ASG Law

Tag: Investment Scams

  • Investment Scams: Defining the Scope of ‘Salesman’ Under the Securities Regulation Code

    In a case involving the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) versus Oudine Santos, the Supreme Court addressed the liability of individuals involved in selling unregistered securities. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision, ruling that Santos, despite not being a signatory to investment contracts, could be held liable for violating Section 28 of the Securities Regulation Code as she actively solicited investments for PIPC Corporation, which sold unregistered securities. This decision clarifies that individuals who actively promote or solicit investments, even without direct involvement in contract signing or fund handling, can be held accountable for violations of securities laws, ensuring greater protection for investors against fraudulent schemes.

    When ‘Providing Information’ Becomes Unlawful Solicitation

    The case originated from complaints filed against Philippine International Planning Center Corporation (PIPC Corporation) and its officers, including Oudine Santos, for violations of the Securities Regulation Code. PIPC Corporation, linked to Performance Investment Products Corporation (PIPC-BVI), had allegedly defrauded investors by promising high returns on investments in a low-risk program. Investors, including Luisa Mercedes P. Lorenzo and Ricky Albino P. Sy, claimed that Santos, acting as an investment consultant for PIPC Corporation, induced them to invest in the company.

    The SEC filed a complaint-affidavit with the Department of Justice (DOJ), alleging violations of Sections 8, 26, and 28 of the Securities Regulation Code. Lorenzo and Sy provided affidavits detailing Santos’ involvement in their investment decisions. Lorenzo stated that Santos presented the investment product, “Performance Managed Portfolio,” and emphasized the confidentiality of the transactions. Sy recounted how Santos convinced him to invest in the Performance Management Portfolio, highlighting the security of the capital and PIPC’s track record. The investors claimed that Santos actively solicited and recruited investors, representing the safety and profitability of investing with PIPC Corporation.

    In her defense, Santos denied any intent to defraud, asserting that she was merely an employee and later an independent information provider for PIPC Corporation. She claimed that PIPC Corporation was a separate entity from PIPC-BVI, and she had no involvement with the latter. Santos argued that she never received any money from Sy and Lorenzo, who directly invested in PIPC-BVI. She maintained that her role was limited to providing information and that the investment contracts were solely between the investors and PIPC-BVI.

    Initially, the DOJ issued a Resolution indicting Liew and Gonzalez-Tuason for violations of Sections 8 and 26 of the Securities Regulation Code, and Santos, along with others, for violation of Section 28. However, on a motion for reconsideration, the DOJ modified its ruling and excluded Santos from prosecution, a decision that was later affirmed by the Secretary of Justice. This exclusion was based on the premise that Santos did not directly participate in the sale of securities and that the investors dealt directly with PIPC-BVI. The Court of Appeals upheld the DOJ’s resolution, leading the SEC to file a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.

    The Supreme Court analyzed the case, focusing on whether Santos’ actions constituted a violation of Section 28 of the Securities Regulation Code, which prohibits engaging in the business of buying or selling securities as a broker or dealer, or acting as a salesman or associated person without proper registration. The Court referenced Section 3 of the Securities Regulation Code for definitions of key terms:

    Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. – x x x.

    3.3. “Broker” is a person engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for the account of others.

    3.4. “Dealer” means [any] person who buys [and] sells securities for his/her own account in the ordinary course of business.

    3.5. “Associated person of a broker or dealer” is an employee thereof whom, directly exercises control of supervisory authority, but does not include a salesman, or an agent or a person whose functions are solely clerical or ministerial.

    3.13. “Salesman” is a natural person, employed as such [or] as an agent, by a dealer, issuer or broker to buy and sell securities.

    The Court determined that Santos’ role as an “information provider” involved soliciting the sale of securities by PIPC Corporation and/or PIPC-BVI. Solicitation, in this context, is defined as the act of seeking or asking for business or information and bringing about the sale of securities made by PIPC Corporation and/or PIPC-BVI to certain individuals by providing information on the investment products of PIPC Corporation and/or PIPC-BVI with the end in view of PIPC Corporation closing a sale. Although Santos was not a signatory to the contracts, she procured the sale of unregistered securities to Sy and Lorenzo by providing information and convincing them to invest.

    The Court found that Santos actively recruited and referred possible investors to PIPC Corporation and/or PIPC-BVI, acting as an ostensible agent. The transactions initiated by Santos constituted an investment contract, defined as an investment in a common venture premised on a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others. The Court highlighted that Sy and Lorenzo did not go directly to Liew or any principal officer of PIPC Corporation and/or PIPC-BVI before making their investments, underscoring Santos’ role in facilitating the deals.

    The Supreme Court set aside the Court of Appeals’ decision and reinstated the DOJ’s Resolutions, directing the inclusion of Santos in the Information for violation of Section 28 of the Securities Regulation Code. The court emphasized that the absence of Santos’ signature in the contract is not exculpatory. The Court clarified that it was only dealing with the preliminary investigation aspect of the case and not adjuging the guilt or lack thereof. Santos’ defense of being a mere employee or simply an information provider is best raised and threshed out during the trial of the case.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether Oudine Santos violated Section 28 of the Securities Regulation Code by engaging in the business of selling securities without being registered as a broker, dealer, or salesman.
    What is Section 28 of the Securities Regulation Code? Section 28 prohibits individuals from engaging in the business of buying or selling securities as a broker or dealer, or acting as a salesman or associated person, without proper registration with the SEC.
    Who was Oudine Santos and what was her role? Oudine Santos was an investment consultant for PIPC Corporation who allegedly induced individuals to invest in the company’s securities. She claimed to be merely an employee or information provider.
    What did the Supreme Court decide in this case? The Supreme Court ruled that Santos could be held liable for violating Section 28, reversing the Court of Appeals’ decision and directing the DOJ to include her in the Information for violating the Securities Regulation Code.
    Why did the Supreme Court reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision? The Supreme Court found that Santos actively solicited investments for PIPC Corporation, which sold unregistered securities, and that her actions went beyond merely providing information.
    What is the definition of “solicitation” in this context? Solicitation is the act of seeking or asking for business or information, which in this case, involved bringing about the sale of securities by PIPC Corporation by providing information and convincing individuals to invest.
    What does it mean to act as an “ostensible agent”? Acting as an “ostensible agent” means that Santos appeared to be acting on behalf of PIPC Corporation in recruiting and referring investors, even if she was not officially designated as an agent.
    Why was Santos’ signature on the investment contracts not necessary for liability? The Court stated that individual culpability could be established even without her signature in the investment contracts, indicating her active recruitment and referral of possible investors to the company’s fraudulent products.
    What is the significance of this ruling for potential investors? This ruling enhances investor protection by clarifying that individuals who actively solicit investments, even without direct involvement in contract signing, can be held accountable for violations of securities laws.

    This case underscores the importance of due diligence in investment decisions and the potential liability of individuals involved in selling unregistered securities. The Supreme Court’s decision reinforces the SEC’s authority to pursue those who facilitate investment scams, even if they are not directly involved in the final sale. This ruling serves as a cautionary tale for those who promote investment products without proper registration and highlights the need for greater scrutiny of individuals presenting investment opportunities.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Securities and Exchange Commission vs. Oudine Santos, G.R. No. 195542, March 19, 2014

  • Investment Scams and Due Diligence: Understanding Broker Liability in Securities Law

    In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Oudine Santos, the Supreme Court ruled that an individual acting as a conduit for selling unregistered securities can be held liable under the Securities Regulation Code, even if they are not a signatory to the investment contracts. The court emphasized that providing information and actively recruiting investors for unregistered securities constitutes a violation, thereby protecting the investing public from potential scams. This decision underscores the importance of due diligence in investment solicitations and clarifies the responsibilities of individuals involved in the sale of securities.

    From Information Provider to Investment Solicitor: When Does SEC Liability Attach?

    The case originated from the collapse of Performance Investment Products Corporation (PIPC), where Michael H.K. Liew, the chairman, absconded with investor funds, exposing a massive investment scam. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed a complaint against Oudine Santos, an investment consultant for PIPC, alleging she violated Section 28 of the Securities Regulation Code by selling unregistered securities. The controversy centered on whether Santos, who claimed to be merely providing information, had crossed the line into actively soliciting investments without proper registration.

    The private complainants, Luisa Mercedes P. Lorenzo and Ricky Albino P. Sy, narrated how Santos’s inducements led them to invest in PIPC. Lorenzo stated that Santos presented the “Performance Managed Portfolio” (PMP), emphasizing high returns and confidentiality, even admitting the company wasn’t allowed to conduct foreign currency trading. Sy recounted how Santos convinced him to invest by highlighting the security and liquidity of PIPC’s investment program. These interactions formed the basis of the SEC’s case against Santos.

    Santos, however, refuted these claims, arguing she was only an employee providing information and had no decision-making power within the company. She emphasized that investors directly dealt with PIPC-BVI, the foreign entity, and she never received any money from them. Furthermore, Santos pointed to an “Information Dissemination Agreement” that allegedly prohibited her from soliciting investments. The Department of Justice (DOJ) initially found probable cause against Santos but later reversed its decision, excluding her from the information for violating Section 28 of the Securities Regulation Code. The Secretary of Justice argued that there was a lack of evidence that respondent Santos violated Section 28 of the SRC, or that she had acted as an agent for PIPC Corp. or enticed Luisa Mercedes P. Lorenzo or Ricky Albino P. Sy to buy PIPC Corp. or PIPC-BVI’s investment products.

    The SEC then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the DOJ’s resolution. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the record in this case is bereft of any showing that [Santos] was engaged in the business of buying and selling securities in the Philippines, whether for herself or in behalf of another person or entity. This led the SEC to elevate the case to the Supreme Court, questioning whether Santos’s actions indeed constituted a violation of the Securities Regulation Code.

    The Supreme Court, in its analysis, delved into the core elements required to establish a violation of Section 28 of the Securities Regulation Code. The court noted that the law prohibits engaging in the business of buying or selling securities as a broker or dealer, or acting as a salesman or associated person without proper registration with the SEC. The central question was whether Santos’s activities, even if she claimed to be merely an “information provider,” met these criteria. The Supreme Court disagreed with the DOJ and the Court of Appeals. The court sided with the DOJ panel’s original findings that PIPC was selling unregistered securities, and Santos was more than just an information provider.

    The court emphasized that solicitation is the act of seeking or asking for business or information, and Santos, through her function as an information provider, facilitated the sale of unregistered securities. The court noted that she brought about the sale of securities made by PIPC Corporation and/or PIPC-BVI to certain individuals, specifically private complainants Sy and Lorenzo by providing information on the investment products of PIPC Corporation and/or PIPC-BVI with the end in view of PIPC Corporation closing a sale.

    The Supreme Court stated that no matter Santos’ strenuous objections, it is apparent that she connected the probable investors, Sy and Lorenzo, to PIPC Corporation and/or PIPC-BVI, acting as an ostensible agent of the latter on the viability of PIPC Corporation as an investment company. The DOJ’s and Court of Appeals’ reasoning that Santos did not sign the investment contracts of Sy and Lorenzo is specious and these contracts merely document the act performed by Santos.

    Drawing from established jurisprudence, the Court highlighted that an investment contract exists when money is invested in a common venture with the expectation of profits derived from the efforts of others. The absence of Santos’s signature in the investment contracts was not exculpatory. Instead, the court suggested it could be indicative of a scheme to circumvent liability. The court referenced People v. Petralba, 482 Phil. 362, 377 (2004), stating that “[w]hen the investor is relatively uninformed and turns over his money to others, essentially depending upon their representations and their honesty and skill in managing it, the transaction generally is considered to be an investment contract.”

    The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision and reinstated the DOJ’s initial resolution to include Santos in the information for violating Section 28 of the Securities Regulation Code. The court held that her defense of being a mere employee or information provider was best addressed during the trial. In conclusion, the Court’s decision emphasizes that individuals actively involved in soliciting investments for unregistered securities can be held liable, reinforcing the importance of SEC registration and due diligence in the financial sector.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether Oudine Santos violated Section 28 of the Securities Regulation Code by acting as a broker, dealer, or salesman of securities without proper registration. The court had to determine if her role as an “information provider” constituted active solicitation of investments.
    What is Section 28 of the Securities Regulation Code? Section 28 of the Securities Regulation Code requires individuals engaged in the business of buying or selling securities as a broker or dealer, or acting as a salesman or associated person, to be registered with the SEC. This regulation aims to protect the public by ensuring that those selling securities are qualified and accountable.
    What constitutes an “investment contract” under the Securities Regulation Code? An investment contract is defined as a contract, transaction, or scheme where a person invests money in a common enterprise and expects profits primarily from the efforts of others. The Supreme Court has noted that it must constitute fraud perpetrated on the public and that the absence of signature is not exculpatory.
    Why did the Supreme Court disagree with the DOJ’s initial decision to exclude Santos? The Supreme Court disagreed because it found that Santos’s actions went beyond merely providing information; she actively recruited and referred potential investors to PIPC, thereby facilitating the sale of unregistered securities. The court highlighted her role in connecting investors to the company and promoting its investment products.
    What evidence did the complainants present against Santos? Complainants presented affidavits detailing how Santos enticed them to invest in PIPC, highlighting high returns, security, and confidentiality. They also provided email exchanges and other documents showing her active involvement in the solicitation process.
    What was Santos’s defense in the case? Santos argued that she was merely a clerical employee or information provider for PIPC, and she never directly received any money from the investors. She also claimed she was prohibited from soliciting investments and that investors directly dealt with PIPC-BVI.
    What is the significance of the Supreme Court’s ruling in this case? The ruling clarifies that individuals involved in promoting and selling unregistered securities can be held liable, even if they are not signatories to the investment contracts. This decision strengthens investor protection and underscores the importance of SEC registration.
    What does this case mean for individuals working in the securities industry? This case emphasizes the need for individuals working in the securities industry to ensure they are properly registered with the SEC and to exercise due diligence in their interactions with potential investors. It also highlights the importance of understanding the legal boundaries of their roles.
    How does this case relate to the crime of estafa? While this case specifically deals with violations of the Securities Regulation Code, the underlying issue of defrauding investors can also be related to the crime of estafa. Estafa involves deceit and misrepresentation to gain money or property from another person, which is often a component of investment scams.

    In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Oudine Santos reinforces the importance of regulatory compliance and ethical conduct in the securities industry. By holding individuals accountable for actively soliciting investments in unregistered securities, the ruling serves as a deterrent against investment scams and protects the investing public from financial harm. It serves as a reminder that simply providing information can lead to liability if it facilitates the sale of unregistered securities.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Securities and Exchange Commission vs. Oudine Santos, G.R. No. 195542, March 19, 2014

  • Piercing the Corporate Veil: Holding Officers Liable for Illegal Paluwagan Schemes in the Philippines

    Holding Corporate Officers Accountable: Piercing the Veil in Paluwagan Scams

    In cases of fraud cloaked in corporate structures, Philippine courts possess the power to disregard the separate legal personality of a corporation and hold its officers personally liable. This principle, known as “piercing the corporate veil,” ensures that individuals cannot hide behind corporate entities to perpetrate illegal activities and escape accountability. This case serves as a stark reminder that corporate officers who engage in or knowingly facilitate fraudulent schemes, such as illegal investment scams, cannot evade civil liability, even if acquitted of criminal charges.

    G.R. No. 123307, November 29, 1999

    INTRODUCTION

    Imagine investing your hard-earned money into a promising venture, only to watch it vanish due to a fraudulent scheme. This was the harsh reality for Leovino Jose and many others who fell victim to the “Biyaya Foundation” (BIYAYA) paluwagan, a get-rich-quick scheme disguised as a legitimate investment opportunity. While the officers of BIYAYA were acquitted of criminal charges of estafa (fraud), this Supreme Court case, Samuel Barangan v. Court of Appeals, highlights a crucial aspect of Philippine corporate law: the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil. The central legal question is whether corporate officers can be held civilly liable for the debts and obligations of a corporation when that corporation is used as a tool for illegal activities, even if they are not criminally convicted.

    LEGAL CONTEXT: PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL AND ESTAFA

    Philippine corporate law recognizes the principle of separate legal personality. This means that a corporation is considered a distinct legal entity from its stockholders and officers. Generally, the debts and liabilities of a corporation are its own, and the personal assets of the stockholders and officers are protected. However, this separate personality is not absolute. The doctrine of “piercing the corporate veil” is an exception to this rule.

    The Supreme Court has consistently held that the corporate veil can be pierced when the corporate fiction is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime. In such cases, the corporation is treated as a mere association of persons, and the stockholders or officers can be held directly liable for the corporate debts and obligations.

    The Revised Penal Code of the Philippines defines estafa (fraud) in various forms. In the context of investment scams like paluwagan, the relevant form is estafa by means of deceit. Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code penalizes anyone who defrauds another by using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud.

    While the crime of estafa requires proof beyond reasonable doubt for criminal conviction, civil liability can arise from the same set of facts even if criminal guilt is not proven. This case underscores this distinction, focusing on civil liability in the context of a fraudulent paluwagan scheme.

    Key legal provisions relevant to this case include:

    • Corporation Code of the Philippines (Batas Pambansa Blg. 68): Governs the creation, operation, and dissolution of corporations in the Philippines and establishes the principle of separate legal personality.
    • Revised Penal Code, Article 315, paragraph 2(a): Defines and penalizes estafa by means of deceit.
    • Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil: A jurisprudential doctrine developed through numerous Supreme Court decisions, allowing courts to disregard the separate legal personality of a corporation in specific circumstances.

    CASE BREAKDOWN: BIYAYA FOUNDATION’S PALUWAGAN AND BARANGAN’S LIABILITY

    The Biyaya Foundation (BIYAYA), initially the San Mateo Small Town Multi-Purpose Cooperative (SMSTMC), was formed by a group of individuals including Samuel Barangan, a lawyer. They purported to uplift the economic condition of members through a paluwagan scheme promising investors their money would “treble in fifteen (15) days.” This promise attracted numerous investors, including Leovino Jose, who invested P43,500.00.

    Here’s a timeline of the key events:

    1. 1989: SMSTMC was dissolved for operating a paluwagan.
    2. 1989: BIYAYA Foundation was formed and registered, continuing the paluwagan scheme. Samuel Barangan was Vice-Chairman.
    3. August 1989: Criminal complaints for estafa were filed against BIYAYA officers, including Barangan, by investors John Gatmen and Leovino Jose who were not paid their promised returns.
    4. September 1989: Warrants of arrest were issued. Barangan and others were apprehended, while some officers, like Federico Castillo, remained at large.
    5. November 1989: Informations (formal charges) for estafa were filed.
    6. November 1990: The trial court acquitted Barangan and other officers on reasonable doubt in both criminal cases but ordered them to jointly and severally pay Leovino Jose P43,000.00 in civil liability, applying the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil.
    7. November 1995: The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision regarding civil liability, except for absolving Efigenia Marquez from liability.
    8. November 1999: The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision, upholding Barangan’s civil liability.

    The trial court, while acquitting the accused of estafa due to lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt for criminal intent, found them civilly liable. The court reasoned that BIYAYA was engaged in an illegal activity – an illegal paluwagan – and that the corporate veil should be pierced to hold the officers accountable. The trial court stated:

    “Compelling and valid reasons exist warranting the lifting of the veil of corporate fiction of BF [Biyaya Foundation] and hold its officers, the accused herein, liable for its obligation to Leovino Jose. BF was engaged in an illegal activity by operating a paluwagan. BF is practically dissolved and abandoned when its officers went into hiding after the military raided it to stop its operation. Unless its officers are held liable for the obligation of BF to Leovino Jose, the wrong committed against him will be perpetuated as recourse to the BF is futile.”

    The Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court upheld this view. The Supreme Court emphasized that while a paluwagan is not inherently illegal, BIYAYA’s operation was a “racket designed to victimize the gullible public,” cloaked as a legitimate investment. The Court highlighted Barangan’s role as Vice-Chairman and his knowledge of the scheme, affirming his civil liability despite the acquittal in the criminal case. The Supreme Court stated:

    “For having engaged in an illegal transaction, the officers and the members of the Board of the Biyaya Foundation who had actual knowledge of the transactions and thus tacitly approved and acquiesced thereto, should be made to answer criminally and civilly…Petitioner Barangan cannot use the defense that since both parties were in pari delicto they could have no action against each other. It is well to stress that the illegality is attributable to the BIYAYA alone as there is no showing from the records that Jose was aware of the illegality of their business operation or that it was prohibited by law.”

    PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS: ACCOUNTABILITY BEYOND CRIMINAL CONVICTION

    This case serves as a significant precedent regarding corporate liability and the piercing of the corporate veil in the Philippines. It reinforces that:

    • Corporate officers cannot hide behind the corporate veil to escape liability for illegal activities. Even if a corporation is a separate legal entity, courts will disregard this fiction when it is used to perpetrate fraud or illegal schemes.
    • Acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically absolve individuals from civil liability. The burden of proof for criminal conviction is higher (proof beyond reasonable doubt) than for civil liability (preponderance of evidence). Officers acquitted of estafa can still be held civilly liable for damages arising from the same fraudulent acts.
    • Directors and officers have a responsibility to ensure the legality of corporate activities. Knowledge and acquiescence to illegal operations, even without direct criminal intent, can lead to civil liability.
    • Investors should exercise caution when dealing with investments promising unusually high returns. “Too good to be true” often is. Due diligence and scrutiny are crucial before investing, especially in schemes like paluwagan.

    Key Lessons:

    • Due Diligence is Key: Corporate officers must conduct thorough due diligence to ensure their company operates legally and ethically.
    • Compliance Matters: Strict adherence to laws and regulations is not just a formality but a crucial shield against liability.
    • Officer Responsibility: Corporate positions come with significant responsibility. Officers are accountable for the overall legality and ethical conduct of the corporation.
    • Investor Caution: Investors should be wary of high-yield, low-risk investment promises and conduct thorough research before investing.

    FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (FAQs)

    Q: What does “piercing the corporate veil” mean?

    A: Piercing the corporate veil is a legal doctrine that allows courts to disregard the separate legal personality of a corporation and hold its shareholders or officers personally liable for corporate debts or actions. It’s applied when the corporate form is used to commit fraud, injustice, or illegal acts.

    Q: When can the corporate veil be pierced in the Philippines?

    A: Philippine courts can pierce the corporate veil when the corporate entity is used to (1) defeat public convenience, (2) justify wrong, (3) protect fraud, or (4) defend crime. This case illustrates the “protect fraud” scenario.

    Q: Is a paluwagan scheme always illegal?

    A: No, a paluwagan, as a simple form of rotating savings and credit association, is not inherently illegal. However, when it is used as a front for a fraudulent investment scheme promising unrealistic returns and designed to defraud investors, it becomes illegal, as seen in the BIYAYA case.

    Q: If corporate officers are acquitted of criminal charges, can they still be held liable civilly?

    A: Yes. As this case demonstrates, acquittal in a criminal case (like estafa) does not automatically absolve officers from civil liability arising from the same actions. Civil liability requires a lower burden of proof.

    Q: What should I do if I suspect an investment scheme is fraudulent?

    A: If you suspect an investment scam, immediately cease investing. Gather all documentation and evidence, and consult with a lawyer specializing in fraud or corporate law. You may also report the scheme to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or law enforcement agencies.

    Q: As a corporate officer, how can I avoid personal liability?

    A: To avoid personal liability, ensure your corporation operates legally and ethically. Practice due diligence in all business dealings, maintain transparency, and seek legal counsel when necessary. Do not participate in or condone any fraudulent or illegal activities within the corporation.

    ASG Law specializes in Corporate Litigation and Fraud & White Collar Crimes. Contact us or email hello@asglawpartners.com to schedule a consultation.