ASG Law

Tag: DAR

  • Land Conversion Disputes: Upholding Finality in Agrarian Reform Decisions

    In Ayala Land, Inc. v. Castillo, the Supreme Court reiterated the importance of finality of judgments, especially concerning agrarian reform. The Court denied the respondents’ motion for reconsideration, underscoring that settled judicial decisions and administrative rulings must stand to maintain stability in the legal system. This means that once a decision regarding land conversion becomes final, it cannot be easily overturned, protecting the rights of those who have relied on it. The ruling emphasizes adherence to procedural rules and respect for the expertise of administrative agencies like the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) in land use matters.

    From Farms to Finances: When Can Agricultural Land Be Converted?

    This case stems from a dispute over land initially mortgaged to Manila Banking Corporation (MBC) by Capitol Citifarms, Inc. (CCFI). Ayala Land, Inc. (ALI) later acquired the property. The core legal question revolves around whether this land, previously subject to a Notice of Coverage under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), could be converted for non-agricultural use. The respondents, including farmer beneficiaries, challenged the conversion, arguing that it violated agrarian reform laws. The legal battle involved the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), the Office of the President (OP), and ultimately, the Supreme Court. The heart of the matter lies in balancing property rights, agrarian reform policies, and the finality of administrative decisions.

    At the heart of the Supreme Court’s decision is the principle of the finality of judgments. The Court emphasized that after a certain point, decisions made by courts and quasi-judicial bodies must be considered final. This principle ensures predictability and stability in the legal system. To reverse previous rulings would undermine this stability, the Court argued. The Court also took issue with the fact that the respondents raised the issue of the Notice of Acquisition late in the proceedings. The Court emphasized, “Respondents never raised the issue regarding the existence or effect of a Notice of Acquisition.”

    The Supreme Court highlighted that Rule 131, Section 1 of the Rules of Court places the burden of proof on the party making an allegation. In this case, the respondents failed to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim that a Notice of Acquisition existed. The Court pointed out that even the Court of Appeals had requested a copy of the Notice of Acquisition from the respondents, but they failed to comply. This failure to substantiate their claims further weakened their position.

    The Court also underscored its role in correcting reversible errors of law committed by the Court of Appeals (CA). It criticized the CA for basing its ruling on a conclusion of fact not supported by the case records. It is a fundamental principle that issues raised for the first time on appeal should not be considered by a reviewing court. The Court explained that, “Points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court are barred by estoppel.” This principle ensures fairness and prevents parties from raising new issues late in the proceedings.

    In its decision, the Supreme Court also invoked the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. This doctrine states that matters requiring the expertise of an administrative body should first be addressed by that body, even if the courts have jurisdiction. The Court noted that the DAR had already reviewed the conversion order and validated it. Thus, the Court was hesitant to interfere with the DAR’s specialized expertise. The Court reiterated what has been said in the Decision. That is, even assuming that the Notice of Acquisition did exist, considering that CCFI and ALI have had no chance to controvert the CA finding of its legal bar to conversion, this Court is unable to ascertain the details of the Notice of Acquisition at this belated stage, or rule on its legal effect on the Conversion Order duly issued by the DAR, without undermining the technical expertise of the DAR itself.

    Furthermore, the Court acknowledged the significant weight and respect given to the factual findings of administrative agencies, particularly the DAR Secretary. The Court held that factual findings made by the DAR Secretary, who possesses expertise in agrarian matters, deserve full respect and should not be altered or reversed without a justifiable reason. The Court stated, “The factual findings of the DAR Secretary, who, by reason of his official position, has acquired expertise in specific matters within his jurisdiction, deserve full respect.” This deference to administrative expertise is a cornerstone of administrative law.

    The respondents argued that the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage was not a new issue. They contended that it had been previously raised before the DAR and the OP. However, the Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the issue of the Notice of Acquisition was distinct from the general issue of CARP coverage. The Court also addressed the respondents’ argument that DAR Administrative Order No. 12, series of 1994 (DAR A.O. 12-94), prioritizes the preservation of prime agricultural land. The Court clarified that this principle does not automatically invalidate a conversion order, especially if the land in question is not proven to be prime agricultural land.

    The Court also addressed the issue of prescription, noting that the applicable rules for determining the timeliness of a petition for cancellation of a conversion order are those in effect at the time the petition is filed. This is because, “It is axiomatic that laws have prospective effect, as the Administrative Code provides.” As such, the Court determined that the respondents’ Petition for Revocation was indeed barred by prescription.

    Regarding the requirement of a zoning ordinance for conversion, the Court noted that even without a comprehensive zoning ordinance, conversion may still be possible if the surrounding area is no longer primarily agricultural. It is important to note that the land in question had the following characteristics: the property is about 10 kilometers from the Provincial Road, the land sits on a mountainside overlooking Santa Rosa technopark, the topography of the landholding is hilly and has an average slope of more than 18%, and the dominant use of the surrounding area is its industrial/ forest growth as the landholding is sitting on a mountain slope overlooking the Sta. Rosa Technopark.

    Lastly, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the land was exempt from CARP coverage, because DAR had already found that the topography of the land is hilly and has an average slope of more than 18%. Hence, the land is exempt from CARP coverage under Section 10 of R.A. 6657, which states, “lands with eighteen percent (18%) slope and over, except those already developed shall be exempt from the coverage of the Act.” The Court emphasized that it relies on the expertise of administrative agencies like the DAR in making such determinations.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether a conversion order for agricultural land could be revoked based on the claim that a Notice of Acquisition had been issued, even though this issue was not raised in the original proceedings.
    What is the doctrine of finality of judgment? The doctrine of finality of judgment holds that at some point, court decisions must become final and unchangeable to ensure stability and predictability in the legal system. This prevents endless litigation and protects the rights of parties who have relied on the judgment.
    What does the burden of proof entail? The burden of proof requires the party making an allegation to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim. If a party fails to present adequate evidence, their claim may be dismissed by the court.
    What is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction? The doctrine of primary jurisdiction states that matters requiring the expertise of an administrative body should first be addressed by that body before resorting to the courts. This recognizes the specialized knowledge and experience of administrative agencies.
    What are admissions against interest? Admissions against interest are statements made by a party that are contrary to their own legal position. These admissions are considered strong evidence and can be used against the party in court.
    When can new issues be raised on appeal? Generally, new issues cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. However, there are exceptions, such as when the issue involves jurisdiction, plain error, jurisprudential developments, or matters of public policy.
    What is the significance of DAR A.O. 12-94? DAR A.O. 12-94 outlines the policies and guidelines for land use conversion. It emphasizes the preservation of prime agricultural land and sets criteria for approving or disapproving conversion applications.
    How does prescription affect petitions for revocation? Prescription sets a time limit within which a legal action must be brought. In the context of land conversion, petitions for revocation must be filed within the period prescribed by applicable regulations, such as DAR A.O. No. 1, series of 1999.
    Can land be converted without a zoning ordinance? Yes, conversion may be possible even without a comprehensive zoning ordinance if the surrounding area is no longer primarily agricultural. The DAR may consider the dominant land use in the vicinity.
    Are lands with a slope of 18% or more covered by CARP? No, lands with a slope of 18% or more are generally exempt from CARP coverage under Section 10 of R.A. 6657. This exemption recognizes the limitations of cultivating steep slopes for agricultural purposes.

    In summary, the Supreme Court’s resolution in Ayala Land, Inc. v. Castillo underscores the importance of adhering to established legal principles such as the finality of judgments, the burden of proof, and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The decision reinforces the role of administrative agencies like the DAR in resolving land use disputes, and provides a framework for balancing agrarian reform policies with property rights and the need for economic development. The decision in the case provides clarity on land conversion disputes and upholds the finality of agrarian reform decisions.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Ayala Land, Inc. v. Castillo, G.R. No. 178110, January 12, 2016

  • Just Compensation in Agrarian Reform: Ensuring Fair Valuation of Expropriated Land

    The Supreme Court held that when determining just compensation for land acquired under agrarian reform, courts must consider factors outlined in Republic Act No. 6657, emphasizing fair market value and the owner’s loss. This case underscores the judiciary’s role in ensuring landowners receive equitable payment for properties taken under agrarian programs, balancing the state’s interest in land reform with individual property rights.

    Balancing Land Reform and Fair Value: The Gacias Heirs’ Quest for Just Compensation

    This case revolves around a dispute over just compensation for an 8-hectare portion of riceland owned by the heirs of Sabiniano and Margarita Gacias (Sps. Gacias), which was placed under the government’s Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) initially valued the land at P77,000.00, a figure the Gacias heirs contested, leading to a legal battle involving the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) and culminating in a Supreme Court decision that underscores the importance of fairly valuing expropriated land in agrarian reform.

    The core legal question is whether the Court of Appeals (CA) erred in affirming the Regional Trial Court’s (RTC) decision, which determined the just compensation without properly considering the factors outlined in Republic Act No. (RA) 6657, also known as the “Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.” The LBP argued that it could not disburse payment without a land transfer claim/claim folder. The Gacias heirs sought a higher valuation based on the land’s productivity, while the courts grappled with applying the correct legal framework for assessing just compensation.

    At the heart of the matter is the constitutional right to just compensation. Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The Supreme Court emphasized that the agrarian reform process, when incomplete (as in this case with unpaid compensation), must be concluded under RA 6657, with Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27 and Executive Order No. (EO) 228 serving only as supplementary guidelines. This means that RA 6657 takes precedence, and PD 27 and EO 228 only apply when RA 6657 is insufficient.

    The procedure for determining just compensation under RA 6657 begins with the LBP valuing the land. Following this, the DAR makes an offer to the landowner. If the offer is rejected, the DAR Adjudicator conducts administrative proceedings to determine compensation. A party disagreeing with the Adjudicator’s decision can appeal to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) acting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC). The RTC then makes the final determination of just compensation.

    In this case, the LBP argued that the DAR had not forwarded the necessary claim folder, a requirement for disbursing payment. However, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the land had been effectively expropriated, given the DAR’s initial valuation and the issuance of emancipation patents (EPs)/certificates of land transfer (CLTs) to tenant-beneficiaries. Disregarding the Gacias heirs’ right to just compensation based solely on the missing claim folders would be a grave injustice, especially considering the delay and failure of the DAR to forward these documents after the land was taken and EPs/CLTs were issued.

    The Supreme Court noted that the DAR Secretary had previously declared the conveyed portions under the OLT Program of PD 27, deeming the conveyances ineffectual due to non-compliance with DAR Memorandum dated May 7, 1982. This memorandum requires tenants to have knowledge of the transfer, recognize the new owners, and pay rentals to them prior to October 21, 1972, for the transfer to be valid against the tenants. Thus, the subject portion was placed under the OLT Program under the original owner’s name, Sabiniano Gacias, and the RTC directed the DAR to forward the claim folder to the LBP.

    While the LBP has the initial responsibility of determining land value and compensation, its valuation is not conclusive. The RTC, acting as a SAC, has the final say on just compensation, as determining just compensation is a judicial function. Despite this, the Supreme Court found that both the RTC and CA failed to consider factors under Section 17 of RA 6657 in determining just compensation, necessitating the remand of the case.

    Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, lists several factors that must be considered in determining just compensation, including: (a) the acquisition cost of the land, (b) the current value of like properties, (c) the nature and actual use of the property and the income therefrom, (d) the owner’s sworn valuation, (e) the tax declarations, (f) the assessment made by government assessors, (g) the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers, and by the government to the property, and (h) the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land. The Court observed that none of these factors were considered by the lower courts.

    To address this, the Supreme Court provided guidelines for the RTC to follow upon remand:

    1. Compensation must be valued at the time of taking: This is when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of the property, typically when title is transferred. Evidence presented must be based on values prevalent at the time of taking for similar agricultural lands.
    2. Evidence must conform with Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, prior to its amendment by RA 9700: Given that the petitions were filed before the passage of RA 9700, the earlier version of Section 17 should control the valuation.
    3. The Regional Trial Court may impose interest on the just compensation: Interest may be warranted by the circumstances and prevailing jurisprudence. Legal interest is pegged at 12% per annum from the time of taking until June 30, 2013, and 6% per annum thereafter, in line with BSP-MB Circular No. 799, series of 2013.
    4. The Regional Trial Court is not strictly bound by DAR formulas: While the DAR’s formulas should be taken into account, the court is not obligated to adhere to them if the situations do not warrant it, as the determination of just compensation is a judicial function.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether the lower courts correctly determined the just compensation for land expropriated under agrarian reform, specifically if they adequately considered the factors outlined in Section 17 of RA 6657.
    What is just compensation? Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner, ensuring that the landowner is neither enriched nor impoverished by the expropriation.
    What is the role of the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) in agrarian reform? The LBP is primarily responsible for determining the land valuation and compensation for private lands acquired under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
    What is the significance of Section 17 of RA 6657? Section 17 of RA 6657 lists the factors that must be considered when determining just compensation, ensuring a comprehensive and fair valuation process.
    What is the timeline for application of Legal Interest in this case? Legal interest is pegged at 12% per annum from the time of taking until June 30, 2013, and 6% per annum thereafter, until fully paid, in line with BSP-MB Circular No. 799, series of 2013.
    Why was the case remanded to the RTC? The case was remanded because the RTC and CA failed to consider the factors listed in Section 17 of RA 6657 when determining just compensation.
    How does this case affect landowners under agrarian reform? This case reinforces the importance of a fair and comprehensive valuation of expropriated land, ensuring landowners receive just compensation based on multiple factors, not just a formula.
    What is the effect of the DAR’s failure to submit the claim folder to LBP? Though LBP claimed that non-submission prevents payment of claim, the Supreme Court held that it cannot be a bar for payment of just compensation because it would be a grave injustice to the landowners.

    In conclusion, this case underscores the judiciary’s vital role in ensuring that landowners receive just compensation for properties taken under agrarian reform. By mandating a comprehensive evaluation of factors outlined in RA 6657, the Supreme Court seeks to strike a balance between the state’s interest in land reform and the protection of individual property rights, ultimately fostering a fairer and more equitable implementation of agrarian programs.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Salud Gacias Beriña, G.R. No. 183901, July 09, 2014

  • CARP and Landowner Rights: Diamond Farms Case on Just Compensation and Beneficiary Possession

    In Diamond Farms, Inc. v. Diamond Farm Workers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, the Supreme Court addressed the critical intersection of agrarian reform, land ownership, and the rights of farmworkers. The Court ruled that despite a landowner’s claim of non-payment of just compensation, the issuance of Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) to qualified beneficiaries effectively transfers ownership and the right to possess the land. This decision reinforces the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law’s (CARL) goal of empowering landless farmers and ensuring their control over agricultural lands, while also clarifying the process and requirements for landowners to claim just compensation.

    From Banana Plantation to Beneficiaries’ Land: Who Holds the Right to the Land?

    Diamond Farms, Inc., a commercial banana farming corporation, found itself in a legal battle over a 109-hectare land in Carmen, Davao, which was placed under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). After the land was awarded to CARP beneficiaries, primarily members of the Diamond Farm Workers Multi-Purpose Cooperative (DFWMPC), Diamond Farms filed a complaint for unlawful occupation, claiming they hadn’t received just compensation for the land. The central legal question was whether the farmworkers could rightfully possess and benefit from the land before the former landowner received full payment for it.

    The legal framework governing this case is primarily Republic Act No. 6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). Section 16(e) of the CARL outlines the procedure for acquiring private lands, stating that upon receipt of payment by the landowner, or deposit with an accessible bank, the DAR shall take immediate possession. This provision became a focal point, as Diamond Farms argued that without receiving just compensation, the transfer of possession was unlawful.

    However, the Supreme Court emphasized the intent of the agrarian reform program, rooted in Section 4, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution and Section 2 of the CARL. These provisions highlight the right of landless farmers and regular farmworkers to own the lands they till, directly or collectively. Building on this principle, the Court affirmed that the issuance of CLOAs serves as evidence of ownership for the beneficiaries, solidifying their right to possess and utilize the land.

    Diamond Farms contended that they had not received just compensation for the land and therefore should retain possession. They also argued that the issue of non-payment was not raised only at the DARAB level, and was intertwined with their cause of action. However, the Court found that the Republic’s TCTs derived from Diamond Farms’ TCTs pursuant to the CARL were not attacked or assailed in the case.

    The Supreme Court, in its analysis, referenced its landmark decision in Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council. That case underscored the constitutional mandate to empower farmers with control over agricultural lands. This case emphasized that the agrarian reform program is founded on the right of farmers and regular farm workers who are landless to own directly or collectively the lands they till. The policy on agrarian reform is that control over the agricultural land must always be in the hands of the farmers.

    Furthermore, the Court addressed Diamond Farms’ claims regarding the non-payment of just compensation. While acknowledging the landowner’s right to receive just compensation, the Court noted that the DAR had already deposited cash and agrarian reform bonds as compensation for the 109-hectare land. The certificates of deposit and DAR memorandum requesting the Register of Deeds to issue TCTs in the name of the Republic of the Philippines were duly annotated. Moreover, Diamond Farms failed to demonstrate that they had pursued a separate action before the Special Agrarian Court (SAC) to determine the final amount of just compensation.

    The Court underscored the importance of following the proper legal avenues for resolving compensation disputes. Sections 56 and 57 of the CARL provide that the RTC, acting as SAC, has original and exclusive jurisdiction over petitions for the determination of just compensation. By not pursuing this avenue, Diamond Farms’ claim of non-payment lacked proper substantiation and could not justify their continued possession of the land.

    Moreover, the Court addressed the issue of production sharing, mandated under Section 32 of the CARL, which requires entities owning or operating agricultural lands to distribute 3% of gross sales to farmworkers. Diamond Farms argued that because they incurred losses, no production share was due. However, the Court clarified that the production share is based on gross sales, not net profits, and Diamond Farms’ own records indicated significant sales from the land’s produce.

    The decision highlights the dual responsibilities of landowners and the government in implementing agrarian reform. Landowners are entitled to just compensation for their land, and the government must ensure that this compensation is provided in a timely and fair manner. Concurrently, the government has a constitutional mandate to redistribute land to qualified beneficiaries, empowering them to become productive members of society.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether farmworkers were entitled to possess and benefit from land awarded to them under CARP before the former landowner received just compensation.
    What is a Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA)? A CLOA is a document issued by the DAR to qualified agrarian reform beneficiaries, serving as evidence of their ownership of the awarded land. The CLOA grants beneficiaries the right to possess, cultivate, and benefit from the land.
    What is just compensation in agrarian reform? Just compensation refers to the fair market value of the land at the time of taking, ensuring that landowners are adequately compensated for the property transferred to agrarian reform beneficiaries.
    What is the role of the Special Agrarian Court (SAC)? The SAC, a branch of the Regional Trial Court, has original and exclusive jurisdiction over petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners. Landowners can file an original action with the SAC to determine just compensation.
    What is production sharing under the CARL? Production sharing mandates that entities owning or operating agricultural lands distribute 3% of gross sales to farmworkers as compensation, pending final land transfer.
    What happens if a landowner disagrees with the DAR’s land valuation? The landowner can file an original action with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) acting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC) to determine just compensation. The court has the right to review with finality the determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.
    What is the legal basis for agrarian reform in the Philippines? The legal basis for agrarian reform is found in Section 4, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution and the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), also known as Republic Act No. 6657.
    Can a landowner refuse the transfer of land if they believe the compensation is insufficient? No, the DAR can take immediate possession of the land upon deposit of the initial valuation with an accessible bank, even if the landowner rejects or does not respond to the offer. The landowner can then pursue a separate action to determine the final just compensation.

    The Diamond Farms case serves as a reminder of the complexities involved in agrarian reform and the importance of balancing the rights of landowners and the welfare of landless farmers. It underscores the government’s commitment to social justice and the empowerment of marginalized sectors through land redistribution, while also ensuring that landowners receive fair compensation for their properties.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Diamond Farms, Inc. vs. Diamond Farm Workers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, G.R. No. 192999, July 23, 2012

  • Initial Valuation vs. Just Compensation: Land Acquisition Under Agrarian Reform

    In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Hon. Ernesto P. Pagayatan, the Supreme Court clarified that before the government can take possession of private land under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), it must first deposit the initial valuation of the land with the landowner. This valuation is determined jointly by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), not by the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD). The Court emphasized that the PARAD’s valuation is preliminary and subject to judicial determination, while the DAR/LBP valuation triggers the government’s right to take possession. This ensures landowners receive compensation promptly while preserving their right to contest the final valuation in court. The case underscores the importance of following the specific procedures outlined in Republic Act No. 6657 to protect the rights of landowners during land acquisition.

    Whose Valuation Counts? The Battle Over Land Compensation in Occidental Mindoro

    The case revolves around a 3,682.0286-hectare estate in Occidental Mindoro, initially subjected to Operation Land Transfer (OLT) under Presidential Decree No. 27, and later, in part, to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). The landowner, Federico Suntay, remained unpaid for a significant portion of this land. His assignee, Josefina Lubrica, sought a summary determination of just compensation from the PARAD, which set a preliminary value of P166,150.00 per hectare, totaling P71,634,027.30. LBP contested this valuation, arguing that the PARAD’s determination was premature due to a pending case regarding the land’s coverage and that the initial valuation by DAR/LBP should be the basis for the deposit.

    The central legal question is: what amount should LBP deposit under Section 16 of RA 6657—the PARAD-determined valuation or the preliminary DAR/LBP valuation? The Supreme Court tackled this question by meticulously examining Section 16 of RA 6657, which outlines the procedure for acquiring private lands under agrarian reform. The Court emphasized that the law mandates the DAR to send a notice to the landowner containing an offer to pay a corresponding value, based on the valuation set forth in Sections 17, 18, and other relevant provisions. This notice is crucial, as it triggers the process of either acceptance or rejection by the landowner.

    Building on this principle, the Court highlighted that only after the landowner receives payment or, in case of rejection or no response, upon deposit of compensation with an accessible bank designated by the DAR, can the DAR take immediate possession of the land. This interpretation aligns with the legislative intent to ensure landowners are promptly compensated for their property before the government takes control. As the Supreme Court explicitly stated in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heir of Trinidad S. Vda. De Arieta:

    The amount of “offer” which the DAR gives to the landowner as compensation for his land, as mentioned in Section 16 (b) and (c), is based on the initial valuation by the LBP. This then is the amount which may be accepted or rejected by the landowner under the procedure established in Section 16. Perforce, such initial valuation by the LBP also becomes the basis of the deposit of provisional compensation pending final determination of just compensation, in accordance with sub-paragraph (e).

    The Court then emphasized the sequential process outlined in Section 16. First, the DAR identifies the land and landowners, then it sends a notice to acquire the land, including an offer based on the initial valuation. The landowner then has 30 days to accept or reject the offer. If the landowner rejects the offer, the DAR conducts summary administrative proceedings to determine compensation. However, even during these proceedings, the initial valuation by the DAR and LBP remains the operative figure for the immediate deposit. The relevant portion of RA 6657 reads:

    (e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries.

    The Supreme Court rejected the argument that the PARAD’s valuation should be the basis for the initial deposit. The Court reasoned that the law explicitly requires the initial valuation made by the DAR and LBP to be the basis for the deposit, not the preliminary valuation made by the PARAD. This ensures that landowners receive prompt compensation based on the government’s initial assessment, while still allowing them to contest the final valuation in court. The Court highlighted that the RTC’s order to deposit the PARAD’s valuation was in error, effectively bypassing the statutory process outlined in Section 16 of RA 6657.

    Building on this, the Court also cited DAR Administrative Order No. 02, Series of 1996, which details the process for land valuation. This administrative order further supports the Court’s interpretation, emphasizing the role of the DAR and LBP in the initial valuation process. The claim folder (CF) prepared by the DAR Municipal Office (DARMO) is crucial for land valuation. The DARMO then forwards this claim folder to the DAR Provincial Office (DARPO) which reviews and evaluates documents and gathers lacking documents, if any. Following this process, the DAR-LBP PPU forwards the CF to the LBP-Land Valuation and Landowner’s Compensation Office (LVLCO) which determines the land valuation based on valuation inputs and prepares and sends a Memo of Valuation, Claim Folder Profile and Valuation Summary (MOV-CFPVS) to the DARPO.

    In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion by ordering the deposit of the PARAD’s valuation instead of the initial valuation made by the DAR and LBP. The Court emphasized that the initial valuation serves as the basis for the deposit, enabling the DAR to take possession of the land while protecting the landowner’s right to just compensation. As a result, the Supreme Court directed the DAR and LBP to determine the initial valuation of the subject land as of the time of its taking and deposit that amount in the name of the landowner or his estate.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The central issue was determining the proper valuation amount to be deposited under Section 16 of Republic Act No. 6657—whether it should be the valuation determined by the PARAD/DARAB or the initial valuation determined by the DAR/LBP.
    What did the Supreme Court decide? The Supreme Court ruled that the amount to be deposited should be the initial valuation determined by the DAR and LBP, not the valuation determined by the PARAD. This is because the initial valuation triggers the government’s right to take possession of the land.
    Why is the DAR/LBP’s initial valuation important? The initial valuation is important because it is the basis for the DAR’s offer to the landowner and allows the government to take possession of the land promptly while the final just compensation is being determined.
    What happens if the landowner disagrees with the initial valuation? If the landowner disagrees with the initial valuation, they can contest it in court to seek a final determination of just compensation. However, the initial deposit based on the DAR/LBP valuation must still be made.
    What is the role of the PARAD in this process? The PARAD plays a role in determining the just compensation if the landowner rejects the initial offer. However, their valuation is preliminary and subject to judicial review, and it does not determine the initial deposit.
    What is the claim folder (CF) and why is it important? The claim folder contains all the necessary documents for the valuation of the land. It’s important because it provides the basis for the DAR and LBP to make an informed initial valuation.
    What is the significance of DAR Administrative Order No. 02, Series of 1996? DAR Administrative Order No. 02 outlines the procedures for acquiring agricultural lands and reinforces the importance of the DAR and LBP’s role in determining the initial valuation of the land.
    What practical implication does this case have for landowners? This case ensures that landowners receive prompt compensation for their land before the government takes possession, while also preserving their right to contest the final valuation in court.

    In conclusion, Land Bank of the Philippines v. Hon. Ernesto P. Pagayatan provides vital clarification on the land acquisition process under agrarian reform. It reinforces the necessity of adhering to the procedural guidelines outlined in RA 6657 to safeguard the rights of landowners and ensure a fair and just compensation process. The decision serves as a reminder that initial valuation plays a key role in enabling the government to proceed with land redistribution while respecting landowners’ constitutional rights.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Land Bank of the Philippines v. Hon. Ernesto P. Pagayatan, G.R. No. 177190, February 23, 2011

  • Livestock Farming and Agrarian Reform: Understanding Land Use Exemptions in the Philippines

    Maintaining Livestock Exemption: Continuous Land Use is Key

    TLDR: This case clarifies that land exempt from agrarian reform due to livestock farming must maintain that specific land use. A shift away from livestock operations can lead to the land being reclassified and subject to agrarian reform, emphasizing the importance of consistent land use for retaining exemptions.

    G.R. No. 182332, February 23, 2011

    Introduction

    Imagine a thriving cattle farm, passed down through generations, suddenly facing the threat of agrarian reform. This was the reality for Milestone Farms, Inc., a company that sought to exempt its land from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) due to its use for livestock farming. The case highlights the complexities of land use exemptions and the importance of maintaining the specific activity that qualifies the land for such exemptions.

    Milestone Farms, Inc. applied for exemption from CARP, arguing that its land was primarily used for livestock, poultry, and swine raising. The legal question at the heart of this case was whether the land, initially exempted based on its use for livestock farming, could be subjected to CARP coverage due to a change in land use. The Supreme Court ultimately ruled against Milestone Farms, emphasizing that continuous use for livestock farming is essential to maintain the exemption.

    Legal Context: CARP, Luz Farms, and Land Use

    The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), established under Republic Act No. 6657, aimed to redistribute agricultural land to landless farmers. However, the law also recognized certain exemptions, particularly for land used for specific purposes.

    A pivotal case in defining these exemptions is Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, which excluded agricultural lands devoted to livestock, poultry, and/or swine raising from CARP coverage. The Supreme Court clarified that livestock, swine, and poultry-raising are industrial activities, not agricultural, and therefore not subject to agrarian reform.

    Republic Act No. 7881 further amended R.A. No. 6657, solidifying the exclusion of private agricultural lands devoted to livestock, poultry, and swine raising from CARP. It is important to note that this exclusion is based on the specific and continuous use of the land for these purposes.

    Key Provisions:

    • Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law): The foundation of agrarian reform in the Philippines, aiming to distribute agricultural land to landless farmers.
    • Republic Act No. 7881: An amendment to R.A. No. 6657, specifically excluding private agricultural lands devoted to livestock, poultry, and swine raising from CARP coverage.
    • Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform: A landmark case that defined livestock farming as an industrial activity, thus exempting it from agrarian reform.

    Case Breakdown: The Journey of Milestone Farms

    The Milestone Farms case unfolded over several years, involving multiple administrative and judicial levels. Here’s a breakdown of the key events:

    1. Initial Exemption: In 1994, the DAR Regional Director initially exempted Milestone Farms’ 316.0422-hectare property from CARP, based on the Luz Farms ruling.
    2. Reconsideration: The Southern Pinugay Farmers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. challenged the exemption, leading to a review by the DAR Secretary.
    3. DAR Secretary’s Ruling: In 1997, the DAR Secretary partially revoked the exemption, covering 75.0646 hectares under CARP, arguing that not all the land was actively used for livestock farming as of June 15, 1988.
    4. Office of the President (OP) Decision: Initially, the OP reinstated the full exemption in 2000, but later reversed its decision in 2002, siding with the DAR Secretary’s partial revocation.
    5. Court of Appeals (CA) Rulings: The CA initially reinstated the full exemption in 2005, but later amended its decision in 2006, lifting the exemption of 162.7373 hectares and declaring it covered by CARP.
    6. Supreme Court Decision: The Supreme Court affirmed the CA’s amended decision, emphasizing that the land was no longer primarily used for livestock farming.

    The Court highlighted the significance of continuous land use, stating:

    “Petitioner’s admission that, since 2001, it leased another ranch for its own livestock is fatal to its cause.”

    The Court also noted the importance of evidence showing current land use, stating:

    “The acquisition of such cattle after the lifting of the exemption clearly reveals that petitioner-appellant was no longer operating a livestock farm, and suggests an effort to create a semblance of livestock-raising for the purpose of its Motion for Reconsideration.”

    Practical Implications: Maintaining Exemptions and Land Use

    This case serves as a crucial reminder for landowners seeking exemptions from agrarian reform based on livestock farming. It underscores the necessity of maintaining continuous and active use of the land for the specific purpose that justifies the exemption.

    Businesses and property owners should ensure that their land use aligns with the legal requirements for exemption and maintain thorough records to demonstrate continuous compliance. Changes in land use, even if seemingly minor, can jeopardize the exemption and subject the land to CARP coverage.

    Key Lessons

    • Continuous Use: Land must be continuously and actively used for livestock, poultry, or swine raising to maintain exemption from CARP.
    • Documentation: Maintain detailed records of livestock operations, including the number of animals, infrastructure, and land use.
    • Compliance: Regularly review and ensure compliance with DAR regulations and guidelines.
    • Transparency: Disclose any changes in land use to the DAR promptly.

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Q: What is the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)?

    A: CARP is a government initiative to redistribute agricultural land to landless farmers, promoting social justice and rural development.

    Q: What type of lands are exempted from CARP?

    A: Under certain conditions, lands used for livestock, poultry, and swine raising, as well as those with industrial or residential classifications, may be exempted.

    Q: What did the Supreme Court decide in Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform?

    A: The Court ruled that livestock, poultry, and swine-raising are industrial activities, not agricultural, and therefore not subject to agrarian reform.

    Q: What happens if land exempted for livestock farming is no longer used for that purpose?

    A: The exemption may be revoked, and the land may be subjected to CARP coverage.

    Q: What evidence is needed to prove continuous use for livestock farming?

    A: Evidence may include records of livestock population, infrastructure, land use, and compliance with DAR regulations.

    Q: Does shifting to another ranch invalidate my CARP Exemption?

    A: Yes. The court found that Milestone Farm’s leasing of another ranch for it’s livestock was fatal to their cause, suggesting they were no longer operating a livestock farm on the property in question.

    ASG Law specializes in agrarian reform and land use issues. Contact us or email hello@asglawpartners.com to schedule a consultation.

  • Just Compensation in Agrarian Reform: SAC Jurisdiction and Land Valuation

    In agrarian reform cases in the Philippines, the Supreme Court clarified that the Special Agrarian Court (SAC) has original and exclusive jurisdiction in determining just compensation for lands acquired under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). The Department of Agrarian Reform’s (DAR) land valuation is preliminary and non-binding. The final determination of just compensation rests with the courts, ensuring landowners receive fair payment based on factors outlined in Republic Act (RA) 6657 and related regulations. This ensures a judicial process for resolving disputes over land valuation in agrarian reform.

    Land Valuation Showdown: When Does the Special Agrarian Court Have the Final Say?

    This case, Heirs of Lorenzo and Carmen Vidad and Agvid Construction Co., Inc. vs. Land Bank of the Philippines, revolves around a dispute over the just compensation for a 446.2375-hectare land in Isabela acquired by the government under RA 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. The landowners, the Heirs of Lorenzo and Carmen Vidad and Agvid Construction Co., Inc. (petitioners), contested the Land Bank of the Philippines’ (LBP) valuation of their land. The core legal question is whether the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator’s (RARAD) decision on just compensation is final and binding, precluding the SAC from determining the land’s value, and whether the LBP has the legal standing to contest the RARAD’s decision before the SAC.

    The petitioners voluntarily offered their land for sale to the government in 1989 under RA 6657. The LBP initially valued the land at P2,961,333.03, which the petitioners rejected. The case went through various administrative proceedings, including petitions with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) and the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD). Ultimately, the RARAD fixed the just compensation at P32,965,408.46, which the petitioners accepted. However, the LBP disagreed and filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC), for the final determination of just compensation, as it is empowered to do under the law.

    The petitioners argued that the RARAD’s decision was final and binding, and that the LBP had no legal standing to bring the case before the SAC. They also accused LBP of forum shopping. The SAC, however, ruled in favor of LBP, setting the just compensation at P5,626,724.47. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the SAC’s decision, leading the petitioners to elevate the case to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court addressed several key issues, including the jurisdiction of the SAC in just compensation cases, the legal personality of the LBP, and the question of forum shopping.

    Building on this principle, the Supreme Court emphasized that the determination of just compensation is inherently a judicial function. It clarified that the PARAD/RARAD/DARAB does not exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the SAC in just compensation cases. The SAC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, as provided under Section 57 of RA 6657. This jurisdiction cannot be undermined by administrative officials. To emphasize this critical point, the Supreme Court quoted Sections 50 and 57 of RA No. 6657:

    Section 50. Quasi-judicial Powers of the DAR. – The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) x x x

    Section 57. Special Jurisdiction. – The Special Agrarian Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. x x x

    The Supreme Court highlighted that while the DAR has primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters, this does not extend to the final determination of just compensation. That determination rests exclusively with the SAC. The DAR’s land valuation is only preliminary. It is not final and conclusive. Courts retain the right to review and make a final determination, exercising their judicial function.

    The Court also addressed the legal personality of the LBP to contest the DAR decision. Section 18 of RA 6657 states that the LBP shall compensate the landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon by the landowner, the DAR, and the LBP, or as may be finally determined by the court. Therefore, the LBP is not merely a nominal party in the determination of just compensation; its agreement is essential. The LBP has the legal standing to question the determination of just compensation, independent of the DAR. The Supreme Court cited Heirs of Roque F. Tabuena v. Land Bank of the Philippines to support its ruling:

    LBP is an agency created primarily to provide financial support in all phases of agrarian reform pursuant to Section 74 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3844 and Section 64 of RA No. 6657. It is vested with the primary responsibility and authority in the valuation and compensation of covered landholdings to carry out the full implementation of the Agrarian Reform Program. It may agree with the DAR and the land owner as to the amount of just compensation to be paid to the latter and may also disagree with them and bring the matter to court for judicial determination.

    Moreover, the Court found that the LBP did not commit forum shopping. Forum shopping occurs when a party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions, facts, and issues. In this case, the SAC had no jurisdiction to issue an injunctive writ against the RARAD’s decision. Therefore, the LBP’s filing of a petition for certiorari with the DARAB, which had the correct jurisdiction for the remedy sought, did not constitute forum shopping.

    However, with respect to the computation of just compensation, the Supreme Court noted deficiencies in the valuation made by the SAC. It emphasized that Section 17 of RA 6657 provides the factors to be considered in determining just compensation, including the cost of acquisition, current value of like properties, and the nature and actual use of the land. Furthermore, DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 5, series of 1998, outlines a basic formula for the valuation of lands covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). The Court ruled that this formula should be applied. Due to the need for further reception of evidence and the unique circumstances of the case, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals, acting as its agent, to receive evidence and determine just compensation in accordance with Section 17 of RA 6657 and DAR regulations.

    Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s decision reinforces the SAC’s role as the final arbiter of just compensation in agrarian reform cases. It affirms the LBP’s legal standing to contest DAR valuations, ensuring a balanced and fair process for both landowners and the government. The decision also underscores the importance of adhering to the specific factors and formulas prescribed by law and regulations in determining just compensation.

    FAQs

    What is the central legal issue in this case? The key issue is determining which entity has the final authority to decide the amount of just compensation for land acquired under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP): the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) or the Special Agrarian Court (SAC). Additionally, the case addresses whether the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) has the legal right to contest the RARAD’s valuation.
    What is the role of the Special Agrarian Court (SAC) in land reform cases? The SAC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners under Republic Act (RA) 6657. This means that landowners or the LBP can bring a case before the SAC to determine the final amount of compensation for lands acquired under CARP.
    Does the DAR’s valuation of land bind the SAC? No, the DAR’s valuation is considered preliminary. The SAC is not bound by the DAR’s valuation and must independently assess the just compensation based on factors outlined in RA 6657 and related regulations.
    Can the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) contest the DAR’s valuation of land? Yes, the LBP is an indispensable party in expropriation proceedings under RA 6657 and has the legal personality to question the determination of just compensation, independent of the DAR. The LBP’s agreement is essential for determining just compensation.
    What factors are considered in determining just compensation? Section 17 of RA 6657 lists several factors, including the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use, and income. Government assessments, tax declarations, and the landowner’s sworn valuation are also considered.
    What is DAR Administrative Order No. 5, series of 1998, and how does it apply? DAR AO No. 5 outlines a basic formula for valuing lands covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). The Supreme Court requires the application of this formula in computing just compensation, though specific factors may be adjusted based on evidence.
    What is forum shopping, and did the LBP commit it in this case? Forum shopping involves repetitively availing of several judicial remedies in different courts based on the same facts and issues. The Supreme Court found that LBP did not commit forum shopping because the SAC lacked jurisdiction on the matter.
    What was the final outcome of the case? The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to receive evidence and determine just compensation in accordance with Section 17 of RA 6657 and DAR regulations. The previous valuation was set aside.

    This case clarifies the respective roles of the DAR, LBP, and SAC in determining just compensation for land acquired under CARP. It emphasizes the judicial nature of determining just compensation and the importance of adhering to the factors and formulas outlined in RA 6657 and DAR regulations. The ultimate goal is to ensure that landowners receive fair payment for their land while upholding the objectives of agrarian reform.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Heirs of Lorenzo and Carmen Vidad and Agvid Construction Co., Inc. vs. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 166461, April 30, 2010

  • Agrarian Reform: DAR’s Authority in Beneficiary Selection Prevails Over DARAB’s Adjudication

    In Concha v. Rubio, the Supreme Court affirmed that the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) holds exclusive jurisdiction in identifying and selecting qualified farmer-beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). This ruling clarifies that the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) overstepped its authority when it intervened in beneficiary selection, an administrative function solely entrusted to the DAR Secretary. The decision reinforces the principle that administrative agencies should operate within their legally defined boundaries, ensuring the proper implementation of agrarian reform laws.

    Land Rights Crossroads: Who Decides the Fate of Farmer-Beneficiaries?

    The case revolves around a dispute over a portion of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-140494, T-140492, and T-140491, involving petitioners Romanita Concha, et al., and respondents Paulino Rubio, et al. The core issue is determining which group is qualified to be beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). The land, initially under private ownership, was subjected to the Compulsory Acquisition Scheme of CARP, leading to a conflict over beneficiary selection. This conflict reached the courts after the respondents, claiming to be the rightful tenants, challenged the petitioners’ inclusion as beneficiaries. The registered owners had entered into a joint project for land development before the dispute escalated. The landowners’ application for conversion was approved by the DAR, under the condition that the remaining hectares would be covered by CARP and distributed to qualified beneficiaries.

    The roots of the dispute lie in conflicting claims over tenancy rights and beneficiary status. Respondents asserted their rights as tenants, alleging they had not relinquished their claims despite receiving monetary awards from the landowners. Petitioners, on the other hand, were identified as qualified farmer-beneficiaries, leading to the issuance of Certificates of Land Ownership Awards (CLOAs) in their favor. Respondents questioned the validity of these CLOAs, leading to legal battles that spanned from the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) to the Court of Appeals (CA). The PARAD initially dismissed the case, stating that respondents had waived their rights and that the selection of beneficiaries was an administrative matter for the DAR. The DARAB, however, reversed this decision, favoring the respondents and ordering the cancellation of the CLOAs issued to the petitioners.

    The CA initially ruled in favor of the petitioners, upholding the titles issued in their favor, but later reversed its decision upon reconsideration, reinstating the DARAB’s decision. This vacillation by the CA set the stage for the Supreme Court to weigh in on the matter. The Supreme Court, in its analysis, focused on whether the DARAB possessed the jurisdiction to resolve the issue of identifying and selecting qualified farmer-beneficiaries. According to the petitioners, this matter fell under the administrative functions of the DAR Secretary, thus placing it beyond DARAB’s authority. This contention formed the crux of the Supreme Court’s examination and ultimately shaped the outcome of the case.

    The Supreme Court anchored its decision on the principle that the identification and selection of CARP beneficiaries are administrative functions falling exclusively within the jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary. Citing Lercana v. Jalandoni, the Court emphasized that these matters involve the administrative implementation of CARP and are beyond the purview of the DARAB. Further, the Court referenced Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v. Amante to highlight the DAR Secretary’s vested authority in beneficiary selection. The Court quoted Section 15 of R.A. No. 6657, which tasks the DAR, in coordination with the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC), with registering qualified beneficiaries of CARP, underscoring the administrative nature of this process.

    SECTION 15. Registration of Beneficiaries. — The DAR in coordination with the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) as organized in this Act, shall register all agricultural lessees, tenants and farm workers who are qualified to be beneficiaries of the CARP.

    Building on this principle, the Court scrutinized the DARAB Revised Rules, emphasizing that matters strictly involving the administrative implementation of CARP are the exclusive prerogative of the DAR Secretary. Rule II of the DARAB Revised Rules provides the scope of the board’s jurisdiction but explicitly excludes matters involving administrative implementation. The administrative function of the DAR is evident in Administrative Order No. 06-00, which specifies that the DAR Secretary has exclusive jurisdiction over the identification, qualification, or disqualification of potential farmer-beneficiaries. Section 2 of the said rules details the cases falling within the DAR Secretary’s exclusive jurisdiction, reinforcing the Court’s view that the DARAB had overstepped its boundaries.

    The Court observed that the PARAD was correct in its initial assessment that it lacked jurisdiction to resolve the dispute. The Court quoted the PARAD’s decision, which stated that no other agency is empowered to select farmer-beneficiaries except the DAR. Despite the PARAD’s clear recognition of its jurisdictional limitations, the DARAB granted affirmative relief to the respondents without addressing the critical issue of jurisdiction. This oversight, according to the Court, was a significant misstep. While acknowledging that the petitioners did not raise the jurisdictional issue before the DARAB, the Court maintained that this did not justify the DARAB’s action, particularly given the PARAD’s explicit discussion of its lack of jurisdiction. The same reasoning applied to the CA’s decision, which failed to address the jurisdictional impediment despite the petitioners raising the issue in their petition.

    The Supreme Court also addressed the circumstances surrounding the respondents’ initial waivers of their rights as tenants and farmer-beneficiaries. While recognizing the potential reluctance of long-term tenants to relinquish their land rights, as highlighted in Torres v. Ventura, the Court distinguished the case at bar. The Court emphasized the administrative prerogative of the DAR to identify and select agrarian reform beneficiaries, referencing Department of Agrarian Reform v. Department of Education, Culture and Sports. This prerogative, according to the Court, should not be easily substituted by judicial determination unless there is a grave abuse of discretion by the administrative agency. The Court, therefore, accorded respect to the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer’s (MARO) decision not to include the respondents as farmer-beneficiaries, citing the MARO’s Affidavit explaining the reasons for their exclusion.

    The MARO’s Affidavit detailed how the respondents had refused to cooperate with the documentation process, received disturbance compensation and lots from the landowners, and executed sworn statements waiving their rights. The Court found that this declaration strengthened the earlier Decision of the PARAD, which ruled that the waivers executed by the respondents were valid and binding. The Court also noted the PARAD’s observation that the respondents were motivated by greed when they sought to repudiate their sworn statements. The PARAD viewed their actions as an attempt to enrich themselves unfairly at the expense of the petitioners. The respondents’ allegation that they were the true tenants was deemed a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR.

    The Court clarified that being a tenant of a land covered by CARP does not automatically entitle one to be a farmer-beneficiary. Section 22 of Republic Act No. 6657 provides an order of priority for qualified farmer beneficiaries, which the MARO or Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) must follow. The Court reiterated that any individual contesting the selection of beneficiaries should avail themselves of administrative remedies within the DAR, not through the DARAB. The DARAB’s role is not to review or reverse the administrative findings of the DAR. Instead, it should defer to the DAR’s expertise in identifying and selecting beneficiaries, as illustrated in Lercana. This deference is now codified in Rule II of the DARAB’s 2003 Rules of Procedure, which allows for the referral of cases involving prejudicial issues related to agrarian law implementation to the Office of the Secretary (OSEC).

    The Court emphasized that while findings of administrative agencies like the DARAB are accorded respect and finality due to their expertise, it is crucial to maintain jurisdictional boundaries set by law. In this case, the DARAB overstepped its legal boundaries by taking cognizance of the dispute and deciding who should be declared the farmer-beneficiaries. The CA, therefore, erred in affirming the DARAB’s decision, which was rendered in excess of jurisdiction. The decision underscores the necessity of respecting the specific roles and expertise of administrative agencies within their legally defined scopes of authority.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The central issue was whether the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) had jurisdiction to decide on the identification and selection of qualified farmer-beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
    Who has the authority to identify CARP beneficiaries? The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Secretary has the exclusive authority to identify, qualify, or disqualify potential farmer-beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). This function is administrative in nature.
    What was the basis for the Supreme Court’s decision? The Supreme Court based its decision on the principle that the identification and selection of CARP beneficiaries are administrative functions that fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary, not the DARAB.
    What did the PARAD initially rule? The Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) initially dismissed the case, stating that the respondents had waived their rights as tenants and that the selection of beneficiaries was an administrative matter for the DAR.
    What was the MARO’s role in this case? The Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) is responsible for screening and selecting potential agrarian beneficiaries. In this case, the MARO’s decision not to include the respondents as farmer-beneficiaries was given deference by the Supreme Court.
    Can a tenant automatically become a CARP beneficiary? No, a tenant of a land covered by CARP is not automatically entitled to be a farmer-beneficiary. Section 22 of Republic Act No. 6657 provides an order of priority of qualified farmer-beneficiaries.
    What should individuals do if they disagree with the selection of beneficiaries? Individuals who disagree with the selection of beneficiaries should avail themselves of administrative remedies under the DAR, such as filing a protest with the MARO or PARO, rather than going through the DARAB.
    What is the significance of Administrative Order No. 06-00? Administrative Order No. 06-00 provides the Rules of Procedure for Agrarian Law Implementation Cases, emphasizing that the DAR Secretary has exclusive jurisdiction over the identification, qualification, or disqualification of potential farmer-beneficiaries.

    The Supreme Court’s decision in Concha v. Rubio serves as a crucial reminder of the importance of adhering to jurisdictional boundaries within administrative agencies. By reinforcing the DAR’s exclusive authority in beneficiary selection, the Court ensures the consistent and effective implementation of agrarian reform laws, preventing potential overreach by bodies like the DARAB. This clarification benefits both potential beneficiaries and landowners by providing a clear framework for resolving disputes related to land distribution under CARP.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Romanita Concha, et al. vs. Paulino Rubio, et al., G.R. No. 162446, March 29, 2010

  • CARP Coverage: Land Use Classification and Exemption Requirements

    The Supreme Court ruled that land classified as ‘agricultural, reserved for residential’ before the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) took effect remains under CARP coverage until formally reclassified and approved by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). This means landowners cannot claim exemption from CARP based solely on intended future use; actual land use and formal reclassification are crucial.

    From Agricultural to Residential: When Does Land Escape CARP?

    Alangilan Realty & Development Corporation sought to exempt its 17.4892-hectare landholding in Batangas City from CARP coverage, arguing that a 1982 zoning ordinance classifying the land as ‘reserved for residential’ effectively converted it to non-agricultural use before the CARL’s enactment in 1988. The DAR denied the exemption, asserting that the land remained agricultural until its reclassification as ‘residential-1’ in 1994, after the CARL’s effectivity. This case explores the critical issue of determining when agricultural land is effectively converted to non-agricultural use, thereby exempting it from CARP coverage.

    The central question revolves around whether the classification of land as ‘reserved for residential’ prior to the enactment of the CARL is sufficient to remove it from CARP coverage. The petitioner relies heavily on the argument that the 1982 zoning ordinance, designating the land as ‘reserved for residential,’ effectively transformed the land’s nature, placing it outside the ambit of agrarian reform. This argument hinges on the interpretation of zoning regulations and their impact on land use classification under agrarian law.

    The DAR Secretary, however, contended that the phrase ‘reserved for residential’ does not equate to actual reclassification. According to the DAR, this phrase merely indicates a future intended use and does not alter the land’s primary agricultural classification until a formal reclassification occurs. This interpretation is supported by the fact that a subsequent ordinance in 1994 was required to reclassify the land as ‘residential-1,’ demonstrating that the earlier designation was not considered a definitive change in land use.

    The Supreme Court sided with the DAR, emphasizing that the operative factor is the actual classification of the land at the time of the CARL’s effectivity. The court highlighted that the Alangilan landholding was classified as agricultural, reserved for residential in 1982, and reclassified as residential-1 only in 1994. The court explained that the term reserved for residential simply reflects the intended land use and does not denote that the property has already been reclassified as residential, because the phrase reserved for residential is not a land classification category.

    The Court distinguished this case from Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Department of Agrarian Reform, where the land was already converted to residential use and developed into a low-cost housing subdivision prior to the CARL’s effectivity. In this case, the Alangilan landholding was still being utilized for agricultural activities, as evidenced by an ocular inspection that revealed the presence of mangoes and coconuts. The ruling underscores that the actual use of the land and its formal classification are critical determinants of CARP coverage.

    The Court also addressed the petitioner’s challenge to the DAR Secretary’s authority to determine land classification. The Supreme Court affirmed that the DAR Secretary has the exclusive jurisdiction to classify and identify landholdings for CARP coverage. According to the ruling, the matter of CARP coverage, including applications for exemption, falls within the administrative implementation of the CARP, which is well within the competence of the DAR Secretary. The Court cited Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657, which grants the DAR Secretary the power to determine whether a property is subject to CARP coverage.

    The Supreme Court emphasized that factual findings of administrative agencies, such as the DAR, are generally accorded respect and finality, especially when supported by substantial evidence. This deference is rooted in the agency’s expertise and specialized knowledge in matters within its jurisdiction. The Court found no justifiable reason to overturn the DAR Secretary’s decision, which was affirmed by both the Office of the President and the Court of Appeals.

    This case reinforces the principle that landowners seeking exemption from CARP must demonstrate that their land was definitively classified as non-agricultural prior to June 15, 1988, the date the CARL took effect. Mere intention or reservation for future non-agricultural use is insufficient. Formal reclassification through proper zoning ordinances and approval from the DAR Secretary are necessary to remove land from CARP coverage. The DAR’s authority to determine land classification for CARP purposes remains paramount, ensuring consistent and effective implementation of agrarian reform laws.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether land classified as ‘reserved for residential’ before the CARL’s effectivity is exempt from CARP coverage. The court ruled it is not exempt unless formally reclassified and approved by the DAR.
    What is the significance of the date June 15, 1988? June 15, 1988, is the date the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) took effect. To be exempt from CARP coverage, the property must have been classified as non-agricultural before this date.
    What did the term ‘reserved for residential’ mean in this case? The term ‘reserved for residential’ indicates a future intended use, not a present classification. It does not change the land’s agricultural nature until a formal reclassification occurs.
    How did this case differ from Natalia Realty v. DAR? In Natalia Realty, the land was already converted and developed for residential use before the CARL. In this case, the land was still agricultural, and only ‘reserved’ for future residential use.
    Who has the authority to determine land classification for CARP coverage? The DAR Secretary has the exclusive jurisdiction to classify and identify landholdings for coverage under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). This authority is granted by Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657.
    What evidence is needed to prove a land’s classification? Evidence includes zoning ordinances, certifications, and actual land use. Formal reclassification approved by the DAR Secretary is also essential.
    Why is the DAR’s interpretation given weight by the Court? The DAR’s interpretation is given weight because it is an administrative agency with expertise in agrarian matters. The Court generally respects the factual findings of administrative agencies.
    What happens if land is reclassified after June 15, 1988? If land is reclassified after June 15, 1988, it does not automatically exempt it from CARP. The reclassification must be approved by the DAR Secretary to be effective.

    This ruling clarifies that mere intention to convert land to non-agricultural use is insufficient to exempt it from CARP coverage. Landowners must actively pursue formal reclassification and secure DAR approval to ensure their property falls outside the ambit of agrarian reform laws.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: ALANGILAN REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, G.R. No. 180471, March 26, 2010

  • Retention Rights Under Agrarian Reform: Landowner’s Duty of Full Disclosure

    The Supreme Court’s decision in Isabelita Vda. de Dayao vs. Heirs of Gavino Robles emphasizes that landowners applying to retain land under agrarian reform laws must provide a complete and honest account of their holdings. The Court denied the landowners’ application because they failed to disclose all their properties. This ruling clarifies that the right to retain land is not automatic; it requires strict compliance with disclosure requirements, ensuring fairness and preventing abuse of agrarian reform laws. This protects the rights of tenant farmers and promotes the equitable distribution of land.

    The Hidden Lands: Did Dayao’s Application for Retention Tell the Whole Story?

    This case arose from a dispute over land in Bulacan and Pampanga, originally owned by Anacleto Dayao. After his death, his heirs, Vicente and Isabelita, sought to retain portions of the land under Presidential Decree No. 27, which allows landowners to keep a limited area of tenanted rice and/or corn lands. Vicente filed an application for retention with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Gavino Robles, a tenant-farmer on the land, opposed the application. The DAR initially granted the application, but Robles appealed, arguing that Vicente had not fully disclosed all his landholdings. This ultimately led to a review by the Court of Appeals, which reversed the DAR’s decision, finding that Vicente’s application was indeed incomplete. The Supreme Court then took up the case to resolve the dispute.

    The central legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the DAR and the Office of the President, which had originally granted the Dayao’s application for retention. At the heart of this question was the landowner’s responsibility to provide a complete and truthful disclosure of their properties when seeking to retain land under agrarian reform laws. The respondents argued, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that Vicente Dayao’s application was deficient due to his failure to list all his properties. The petitioners, on the other hand, contended that they were entitled to the retention rights guaranteed by PD 27 and related laws.

    The Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeals’ decision, emphasizing that factual findings of administrative agencies like the DAR are generally binding. However, this is not the case when those findings are based on speculation, conjecture, or a misappreciation of evidence. The Court found that the DAR had overlooked crucial evidence indicating that Vicente Dayao had not disclosed all of his properties in his retention application. The Court referenced a 1959 extrajudicial settlement which provided a summary of Anacleto’s properties, noting that Vicente failed to reconcile the discrepancies between this document and his own application. The burden of proving entitlement to retention rested on Vicente, and his failure to clarify these discrepancies was fatal to his claim. Therefore, Vicente’s application suffered from material omissions and was fatally incomplete.

    Moreover, the Supreme Court also noted that Isabelita Dayao never actually filed an application for retention. Her name only surfaced in an extrajudicial settlement filed by Vicente. The Court emphasized that the DAR lacked the authority to grant retention rights to someone who had not even applied for them. Building on this principle, the Supreme Court affirmed the importance of forthrightness and completeness in applications for retention under agrarian reform laws. Landowners must provide a transparent and accurate account of all their properties. This is to ensure the proper implementation of agrarian reform and protect the rights of tenant farmers. The Court stated that failure to disclose all properties undermines the very purpose of agrarian reform, which is to redistribute land equitably.

    The Court also considered specific examples of properties that Vicente Dayao failed to account for in his application. These included several tracts of land in Malolos City and numerous parcels of land in various barangays of Hagonoy, Bulacan. These omissions were significant and demonstrated a lack of transparency in Vicente’s application, preventing the DAR from accurately assessing his eligibility for retention rights. The Supreme Court ultimately concluded that the DAR and the Office of the President had misappreciated the evidence and made incorrect considerations when they approved Vicente’s application for retention.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The central issue was whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the DAR and the Office of the President’s decision to grant the Dayao’s application for retention under agrarian reform laws, given allegations of incomplete disclosure.
    What is a retention right in agrarian reform? A retention right allows landowners, subject to certain conditions, to retain a portion of their agricultural land that would otherwise be subject to redistribution under agrarian reform laws.
    What did the DAR originally decide? The DAR initially granted the application for retention filed by the Heirs of Vicente O. Dayao and Isabelita O. Dayao.
    Why did the Court of Appeals reverse the DAR’s decision? The Court of Appeals reversed the decision because Vicente Dayao’s application for retention was deemed insufficient, incomplete, and lacking forthrightness, and because Isabelita Dayao never filed her own application.
    What specific omissions were found in Vicente Dayao’s application? Vicente Dayao failed to list all his properties, including several tracts of land in Malolos City and various parcels of land in different barangays of Hagonoy, Bulacan.
    What was the significance of the 1959 extrajudicial settlement? The 1959 extrajudicial settlement listed Anacleto Dayao’s properties and revealed discrepancies with the properties listed in Vicente’s retention application, raising doubts about the completeness of Vicente’s disclosure.
    What was the Court’s ruling on Isabelita Dayao’s retention right? The Court ruled that Isabelita Dayao had no retention right because she never filed an application for retention with the DAR.
    What is the main takeaway of this case for landowners? Landowners applying for retention rights must provide a complete and truthful disclosure of all their properties to the DAR, as failure to do so may result in the denial of their application.

    In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision underscores the critical importance of transparency and full disclosure in agrarian reform cases. The ruling serves as a reminder that the right to retain land is contingent upon strict compliance with legal requirements, ultimately ensuring the equitable distribution of land and protection of tenant farmers’ rights.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Isabelita Vda. de Dayao vs. Heirs of Gavino Robles, G.R. No. 174830, July 31, 2009

  • Agrarian Reform vs. Forcible Entry: Resolving Jurisdiction in Land Disputes

    In Hilario v. Prudente, the Supreme Court addressed a critical question of jurisdiction in land disputes involving agrarian reform. The Court ruled that when a property is under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), specifically the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), has primary jurisdiction. This means that regular courts cannot decide on ejectment or forcible entry cases if they are intertwined with agrarian reform issues. This ruling ensures that agrarian reform laws are consistently applied and that farmers’ rights are protected during land disputes.

    Clash of Claims: When Agrarian Reform and Ejectment Collide

    Dr. Rosalina G. Hilario owned a 10.2048-hectare agricultural land in Tanay, Rizal. In 1997, 5.2048 hectares of her land were placed under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), identifying Modesto Prudente, Crisanto Prudente, Remedios Prudente-Puno, and Benito Prudente as potential farmer-beneficiaries because they were allegedly tilling the land. Dr. Hilario protested this inclusion, arguing that the Prudentes were neither tenants nor legitimate tillers. Her protest was initially denied by the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO).

    Subsequently, Dr. Hilario filed a forcible entry case with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), claiming that the Prudentes had entered her land without her consent, destroyed trees, and built a house. The MTC initially ruled in favor of Dr. Hilario. However, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) reversed the MTC’s decision, stating that the case involved an agrarian dispute and, therefore, fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC’s ruling, leading Dr. Hilario to appeal to the Supreme Court.

    At the heart of the issue was whether the MTC had jurisdiction over the forcible entry case, given the ongoing agrarian reform proceedings involving the same land. The Supreme Court emphasized the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which holds that courts cannot resolve a controversy over which an administrative agency with special competence, like the DAR, has initial jurisdiction. In agrarian reform cases, this jurisdiction is specifically vested in the DARAB. This doctrine ensures that specialized bodies handle issues within their expertise, promoting consistent and informed decisions. The Court cited Bautista v. Mag-isa Vda. de Villena, reiterating that:

    The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from resolving a controversy over which jurisdiction has initially been lodged with an administrative body of special competence. For agrarian reform cases, jurisdiction is vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR); more specifically, in the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).

    The Court clarified that whether a tenancy relationship existed between the parties was irrelevant in determining jurisdiction. The crucial point was that the case involved an agrarian dispute related to the implementation of CARP. Dr. Hilario’s attempt to file an ejectment suit in the MTC was seen as an effort to circumvent the PARO’s unfavorable ruling. This underscored the principle that parties cannot use legal maneuvering to undermine agrarian reform laws intended to benefit landless farmers.

    Furthermore, the Supreme Court underscored the interconnectedness of the agrarian reform proceedings and the forcible entry case. Allowing the MTC to rule on the possession of the land could preempt the DAR’s authority to determine the farmer-beneficiaries under CARP. This approach ensures that the objectives of agrarian reform are not frustrated by parallel court proceedings. The CA had correctly noted that a ruling on possession by the MTC would effectively prevent the farmer-beneficiaries from exercising their rights, thus rendering the agrarian reform process meaningless. Therefore, the High Court affirmed the CA decision and upheld the primary jurisdiction of the DAR in agrarian disputes.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The primary issue was whether the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) had jurisdiction over a forcible entry case when the land was also subject to agrarian reform proceedings under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
    What is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction? The doctrine of primary jurisdiction states that courts should not resolve issues over which an administrative body with special competence has initial jurisdiction, like the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) in agrarian reform cases.
    Who are farmer-beneficiaries under CARP? Farmer-beneficiaries are individuals identified by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) as qualified recipients of land redistribution under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), often based on their tillage of the land.
    What is the role of the DARAB? The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) is the quasi-judicial body within the DAR that has the authority to hear and adjudicate agrarian reform matters, including disputes related to land ownership and tenancy.
    What happens if a case involves both forcible entry and agrarian reform issues? If a case involves both forcible entry and agrarian reform issues, the DARAB generally has primary jurisdiction, meaning that the case should be resolved by the DARAB rather than the regular courts, to ensure consistent application of agrarian laws.
    Why was the forcible entry case dismissed in this instance? The forcible entry case was dismissed because the land in question was under CARP coverage and the respondents were identified as potential farmer-beneficiaries; therefore, the matter fell under the primary jurisdiction of the DAR.
    Can landowners file ejectment suits to avoid CARP coverage? The Supreme Court discourages landowners from filing ejectment suits to circumvent CARP, as this undermines the state’s policy of promoting social justice for landless farmers.
    What law gives DAR jurisdiction over agrarian disputes? Republic Act No. 6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, vests the DAR with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters.

    In conclusion, the Hilario v. Prudente case reinforces the principle of primary jurisdiction, particularly concerning agrarian disputes. The ruling safeguards the objectives of agrarian reform by ensuring that specialized bodies like the DARAB handle matters within their expertise. Landowners must respect the processes and determinations made by the DAR in identifying farmer-beneficiaries, while potential beneficiaries are guaranteed the rights as such until there is a ruling otherwise.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Hilario v. Prudente, G.R. No. 150635, September 11, 2008