In Department of Agrarian Reform v. Berenguer, the Supreme Court affirmed that landholdings reclassified as residential or industrial prior to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) are exempt from its coverage, safeguarding landowners’ rights against unwarranted agrarian reform impositions. This decision underscores the importance of land classification in determining CARP applicability, especially when land use has shifted from agricultural to residential or industrial purposes before the law’s effectivity. This ruling balances the State’s agrarian reform objectives with the protection of private property rights.

Agrarian Reform Clash: When Residential Classification Trumps Agricultural Intent

This case revolves around a dispute between the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the Berenguer family, landowners in Sorsogon, whose properties were placed under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). The respondents, Pablo Berenguer, Belinda Berenguer, Carlo Berenguer, Rosario Berenguer-Landers, and Remedios Berenguer-Lintag, owned 58.0649 hectares of land in Barangay Bibincahan, Sorsogon. These lands, covered by several Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs), were initially targeted for CARP coverage by the DAR, prompting the landowners to seek exclusion, arguing that their lands were not agricultural but residential and industrial. The heart of the legal battle lies in whether the DAR correctly applied the principles of agrarian reform to lands that the respondents claimed had already been reclassified.

The DAR’s decision to include the Berenguer lands under CARP was challenged on the grounds that the properties had been reclassified as residential and industrial long before the enactment of Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). The landowners presented evidence, including certifications from the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and resolutions from the Sangguniang Bayan of Sorsogon, to demonstrate that their lands were within the poblacion area and designated for residential and commercial use. This reclassification, they argued, exempted their lands from CARP coverage under the established jurisprudence, particularly the ruling in Luz Farms v. Secretary of DAR, which held that lands used for livestock and poultry raising, as well as commercial, industrial, and residential lands, were beyond the scope of agrarian reform.

The Court of Appeals sided with the Berenguer family, reversing the DAR Secretary’s order and ruling that the landholdings were indeed exempt from CARP coverage. The appellate court emphasized the importance of the land’s classification prior to the enactment of the CARL and the presumption that lands within a poblacion are residential or commercial unless proven otherwise. This decision highlighted the need for the DAR to consider existing land use classifications and the landowners’ right to due process. The DAR, dissatisfied with the appellate court’s decision, elevated the case to the Supreme Court, arguing that the CA erred in its interpretation of the law and the facts.

At the forefront of the issues brought before the Supreme Court was whether the Court of Appeals erred in treating the respondents’ petition for certiorari as a petition for review. The DAR argued that the CA should have dismissed the petition outright due to the respondents’ insistence that it was a certiorari action, implying that the CA lacked the power to review the DAR’s decision on the merits. The Supreme Court, however, affirmed the CA’s decision to treat the petition as a petition for review, citing precedents that allow for such a conversion in the interest of substantial justice and the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court. This procedural flexibility is crucial to ensure that cases are decided based on their merits rather than on technicalities.

Addressing the substantive issues, the Supreme Court focused on whether the respondents’ landholdings were subject to CARP. The DAR argued that the lands were agricultural and not primarily devoted to cattle raising, pointing to the low ratio of cattle to land area as evidence. However, the Court sided with the respondents, noting the CA’s finding that cattle were indeed being raised on the landholdings, despite any temporary insufficiency in numbers due to factors like pestilence or sale. More importantly, the Court emphasized that the DAR failed to establish that the landholdings were agricultural in nature, considering the pre-existing reclassification as residential and industrial.

The Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle established in Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, underscoring that the Constitutional Commission never intended to include lands used for raising livestock and poultry, and commercial, industrial, and residential lands within the coverage of the Agrarian Reform Program. This exclusion is based on the understanding that agrarian reform is designed to address issues related to agricultural land and tenant farmers, not to disrupt established commercial and residential areas. The Court quoted the Luz Farms case, stating:

It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A. 6657 which includes ‘private agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising’ in the definition of ‘commercial farms’ is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State. There is simply no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform.

Building on this principle, the Supreme Court highlighted the significance of Resolution No. 5, passed by the Sangguniang Bayan of Sorsogon, which included Barangay Bibincahan, where the respondents’ landholdings were located, within the poblacion area. This inclusion carried a presumption that the lands were industrial and residential, a presumption that the DAR failed to overcome. Citing Hilario v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court stated:

The presumption assumed by the appellate court that a parcel of land which is located in a poblacion is not necessarily devoted to residential purposes is wrong. It should be the other way around. A lot inside the poblacion should be presumed residential, or commercial, or non-agricultural unless there is a clearly preponderant evidence to show that it is agricultural.

The DAR’s designation of Baribag as the beneficiary of the landholdings was also questioned by the Court. Section 22 of the CARL specifies a clear order of priority for qualified beneficiaries, starting with landless residents of the same barangay and prioritizing agricultural lessees, share tenants, and farmworkers. The DAR’s reason for excluding the actual workers on the landholdings, citing a supposed lack of interest or fear of the landowners, was deemed unacceptable by the Court. The Court emphasized that the DAR failed to present any evidence to support its claim that the workers had genuinely lost interest or refused to participate in the screening process.

The Court also found that the DAR violated the respondents’ right of retention under Section 6 of the CARL. Even if the landholdings were covered by CARP, the respondents, as landowners, had the right to retain five hectares of their land and to choose which areas to retain. The DAR’s cancellation of all of the respondents’ TCTs effectively nullified this right, depriving them of their property without due process. This underscored the importance of respecting landowners’ rights even within the context of agrarian reform.

Finally, the Court addressed the irregular issuance of a writ of execution by RARAD Florin in favor of Baribag. The Court noted that RARAD Florin lacked jurisdiction over Baribag because the cooperative was not a party in the original application for exclusion. Moreover, the denial of the respondents’ application for exclusion was still under review by the DAR Secretary when the writ of execution was issued, rendering the issuance premature and without legal basis. This procedural misstep further highlighted the DAR’s overzealous approach in implementing CARP without due regard for legal processes and landowners’ rights.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The primary issue was whether the landholdings of the Berenguer family were covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), considering their reclassification as residential and industrial prior to the enactment of the law. The court had to determine if the DAR correctly applied CARP principles to lands that landowners claimed had already been reclassified.
What did the DAR argue?	The DAR contended that the landholdings were agricultural and not primarily devoted to cattle raising, and therefore subject to CARP coverage. They also challenged the Court of Appeals’ decision to treat the respondents’ petition for certiorari as a petition for review.
What did the landowners argue?	The landowners argued that their properties had been reclassified as residential and industrial long before the enactment of the CARL, supported by certifications from HLURB and resolutions from the Sangguniang Bayan of Sorsogon, thus exempting them from CARP coverage. They also claimed that the DAR had violated their right of retention and that the designation of farmer beneficiaries was irregular.
What was the significance of Resolution No. 5?	Resolution No. 5, passed by the Sangguniang Bayan of Sorsogon, included Barangay Bibincahan, where the respondents’ landholdings were located, within the poblacion area. This inclusion carried a presumption that the lands were industrial and residential, thus non-agricultural and exempt from CARP.
Why was the DAR’s designation of Baribag as beneficiary questioned?	The DAR’s designation of Baribag as the beneficiary was questioned because it did not follow the priority order specified in Section 22 of the CARL, which prioritizes landless residents, agricultural lessees, share tenants, and farmworkers. The DAR’s reasons for excluding the actual workers on the landholdings were deemed unacceptable.
What is the landowner’s right of retention under CARP?	Under Section 6 of the CARL, landowners have the right to retain five hectares of their land, even if the land is covered by CARP. The landowners also have the right to choose which areas to retain, which should be compact or contiguous.
What was the Court’s ruling on the writ of execution?	The Court ruled that the issuance of the writ of execution by RARAD Florin in favor of Baribag was irregular because RARAD Florin lacked jurisdiction over Baribag, as the cooperative was not a party in the original application for exclusion. Additionally, the denial of the respondents’ application for exclusion was still under review when the writ was issued.
What was the final decision of the Supreme Court?	The Supreme Court denied the DAR’s petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision. The Court ordered the DAR to cancel the certificates of land ownership awards issued to Baribag, reinstate the respondents’ transfer certificates of title, and restore possession of the landholdings to the respondents.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in Department of Agrarian Reform v. Berenguer reinforces the importance of respecting landowners’ rights and adhering to legal processes in the implementation of agrarian reform. The ruling serves as a reminder that the noble goals of CARP should not be pursued at the expense of due process and established property rights. This decision highlights the necessity for the DAR to thoroughly investigate land classifications and beneficiary qualifications before placing properties under CARP coverage.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM VS. PABLO BERENGUER, ET AL., G.R. No. 154094, March 09, 2010