Tag: Republic Act No. 4726

Condominium Foreclosure: The Necessity of Special Authority for Extrajudicial Sales

The Supreme Court affirmed that a condominium corporation must possess a specific grant of authority from the unit owner before it can initiate extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings for unpaid dues. This authority, typically a special power of attorney, empowers the corporation to act as the owner’s agent in selling the property. Without this explicit authorization detailed in the condominium’s governing documents, the corporation cannot legally pursue extrajudicial foreclosure. This ruling protects condominium owners from potentially unwarranted property seizures, ensuring their rights are safeguarded by requiring clear and demonstrable consent for such actions.

Unpaid Dues and Foreclosure: Can a Condo Corp Sell Your Unit Without Explicit Consent?

In LPL Greenhills Condominium Corporation v. Catharina Brouwer, the central issue revolved around the validity of extrajudicial foreclosure sales of condominium units due to unpaid association dues. Catharina Brouwer owned two units in LPL Greenhills Condominium and failed to pay her dues, leading LPL to initiate foreclosure proceedings. Brouwer contested the sales, arguing that LPL lacked the necessary authority to foreclose extrajudicially. The case reached the Supreme Court, which had to determine whether a condominium corporation needs explicit authorization from the unit owner to conduct an extrajudicial foreclosure for unpaid dues.

The petitioners, LPL Greenhills Condominium Corporation, relied heavily on Section 20 of the Condominium Act (Republic Act No. 4726), arguing that it provides sufficient basis for initiating foreclosure proceedings without needing a separate special authority from the unit owner. They also cited the case of Chateau de Baie Condominium Corp. v. Spouses Moreno, suggesting it established a precedent where condominium corporations do not require special authority to initiate foreclosure for unpaid dues. Petitioners also contended that, even if a special authority was necessary, LPL’s Master Deed of Restrictions and By-Laws contained sufficient provisions to satisfy this requirement, drawing a comparison to the By-Laws in Welbilt Construction Corp. v. Heirs of Cresenciano C. De Castro.

However, the Supreme Court found these arguments unconvincing. The Court clarified that Chateau de Baie did not eliminate the requirement for special authority. It emphasized that Chateau de Baie involved an intra-corporate dispute and did not overrule the established doctrine in First Marbella Condominium Association, Inc. v. Gatmaytan, which mandates that a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure must be supported by evidence that the petitioner holds a special power or authority to foreclose.

Building on this principle, the Court emphasized that Section 20 of the Condominium Act outlines the procedure for treating unpaid assessments as a superior lien but does not, on its own, grant the condominium corporation the authority to foreclose. To underscore this point, the Supreme Court quoted First Marbella:

Clearly, Section 20 merely prescribes the procedure by which petitioner’s claim may be treated as a superior lien — i.e., through the annotation thereof on the title of the condominium unit. While the law also grants petitioner the option to enforce said lien through either the judicial or extrajudicial foreclosure sale of the condominium unit, Section 20 does not by itself, ipso facto, authorize judicial as extra-judicial foreclosure of the condominium unit. Petitioner may avail itself of either option only in the manner provided for by the governing law and rules. As already pointed out, A.M. No. 99-10-05-0, as implemented under Circular No. 7-2002, requires that petitioner furnish evidence of its special authority to cause the extrajudicial foreclosure of the condominium unit.

The necessity of a special authority stems from the fundamental legal principle of “nemo dat quod non habet,” meaning one cannot give what one does not have. Only the registered owner, in this case, Brouwer, possesses the jus disponendi, the right to dispose of the property. For LPL to act on Brouwer’s behalf, it needed a clear, special power of attorney.

Article 1878 of the Civil Code reinforces this requirement, specifying that special powers of attorney are necessary to enter into contracts that transmit or acquire ownership of immovable property, create or convey real rights over immovable property, or perform any other act of strict dominion. A special power of attorney to sell is indispensable in extrajudicial foreclosure, as the mortgagee acts as the agent of the mortgagor-owner. In the absence of such authority, the sale is void.

The Court further explained that this special power need not be in a specific form but must unequivocally demonstrate the owner’s intent to authorize the corporation to sell the property in case of default. The Supreme Court cited the case of The Commoner Lending Corp. v. Spouses Villanueva:

x x x [I]n extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage, a special power to sell the property is required which must be either inserted in or attached to the deed of mortgage. Apropos is Section 1 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118 x x x.

x x x x

The special power or authority to sell finds support in civil law. Foremost, in extrajudicial foreclosure, the sale is made through the sheriff by the mortgagees acting as the agents of mortgagors-owners. Hence, there must be a written authority from the mortgagor-owners in favor of the mortgagees. Otherwise, the sale would be void. Moreover, a special power of attorney is necessary before entering “into any contract by which the ownership of an immovable is transmitted or acquired either gratuitously or for a valuable consideration.” Thus, the written authority must be a special power of attorney to sell.

Consequently, since LPL lacked the requisite special authority, the Court affirmed that it could only enforce its lien through an ordinary collection suit or judicial foreclosure proceedings under Rule 68 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioners were also deemed to have been barred by laches from raising the issue of whether the Master Deed of Restrictions and By-Laws contained the necessary special authority because they failed to timely challenge the RTC’s factual findings on this matter. The Court emphasized that issues not brought to the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, as doing so would violate due process.

Moreover, the Court noted that the interpretation of the Master Deed and By-Laws involved questions of fact, which are generally outside the scope of a Rule 45 petition. Even if the Court were to consider these documents, the provisions cited by LPL did not resemble a special authority to sell the properties. The Supreme Court differentiated this case from Welbilt, where the condominium corporation did possess such authority within its governing documents.

Finally, the Court dismissed the argument that the death of Brouwer’s attorney-in-fact, Manfred De Koning, terminated the legal representation of Gutierrez, Cortez & Partners. The Court clarified that De Koning was merely a representative, and the attorney-client relationship existed between Brouwer and her counsel. Therefore, De Koning’s death did not automatically terminate the legal representation.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether a condominium corporation needs a special authority or power from the unit owner to initiate extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings for unpaid condominium dues.
What is a special power of attorney in the context of foreclosure?	A special power of attorney is a legal document authorizing another person or entity (in this case, the condominium corporation) to act on behalf of the property owner, specifically to sell the property in case of default.
*What is “jus disponendi” and why is it important?*	Jus disponendi is the right to dispose of property. It’s important because only the owner of the property has this right, unless they specifically grant that right to someone else via special power of attorney.
Does Section 20 of the Condominium Act grant condominium corporations the power to foreclose?	No, Section 20 outlines the procedure for treating unpaid dues as a lien but does not, by itself, grant the power to foreclose. It simply provides the option to enforce the lien through judicial or extrajudicial means.
What is the legal basis for requiring a special power of attorney for extrajudicial foreclosure?	The legal basis comes from Article 1878 of the Civil Code and the principle of “nemo dat quod non habet,” which means one cannot give what one does not have.
What happens if a condominium corporation forecloses without a special power of attorney?	The foreclosure sale is considered void, and the unit owner retains ownership of the property. The corporation can pursue other legal avenues, such as a collection suit or judicial foreclosure.
What is “laches” and how did it affect this case?	Laches is the failure to assert one’s rights in a timely manner. In this case, the petitioners were barred by laches from raising the factual issue of whether the Master Deed contained a special authority because they failed to raise the issue at the trial court level.
How does this ruling protect condominium owners?	This ruling protects condominium owners by ensuring that they retain control over their property and that a condominium corporation cannot initiate extrajudicial foreclosure without their explicit consent, as demonstrated through a specific grant of authority.
What options does a condominium corporation have if it cannot pursue extrajudicial foreclosure?	The condominium corporation can pursue other legal options, such as filing an ordinary collection suit or initiating judicial foreclosure proceedings under Rule 68 of the Rules of Court.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision underscores the importance of explicit authorization when a condominium corporation seeks to enforce its lien for unpaid dues through extrajudicial foreclosure. This ruling serves as a critical safeguard for condominium owners, ensuring their property rights are protected and that they are not subjected to foreclosure without clear and demonstrable consent.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: LPL Greenhills Condominium Corporation v. Catharina Brouwer, G.R. No. 248743, September 07, 2022

September 7, 2022

Condominium Corporations and Local Business Taxes: Defining ‘Business’ for Tax Purposes

The Supreme Court has definitively ruled that condominium corporations are generally exempt from local business taxes under the Local Government Code. This is because their activities, primarily managing common areas and collecting dues for maintenance, do not constitute “business” as defined by law, which requires a commercial activity engaged in for livelihood or profit. This decision clarifies the scope of local government taxing powers and protects condominium corporations from unwarranted tax burdens.

Are Condo Dues “Business”? Makati’s Tax Claim vs. BA-Lepanto

The City of Makati sought to impose business taxes on BA-Lepanto Condominium Corporation, arguing that the dues collected from unit owners constituted a business activity because they maintain the property value. The City Treasurer asserted that these dues led to “full appreciative living values” and better resale prices, thus qualifying as a profit venture. The condominium corporation contested this assessment, stating that it was a non-profit entity solely managing the common areas as mandated by the Condominium Act. This dispute highlighted a fundamental question: Can a condominium corporation, operating as a non-profit entity for the benefit of its unit owners, be considered a business subject to local business taxes?

The core of the legal battle revolved around the definition of “business” within the context of the Local Government Code, which allows local government units to impose taxes on various businesses. The Code defines “business” as a “trade or commercial activity regularly engaged in as a means of livelihood or with a view to profit.” The Supreme Court, examining the statutory nature of condominium corporations under the Condominium Act, found that their corporate purposes are limited to managing common areas, holding titles, and other activities incidental to these functions, none of which directly involve maintaining a livelihood or seeking profit. This effectively shields them from business tax liabilities unless they undertake activities beyond their permitted scope for profit.

Moreover, the Court addressed the procedural issue concerning the mode of appeal from decisions of Regional Trial Courts (RTC) on tax protests. While the Court acknowledged that the RTC exercises original jurisdiction in such cases, meaning the initial judicial review, it noted the conflicting views on whether such reviews should be treated as ordinary appeals or petitions for review. In this particular case, the Court opted to overlook the procedural error committed by the Corporation in filing a Petition for Review under Rule 42 instead of an ordinary appeal under Rule 41, as it served the interest of justice and did not prejudice the City Treasurer. This emphasizes the Court’s willingness to prioritize substantive justice over strict procedural adherence, particularly in cases involving significant public interest.

However, the court also provided guidance for future cases, noting that Republic Act No. 9282 now confers exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) over decisions of the Regional Trial Courts (RTC) in local tax cases. This clarification streamlined the process for resolving local tax disputes by centralizing expertise in the CTA, although it does not affect cases, such as this one, that arose before the law’s enactment.

Furthermore, the Court scrutinized the City Treasurer’s failure to specify the precise statutory basis under the Makati Revenue Code for levying the business tax. The absence of a clear citation raised concerns about due process, as it left the taxpayer uncertain about the legal foundation of the tax assessment. This lack of transparency prompted the Court to emphasize the importance of local treasurers providing sufficient particularity regarding the tax’s basis to ensure taxpayers understand their obligations. It protects the taxpayer’s right to know and ability to defend their position, highlighting the requirements that should be included in a notice of assessment which must state the nature of the tax, fee or charge, the amount of deficiency, surcharges, interests and penalties

In its analysis, the Supreme Court also dismissed the argument that a condominium corporation’s power to “acquire, own, hold, enjoy, lease, operate and maintain, and to convey, sell transfer mortgage or otherwise dispose of real or personal property” indicates a business purpose. The Court clarified that this power is a standard feature of all corporations and does not, by itself, indicate that a condominium corporation is engaging in business for profit. Thus, the court highlighted that such activities must remain within the bounds of the statutory definition provided by the Condominium Act to avoid misapplication of the local taxing power.

The Supreme Court’s decision affirms that condominium corporations are generally exempt from local business taxes, thereby providing clarity and protection for these entities operating within the parameters of the Condominium Act. The ruling clarifies the requirements of due process by the City Treasurer, including stating with sufficient particularity the basis of the tax.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether a condominium corporation, primarily managing common areas and collecting dues, should be classified as a “business” subject to local business taxes under the Local Government Code.
What did the court decide?	The Supreme Court decided that condominium corporations are generally exempt from local business taxes, as their activities do not typically constitute “business” within the meaning of the Local Government Code.
What is the definition of “business” according to the Local Government Code?	According to Section 131(d) of the Code, “business” is defined as “trade or commercial activity regularly engaged in as a means of livelihood or with a view to profit.”
What law governs condominium corporations?	Republic Act No. 4726, otherwise known as the Condominium Act, governs the creation, management, and operation of condominium corporations in the Philippines.
Are there exceptions to the rule that condo corporations are exempt from business tax?	Yes, if a condominium corporation engages in activities beyond its statutory purposes, such as operating businesses for profit, it may be subject to business taxes, even if those activities are considered ultra vires.
What should a City Treasurer include in the notice of assessment?	A notice of assessment, as required by Section 195 of the Local Government Code, should state the nature of the tax, fee, or charge, the amount of deficiency, surcharges, interests, and penalties to ensure transparency and taxpayer awareness.
Does Republic Act No. 9282 affect this ruling?	Republic Act No. 9282, which expanded the jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals, does not apply to this particular case because it arose before the law’s effectivity, though the CTA will have jurisdiction over similar cases arising after R.A. No. 9282.
What must be shown for any activity to be classified as “business”?	To be classified as a business, it must be shown that the activity is regularly engaged in as a means of livelihood or with a view to profit, aligning with the Local Government Code’s definition and excluding activities conducted merely for the maintenance of value or incidental gains.

This landmark ruling ensures that condominium corporations are protected from unwarranted tax assessments, recognizing the scope and limits of local government taxing powers. It confirms the statutory purposes of such entities, emphasizing that management activities are not necessarily commercial endeavors.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Yamane v. BA Lepanto Condominium Corp., G.R. No. 154993, October 25, 2005

October 25, 2005