ASG Law

Tag: Good Faith

  • Protecting Land Rights: Innocent Purchaser Status and Due Diligence in Property Sales

    The Supreme Court has ruled that summary judgment is inappropriate when genuine issues of material fact exist, particularly concerning the status of a buyer as an innocent purchaser for value. This case emphasizes the need for a full trial to determine whether a buyer acted in good faith and conducted due diligence before purchasing property. The decision underscores that stipulations and documentary evidence alone may not suffice to resolve complex factual issues in land disputes.

    Unraveling Land Disputes: Did Grand Planters Act in Good Faith?

    This case revolves around a parcel of land in Limay, Bataan, originally registered under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 16 in the name of Leonardo Serios. After Leonardo’s death, his heirs allegedly sold the property to Maine City Property Holding Corp. (MCPHC). Later, the Heirs of Leonardo executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale in favor of Arlene Bernardo, who then sold the property to Grand Planters International, Inc. (GPII). MCPHC filed a complaint seeking to nullify these subsequent transactions, claiming that the original sale to them should be affirmed.

    The central legal question is whether the lower courts erred in rendering a summary judgment, concluding that no genuine issues of material fact remained to be resolved. GPII argued that its status as an innocent purchaser for value was a genuine issue that required a full trial. The Supreme Court agreed, reversing the Court of Appeals’ decision and emphasizing the importance of evidence and due process in determining land ownership.

    The Supreme Court emphasized that a summary judgment is only appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 35 of the Rules of Court provides the legal framework for summary judgments, allowing parties to move for judgment based on pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file. However, the Court cautioned against hasty dispositions, especially when factual disputes necessitate a full presentation of evidence.

    SECTION 1. Summary judgment for claimant. – A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.

    The Court scrutinized the factual allegations in the complaint and the affirmative defenses raised by the defendants, particularly GPII’s claim of being an innocent purchaser for value. The Supreme Court underscored that the presence or absence of good faith is a factual issue that requires evidence, making it inappropriate for resolution through summary judgment. The Court reiterated that even stipulations and documentary evidence may not suffice to resolve such complex factual issues.

    Several key factual issues remained unresolved by the stipulations, including whether Bernardo and GPII knew about the prior sale to MCPHC, the true nature of the transaction between the Heirs of Leonardo and MCPHC (sale or contract to sell), and whether MCPHC had fully paid the purchase price. These issues were material to determining the validity of the subsequent transactions and the rights of the parties involved. The Supreme Court emphasized that these genuine issues required a full-dressed hearing where all parties could present their respective evidence.

    The Supreme Court also addressed the concept of an innocent purchaser for value. The Court noted that the burden of proving such status lies with the party claiming it, and the ordinary presumption of good faith is insufficient. GPII’s claim as an innocent purchaser could not be prejudiced by the actions or omissions of others, following the principle of res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet, which means that the act of one person does not prejudice another. Thus, GPII was entitled to present its own evidence to establish its good faith independently of the other parties.

    Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court – The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another.

    In essence, the Supreme Court’s decision reaffirms the importance of due diligence in property transactions and the necessity of a full trial when genuine issues of material fact exist. The Court emphasized that the remedy of summary judgment should be applied with utmost caution, particularly when factual disputes require the presentation of evidence to determine the rights and obligations of the parties involved. The case highlights that a claim of being an innocent purchaser for value is a factual issue that cannot be resolved solely based on stipulations or documentary evidence.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether the lower courts erred in rendering a summary judgment, concluding that no genuine issues of material fact remained to be resolved regarding GPII’s status as an innocent purchaser for value.
    What is a summary judgment? A summary judgment is a procedural device used to expedite cases where the facts are undisputed. It allows a court to render a judgment without a full trial if there are no genuine issues of material fact.
    What does it mean to be an innocent purchaser for value? An innocent purchaser for value is someone who buys property without knowledge of any defects in the seller’s title or any prior claims on the property and pays a fair price for it.
    Who has the burden of proving innocent purchaser status? The party claiming to be an innocent purchaser for value has the burden of proving that they acted in good faith and without knowledge of any defects in the title.
    What is the principle of res inter alios acta? Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet means that the act of one person does not prejudice another. In this context, it means GPII’s claim as an innocent purchaser cannot be prejudiced by the actions or omissions of other parties.
    Why did the Supreme Court reverse the lower courts’ decisions? The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts because genuine issues of material fact existed, particularly regarding GPII’s status as an innocent purchaser for value. These issues required a full trial for proper resolution.
    What is the significance of due diligence in property transactions? Due diligence is the process of conducting a thorough investigation of a property’s title and history before purchasing it. It helps ensure that the buyer is aware of any potential claims or defects that could affect their ownership rights.
    What is the difference between a contract of sale and a contract to sell? In a contract of sale, ownership of the property transfers to the buyer upon delivery. In a contract to sell, ownership does not transfer until the full purchase price is paid.

    In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision underscores the importance of protecting land rights through due process and careful examination of factual issues. This case serves as a reminder that courts must exercise caution when rendering summary judgments, particularly in land disputes where the status of an innocent purchaser for value is at stake. A full trial is often necessary to ensure that all parties have an opportunity to present their evidence and protect their interests.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: GRAND PLANTERS INTERNATIONAL, INC. VS. MAINE CITY PROPERTY HOLDINGS CORP., AND JOEL G. YAP, G.R. No. 256633, August 22, 2022

  • Accountability in Public Spending: Good Faith and the Duty to Document

    The Supreme Court ruled that public officials can be held liable for disallowed government expenditures if they fail to provide adequate documentation, even if they claim good faith. This decision reinforces the importance of transparency and accountability in handling public funds. While the principle of quantum meruit may reduce liability by allowing contractors to be paid for services rendered, officials bear the responsibility to ensure all transactions are fully documented.

    When a Stadium’s Lights Dim: Questioning Good Faith in Public Infrastructure Projects

    This case revolves around the disallowance of funds spent on the 23rd Southeast Asian Games (SEA Games) held in Bacolod City. Monico O. Puentevella, as chairperson of the Bacolod Southeast Asian Games Organizing Committee (BASOC), was found liable for failing to properly document expenditures related to the rehabilitation of sports facilities. The Commission on Audit (COA) disallowed P36,778,105.44 due to the lack of supporting documents, leading to the central question: Can a public official be excused from liability for disallowed expenses by claiming good faith, despite failing to comply with auditing rules?

    The Philippine Sports Commission (PSC) granted financial assistance to BASOC, yet the proper liquidation reports were not submitted promptly. After a special audit, deficiencies were noted, including a lack of acknowledgment receipts and failure to submit contracts and specifications. Despite these issues, petitioner argued that he acted in good faith, citing time constraints and a lack of technical expertise within BASOC. He presented that he submitted what he could, despite it all.

    The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of documentary evidence in government transactions. Section 4 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1445, the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines, mandates that claims against government funds must be supported with complete documentation. The COA issued circulars, such as COA Circular No. 76-34, which requires agencies to submit copies of contracts and supporting documents shortly after execution, ensuring transparency and accountability.

    The court referenced COA Memorandum No. 2005-027, which implements the Government Procurement Reform Act by requiring the submission of technical documents for evaluation by specialists. These documents include approved contracts, plans, specifications, and cost breakdowns. The systematic failure to submit these documents was a major point.

    The Supreme Court found Puentevella liable for gross negligence, referencing Sections 38 and 39 of the 1987 Administrative Code. These sections state that public officers can be held accountable for acts performed in connection with official duties if there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice, or gross negligence. Gross negligence is defined as a want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act where there is a duty to act, with conscious indifference to consequences.

    The court stated that Puentevella’s submissions were insufficient and did not comply with COA circulars or the Notice of Suspension. The court noted that detailed scopes of work, designs, and cost estimates are essential for transparency in publicly funded construction contracts. The failure to secure such documents, especially for a large international event, defied logic and undermined the claim of good faith.

    Despite upholding the disallowance, the Supreme Court invoked the principle of quantum meruit, modifying the COA’s decision to allow for a reduction in liability. The court acknowledged that the 23rd SEA Games brought prestige to the Philippines, and the rehabilitation of sports facilities benefited the public. As such, contractors and suppliers were entitled to receive reasonable payment for their services, preventing undue enrichment. The court remanded the case to the COA to determine the appropriate amounts based on the principle of quantum meruit.

    The Rules of Return first enunciated in Madera v. COA and later amended by Torreta v. COA apply in this case. To restate, the civil liability for the disallowed amount may be reduced by the amounts due to the recipient based on the application of the principle of quantum meruit on a case to case basis.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether Monico O. Puentevella, as chairperson of BASOC, could be held liable for disallowed expenses due to a lack of documentation, despite claiming good faith. The court ultimately held him liable due to gross negligence in failing to comply with auditing requirements.
    What is a Notice of Disallowance (ND)? A Notice of Disallowance is issued by the Commission on Audit (COA) when it finds that certain government expenditures are irregular, illegal, or unconscionable. It requires the responsible officials to return the disallowed amount to the government.
    What does “gross negligence” mean in this context? Gross negligence refers to a public official’s failure to exercise even slight care in performing their duties. It involves acting or failing to act with conscious indifference to the potential consequences, indicating a reckless disregard for the proper handling of public funds.
    What is the principle of quantum meruit? Quantum meruit, meaning “as much as he deserves,” is a legal principle that allows a person to recover the reasonable value of services or goods provided, even without a valid contract. In this case, it allows contractors to be paid for the work they performed, despite irregularities in the contracts.
    Why were the funds disallowed in this case? The funds were disallowed because BASOC failed to submit the necessary supporting documents to justify the expenditures. This included contracts, plans, specifications, and receipts, making it impossible for the COA to verify the validity and reasonableness of the expenses.
    What is the role of the Commission on Audit (COA)? The COA is an independent constitutional body tasked with ensuring the proper use of government funds. It audits government agencies and disallows illegal or irregular expenditures to safeguard public resources.
    What happens after a Notice of Disallowance is issued? After a Notice of Disallowance is issued, the individuals held liable can appeal the decision. If the disallowance is upheld, they are required to return the disallowed amount. However, principles like quantum meruit may be applied to reduce the amount to be returned.
    What was the outcome of this Supreme Court case? The Supreme Court affirmed the COA’s disallowance but modified the decision to allow for the application of quantum meruit. The case was remanded to the COA to determine the reasonable value of the services rendered by the contractors, which would be deducted from the disallowed amount.

    This case underscores the critical importance of meticulous record-keeping and compliance with auditing regulations in government projects. While good faith is a consideration, it cannot excuse a complete failure to document the use of public funds. Public officials must ensure that all expenditures are properly supported to maintain transparency and accountability.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: MONICO O. PUENTEVELLA v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, G.R. No. 254077, August 02, 2022

  • Upholding Good Faith in Government Bidding: Acceptance of Amended Documents and Graft Charges

    The Supreme Court acquitted Don Theo J. Ramirez of violating Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, emphasizing that good faith reliance on expert advice and due diligence in government bidding processes preclude findings of manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. The Court underscored that the acceptance of an amended Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) during the post-qualification stage of a bidding process does not automatically constitute unwarranted benefit to a private party if the decision-makers acted transparently and reasonably, based on sound legal interpretations and expert counsel. This ruling affirms the importance of reasoned judgment and procedural fairness in government procurement.

    Bidding on Waste Oil: Was Accepting an Amended ECC a Corrupt Act?

    This case revolves around the bidding process for the sale and disposal of waste oil from the Sucat Thermal Power Plant (STPP) under the Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM). Don Theo J. Ramirez, along with other members of the PSALM Bids and Awards Committee (BAC), were charged with violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The central issue was whether the BAC acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence by accepting an amended Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the Joint Venture of Genetron International Marketing, Atomillion Corporation, and Safeco Environmental Services Inc. (Joint Venture) during the post-qualification stage, thereby giving them unwarranted benefits.

    The prosecution argued that the acceptance of the Amended ECC after the bid opening date allowed the Joint Venture to enhance its bid, enabling it to qualify unfairly. They contended that the ECC, as a required eligibility document, should have been submitted during the pre-qualification stage, and accepting it later violated bidding rules. Conversely, the defense maintained that accepting the Amended ECC was within the BAC’s prerogative under the bidding rules and that the BAC acted in good faith, relying on expert advice and conducting thorough deliberations.

    The Sandiganbayan initially found all the accused guilty, stating that the BAC members gave unwarranted benefit, preference, and advantage to the Joint Venture by allowing the submission of the Amended ECC during the post-qualification stage. It asserted that this action violated bidding rules and constituted manifest partiality, leading to the award of the contract to a bidder who should have been disqualified.

    However, the Supreme Court reversed this decision, acquitting Ramirez and his co-accused. The Court emphasized that to establish a violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, it must be proven beyond reasonable doubt that the accused acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence, causing undue injury or giving unwarranted benefits. The Court found that the prosecution failed to prove these elements, particularly the mental element of the crime.

    The Supreme Court meticulously examined the bidding documents, specifically the Invitation to Bid (ITB) and the Bid Data Sheet (BDS). It noted that Clause 24.2(c) of the ITB allowed the submission of “other appropriate licenses and permits required by law and stated in the BDS” during the post-qualification stage. The BAC, with the aid of expert advice, interpreted this clause as permitting the submission of the Amended ECC, considering it an appropriate license or permit required by law. The Court found that the BAC’s interpretation was reasonable, especially given that the BAC sought expert advice from Atty. Conrad S. Tolentino, who confirmed that the BAC had the prerogative to accept or reject the Amended ECC. Tolentino also explained that the post-qualification stage was the venue for bidders to present authenticated documents and submit the latest versions of permits and licenses.

    24.2 Within a non-extendible period of three (3) calendar days from receipt by the bidder of the notice from the BAC that it is the Highest Bid, the Bidder shall submit the following documentary requirements:
    c. Other appropriate licenses and permits required by law and stated in the BDS.

    Building on this principle, the Court highlighted the extensive deliberations conducted by the BAC and the consultation meetings with authorities. These actions indicated that the BAC exercised due diligence in resolving the issue, negating any claim of manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. The Court emphasized that the BAC’s decision was not a result of recklessness or intentional wrongdoing, but rather a reasoned judgment based on the bidding rules and expert guidance.

    Furthermore, the Court took into account the findings of a Task Force created by PSALM to review the bidding process. The Task Force concluded that the acceptance of the Amended ECC was within the provisions of the ITB, BDS, and SBB. This further supported the argument that the BAC’s actions were legally permissible and did not constitute a violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

    The acceptance of the amended ECC is allowed under ITB Clause 24.2 (c), Section III. Bid Data Sheet, as amended by Item 5 of Supplemental Bid Bulletin No. 1, dated 4 November 2011, thus, the award by the BAC to the Joint Venture of AC, GIM, and SES is legally permissible under the Bidding Documents.

    The Court also noted that the BAC was already aware of the pending amendment of the Joint Venture’s ECC before the submission of bids. This awareness indicated that the submission of the Amended ECC during the post-qualification stage was not a surprise or an attempt to manipulate the bidding process. Instead, it was a necessary update to ensure that the BAC had the most accurate information about the Joint Venture’s capacity to handle the project. In summary, the Supreme Court’s decision hinged on the principle that government officials should not be penalized for making reasonable interpretations of bidding rules, especially when they act in good faith and with due diligence.

    Moreover, the Court addressed the element of undue injury or unwarranted benefits. It clarified that in the absence of manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence, there could be no undue injury to the government or unwarranted benefits to the Joint Venture. The Court emphasized that the Joint Venture was entitled to the acceptance and consideration of its Amended ECC under the terms of the bidding documents, and there was no evidence that the BAC’s actions amended, enhanced, or improved the Joint Venture’s bid improperly.

    The Court further observed that there was no serious challenge to the Joint Venture’s capacity to handle and complete the project efficiently. The TWG itself was satisfied with the Joint Venture’s ability to handle the project after inspecting its facility. This evidence supported the conclusion that the Joint Venture had the requisite capacity for the project, and the acceptance of the Amended ECC did not confer any undue advantage.

    Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that appellant Don Theo J. Ramirez and the rest of the BAC members who voted to accept the Joint Venture’s Amended ECC did not act with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. The Court highlighted the meticulous procedures and strict scrutiny applied by the BAC, emphasizing that their actions were consistent with the principles of fairness and transparency in government bidding processes.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether members of the PSALM Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) violated the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act by accepting an amended Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) during the post-qualification stage of a bidding process.
    What is Section 3(e) of RA 3019? Section 3(e) of RA 3019 prohibits public officers from causing undue injury to any party or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of their official functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence.
    What does “manifest partiality” mean? “Manifest partiality” refers to a bias that excites a disposition to see and report matters as they are wished for rather than as they are, favoring one party over another.
    What is an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC)? An ECC is a document issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) certifying that a proposed project or undertaking will not cause significant adverse environmental impacts.
    What is the significance of the post-qualification stage in a bidding process? The post-qualification stage is the process where the BAC determines whether the bidder with the highest bid complies with and is responsive to all the requirements and conditions specified in the bidding documents.
    Did the Supreme Court find the BAC members guilty? No, the Supreme Court reversed the Sandiganbayan’s decision and acquitted the BAC members, including Don Theo J. Ramirez, due to the failure of the prosecution to prove the elements of the crime beyond reasonable doubt.
    On what grounds did the Supreme Court acquit the accused? The Supreme Court acquitted the accused because they found no manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence in the BAC’s acceptance of the Amended ECC. The Court noted the BAC acted on expert advice and conducted thorough deliberations.
    What was the role of the expert opinion in this case? The expert opinion of Atty. Conrad S. Tolentino, who confirmed that the BAC had the prerogative to accept or reject the Amended ECC, was crucial in demonstrating that the BAC acted reasonably and in good faith.
    What is the practical implication of this ruling? The ruling emphasizes that government officials should not be penalized for reasonable interpretations of bidding rules when they act in good faith and with due diligence, relying on expert advice and conducting thorough deliberations.

    This decision reinforces the principle that public officials should not be unduly penalized for good-faith interpretations of complex regulations, especially when supported by expert advice and thorough due diligence. It underscores the importance of procedural fairness and reasoned judgment in government procurement processes, providing a framework for evaluating potential graft charges in similar contexts.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. RICO P. VALDELLON, G.R. No. 254552, July 20, 2022

  • Clean Water Act: Reducing Fines for MWSS, Maynilad, and Manila Water Due to Good Faith Efforts and Franchise Amendments

    The Supreme Court modified its previous decision regarding fines imposed on Maynilad, Manila Water, and MWSS for violations of the Philippine Clean Water Act (CWA). While the Court affirmed the violation, it significantly reduced the fines due to the companies’ good faith efforts to comply with the law and the subsequent amendments to their franchise agreements extending the compliance deadline to 2037. This ruling balances the need to enforce environmental regulations with the practical realities faced by service providers in achieving full compliance. The decision underscores the importance of considering mitigating factors and good faith efforts when imposing penalties for regulatory violations, especially in the context of long-term infrastructure projects.

    When Good Intentions Meet Delayed Compliance: A Clean Water Act Case Study

    This case revolves around the failure of Maynilad Water Services, Inc., Manila Water Company, Inc., and the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) to fully comply with Section 8 of Republic Act No. 9275, also known as the Philippine Clean Water Act (CWA). This section mandates the connection of existing sewage lines to available sewerage systems within five years of the CWA’s effectivity. Petitioners sought reconsideration of the Court’s August 6, 2019 Decision, which found them liable for substantial fines for their non-compliance. The central legal question is whether the imposed fines were just and reasonable, considering the petitioners’ efforts toward compliance, the complexities of infrastructure development, and subsequent legislative changes.

    The MWSS argued its limited jurisdiction over the concessionaires’ operations and highlighted the necessity of support from other government agencies like the DENR, DPWH, and DOH for effective implementation of the CWA. Maynilad contended that the Court’s interpretation of Section 8 was overly literal and isolated, advocating for a more holistic approach considering other provisions of the CWA and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR). Manila Water, on the other hand, asserted that it had complied with Section 8 and that Section 28 of the CWA does not penalize omissions, only positive acts of violation.

    The Court, in its resolution, addressed several key issues raised by the petitioners. It emphasized that the constitutionality of a statute can only be challenged in a direct proceeding, not collaterally in a motion for reconsideration. The Court also clarified that the fines and penalties under Section 28 of the CWA are administrative in nature and, therefore, not subject to the constitutional prohibition on excessive fines in criminal prosecutions. The Supreme Court referenced Republic v. N. Dela Merced & Sons to support this point, stating:

    Dela Merced & Sons’ invocation of Article III, Section 19 (1) of the Constitution is erroneous. The constitutional prohibition on the imposition of excessive fines applies only to criminal prosecutions. In contrast, this case involves an administrative proceeding and, contrary to the supposition of Dela Merced & Sons, the fine imposed is not a criminal penalty. Hence, the proscription under Article III, Section 19 is inapplicable to this case.

    Addressing Manila Water’s argument that Section 28 only punishes commissions, not omissions, the Court pointed to Section 27 of the CWA, which lists prohibited acts, some of which involve inaction or failure to comply with certain requirements. The court emphasized that Section 28 clearly states that any person who commits any of the prohibited acts or violates any provision of the Act or its implementing rules and regulations shall be fined.

    SECTION 28. Fines, Damages and Penalties. — Unless otherwise provided herein, any person who commits any of the prohibited acts provided in the immediately preceding section or violates any of the provision of this Act or its implementing rules and regulations x x x

    The Court also addressed the petitioners’ reliance on the Metro Manila Development Authority v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay (MMDA) Resolution, which set a deadline of 2037 for the completion of wastewater treatment facilities. The Court clarified that the MMDA case pertained to the general establishment of wastewater facilities for the rehabilitation of Manila Bay, while the present cases concern the specific failure to connect and interconnect sewage lines as mandated by Section 8 of the CWA. The Court further emphasized that both obligations are standing and interdependent, and that the obligation to interconnect sewage lines cannot be contingent solely on the availability of a sewerage system, as this would constitute a potestative condition void under the law. Citing Art. 1182 of the Civil Code, the court affirmed that conditional obligations are void when fulfillment depends solely on the will of the debtor.

    However, despite affirming the petitioners’ violation of Section 8, the Court recognized their good faith efforts towards partial compliance. Evidence presented showed that the petitioners had made significant investments in expanding sewer service connections, operating sewage treatment plants, and providing sanitation services, including septic tank desludging. These actions, according to the Court, demonstrated an honest belief and purpose in fulfilling their obligations under the CWA. The Court noted: “Good faith is a state of mind consisting of honesty in belief or purpose, faithfulness to one’s duty or obligation, observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in a given trade or business, or absence of intent to defraud or to seek unconscionable advantage.”

    Another crucial factor considered by the Court was Maynilad’s corporate rehabilitation from 2003 to 2008. During this period, the company’s financial resources were limited, making full compliance with the CWA challenging. Furthermore, the recent grant of legislative franchises to Maynilad and Manila Water, extending their compliance deadline to 2037, was also a significant consideration. These new franchises, R.A. No. 11600 and R.A. No. 11601, effectively amended the CWA with respect to the petitioners’ obligations and compliance timeline.

    Considering all these factors, the Court concluded that a reduction in the fines was warranted. The initial penalty of P200,000.00 per day of violation was deemed excessive, and the Court reduced it to a base amount of P30,000.00 per day of violation, counting from May 7, 2009, until January 21, 2022, the day before the effectivity of the new franchises. This reduced amount was still subject to a 10% increase every two years, as provided under Section 28 of the CWA. The Court also ordered that the total amount of the fines earn legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of the Resolution until full satisfaction.

    The Court emphasized that the resolution of these cases serves as a reminder of the importance of the Public Trust Doctrine, holding the State accountable as a trustee over the country’s resources for the benefit of its citizens. The ruling highlights the renewed mandate of Maynilad and Manila Water under their legislative franchises to provide water supply and sewerage services in a prudent, efficient, and satisfactory manner. The Court also cautioned the MWSS to be more diligent and circumspect in its supervisory role, ensuring that the provisions of the CWA are observed to the fullest extent. The judgment underscores the importance of a balanced approach to regulatory enforcement, one that considers both the need for compliance and the practical challenges faced by regulated entities.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The central issue was the reasonableness of fines imposed on Maynilad, Manila Water, and MWSS for failing to connect sewage lines as required by the Philippine Clean Water Act (CWA), considering their efforts to comply and subsequent changes in their franchise agreements.
    Why did the Supreme Court reduce the fines? The Court reduced the fines primarily due to the companies’ good faith efforts to comply with the CWA, the financial constraints faced by Maynilad during its corporate rehabilitation, and the extension of the compliance deadline through legislative franchise amendments.
    What is Section 8 of the Philippine Clean Water Act? Section 8 mandates water and sewerage service providers in Metro Manila and other highly urbanized cities to connect existing sewage lines to available sewerage systems within five years of the Act’s effectivity.
    What is the Public Trust Doctrine? The Public Trust Doctrine recognizes the state as a trustee of the country’s resources, responsible for managing them for the benefit of its citizens, emphasizing accountability in resource management.
    What was the original penalty for violating the Clean Water Act? The original penalty was a fine of P200,000.00 per day of violation, as provided under Section 28 of the Philippine Clean Water Act.
    What is the new compliance deadline for Maynilad and Manila Water? The new compliance deadline for achieving 100% water, sewerage, and sanitation coverage is the year 2037, as stipulated in their legislative franchises, RA No. 11600 and RA No. 11601.
    Are the fines considered criminal penalties? No, the fines imposed under Section 28 of the CWA are administrative penalties, not criminal penalties, and therefore are not subject to the constitutional limitations on excessive fines in criminal cases.
    What is the significance of good faith in this case? The Court considered the companies’ good faith efforts to comply with the CWA as a mitigating factor, justifying the reduction of the fines, because good faith indicates an honest intention to fulfill legal obligations.

    In conclusion, this case demonstrates the Supreme Court’s nuanced approach to enforcing environmental regulations, balancing the need for strict compliance with considerations of fairness, equity, and practical feasibility. It is a reminder that while legal obligations must be met, good faith efforts and mitigating circumstances can influence the severity of penalties, particularly in complex and long-term infrastructure projects.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: MAYNILAD WATER SERVICES, INC. vs. DENR, G.R. No. 202897, July 19, 2022

  • Building in Bad Faith? When Landowner’s Silence Equals Consent

    In the case of Agapito v. Agapito, the Supreme Court ruled that even if a builder constructs on another’s land knowing it’s not theirs, they may still be entitled to reimbursement for improvements if the landowner was aware of the construction and didn’t object. This decision emphasizes that a landowner’s silence and lack of opposition can be interpreted as consent, blurring the lines between good faith and bad faith in construction disputes. This ruling provides a significant legal protection for builders in the Philippines, especially in familial or close-knit community settings, where formal agreements are often absent.

    Family Land, Silent Consent: Who Pays for the House?

    This case revolves around a dispute between siblings, Onesimo and Marilyn Agapito, concerning a parcel of land in Bocaue, Bulacan. Marilyn, the registered owner, filed an unlawful detainer case against Onesimo, who had been occupying the property for over a decade. Onesimo built a house on the land without Marilyn’s express consent, but with her knowledge. The central legal question is whether Onesimo, as a builder on his sister’s land, is entitled to reimbursement for the value of the improvements he introduced, despite not being a builder in good faith in the traditional sense.

    Initially, the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) ruled in favor of Marilyn, ordering Onesimo to vacate the property and pay rent, denying his claim for reimbursement because he knew his sister owned the land. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed this decision, stating that only possessors in good faith are entitled to reimbursement and retention rights. The Court of Appeals (CA) modified the decision, reinstating reimbursement for necessary expenses for land preservation but denying reimbursement for the house’s construction.

    The Supreme Court (SC), however, took a different view, emphasizing the significance of Marilyn’s knowledge and lack of opposition to the construction. The SC acknowledged the general rule that a builder in good faith is one who believes they own the land or have a valid claim to it. However, the Court also recognized an exception under Article 453 of the Civil Code, which states that if both the builder and the landowner are in bad faith, the rights of one and the other shall be the same as though both had acted in good faith.

    Article 453. If there was bad faith, not only on the part of the person who built, planted or sowed on the land of another, but also on the part of the owner of such land, the rights of one and the other shall be the same as though both had acted in good faith.

    It is understood that there is bad faith on the part of the landowner whenever the act was done with his knowledge and without opposition on his part.

    Building on this principle, the Court cited the case of Department of Education v. Casibang, where it was ruled that Article 448 of the Civil Code applies even when the builder constructed improvements with the landowner’s consent. Similarly, in Spouses Belvis, Sr. v. Spouses Erola, the Court held that when improvements are introduced on titled land with the owner’s knowledge and consent, the rights and obligations are the same as if both acted in good faith. These precedents highlight a crucial point: active opposition, not mere silence, is necessary to negate the builder’s claim for reimbursement.

    The Supreme Court underscored that Marilyn lived close to the property and never objected to the house’s construction for over 14 years. Further, evidence showed the house was declared for taxation purposes under the name of “AGAPITO ARMANDO MTO MARILYN A. GAPITO.” This declaration strongly suggested Marilyn’s awareness and implicit approval of the construction. The court noted that had she not been aware nor had she not given her permission, she would not have declared the house under her name for taxation purposes.

    Based on these undisputed facts, the SC concluded that both Onesimo and Marilyn were in bad faith. As such, Articles 448 and 453, in relation to Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code, should apply. This means Marilyn has two options: (1) appropriate the improvements by reimbursing Onesimo for the necessary and useful expenses, granting Onesimo a right of retention until reimbursement is complete; or (2) sell the land to Onesimo at its current market value. If the land’s value is considerably higher than the improvements, Onesimo cannot be forced to buy it but must pay reasonable rent.

    The Court remanded the case to the MTC to determine the value of the improvements and the land, essential for applying Article 448 correctly. This decision underscores the importance of clear communication and formal agreements regarding land use and construction, especially within families. A landowner’s silence, when coupled with awareness of construction on their property, can have significant legal consequences, potentially obligating them to compensate the builder for improvements made.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The main issue was whether Onesimo, who built a house on his sister Marilyn’s land without her express consent but with her knowledge, was entitled to reimbursement for the improvements. The court examined the concept of ‘good faith’ in construction and the implications of a landowner’s silence.
    What does it mean to be a builder in good faith? A builder in good faith is someone who believes they own the land or have a valid claim to it when constructing on it. They are unaware of any defect or flaw in their title or right to build on the property.
    What is the effect of the landowner’s silence or lack of opposition? The Supreme Court stated that if a landowner is aware of construction on their land and does not oppose it, they are considered to be in bad faith. This implies consent and can obligate them to compensate the builder for the improvements.
    What are the landowner’s options when the builder is also in bad faith? The landowner can either appropriate the improvements after reimbursing the builder for the necessary and useful expenses, or sell the land to the builder. If the land’s value is considerably higher, the builder cannot be forced to buy it but must pay reasonable rent.
    What is the significance of Article 453 of the Civil Code? Article 453 states that if both the builder and landowner are in bad faith, their rights are the same as if both acted in good faith. This levels the playing field and provides a legal framework for resolving disputes where both parties are at fault.
    How does this ruling affect family disputes over land? This ruling emphasizes the importance of clear communication and formal agreements within families regarding land use and construction. It highlights that a landowner’s silence can have legal consequences, potentially obligating them to compensate a family member for improvements.
    Why was the case remanded to the MTC? The case was remanded to the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) to determine the value of the improvements made by Onesimo and the value of the land. This information is necessary for the proper application of Article 448 of the Civil Code and to determine the appropriate compensation or rent.
    What practical lesson can be learned from this case? It is essential for landowners to actively voice their opposition to any construction or improvements on their property if they do not agree with it. Silence can be interpreted as consent, leading to legal obligations to compensate the builder.

    The Agapito v. Agapito case serves as a reminder of the complexities of property law and the importance of clear agreements. It highlights the need for landowners to be proactive in protecting their rights and for builders to seek proper authorization before constructing on another’s property. The implications of this decision may extend beyond familial disputes, influencing similar cases where consent is implied through inaction.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Onesimo Agapito v. Marilyn F. Agapito, G.R. No. 255157, July 04, 2022

  • Good Faith vs. Criminal Intent: When a Mistake Isn’t Estafa

    The Supreme Court acquitted Teofilo Flores of estafa, clarifying that not every mistake in a commercial transaction constitutes criminal fraud. The Court emphasized that for estafa to exist, there must be a clear intent to deceive and cause damage, and that mere negligence or errors in judgment do not suffice. This ruling safeguards individuals from unjust accusations of fraud when they act in good faith, even if their actions result in financial losses for others, reinforcing the importance of proving criminal intent beyond a reasonable doubt in estafa cases.

    Hired Help or Crook? Unraveling the Estafa Accusation

    Teofilo Flores, a jeepney driver, found himself accused of estafa after unwittingly becoming involved in a fraudulent transaction. Hired by a woman named Hernandez to pick up goods from TRM Sales Marketing, Flores delivered the items, unaware that the purchase orders and payment check were spurious. TRM Sales Marketing, having been deceived by Hernandez, filed charges against Flores, alleging that he misrepresented himself as an authorized representative of Aboitiz. The central legal question is whether Flores’s actions, performed without knowledge of the fraud, met the elements of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.

    The legal framework for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code requires proof of: (1) a false pretense or fraudulent act; (2) the pretense or act occurring before or during the fraud; (3) reliance by the offended party on the pretense; and (4) resulting damage to the offended party. The prosecution argued that Flores falsely pretended to possess the authority to pick up goods on behalf of Aboitiz, thereby inducing TRM Sales Marketing to release the merchandise. To fully understand the complexities, it’s helpful to view the statutory language directly:

    ARTICLE 315. Swindling (Estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned herein below x x x x:

    x x x x

    By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:

    (a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.

    The Supreme Court, however, carefully scrutinized the facts and determined that the element of fraudulent intent was not sufficiently proven. The Court emphasized the importance of establishing conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt, stating, For conspiracy to exist, it is essential that there must be a conscious design to commit an offense. Conspiracy is the product of intentionality on the part of the cohorts. The prosecution failed to demonstrate that Flores had any prior knowledge of Hernandez’s fraudulent scheme or that he acted with the intent to deceive TRM Sales Marketing. Instead, the evidence suggested that Flores was merely a hired driver who followed instructions without being privy to the illegal nature of the transaction.

    Building on this principle, the Court noted that Flores consistently maintained his innocence throughout the proceedings, testifying that he was simply hired to pick up and deliver the goods. His actions, such as handing over the sealed envelope, signing the sales invoices, and delivering the goods, were all consistent with the behavior of an unwitting participant. Unlike the other individuals involved in the scheme, Flores used his real name and readily cooperated with authorities when questioned. The testimony of another jeepney driver, Brania, corroborated Flores’s account, further supporting the conclusion that Flores was unaware of the fraud.

    This approach contrasts with situations where the accused actively participates in the deceitful scheme or has knowledge of the fraudulent intent. In such cases, the elements of estafa are more easily established. However, in Flores’s case, the Court found that his actions lacked the necessary criminal intent to warrant a conviction. It was the negligence of the TRM Sales Marketing’s warehouse supervisor, Sarmiento, to check the authorization letter which led to the fraud. As the Court stated:

    It was no other than Sarmiento’s gross negligence which directly caused him and the company to lose the goods to the impostor or impostors. For despite the fact that petitioner’s name was not borne in the Authorization Letter itself, still, Sarmiento processed the transaction and even ordered the loading of the goods in petitioner’s jeep. If this is not self-inflicted injury, what is?

    Drawing from the case of Metrobank v. Tobias, the Court analogized that TRM Sales Marketing failed to exercise due diligence in verifying the authorization and payment details. This lack of diligence contributed to their loss and weakened their claim that Flores’s actions were the primary cause of the damage. Metrobank v. Tobias emphasized the importance of conducting thorough background checks and verifying the validity of documents before engaging in financial transactions. The principle is outlined as follows:

    [C]omplainant Metrobank could not have been a victim of estafa when it failed to observe due diligence in: (1) not performing a thorough background check on the accused; (2) not ascertaining the validity and integrity of the documents presented; (3) not assessing the actual location and condition of the subject property; and (4) not investigating the real owner of such property.

    The practical implications of this ruling are significant. It underscores the importance of proving criminal intent beyond a reasonable doubt in estafa cases. Individuals who act in good faith, without knowledge of a fraudulent scheme, cannot be held criminally liable for the resulting damages. This decision protects individuals from unjust accusations and ensures that the burden of proof remains with the prosecution to establish all elements of estafa, including fraudulent intent. Further, the ruling reinforces the need for businesses to implement robust verification procedures to prevent fraud and minimize their risk of loss.

    The ruling also highlights the distinction between civil liability and criminal culpability. While TRM Sales Marketing may have had grounds to pursue a civil action against Hernandez for breach of contract or fraud, the evidence did not support a criminal conviction against Flores. This distinction is crucial because it prevents the criminal justice system from being used to penalize individuals for mere errors in judgment or negligence, absent a clear showing of criminal intent.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether Teofilo Flores, a jeepney driver, could be convicted of estafa for unknowingly participating in a fraudulent transaction. The Supreme Court focused on whether Flores possessed the requisite criminal intent to deceive TRM Sales Marketing.
    What is estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code? Estafa is a form of fraud where a person defrauds another by using a fictitious name or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, or other qualifications. The act must be executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, and the offended party must suffer damage as a result.
    What did the prosecution have to prove to convict Flores of estafa? The prosecution had to prove that Flores made a false pretense or committed a fraudulent act, that the act occurred before or during the fraud, that TRM Sales Marketing relied on the false pretense, and that TRM Sales Marketing suffered damage as a result. Most importantly, they needed to prove Flores’s intent to deceive.
    Why did the Supreme Court acquit Teofilo Flores? The Supreme Court acquitted Flores because the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted with fraudulent intent. The evidence suggested that Flores was merely a hired driver unaware of the fraudulent scheme.
    What role did negligence play in the outcome of the case? The negligence of TRM Sales Marketing in failing to properly verify the authorization and payment details contributed to their loss. The Court suggested that this lack of due diligence weakened their claim that Flores’s actions were the primary cause of the damage.
    What is the difference between civil liability and criminal culpability in this case? While TRM Sales Marketing may have had grounds to pursue a civil action against the perpetrators of the fraud, the evidence did not support a criminal conviction against Flores. The Court emphasized the importance of proving criminal intent beyond a reasonable doubt.
    How does this ruling affect individuals who unknowingly participate in fraudulent transactions? This ruling protects individuals who act in good faith, without knowledge of a fraudulent scheme, from being held criminally liable for resulting damages. It underscores the importance of proving criminal intent in estafa cases.
    What can businesses learn from this case? Businesses should implement robust verification procedures to prevent fraud and minimize their risk of loss. This includes conducting thorough background checks, verifying the validity of documents, and exercising due diligence in all transactions.

    In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in the case of Teofilo Flores serves as a reminder of the high burden of proof in criminal cases, particularly those involving fraud. It protects individuals from unjust accusations when they act in good faith and reinforces the importance of due diligence in commercial transactions.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: TEOFILO FLORES Y DELA CRUZ, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT., G.R. No. 252807, June 22, 2022

  • Accountability in Governance: Good Faith and the Duty to Return Illegally Granted Benefits in the NHA

    The Supreme Court has affirmed the Commission on Audit’s (COA) decision, holding National Housing Authority (NHA) officials and employees liable for the return of disallowed benefits. The court emphasized that good faith cannot be claimed when approving officers are aware of the illegality of disbursements, and recipients are bound to return amounts unduly received, especially when they’ve acknowledged this obligation. This ruling underscores the importance of due diligence and adherence to legal regulations in the handling of public funds, promoting accountability within government agencies.

    NHA Under Scrutiny: Can Good Intentions Excuse Illegal Bonuses?

    The National Housing Authority (NHA) found itself in legal crosshairs following a Commission on Audit (COA) investigation into the allowances, bonuses, and other emoluments granted to its officers and employees from 2008 to 2009. The COA issued several Notices of Disallowance (NDs) totaling P367,844,754.36, questioning the legal basis for these disbursements. The NHA, in defense, argued that these grants were made in good faith and in accordance with existing policies and collective bargaining agreements. This case brought to the forefront the critical question of whether good faith can excuse government officials from liability when public funds are disbursed without proper legal basis, and the extent to which recipients of these funds are obligated to return them.

    The core of the dispute stemmed from the NHA’s grant of various incentives, including Cash Incentive Awards, Economic Subsidies, Christmas Bonuses, Citation Bonuses, Mid-Year Financial Assistance (MYFA), meal subsidies, children’s allowances, rice subsidies, and Representation and Transportation Allowances (RATA). The COA challenged these disbursements, citing violations of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6758, which mandates a standardized compensation and position classification system in the government. The COA argued that these allowances and bonuses were inconsistent with the standardized salary system and lacked proper legal authorization. Specifically, Section 12 of R.A. No. 6758 was cited, along with Memorandum Order (MO) No. 20, and Sections 45 of R.A. Nos. 9498 and 9524, highlighting the lack of legal basis for these disbursements.

    The NHA countered that the grants were authorized under Letter of Implementation (LOI) No. 97 and Section 10 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 757, which empower the General Manager, subject to the Board of Directors (BOD) approval, to determine allowances and compensation. They also argued that the incentives were given in recognition of the employees’ contributions and to help them cope with financial difficulties. However, the COA maintained that these justifications were insufficient, as R.A. No. 6758 had already repealed the earlier provisions, and no specific approval from the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) or the President was obtained for the said grants.

    The Supreme Court, in its analysis, sided with the COA, emphasizing that R.A. No. 6758 aimed to standardize compensation across government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs) and eliminate multi-level allowances. The court affirmed that any provisions of law inconsistent with this standardization were effectively repealed. The court also noted that the authority to determine which allowances or benefits could continue rested with the DBM, and most of the allowances in question were not excluded from integration into the standardized salary rates.

    A crucial aspect of the case revolved around the issue of good faith. The NHA argued that its officials and employees acted in good faith and should not be held liable to refund the disallowed benefits. However, the court found that good faith could not be appreciated in this case. The Supreme Court has consistently ruled that good faith does not apply when the approving officers had knowledge of facts or circumstances which would render the disbursements illegal. In this case, the NHA Board of Directors, composed largely of Cabinet Secretaries, should have been aware of the limitations imposed by R.A. No. 6758 and the need for specific approval from the DBM or the President.

    Furthermore, the court highlighted the significance of the notarized Deeds of Undertaking signed by the recipient-employees.

    These documents acknowledged the possibility of a refund and authorized the NHA to deduct the equivalent amount from their salaries or benefits. The court interpreted this as an indication that the employees were aware of the potential illegality of the allowances and benefits they received.

    The Court also invoked Section 103 of PD No. 1445 which states, “Expenditures of government funds or uses of government property in violation of law or regulations shall be a personal liability of the official or employee found to be directly responsible therefor.” The court made a distinction between approving/certifying officers and the recipient-employees. It emphasized that the approving and certifying officers were solidarily liable for the total disallowed amount, while the recipient-employees were individually liable for the amounts they actually received.

    The Supreme Court referenced its prior ruling in Madera v. COA, which established guidelines for the refund of disallowed amounts. However, the Court also addressed the applicability of the 3-year prescriptive period established in the case of Cagayan de Oro City Water District v. COA. The Court found that the 3-year prescriptive period does not apply to the present case, considering the employees’ execution of notarized Deeds of Undertaking. The Court reasoned that although it took more than three years before the COA issued the NDs, the NHA employees who were passive recipients are still liable to refund the disallowed amounts because the notarized Deeds of Undertaking gave them sufficient notice of the illegality and irregularity of the allowances and benefits.

    The Supreme Court ultimately dismissed the consolidated petitions, affirming the COA’s decision in its entirety. The Court held the approving and certifying officers solidarily liable for the return of the disallowed amounts, while the recipient-employees were individually liable for the amounts they received. The decision underscores the importance of adhering to legal regulations and exercising due diligence in handling public funds. It also reinforces the principle that good intentions cannot excuse illegal disbursements, and recipients of such funds have a duty to return them, particularly when they have acknowledged the potential for a refund.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether the COA acted with grave abuse of discretion in affirming the disallowance of certain benefits granted to NHA officers and employees, and whether these individuals should be held liable to return the disallowed amounts.
    What benefits were disallowed by the COA? The disallowed benefits included Cash Incentive Awards, Economic Subsidies, Christmas Bonuses, Citation Bonuses, Mid-Year Financial Assistance, meal subsidies, children’s allowances, rice subsidies, and Representation and Transportation Allowances (RATA).
    What law did the COA cite in disallowing the benefits? The COA primarily cited Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6758, which prescribes a revised compensation and position classification system in the government, aiming to standardize salaries and eliminate unauthorized allowances.
    What was the NHA’s main argument in defending the grants? The NHA argued that the grants were made in good faith, based on existing policies, collective bargaining agreements, and the employees’ contributions to the agency.
    Why did the Supreme Court reject the NHA’s good faith argument? The Court found that the NHA officials, particularly the Board of Directors, should have been aware of the limitations imposed by R.A. No. 6758 and the need for specific approval from the DBM or the President for such allowances.
    What was the significance of the Deeds of Undertaking signed by the employees? The Deeds of Undertaking acknowledged the possibility of a refund and authorized deductions from their salaries, indicating that the employees were aware of the potential illegality of the benefits.
    Who is liable to refund the disallowed amounts? The approving and certifying officers are solidarily liable for the total disallowed amount, while the recipient-employees are individually liable for the amounts they actually received.
    Does the 3-year prescriptive period apply to excuse recipients from refunding the amounts they received? No, the 3-year prescriptive period does not apply to the present case considering the NHA employees’ execution of notarized Deeds of Undertaking which gave them sufficient notice of the illegality and irregularity of the allowances and benefits.

    The Supreme Court’s decision serves as a reminder to government agencies and officials to exercise caution and due diligence in the disbursement of public funds. Compliance with legal regulations and obtaining proper authorization are essential to avoid disallowances and personal liability. The ruling underscores the importance of transparency and accountability in governance, ensuring that public resources are used responsibly and in accordance with the law.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: National Housing Authority vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 239936, June 21, 2022

  • Double Sales and Good Faith: Determining Land Ownership in Conflicting Claims

    In a case of conflicting property claims, the Supreme Court ruled that a prior valid sale transfers ownership, even if a subsequent buyer registers the property first. The Court emphasized the importance of good faith in property transactions, protecting the rights of the original buyer and reinforcing the principle that registration alone does not guarantee ownership. This decision clarifies the rights of property buyers and the responsibilities of sellers, safeguarding against fraudulent double sales.

    Can a Second Sale Overshadow a Prior Agreement? Examining Property Rights and Good Faith

    This case revolves around a dispute over a parcel of land in Manila. Zenaida Gonzales initially purchased the property from the spouses Dominador and Estefania Basas, with several documents formalizing their agreement. Later, the Basas couple sold the same property to Romeo Munda, leading to a legal battle over rightful ownership. The central legal question is whether the initial sale to Gonzales transferred ownership, despite the subsequent sale and registration by Munda. The Supreme Court’s decision hinged on the validity of the first sale and the good faith of the subsequent buyer.

    The Supreme Court meticulously examined the contracts between Zenaida Gonzales and the spouses Basas. Three key documents were at the heart of the dispute: the Contract to Sell dated May 10, 1996; the Deed of Absolute Sale (DOAS) dated May 13, 1996; and an Agreement allegedly dated August 14, 1996. While the spouses Basas argued that the Agreement superseded the previous contracts, the Court found that it reinforced the DOAS. The DOAS effectively transferred ownership to Gonzales, subject to certain resolutory conditions outlined in the Agreement. These conditions primarily involved securing the National Housing Authority’s (NHA) approval for the transfer and the subsequent payment of the remaining balance by Gonzales.

    The Court underscored that the Agreement, despite its nomenclature, functioned as a contract of sale. Paragraph 5 of the Agreement was particularly telling, as it reserved the seller’s right to repossess ownership if certain conditions were met. This provision indicated that ownership had already been transferred to Gonzales. As the Regional Trial Court (RTC) aptly pointed out, such a right to repossess could not exist if ownership hadn’t been transferred in the first place. Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that ownership was indeed transferred to Gonzales upon the execution of the DOAS and the subsequent Agreement.

    With the initial sale to Gonzales deemed valid, the Supreme Court addressed the second sale to Romeo Munda. Article 1544 of the Civil Code, concerning double sales, was invoked. This provision outlines the rules for determining ownership when the same property is sold to multiple buyers. For Article 1544 to apply, several conditions must be met: the sales must involve the same subject matter, the buyers must have conflicting interests, and the buyers must have purchased from the same seller. However, the Supreme Court found that the sale to Munda did not meet these requisites.

    The key factor was that by the time the spouses Basas sold the property to Munda, they were no longer the rightful owners. The previous sale to Gonzales had already transferred ownership. As the legal maxim states, “nemo dat quad non habet,” meaning no one can give what one does not have. Since the Basas couple no longer owned the property, they had no right to transfer it to Munda. Thus, the second sale was deemed invalid.

    Even if Article 1544 were applicable, the Supreme Court found that Munda was not a buyer in good faith. Good faith is a crucial element in determining rightful ownership in cases of double sales. A buyer in good faith is one who purchases property without notice of any defect in the seller’s title. The Court acknowledged that when Munda initially executed the Deed of Sale with the Basas couple on August 25, 1997, he may not have been aware of Zenaida’s claim, as her adverse claim was only annotated on the title on October 29, 1997.

    However, subsequent events revealed Munda’s lack of good faith. He was required to obtain the NHA’s approval for the transfer, and during this process, he became aware of Zenaida’s adverse claim. The Court highlighted that Munda had knowledge of the defect in the seller’s title when he procured the NHA’s approval dated December 1, 1997, and when he paid the transfer fee on January 30, 1998. Despite this knowledge, he proceeded to register the property under his name. The Supreme Court emphasized that purchasers must maintain good faith throughout the entire transaction, from acquisition to registration. Munda failed to meet this standard.

    The Court also considered the conduct of the spouses Basas. They knowingly entered into a valid contract of sale with Zenaida but unjustifiably refused to honor their obligation. This deliberate act warranted the imposition of exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. The Court further noted that although the spouses Basas had passed away, their contractual obligations were transmissible to their heirs. Article 776 of the Civil Code states that inheritance includes all the property, rights, and obligations of a person which are not extinguished by death. Therefore, the heirs of the Basas couple were liable for the consequences of their predecessors’ contractual obligations.

    In conclusion, the Supreme Court upheld the rights of Zenaida Gonzales, represented by her heirs, and declared her the rightful owner of the disputed property. The Court’s decision underscored the importance of good faith in property transactions and reinforced the principle that a prior valid sale transfers ownership, even if a subsequent buyer registers the property first. The Court’s ruling not only resolved the specific dispute but also provided valuable guidance for future cases involving conflicting property claims, ensuring fairness and protecting the rights of legitimate property owners.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The central issue was determining who had the rightful ownership of a property sold twice: first to Zenaida Gonzales and then to Romeo Munda. The court had to determine if the initial sale was valid and whether the subsequent buyer acted in good faith.
    What is a Deed of Absolute Sale (DOAS)? A DOAS is a legal document that transfers ownership of a property from the seller to the buyer. It signifies the completion of the sale, granting the buyer full rights over the property.
    What does “good faith” mean in a property transaction? In property law, “good faith” refers to a buyer who purchases property without knowledge of any defects or conflicting claims on the seller’s title. A buyer in good faith must also pay a fair price for the property.
    What is an adverse claim? An adverse claim is a legal notice registered on a property’s title to inform the public that someone has a claim or interest in that property. It serves as a warning to potential buyers.
    What is Article 1544 of the Civil Code? Article 1544 of the Civil Code addresses situations where the same property is sold to multiple buyers. It establishes rules for determining who has the better right to the property based on possession, registration, and good faith.
    What is the legal principle of “nemo dat quad non habet”? This Latin phrase means “no one can give what one does not have.” It means a seller can only transfer the rights they legally possess and cannot transfer ownership if they no longer own the property.
    Are heirs liable for the contractual obligations of their deceased parents? Yes, heirs are generally liable for the contractual obligations of their deceased parents, but only to the extent of the value of the inheritance they receive. Debts and obligations are charged against the estate of the deceased.
    What are exemplary damages? Exemplary damages are damages awarded to punish a wrongdoer and deter others from similar misconduct. They are imposed as an example or correction for the public good.

    This case underscores the critical importance of conducting thorough due diligence when purchasing property. Buyers should verify the seller’s title, check for any encumbrances or adverse claims, and ensure they act in good faith throughout the transaction. The Supreme Court’s decision reinforces the principle that a prior valid sale generally takes precedence, protecting the rights of the original buyer and providing clarity in resolving conflicting property claims.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Heirs of Gonzales vs. Spouses Basas, G.R. No. 206847, June 15, 2022

  • Per Diem vs. Honoraria: Defining Compensation Limits for Government Board Members

    The Supreme Court has ruled that government officials cannot receive additional compensation in the form of honoraria if they are already receiving a per diem allowance, as this would violate established laws and regulations. This decision clarifies the boundaries of permissible compensation for members of government boards, emphasizing adherence to prescribed limits and preventing unauthorized financial benefits. It reinforces the importance of transparency and accountability in public service, ensuring that government funds are used appropriately and in accordance with legal provisions.

    ICAB’s Extra Pay: Was Reviewing Adoption Files Beyond the Call of Duty?

    This case revolves around the Inter-Country Adoption Board (ICAB), the central authority in the Philippines for inter-country adoptions. In this case, Bernadette Lourdes B. Abejo, the Executive Director of the ICAB, challenged the Commission on Audit’s (COA) disallowance of additional remuneration paid to ICAB members. The COA disallowed the payments, arguing they lacked legal basis and violated existing regulations. The core legal question is whether ICAB members, who already receive a per diem, could also be paid honoraria for reviewing prospective adoptive parents’ (PAPs) dossiers, a task they undertook to address a heavy workload. The Supreme Court was asked to determine if this additional compensation was justified or if it ran afoul of the laws governing compensation for government officials.

    The ICAB was created under Republic Act No. 8043 (RA 8043), also known as the “Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995.” Its members include the Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) as ex-officio Chairman, along with six other members appointed by the President. An Inter-Country Adoption Placement Committee (ICPC) operates under the Board’s direction, managing the selection and matching of applicants and children. From 2008 to 2010, the ICAB experienced a surge in applications, prompting its members to assist the ICPC with reviewing PAPs Dossiers. In response to this increased workload, Undersecretary Luwalhati F. Pablo authorized additional remuneration for ICAB members: P250.00 for each reviewed application, later increased to P500.00.

    However, after an audit, the COA issued a Notice of Disallowance (ND) for P162,855.00, citing the lack of legal basis, conflict with Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Budget Circular (BC) No. 2003-5, and Section 49 of RA 9970. The COA also pointed out that the DSWD Legal Service had denied the grant of honoraria to ICAB members and that Section 5 of RA 8043 limited compensation to a per diem of P1,500.00 per meeting. Abejo, as the Executive Director and approving officer, was identified as liable for the disallowed amount. The COA Proper affirmed the disallowance, stating that the additional remuneration violated Section 5 of RA 8043 and DBM BC No. 2003-5, which prohibits honoraria for those already receiving per diem.

    A key procedural point arose: Abejo did not file a motion for reconsideration of the COA Proper’s decision before filing a certiorari petition with the Supreme Court. Generally, failure to move for reconsideration is fatal to a certiorari petition because it deprives the tribunal of the opportunity to correct its errors. However, the Supreme Court recognized an exception: when the issues raised in the certiorari proceedings have already been addressed by the lower court. Because Abejo raised the same issues before the COA Proper, the Court proceeded to resolve the petition on its merits.

    The Supreme Court emphasized that while government employees may be compensated for work outside their regular functions, such compensation must comply with applicable laws and rules. The Court quoted Sison v. Tablang, which states that while honoraria are given in appreciation for services, their payment must be circumscribed by the DBM’s rules and guidelines. In this case, RA 8043 and DBM BC No. 2003-5 prevented the ICAB members from receiving additional compensation. Section 5 of RA 8043 limits the per diem ICAB members can receive, and Item 4.3 of DBM BC 2003-5 prohibits honoraria for officers already receiving per diem.

    The Court rejected the argument that the Intercountry Adoption Board Manual of Operation authorized the honoraria because Section 5 of the manual applied only to members of the ICPC, not the ICAB. Further, the manual itself was subordinate to express provisions of law and auditing rules. It states: “A Committee member shall receive an honorarium which shall be determined by the Board subject to usual accounting and auditing rules and regulations.” The Court also dismissed the claim that the ICAB members’ work constituted a “special project” compensable under Section 49 of RA 9970. To qualify as a special project, the undertaking must be a duly authorized inter-office or intra-office endeavor outside the regular functions of the agency, reform-oriented or developmental in nature, and contributory to improved service delivery.

    In Ngalob v. Commission on Audit, the Supreme Court laid out specific requirements for a “special project,” including an approved project plan with defined objectives, outputs, timelines, and cost estimates. Abejo failed to demonstrate any approved special project plan, leaving the Court without a basis to determine if the ICAB members’ dossier review qualified as such.

    Paragraph 4.3 of DBM Circular No. 2007-2 is explicit in requiring that a special project plan should be “prepared in consultation with all personnel assigned to a project and approved by the department/agency/lead agency head,” containing the following:

    • title of the project;
    • objectives of the project, including the benefits to be derived therefrom;
    • outputs or deliverables per project component;
    • project timetable;
    • skills and expertise required;
    • personnel assigned to the project and the duties and responsibilities of each;
    • expected deliverables per personnel assigned to the project per project component at specified timeframes; and
    • cost by project component, including the estimated cost for honoraria for each personnel based on man-hours to be spent in the project beyond the regular work hours; personnel efficiency should be a prime consideration in determining the man-hours required.

    Despite upholding the disallowance, the Supreme Court absolved Abejo from liability to return the disallowed amount. The Court applied the Madera v. Commission on Audit rules, which provide that approving and certifying officers are not civilly liable if they acted in good faith, in the regular performance of official functions, and with the diligence of a good father of the family. The Madera ruling provides a definitive set of rules in determining the liability of government officers and employees:

    Approving and certifying officers who acted in good faith, in regular performance of official functions, and with the diligence of a good father of the family are not civilly liable to return consistent with Section 38 of the Administrative Code of 1987.

    The Court found that Abejo had acted in good faith because there was no prior disallowance of the same benefit against ICAB, and no precedent disallowing a similar case in jurisprudence. This decision underscores the importance of adhering to compensation limits for government officials, while also protecting those who act in good faith from personal liability. Lastly, the Court noted that the individual ICAB members who received the additional remuneration were not held liable in the ND, and this determination had already attained finality. The Court stated, “To disturb their exoneration is to violate the doctrine of immutability of final orders or judgments.”

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether members of the Inter-Country Adoption Board (ICAB), who already received a per diem, could also be paid honoraria for reviewing applications, and whether the Executive Director could be held liable for the disallowed amounts.
    What is a per diem? A per diem is a daily allowance given to government officials to cover expenses incurred while performing official duties, such as attending meetings. It is meant to cover costs like transportation, meals, and lodging.
    What are honoraria? Honoraria are payments given as a token of appreciation for services rendered, typically for special or additional tasks. They are not considered a salary but rather a voluntary donation in consideration of services.
    Why did the COA disallow the additional remuneration? The COA disallowed the payments because they lacked legal basis, conflicted with Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Budget Circular No. 2003-5, and violated Section 5 of RA 8043, which limits compensation to a per diem.
    What is the significance of DBM Budget Circular No. 2003-5? DBM Budget Circular No. 2003-5 provides guidelines on the payment of honoraria and stipulates that individuals already receiving a per diem are not eligible to receive honoraria for the same services.
    What did the Supreme Court rule regarding the disallowance? The Supreme Court affirmed the COA’s decision, ruling that the additional remuneration was correctly disallowed because it violated RA 8043 and DBM BC No. 2003-5. The Court emphasized that the existing laws prevent the ICAB member from receiving additional compensation for the work they have done reviewing the PAPs Dossiers.
    Why was the Executive Director absolved from liability? The Executive Director, Bernadette Lourdes B. Abejo, was absolved from liability because the Court found that she had acted in good faith, with no prior disallowance of the same benefit and no precedent disallowing a similar case in jurisprudence.
    What are the Madera Rules mentioned in the decision? The Madera Rules, established in Madera v. Commission on Audit, provide a framework for determining the liability of government officers and employees in cases of disallowed benefits. They specify that those who act in good faith and with due diligence are not held civilly liable.
    What was the Court’s ruling about the ICAB members who received the money? The individual ICAB members who received the additional remuneration were not held liable in the ND, and this determination had already attained finality. To disturb their exoneration is to violate the doctrine of immutability of final orders or judgments

    This case clarifies the importance of adhering to prescribed compensation limits for government officials. While acknowledging that additional responsibilities may warrant additional compensation, the ruling emphasizes that such compensation must be within the bounds of existing laws and regulations. The absolution of the Executive Director from personal liability underscores the protection afforded to public officials who act in good faith, even when errors in judgment occur.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: BERNADETTE LOURDES B. ABEJO VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, G.R. No. 251967, June 14, 2022

  • Good Faith and Anti-Graft Law: When an Honest Mistake Leads to Acquittal

    In a significant ruling, the Supreme Court acquitted former Mayor Carlos R. Asuncion and several chapter presidents of Bayanihan ng Kababaihan from charges of violating Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and malversation of public funds. The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused acted with evident bad faith or corrupt intent when the mayor granted loans to the women’s groups, even if the groups were later deemed unqualified. This decision underscores that not every mistake by a public official constitutes a crime, especially when actions are based on a good faith interpretation of the law and there is no evidence of personal gain or corruption.

    Tobacco Funds and Women’s Groups: Was it Corruption or a Misunderstanding?

    The case revolves around a decision by then-Mayor Carlos Racadio Asuncion of Sta. Catalina, Ilocos Sur, to grant financial assistance sourced from the municipality’s share of tobacco excise taxes to four chapters of the Bayanihan ng Kababaihan, a women’s organization. Accusations arose from Jonathan Amando R. Redoble, a political opponent, alleging violations of anti-graft laws and malversation. The Sandiganbayan initially convicted Mayor Asuncion and the chapter presidents of violating Sections 3(e) and 3(j) of RA 3019, as well as malversation, finding that they conspired to give unwarranted benefits to unqualified entities. However, the Supreme Court reversed this decision, focusing on the lack of evidence demonstrating corrupt intent or bad faith.

    To understand the Court’s reasoning, it’s crucial to examine the elements of the crimes charged. Section 3(e) of RA 3019 prohibits public officials from causing undue injury to the government or giving unwarranted benefits through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. Essential to a conviction under this section is proving that the public officer acted with a corrupt motive or a clear intent to do wrong. The Court emphasized that “bad faith per se is not enough for one to be held criminally liable… [it] must be evident… a manifest deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or to cause damage.” The prosecution failed to establish that Mayor Asuncion acted with such intent.

    Furthermore, Section 3(j) of RA 3019 penalizes knowingly granting a benefit to an unqualified person. The Supreme Court found that the prosecution did not prove that Mayor Asuncion knew the women’s groups were unqualified to receive the funds. The groups had been accredited by the Sangguniang Bayan (municipal council) as community-based organizations, which reasonably led the mayor to believe in their eligibility.

    The court highlighted the importance of distinguishing between a simple mistake and a corrupt act. In Martel vs. People, the Supreme Court underscored that RA 3019 is an anti-graft and corruption measure, meant to penalize the acquisition of gain in dishonest ways:

    At this juncture, the Court emphasizes the spirit that animates R.A. 3019. As its title implies, and as what can be gleaned from the deliberations of Congress, R.A. 3019 was crafted as an anti-graft and corruption measure. At the heart of the acts punishable under R.A. 3019 is corruption.

    The Court also considered that the tobacco excise tax fund, while intended for tobacco farmers, did not explicitly exclude other farmers or community groups within tobacco-producing provinces. Thus, Mayor Asuncion’s interpretation of the law, even if mistaken, was not inherently malicious or corrupt. The subsequent repayment of the loans by the women’s groups further supported the absence of any corrupt intent.

    Regarding the charge of malversation, the Revised Penal Code defines it as the appropriation, taking, or misappropriation of public funds by a public officer. An essential element of malversation is that the offender has appropriated, taken, misappropriated or consented, or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them. The Supreme Court found no such evidence in this case. Mayor Asuncion acted under the authority of existing appropriation ordinances, negating any claim of intentional or negligent misuse of funds. This case reinforces the principle that public officials should not be penalized for honest mistakes, especially when there is no evidence of personal gain or corrupt intent.

    The prosecution also argued that a conspiracy existed between Mayor Asuncion and the chapter presidents. However, the Court found the evidence insufficient to prove a common design or purpose to commit a wrongful act. The mere fact that Mayor Asuncion’s wife was the Federated President of the Bayanihan ng Kababaihan did not, by itself, establish a conspiracy. The Court reiterated that “there is no such thing as presumption of bad faith in cases involving violations of RA 3019.” The prosecution must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, which it failed to do in this case. Because the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy, the acquittal of accused-appellant Mayor Asuncion carries with it the acquittal of his co-accused.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? Whether Mayor Asuncion and the chapter presidents acted with corrupt intent or bad faith when granting and receiving loans from the tobacco excise tax fund. The Supreme Court found insufficient evidence of such intent.
    What is Section 3(e) of RA 3019? It prohibits public officials from causing undue injury to the government or giving unwarranted benefits through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence.
    What is Section 3(j) of RA 3019? It penalizes knowingly granting a benefit to an unqualified person. The prosecution must prove the official knew the person was unqualified.
    What is malversation of public funds? It is the appropriation, taking, or misappropriation of public funds by a public officer. Intent or negligence in the misuse of funds must be proven.
    What is needed to prove conspiracy? The prosecution must show that all participants performed overt acts with such closeness and coordination as to indicate a common purpose or design to commit the felony.
    What did the Supreme Court emphasize about RA 3019? It is an anti-graft and corruption measure intended to penalize the acquisition of gain in dishonest ways, not to punish simple mistakes by public officials.
    Why was the repayment of loans important? The Supreme Court deemed the immediate repayment of the loans as a badge of good faith, which negates any allegation of bad faith.
    What was the effect of Mayor Asuncion’s good faith? Since the disbursements were supported by the proper Appropriation Ordinances, there was no reason for accused-appellant Mayor not to enter into the loan agreements with his co­-accused chapter presidents, and the charge of malversation must fail.

    This case serves as a reminder that anti-graft laws are designed to combat corruption, not to penalize honest mistakes or good-faith interpretations of the law. Public officials are entitled to the presumption of innocence, and the prosecution bears the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, including demonstrating corrupt intent or bad faith. The decision protects public servants from unwarranted prosecution while reinforcing the importance of ethical conduct and accountability in public office.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. CARLOS RACADIO ASUNCION, ET AL., G.R. Nos. 250366 and 250388-98, April 06, 2022