifying jurisdictional boundaries and underscoring the significance of temporal considerations in land classification. This clarification helps ensure consistent application of laws and regulations concerning land conversion. Landowners and tenants should be cognizant of these guidelines to better comprehend their rights and obligations in agrarian reform-related matters.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: JUSTINA ADVINCULA-VELASQUEZ v. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 111387 & 127497, June 08, 2004