Tag: Mayor’s Permit

Accountability and the Limits of Official Discretion: When Granting a Permit Becomes a Crime

This case clarifies the responsibilities of public officials in the Philippines, specifically Mayors, when issuing permits. The Supreme Court affirmed the Sandiganbayan’s conviction of former Mayor Charita M. Chan for violating Section 3(j) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019). Chan knowingly granted a permit to the Liga ng mga Barangay to hold cockfights on Saturdays, despite existing laws prohibiting such activities. This ruling underscores that public officials cannot use their positions to circumvent legal restrictions, even if they claim a lack of criminal intent, thus emphasizing accountability in governance and adherence to the law.

Cockfights and Conflicts: Did a Mayor’s Permit Cross the Line?

The case of Charita M. Chan v. People of the Philippines revolves around the intersection of local governance, legal restrictions, and the anti-graft law. In 2016, Charita M. Chan, then the Mayor of Babatngon, Leyte, faced two criminal charges for violating Section 3(j) of Republic Act No. 3019, also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. These charges stemmed from the approval and issuance of Mayor’s Permits for the operation of a cockpit and the holding of cockfights in her municipality. The pivotal question was whether Chan, in her official capacity, knowingly granted permits to entities not legally entitled to them, thereby violating the anti-graft law.

The first charge, SB-16-CRM-0511, pertained to a permit granted to Nicomedes Alde, the owner of the Babatngon Gallera. He was also a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Babatngon and President of the Liga ng mga Barangay. The information alleged that Chan knew Alde was prohibited under Section 89(2) of the Local Government Code (RA 7160) from holding such an interest in a licensed cockpit. However, she still approved the permit. The second charge, SB-16-CRM-0512, concerned a Mayor’s Permit issued to the Liga ng mga Barangay, allowing them to hold cockfights every Saturday. This was allegedly in violation of Section 5(d) and (e) of Presidential Decree No. 449 (The Cockfighting Law of 1974) and Municipal Ordinance No. 281 of Babatngon, Leyte. The Sandiganbayan acquitted Chan in the first case due to insufficient evidence but convicted her in the second case.

The key provision at the heart of this case is Section 3(j) of RA 3019, which explicitly defines corrupt practices of public officers. This section states that it is unlawful for a public officer to knowingly approve or grant any license, permit, privilege, or benefit in favor of any person not qualified or not legally entitled to such advantages. This is especially true when dealing with a mere representative or dummy of someone unqualified or not entitled. This provision is crucial in ensuring that public officials act within the bounds of the law and do not abuse their authority for personal or other undue advantages.

In assessing Chan’s actions, the Supreme Court emphasized that the prosecution must prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The elements of Section 3(j) of RA 3019 are: (1) that the offender is a public officer; (2) that he/she knowingly approved or granted any license, permit, privilege, or benefit; and (3) that the license, permit, privilege, or benefit was granted in favor of any person not qualified or not legally entitled to such license, permit, privilege or advantage, or in favor of a mere representative or dummy of one who is not qualified or entitled. The Court found that all these elements were sufficiently proven in Criminal Case No. SB-16-CRM-0512.

The Court noted that it was undisputed that Chan was the incumbent Mayor of Babatngon, Leyte at the time of the alleged offense, satisfying the first element. As for the second element, the Mayor’s Permit itself, marked as Exhibit “H,” explicitly stated that the Liga ng mga Barangay was granted permission to hold cockfights every Saturday. This evidence demonstrated that Chan knowingly approved or granted the permit. The permit read:

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY of the Municipality of Babatngon, Leyte is hereby granted this Mayor’s Permit to hold COCKFIGHT at the Barangay District III, Babatngon, Leyte, every Saturday, as per SB Resolution Resolution No. 2749-12.

Done, this 13^th day of April 2012, Babatngon, Leyte, Philippines

The final element was proven by establishing that the Liga ng mga Barangay, whose members were barangay officials, was not qualified to receive such a permit. The Court cited Section 89(a)(2) of RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, which explicitly prohibits local government officials from holding interests in cockpits or other games licensed by the local government unit. Section 89 states:

SECTION 89. Prohibited Business and Pecuniary Interest. — (a) It shall be unlawful for any local government official or employee, directly or indirectly, to:
x x x x
(2) Hold such interests in any cockpit or other games licensed by a local government unit;

Building on this principle, the Court rejected Chan’s argument that she had no intent to commit the offense, emphasizing that criminal intent is not necessary in mala prohibita offenses, such as the violation of Section 3(j) of RA 3019. This is based on the principle articulated in Luciano v. Estrella:

In other words, the act treated thereunder [Section 3(g), RA 3019] partakes of the nature of a malum prohibitum; it is the commission of that act as defined by the law, not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been violated. And this construction would be in consonance with the announced purpose for which Republic Act 3019 was enacted, which is the repression of certain acts of Republic officers and private persons constituting graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto. Note that the law does not merely contemplate repression of acts that are unlawful or corrupt per se, but even of those that may lead to or result in graft and corruption.

The Supreme Court upheld the Sandiganbayan’s finding, stating that Chan was guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. SB-16-CRM-0512 for knowingly granting a permit to hold cockfights in favor of the Liga ng mga Barangay, whose members were prohibited from having an interest in any cockpit operation under RA 7160. The penalty imposed by the Sandiganbayan was also affirmed. The Court found it to be within the statutory limits set forth in Section 9 of RA 3019, which includes imprisonment and perpetual disqualification from holding public office. This decision reinforced the importance of adhering to anti-graft laws and upholding the integrity of public office.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether Mayor Charita M. Chan violated Section 3(j) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act by knowingly granting a permit to an entity not legally entitled to it. The case specifically focused on a permit issued to the Liga ng mga Barangay to hold cockfights every Saturday.
What is Section 3(j) of RA 3019?	Section 3(j) of RA 3019 prohibits public officers from knowingly approving or granting any license, permit, privilege, or benefit to unqualified individuals or entities. This provision aims to prevent corruption and abuse of authority in the issuance of government permits and licenses.
Why was the Liga ng mga Barangay not qualified for the permit?	The Liga ng mga Barangay, whose members were barangay officials, was not qualified because Section 89(a)(2) of the Local Government Code (RA 7160) prohibits local government officials from having interests in cockpits or other games licensed by the local government unit.
Did the court consider Mayor Chan’s intent in issuing the permit?	No, the court did not consider Mayor Chan’s intent as a defense. Violations of Section 3(j) of RA 3019 are considered mala prohibita, meaning the act itself is prohibited by law, regardless of the offender’s intent.
*What does mala prohibita* mean?**	Mala prohibita refers to acts that are prohibited by law, regardless of whether they are inherently immoral or harmful. The focus is on whether the act was committed, not on the intent or moral culpability of the offender.
What was the Sandiganbayan’s ruling?	The Sandiganbayan found Mayor Chan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(j) of RA 3019 in Criminal Case No. SB-16-CRM-0512. She was sentenced to imprisonment and perpetual disqualification from holding public office.
What was the Supreme Court’s decision?	The Supreme Court affirmed the Sandiganbayan’s decision, upholding Mayor Chan’s conviction. The Court agreed that all elements of the offense were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
What is the significance of this ruling?	This ruling reinforces the accountability of public officials in the Philippines, particularly in the issuance of permits and licenses. It emphasizes that public officials must adhere to legal restrictions and cannot use their positions to circumvent the law, even if they claim a lack of criminal intent.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Chan v. People serves as a crucial reminder for public officials to exercise their duties with utmost diligence and integrity. The ruling reinforces the principle that ignorance of the law is no excuse, especially when it comes to upholding anti-graft measures designed to protect public interest. This case will likely influence future decisions regarding the responsibilities of public officials in issuing permits and licenses, underscoring the need for strict adherence to legal guidelines and ethical standards in governance.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Charita M. Chan, G.R. No. 238304, July 27, 2022

July 27, 2022

Mayor’s Permit vs. Local Ordinance: Upholding the Ombudsman’s Power in Anti-Graft Cases

The Supreme Court affirmed the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against a mayor for violating Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. This case underscores that local officials cannot disregard existing ordinances, even if permits are traditionally granted, and reinforces the Ombudsman’s authority to investigate potential abuses of power. The decision clarifies the scope of due process rights during preliminary investigations, emphasizing that the right to examine evidence is primarily focused on the complainant’s submissions, not those of co-respondents.

When a Firecracker Permit Ignites Legal Scrutiny: Did a Mayor Abuse His Authority?

This case revolves around Edwin Granada Reyes, then mayor of Bansalan, Davao del Sur, who approved a permit allowing the sale of firecrackers at the Bansalan Public Market from December 21, 2009, to January 1, 2010. This action occurred despite the existence of Municipal Ordinance No. 357, which prohibited the “storing, displaying, selling, and blowing up (‘pagpabuto’) of those pyrotechnics products allowed by law, commonly called ‘firecrackers’ or ‘pabuto’ within the premises of buildings 1 and 2 of the Bansalan Public Market.” Subsequently, a fire damaged the public market on December 27, 2009. Paul Jocson Arches filed a complaint against Reyes, alleging that the mayor’s permit violated the ordinance and caused the fire.

The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict Reyes, along with Rita Potestas Domingo, Solomon Anore de Castilla, and Gil C. Andres, for violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. This section penalizes public officials who, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence, cause undue injury to any party, including the government, or give any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference. The Ombudsman argued that Reyes and his co-respondents, in their respective positions, gave unwarranted benefits to firecracker vendors by issuing a permit that contravened the existing municipal ordinance.

Reyes filed a Petition for Certiorari, arguing that the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion by finding probable cause without sufficient basis. He claimed there was no bad faith, manifest partiality, or gross inexcusable negligence, and that the permit was based on a long-standing practice. Reyes also alleged a violation of his right to due process, arguing that he was not furnished with an affidavit from co-respondent Andres, which the Ombudsman relied upon. The central legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in determining the existence of probable cause against Reyes.

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, reinforcing the principle that it generally does not interfere with the Ombudsman’s findings of probable cause. The Court cited Dichaves v. Office of the Ombudsman, emphasizing the wide latitude granted to the Ombudsman by the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770 to act on criminal complaints against public officials. The Court reiterated that the determination of probable cause is an executive function based on facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonable mind to believe that the accused is guilty. The Ombudsman, with its power to investigate, is in a better position to assess the evidence.

As a general rule, this Court does not interfere with the Office of the Ombudsman’s exercise of its constitutional mandate. Both the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989) give the Ombudsman wide latitude to act on criminal complaints against public officials and government employees.

The Court clarified that disagreement with the Ombudsman’s findings does not constitute grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion requires a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to a lack of jurisdiction or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Reyes failed to demonstrate that the Ombudsman’s preliminary investigation met this threshold. Probable cause, as defined by the Court, is the existence of facts and circumstances that would lead a person of ordinary caution to suspect that the person charged is guilty, implying probability of guilt but requiring less than evidence that would justify a conviction.

The Court found that the Ombudsman properly performed its duty in determining probable cause for a violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. The Ombudsman demonstrated that Reyes was a public officer, that the issuance of the permit gave unwarranted benefit to firecracker vendors, and that the action was tainted with bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. The Court referenced the Ombudsman’s explanation that “unwarranted” means lacking adequate or official support, and that the permit violated both a municipal ordinance and the Fire Code of the Philippines. Furthermore, the Ombudsman’s resolution explained the finding of bad faith, referencing the respondents’ awareness of Municipal Ordinance No. 357 and the lack of a Fire Safety Inspection Certificate (FSIC) for the vendors.

Addressing Reyes’ claim that his right to due process was violated, the Supreme Court emphasized that preliminary investigation is not part of the trial and is only conducted to establish probable cause. Citing Webb v. De Leon, the Court stated that the decision to call witnesses for clarificatory questions lies solely with the investigator, and a clarificatory hearing is unnecessary if the evidence on hand already establishes probable cause. The rights of a person during preliminary investigation are limited to those provided by procedural law.

Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence.

The Court highlighted that Rule 112, Section 3 of the Rules of Court grants a respondent the right to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant but does not extend this right to evidence submitted by co-respondents. This principle was further clarified in Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman, which explicitly stated that there is no law or rule requiring the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies of the counter-affidavits of co-respondents. The Court emphasized that the respondent was able to file a counter-affidavit to explain his side, thus fulfilling the essence of due process, which is simply an opportunity to be heard.

This case reinforces the importance of public officials adhering to existing laws and ordinances. The ruling underscores the significant authority of the Ombudsman in investigating and prosecuting potential violations of anti-graft laws. Furthermore, the decision clarifies the scope of due process rights during preliminary investigations, ensuring that the process remains efficient while still protecting fundamental rights. For local government officials, this case serves as a reminder to prioritize compliance with legal frameworks and to exercise their authority with due diligence and good faith.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause to indict Mayor Reyes for violating Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. This stemmed from his issuance of a firecracker sales permit despite a local ordinance prohibiting such sales.
What is Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act?	Section 3(e) penalizes public officials who, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence, cause undue injury to any party or give unwarranted benefits to a private party. It is aimed at preventing corruption and abuse of power in government.
What does “probable cause” mean in this context?	Probable cause refers to the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably cautious person to believe that the accused is guilty of the crime. It requires more than a mere suspicion but less than the evidence needed for a conviction.
Did Mayor Reyes have the right to see the affidavit of his co-respondent?	No, the Supreme Court clarified that during a preliminary investigation, a respondent has the right to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant, but not necessarily the evidence submitted by co-respondents. This is because preliminary investigations are not part of the trial itself.
What is the role of the Ombudsman in this case?	The Ombudsman is an independent constitutional body responsible for investigating and prosecuting public officials for corruption and other offenses. In this case, the Ombudsman determined that there was probable cause to indict Mayor Reyes.
What was the main argument of Mayor Reyes in his defense?	Mayor Reyes argued that he did not act with bad faith, manifest partiality, or gross inexcusable negligence and that the permit was based on a long-standing practice. He also claimed his right to due process was violated because he did not receive a copy of his co-respondent’s affidavit.
How did the Supreme Court rule on the issue of due process?	The Supreme Court held that Mayor Reyes was not denied due process because he had the opportunity to file a counter-affidavit and present his side of the story. The Court emphasized that preliminary investigations have less stringent due process requirements than trials.
What is the practical implication of this ruling for local government officials?	The ruling serves as a reminder to local government officials to strictly adhere to existing laws and ordinances, even when granting permits or licenses based on past practices. It reinforces the importance of exercising due diligence and acting in good faith to avoid potential anti-graft violations.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in this case affirms the Ombudsman’s authority to investigate potential abuses of power by public officials and clarifies the procedural rights of respondents during preliminary investigations. Local government officials must be mindful of their obligations to uphold existing laws and ordinances and avoid actions that could be construed as granting unwarranted benefits to private parties.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

June 5, 2017

Revocation of Permits: When Courts Lack Jurisdiction in Ejectment Cases

The Supreme Court held that a municipal trial court lacks jurisdiction over an ejectment case if the complaint does not establish prior physical possession by the plaintiff or unlawful deprivation of possession by the defendant through force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. This means that individuals seeking to evict others from property must demonstrate a clear legal basis for their claim and adhere to specific procedural requirements to invoke the court’s jurisdiction.

Stallholders’ Showdown: Mayor’s Permit Revocation and Court Authority

The case revolves around a dispute over market stalls in the New Pampang Public Market in Angeles City. Petitioners, armed with Mayor’s Permits, sought to evict private respondent, Evangeline Lim, from the stalls. However, the Mayor’s Permits were revoked shortly after, leading to a legal battle over who had the right to possess the stalls. The central legal question is whether the Municipal Trial Court had the authority to hear the case, given the revocation of the permits and the specific requirements for ejectment cases.

The petitioners filed complaints for ejectment against Lim in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), claiming they were the rightful stallholders due to the Mayor’s Permits issued to them. The MTC ruled in favor of the petitioners. Lim appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which reversed the MTC’s decision, stating that the rule on forcible entry and unlawful detainer did not apply and that the cases were moot due to the revocation of the Mayor’s Permits. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC’s decision. Dissatisfied, the petitioners elevated the matter to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court scrutinized the nature of the action and the jurisdiction of the MTC. The Court emphasized that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint. To establish jurisdiction in an action for **forcible entry**, the plaintiff must allege prior physical possession and deprivation of that possession through force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In this case, the petitioners failed to allege prior physical possession or that Lim deprived them of possession through any of these means.

Similarly, for an action of **unlawful detainer**, the plaintiff must show that the defendant unlawfully withholds possession after the expiration or termination of their right to possess the property under a contract, express or implied. Here, there was no contract between the petitioners and Lim for the possession of the market stalls. Therefore, there could be no unlawful withholding of possession. Further, the permits had been revoked before two of the cases were even filed.

The Court also took note of the fact that the stalls are properties of the local government, with Lim holding a Mayor’s Permit in 1993 that was never formally revoked. Even though this permit wasn’t renewed, the absence of action on behalf of the government affected the court’s viewpoint. This emphasizes the significance of proper legal procedure and documentation when determining possession rights in such disputes.

Because the complaints filed by the petitioners did not meet the necessary jurisdictional requirements for either forcible entry or unlawful detainer, the Supreme Court concluded that the MTC lacked jurisdiction over the cases. The RTC should have reversed the MTC’s decision solely on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, and the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s decision in full, especially regarding the pronouncement that Lim had a better right of possession.

The Supreme Court therefore modified the CA decision. The modification affirmed the reversal of the MTC decisions due to a lack of jurisdiction. The ruling clarified that a court cannot decide the merits of a case if it never had the power to hear it in the first place. Litigants are cautioned to ensure their complaints contain all essential jurisdictional facts before initiating legal proceedings, or risk having their cases dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether the Municipal Trial Court had jurisdiction over the ejectment cases filed by the petitioners against the private respondent, considering the revocation of the Mayor’s Permits and the requirements for forcible entry or unlawful detainer actions.
What is required for a forcible entry case?	For a forcible entry case, the plaintiff must allege prior physical possession of the property and that the defendant deprived them of possession through force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. The action must be filed within one year from the illegal entry.
What is required for an unlawful detainer case?	For an unlawful detainer case, the plaintiff must show that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession after the expiration or termination of their right to possess the property under a contract, express or implied, with the plaintiff. The action must be filed within one year from the date of the last demand to vacate.
Why did the Municipal Trial Court lack jurisdiction?	The Municipal Trial Court lacked jurisdiction because the petitioners’ complaints did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirements for either forcible entry or unlawful detainer. They failed to allege prior physical possession or a contract with the private respondent.
What happened to the Mayor’s Permits of the petitioners?	The Mayor’s Permits issued to the petitioners were revoked by the City Mayor on March 22, 1994, due to their names not appearing in the Master List of Stallholders and their failure to secure the required clearance from the Market Administrator.
Did the private respondent have any existing permits?	The private respondent held a Mayor’s Permit in 1993, which was not renewed but also not formally revoked by the City Mayor, adding another layer of complexity to the claims of lawful possession.
What was the Supreme Court’s ruling?	The Supreme Court ruled that the Municipal Trial Court lacked jurisdiction over the cases and modified the Court of Appeals’ decision, affirming the reversal of the Municipal Trial Court’s decisions based on the lack of jurisdiction.
What is the significance of this ruling?	This ruling highlights the importance of adhering to specific procedural requirements and establishing a clear legal basis for claiming possession rights in ejectment cases. It underscores that a court’s jurisdiction is strictly determined by the allegations in the complaint.

This case underscores the critical importance of establishing proper jurisdiction in legal disputes. When initiating legal proceedings, especially those concerning property rights, one must diligently satisfy all jurisdictional requirements, or risk having the case dismissed. It also points out how revocations can affect rulings, and the courts’ interpretations based on timing of revocations, as well as any existing permits (revoked or non-renewed).

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

May 20, 2004

Cockpit Operation and the Imperative of a Municipal Ordinance: Canet v. Decena

In Canet v. Decena, the Supreme Court ruled that a mayor cannot be compelled to issue a permit for the operation of a cockpit without a specific municipal ordinance authorizing such operation. The absence of a clear legal basis at the local level prevents the executive branch from overstepping its bounds and ensures adherence to the law, highlighting the division of powers between the legislative and executive branches in local governance. This decision underscores the necessity of explicit legal authorization for activities, particularly those involving gambling, to safeguard against potential abuses and to align with broader societal objectives.

No Permit, No Cockpit: When Local Law Dictates the Playing Field

The case originated from Rolando N. Canet’s application for a mayor’s permit to operate a cockpit in Bula, Camarines Sur. Canet relied on a Sangguniang Bayan resolution authorizing him to operate the cockpit. However, Mayor Julieta A. Decena denied the application because no municipal ordinance specifically authorized the issuance of such permits. This denial led to a legal battle, eventually reaching the Supreme Court, focusing on whether the mayor could be compelled to issue the permit in the absence of a specific enabling ordinance. The core legal question was whether a local government executive could be mandated to issue a permit for an activity, in this case, operating a cockpit, when there was no explicit municipal law in place to govern it.

Section 447(a)(3)(v) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. 7160) is central to this issue, vesting in the Sangguniang Bayan the power to authorize and license the establishment, operation, and maintenance of cockpits. It also regulates cockfighting and the commercial breeding of gamecocks. The petitioner argued that Resolution No. 049, Series of 1998, and Municipal Tax Ordinances Nos. 01, S. 1989, and 05, S. 1993, provided sufficient basis for the permit’s issuance. The respondent countered that without a specific ordinance detailing the rules and regulations for cockfighting, she could not issue the permit.

The Supreme Court sided with Mayor Decena. The Court emphasized that the Local Government Code explicitly grants the power to authorize and regulate cockpits to the Sangguniang Bayan, the legislative body of the municipality. Since there was no ordinance specifically allowing the operation of a cockpit, Resolution No. 049 could not be implemented. To compel the mayor to issue a permit without such an ordinance would violate Section 447 of the Local Government Code and encroach on her administrative functions.

SEC. 447. Powers, Functions and Compensation. (a) The Sangguniang Bayan as the legislative body of the municipality shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the municipality as provided for under Section 22, and shall:

(3) Subject to the provisions of Book II of this Code, grant franchises, enact ordinances levying taxes, fees and charges upon such conditions and for such purposes intended to promote the general welfare of the inhabitants of the municipality, and pursuant to this legislative authority shall:

(v) Any law to the contrary notwithstanding, authorize and license the establishment, operation and maintenance of cockpits and regulate cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks: Provided, That existing rights should not be prejudiced.

The Court further clarified that general provisions in existing tax ordinances do not suffice as specific authorization for the operation of cockpits. Specifically, the Court invoked the legal principle of expression unius est exclusio alterius, meaning that the express mention of one thing excludes all others. Since the tax ordinances did not explicitly mention cockpits, they could not be interpreted to include them. Allowing for such interpretation would go against established rules of statutory construction and could expand the scope of the law beyond its intended limits. The void could not be filled in by a judicial fiat.

Moreover, the Court noted that cockfighting is a form of gambling, which requires strict regulation due to its potentially adverse effects on public welfare. Statutes authorizing gambling activities must be strictly construed to limit rather than expand the rights claimed by franchise holders. The decision reinforces the importance of adhering to legal frameworks when authorizing and regulating activities with social and economic implications, further illustrating the necessity of a comprehensive and explicit regulatory framework. This stance aligns with the broader goal of responsible governance and upholding the rule of law.

The absence of a clear legal framework not only jeopardizes the integrity of local governance but also has direct implications for individuals seeking to engage in regulated activities. The Supreme Court underscored that judicial interpretation cannot substitute legislative action, thereby ensuring the balance of power and the protection of public interests.

FAQs

What was the central issue in this case?	The core issue was whether a mayor could be compelled to issue a permit to operate a cockpit in the absence of a specific municipal ordinance authorizing such operation.
What did the Supreme Court rule?	The Supreme Court ruled that the mayor could not be compelled to issue the permit without a specific municipal ordinance. This upheld the principle that executive actions must be grounded in explicit legal authorization.
What is Section 447(a)(3)(v) of the Local Government Code?	This section grants the Sangguniang Bayan (municipal council) the power to authorize and license cockpits. It regulates cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks within their jurisdiction.
What was the petitioner’s main argument?	The petitioner argued that a resolution from the Sangguniang Bayan and general municipal tax ordinances provided sufficient grounds for the permit.
*What does expression unius est exclusio alterius* mean?**	This legal principle means the express mention of one thing excludes all others. The Court used this to argue that tax ordinances not explicitly mentioning cockpits could not be interpreted to include them.
Why is a specific ordinance important for regulating cockpits?	A specific ordinance ensures clear rules and regulations for the operation of cockpits, promoting accountability and safeguarding against potential abuses. It’s especially important because cockfighting is considered a form of gambling.
Can courts create laws to fill in legislative gaps?	No, courts cannot create laws or supply details to fill legislative gaps. They cannot insert into the law what they think should be there or what the legislature might have intended.
What is the implication of this ruling for local governance?	The ruling reinforces the importance of adhering to legal frameworks and respecting the division of powers between the legislative and executive branches in local governance.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Canet v. Decena affirms the primacy of legislative authorization in local governance and the importance of strict interpretation when dealing with potentially harmful activities such as gambling. This case serves as a reminder that clear and specific legal frameworks are essential for responsible and accountable local governance.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

January 20, 2004