ASG Law

Tag: Sovereign Immunity

  • Sovereign Immunity vs. Corporate Liability: When Can a Foreign Government Agency Be Sued?

    The Supreme Court ruled that the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), though owned by the German government, could be sued in the Philippines because it was established as a private company. This decision underscores that simply being an implementing agency of a foreign government does not automatically grant immunity from suit, particularly if the entity operates under private law, impacting how international organizations conduct operations and enter into contracts within the country.

    Global Aid, Local Accountability: Can International Development Agencies Claim Immunity?

    In the case of Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) vs. Court of Appeals, the central legal question revolved around whether GTZ, as an implementing agency of the German government, could invoke sovereign immunity to shield itself from a suit for illegal dismissal filed by its local employees in the Philippines. The controversy began when several Filipino employees of the Social Health Insurance–Networking and Empowerment (SHINE) project, implemented by GTZ in collaboration with the Philippine government, were terminated from their positions. These employees claimed illegal dismissal and sought legal recourse against GTZ, leading to a dispute over the jurisdiction of Philippine labor authorities to hear the case against an entity claiming to act on behalf of a foreign sovereign.

    The core issue was whether GTZ, by virtue of its role and connection to the German government, was entitled to the same immunity from suit typically granted to foreign states. The petitioners argued that their actions were undertaken in the discharge of governmental functions and sovereign acts of the Federal Republic of Germany, thus shielding them from local legal proceedings. The employees countered that GTZ was a private corporation engaged in implementing development projects, and had failed to secure a certification from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) affirming its immunity from suit.

    The Supreme Court considered the principle of state immunity from suit, enshrined in Section 9, Article XVI of the Philippine Constitution, which states that the State may not be sued without its consent. While this doctrine protects foreign states from being subjected to local court actions, it is not absolute and does not automatically extend to every entity associated with a foreign government. The Court distinguished between incorporated and unincorporated government agencies, noting that incorporated agencies with their own charters are suable if their charters say so, regardless of their functions.

    Crucially, the Court examined the legal nature of GTZ. While GTZ claimed to be an implementing agency of the German government, the Court found that GTZ’s own website described it as a “federally owned” entity “founded in 1975 as a company under private law.” This characterization suggested that GTZ, though owned by the German government, was organized under private law and possessed a legal personality distinct from that of the Federal Republic of Germany. The Court also pointed out that GTZ had not provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that, under German law, it was immune from suit, despite being owned by the German government. In the absence of contrary evidence, the Court applied the presumption that foreign laws are similar to those of the Philippines, where a government-owned corporation without an original charter is generally suable.

    Furthermore, the Court referenced its prior ruling in Holy See v. Del Rosario, which established a procedure for foreign entities to prove their entitlement to state immunity. This procedure involves securing an executive endorsement from the DFA, which conveys to the court that the defendant is entitled to immunity. GTZ failed to obtain such certification from the DFA, weakening its claim of immunity. The Court emphasized that while the Solicitor General had endorsed GTZ’s claim, this endorsement did not carry the same weight as a DFA certification.

    Because GTZ could not sufficiently establish that it enjoyed immunity from suit, the Supreme Court ruled that the Labor Arbiter and the Court of Appeals had acted correctly in refusing to dismiss the complaint against GTZ. As GTZ had failed to properly appeal the Labor Arbiter’s decision to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), the decision had become final and executory. Therefore, the Supreme Court denied the petition and upheld the lower courts’ decisions. The decision serves as a reminder that agencies must properly establish their entitlement to immunity, particularly when operating under private law.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), as an agency of the German government, could claim sovereign immunity in a labor dispute with its employees in the Philippines. The court examined whether GTZ’s status as a government implementing agency automatically shielded it from lawsuits.
    What is sovereign immunity? Sovereign immunity is a legal doctrine that prevents a sovereign state or its instrumentalities from being sued in the courts of another state without its consent. This principle is rooted in international law and is recognized in most national legal systems to protect the dignity and independence of states.
    Why did the Court deny GTZ’s claim of immunity? The Court denied GTZ’s claim because GTZ was established as a company under private law, and it did not provide sufficient evidence to show that it was immune from suit under German law. Additionally, GTZ failed to obtain a certification from the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) confirming its entitlement to immunity.
    What is the significance of the DFA certification? The DFA certification is crucial because it serves as an executive endorsement of a foreign entity’s claim of sovereign immunity, carrying significant weight in Philippine courts. It provides factual basis for the immunity claim.
    How does this ruling affect other foreign government agencies operating in the Philippines? This ruling clarifies that merely being an implementing agency of a foreign government does not automatically grant immunity from suit. Foreign government agencies must demonstrate that they are entitled to immunity under their own laws and must obtain the necessary endorsement from the Philippine government.
    What was the basis of the illegal dismissal claim? The employees alleged that they were illegally dismissed due to disagreements with the project manager, leading to loss of confidence and trust. However, because GTZ failed to properly appeal the initial labor arbiter’s decision, the specifics of the dismissal claim were no longer subject to review.
    What procedural error did GTZ commit in this case? GTZ directly filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals instead of first appealing the Labor Arbiter’s decision to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). This procedural lapse resulted in the Labor Arbiter’s decision becoming final and executory.
    Does this case distinguish between governmental and commercial activities of foreign entities? Yes, the case acknowledged the distinction, noting that if a foreign state engages in activities in the regular course of business, it may not be able to claim immunity. The Court looked into GTZ’s status to ascertain if it was performing governmental or proprietary functions.

    In conclusion, this case underscores the importance of understanding the legal structure and operational framework of foreign entities operating within the Philippines, especially concerning labor laws and potential liabilities. It highlights the need for these entities to clearly establish their immunity from suit and comply with Philippine legal procedures.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: DEUTSCHE GESELLSCHAFT FÜR TECHNISCHE ZUSAMMENARBEIT vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 152318, April 16, 2009

  • Protecting Government Assets: Understanding Exemptions from Execution in the Philippines

    Government Funds are Shielded: The Importance of Sovereign Immunity and Statutory Exemptions

    TLDR: This Supreme Court case clarifies that government funds and properties, especially those crucial for public service like GSIS funds, are generally exempt from execution or garnishment unless explicitly allowed by law. It underscores the principle of sovereign immunity and the need to protect public assets from undue legal processes to ensure uninterrupted government operations. Agencies must be vigilant in asserting these exemptions to safeguard public resources.

    GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, PETITIONER, VS. HON. VICENTE A. PACQUING, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 28 AND MARIO ANACLETO M. BAÑEZ, JR., CLERK OF COURT, RTC, SAN FERNANDO CITY, LA UNION, RESPONDENTS. G.R. No. 40849, February 02, 2007

    INTRODUCTION

    Imagine a scenario where a crucial government service grinds to a halt because its funds are suddenly seized due to a court judgment. Hospitals can’t buy medicine, schools can’t pay teachers, and disaster relief operations are crippled. This isn’t just hypothetical; it highlights the critical need to protect government assets from execution. The case of GSIS vs. Pacquing delves into this very issue, examining the extent to which government funds, specifically those of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), are shielded from legal processes like garnishment and execution.

    At the heart of this case is the question: Can a court order the seizure of GSIS funds to satisfy a judgment against the agency? The GSIS argued that its funds are exempt under Republic Act No. 8291, the GSIS Act of 1997. This case clarifies the scope of this exemption and reinforces the broader principle of sovereign immunity, ensuring that public funds are used for their intended purpose – serving the Filipino people.

    LEGAL CONTEXT: SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND STATUTORY EXEMPTIONS

    The principle of sovereign immunity is a cornerstone of Philippine law. It essentially means that the government, its agencies, and instrumentalities generally cannot be sued without their consent. This immunity extends to the government’s assets, protecting them from being easily seized to satisfy judgments. This protection is not absolute but is rooted in the idea that public funds are meant for public purposes and should not be diverted by private claims without proper legal basis.

    Complementary to sovereign immunity are statutory exemptions. These are laws specifically enacted by Congress to exempt certain government funds or properties from attachment, garnishment, or execution. These exemptions are crucial for the efficient operation of government and the delivery of public services. Section 39 of RA 8291, the GSIS Act of 1997, is a prime example of such a statutory exemption. It explicitly states:

    “Sec. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien.-
    x x x
    The funds and/or properties referred to herein as well as the benefits, sums or monies corresponding to the benefits under this Act shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, execution, levy or other processes issued by the courts, quasi-judicial agencies or administrative bodies including Commission on Audit (COA) disallowances and from all financial obligations of the members, including pecuniary accountability arising from or caused or occasioned by his exercise or performance of his official functions or duties, or incurred relative to or in connection with his position or work except when his monetary liability, contractual or otherwise, is in favor of the GSIS.”

    This provision clearly aims to safeguard GSIS funds, ensuring they are available for their primary purpose: providing social security and insurance benefits to government employees. The question in GSIS vs. Pacquing was whether this exemption was properly applied in the context of a court-ordered execution for costs of suit.

    CASE BREAKDOWN: A TALE OF FORECLOSURE, COSTS, AND CONTEMPT

    The legal saga began in 1971 when Bengson Commercial Building, Inc. (Bengson) took out a loan from GSIS, secured by mortgages. Bengson defaulted, leading GSIS to foreclose on the properties in 1977. Bengson then sued GSIS to annul the foreclosure, and after a long legal battle through the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA), Bengson ultimately won. The courts declared the foreclosure void.

    However, the story didn’t end there. The CA decision, which became final in 1988, ordered GSIS to return the foreclosed properties and pay costs of suit. When GSIS failed to return the properties, the RTC, under Judge Pacquing, ordered GSIS to pay the equivalent value. Then, in 1995, the RTC further ordered GSIS to pay a staggering P31 million as costs of suit. This order became final because GSIS’s lawyer, Atty. Terrado, was negligent and failed to inform GSIS or file any appeal.

    GSIS, realizing the gravity of the situation, filed motions for relief, arguing their counsel’s gross negligence. These motions were denied. An attempt to seek certiorari in the CA also failed due to procedural lapses and being filed late. Despite GSIS’s pending appeals and motions, Judge Pacquing issued an alias writ of execution in 1998 to enforce the P31 million cost of suit. Sheriff Bañez levied on GSIS’s shares in San Miguel Corporation (SMC) worth P6.2 million, which were then sold at auction to Bengson.

    GSIS fought back, moving to quash the writ, arguing that its funds were exempt under RA 8291. Judge Pacquing denied this, arguing that only funds “necessary to maintain petitioner’s actuarial solvency” were exempt. This led GSIS to file a special civil action for certiorari with the Supreme Court, questioning the garnishment and sale. Simultaneously, GSIS filed an administrative complaint against Judge Pacquing and Sheriff Bañez for ignorance of the law and bias.

    The Supreme Court, in its resolution, ultimately dismissed the administrative complaint against Judge Pacquing and Sheriff Bañez. While acknowledging the nullification of Judge Pacquing’s orders in related cases (G.R. Nos. 137448 and 141454, which addressed the underlying judgment), the Court focused on whether Judge Pacquing acted with gross ignorance or bad faith in issuing the writ of execution and denying the motion to quash. The Court reasoned:

    “For a judge to be administratively liable for ignorance of the law, the acts complained of must be gross or patent. To constitute gross ignorance of the law, such acts must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but also motivated by bad faith, fraud, malice or dishonesty. That certainly does not appear to be the case here as petitioner’s complaint was spawned merely by the honest divergence of opinion between petitioner and respondent judge as to the legal issues and applicable laws involved.”

    The Court found no evidence of malice or bad faith, concluding that Judge Pacquing’s actions, even if legally erroneous, did not warrant administrative sanctions. Regarding Sheriff Bañez, the Court held that he was merely performing his ministerial duty in executing the writ.

    PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS: PROTECTING PUBLIC FUNDS AND AGENCY RESPONSIBILITIES

    The GSIS vs. Pacquing case, while dismissing the administrative charges, implicitly reinforces the importance of statutory exemptions like Section 39 of RA 8291. It serves as a reminder to government agencies to be vigilant in asserting their legal exemptions from execution to safeguard public funds. While the administrative aspect of the case focused on the judge’s potential misconduct, the underlying principle of protecting government assets remains paramount.

    This case highlights several key practical implications:

    • Government agencies must be proactive in invoking statutory exemptions: Agencies should have robust internal legal teams that are well-versed in laws like RA 8291 and can promptly assert these exemptions when faced with writs of execution or garnishment.
    • Sovereign immunity is not absolute but provides significant protection: While the government can be sued with its consent, its assets are generally protected from arbitrary seizure. Agencies should understand the nuances of sovereign immunity and how it interacts with statutory exemptions.
    • Negligence of counsel can have severe consequences: The initial failure of GSIS’s counsel to act on the P31 million cost of suit order underscores the critical importance of competent legal representation. Agencies must choose their legal counsel wisely and ensure diligent monitoring of cases.
    • Administrative complaints are not substitutes for judicial remedies: Filing an administrative case against a judge is not the proper way to correct perceived legal errors. The correct recourse is to pursue judicial remedies like motions for reconsideration, appeals, and certiorari petitions.

    KEY LESSONS

    • Know Your Exemptions: Government agencies should thoroughly understand the statutory exemptions that protect their funds and properties.
    • Vigilant Legal Defense: Proactive and competent legal representation is crucial to assert these exemptions effectively.
    • Prioritize Judicial Remedies: Focus on pursuing appropriate judicial remedies to address legal errors instead of relying on administrative complaints for legal correction.
    • Protect Public Funds: The ultimate goal is to safeguard public funds and ensure they are used for their intended public purposes, free from unwarranted legal seizures.

    FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (FAQs)

    Q1: What is sovereign immunity in the context of Philippine law?

    A: Sovereign immunity is the principle that the government cannot be sued without its consent. It also extends to protecting government assets from seizure without proper legal process. This is to ensure the government can function effectively and public funds are used for public purposes.

    Q2: What does RA 8291, Section 39, exempt GSIS funds from?

    A: Section 39 of RA 8291 exempts GSIS funds and properties, as well as benefits, from attachment, garnishment, execution, levy, and other legal processes. This protection is in place to ensure GSIS can fulfill its mandate of providing social security and insurance to government employees.

    Q3: Are all government funds automatically exempt from execution?

    A: Generally, yes, government funds are considered exempt due to sovereign immunity and various statutory exemptions. However, exemptions are statutory, meaning they are created by law, and the specific scope of each exemption depends on the wording of the relevant statute. It’s not an absolute blanket exemption in all conceivable situations but provides strong protection.

    Q4: What should a government agency do if its funds are garnished?

    A: The agency should immediately file a motion to quash the writ of garnishment, citing sovereign immunity and any applicable statutory exemptions like Section 39 of RA 8291 for GSIS or similar provisions for other agencies. They should also seek legal counsel immediately.

    Q5: Can a judge be held liable for errors in interpreting exemption laws?

    A: Not necessarily. As the GSIS vs. Pacquing case shows, a judge is generally not administratively liable for mere errors in judgment or interpretation of the law, unless those errors are gross, patent, and motivated by bad faith, malice, or dishonesty.

    Q6: What is the difference between an administrative case and a judicial remedy?

    A: An administrative case, like the one filed against Judge Pacquing, is meant to address misconduct or errors by a judge or court personnel. A judicial remedy, like an appeal or certiorari, is a legal procedure to correct errors in a court’s decision within the judicial process itself. They serve different purposes.

    Q7: If a government agency loses a case, does it still have to pay?

    A: Yes, if the government agency is properly sued and loses, it is generally obligated to pay the judgment. However, the enforcement of that judgment, particularly against government funds, is subject to sovereign immunity and statutory exemptions. The judgment itself is valid, but the means of executing it may be restricted.

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  • Public Funds and Legal Obligations: Enforcing Judgments Against Government Entities

    The Supreme Court has affirmed that government funds can be subject to garnishment to satisfy a legal judgment if there is a specific appropriation for that purpose. This ruling reinforces the principle that government entities must honor their legal obligations and cannot use the shield of sovereign immunity to evade legitimate debts when funds have already been allocated for payment. It ensures that individuals or entities who have valid claims against the government can enforce those claims through judicial processes, fostering fairness and accountability.

    Can a City Evade Its Debts? A Case of Back Wages and Government Responsibility

    The case of City of Caloocan vs. Hon. Mauro T. Allarde revolves around Delfina Hernandez Santiago, a former Assistant City Administrator of Caloocan City, whose position was illegally abolished in 1972. After a protracted legal battle, the Court declared the abolition illegal, mandating her reinstatement and the payment of back salaries. Despite the court’s ruling and subsequent appropriation of funds, the City Government of Caloocan repeatedly resisted fulfilling its financial obligations to Santiago, leading to multiple court actions and legal maneuvers spanning over two decades. The central question before the Supreme Court was whether the City of Caloocan could avoid satisfying the judgment for back salaries, particularly concerning the garnishment of public funds and the levy on city-owned vehicles.

    The City of Caloocan argued that its funds deposited with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) were public funds and, therefore, exempt from garnishment. They also contended that the levy on the city’s motor vehicles was illegal because these vehicles were necessary for public use. Central to the city’s defense was the principle of sovereign immunity, which generally protects government funds and properties from execution. However, the Supreme Court clarified that this immunity is not absolute.

    The Court acknowledged the established rule that government funds are generally immune from garnishment to prevent disruption of public services. This is rooted in public policy considerations, ensuring that state functions are not paralyzed by the diversion of public funds from their intended purposes.

    The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.

    This rule safeguards the financial stability and operational efficiency of government entities.

    However, the Supreme Court emphasized a critical exception to this rule. The immunity of public funds from garnishment does not apply when there is a corresponding appropriation as required by law, specifically allocated for satisfying the money judgment against the government. In such cases, the allocated funds are deemed segregated from general public funds and earmarked for the specific obligation, thus allowing the judgment to be enforced through judicial processes.

    In this instance, the City Council of Caloocan had already approved Ordinance No. 0134, Series of 1992, which allocated the amount of P439,377.14 for Santiago’s back salaries plus interest. Because of this ordinance, the Supreme Court held that the case fell squarely within the exception. The court also noted that then Mayor Macario Asistio, Jr. had approved this ordinance, which constituted his agreement to the appropriation of funds for Santiago’s back wages.

    The City also questioned the legality of the levy on the three motor vehicles, claiming they were exempt from execution and that the alias writ had expired. The court noted that Judge Allarde had already lifted the levy on these three vehicles, so the question of legality was already moot. However, as to the legality of the auction sale of the motor vehicle with plate no. SBH-165, the court noted that there must be “substantial evidence” of any wrong doing on the part of the sheriff. Because no evidence was presented by the City of any wrong doing by the sheriff the auction sale was deemed valid.

    The Supreme Court underscored the importance of honoring legal obligations. It dismissed the City’s claims, emphasizing that justice must be served, particularly after Santiago had been unjustly deprived of her rightful compensation for an extended period. The Court also admonished the former Mayor of Caloocan City for refusing to sign the check, which was seen as an open defiance of judicial processes and a direct violation of the approved ordinance.

    This case reinforces the principle that municipalities and local government units cannot evade just obligations, especially when they have already appropriated funds for payment. The Court’s decision underscores the judiciary’s role in ensuring that government entities are held accountable and that citizens can enforce their valid claims against the government through legal means.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether the City of Caloocan could avoid satisfying a judgment for back salaries owed to a former employee, particularly concerning the garnishment of public funds.
    Are government funds typically subject to garnishment? Generally, government funds are immune from garnishment to prevent disruption of public services, ensuring that state functions are not paralyzed by the diversion of public funds.
    What is the exception to the rule of immunity from garnishment? The exception arises when there is a specific appropriation, as required by law, that is allocated to satisfy a money judgment against the government.
    What was the significance of Ordinance No. 0134 in this case? Ordinance No. 0134, approved by the City Council of Caloocan, specifically allocated funds for the payment of Santiago’s back salaries, triggering the exception to the rule of immunity from garnishment.
    Did the Court address the levy on the city’s vehicles? Yes, the Court noted that since Judge Allarde lifted the levy on the vehicles the question was moot.
    Why was the Mayor’s refusal to sign the check significant? The Mayor’s refusal was seen as an open defiance of judicial processes and a violation of the very ordinance he had approved, underscoring a lack of compliance with legal obligations.
    What does this case imply for other government entities? It reinforces that municipalities and local government units must honor their legal obligations, especially when they have already allocated funds for payment through appropriations.
    What broader principle does this case reinforce? The case reinforces the judiciary’s role in ensuring accountability of government entities and affirming that citizens can enforce their claims against the government through legal means.

    In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Caloocan vs. Hon. Mauro T. Allarde serves as a reminder that government entities, like all parties, must adhere to legal judgments, especially when funds are duly allocated. This ruling promotes accountability and fairness in the enforcement of legal obligations against the government, ultimately fostering a more just legal environment.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: City of Caloocan vs. Hon. Mauro T. Allarde, G.R. No. 107271, September 10, 2003

  • Sovereign Immunity: Contracts with Foreign States and Waiver of Immunity

    The Supreme Court has definitively ruled that a foreign state’s agreement to settle legal disputes under Philippine law does not automatically waive its sovereign immunity from being sued in Philippine courts. The ruling clarifies that entering into a contract is not enough to strip a foreign state of its protection from lawsuits. This decision protects foreign states from potential legal overreach while allowing them to engage in necessary agreements, thereby fostering international relations and upholding the principles of sovereign equality.

    Embassy Maintenance and the Reach of Sovereign Immunity

    This case arose from a maintenance agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and James Vinzon, doing business as Vinzon Trade and Services. Vinzon was contracted to maintain equipment at the Indonesian Embassy. A dispute arose when the embassy terminated the agreement, leading Vinzon to sue for breach of contract. The Republic of Indonesia argued that it was immune from suit due to its sovereign status, a claim that Vinzon contested, citing a clause in the agreement that any legal action would be settled under Philippine law.

    The central question before the Supreme Court was whether this clause constituted a waiver of sovereign immunity. The Court referred to established principles of international law, emphasizing that the Philippines adheres to the principles of reciprocity, comity, independence, and equality of states. Sovereign immunity, derived from these principles, protects a state from being sued in foreign courts without its consent, ensuring that no state exerts authority over another. However, this immunity is not absolute. The Court also acknowledged the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, which distinguishes between acts jure imperii (governmental acts) and acts jure gestionis (commercial acts). Immunity applies to the former but not necessarily the latter.

    The Court then distinguished merely entering into a contract from the nature of the contract. While entering into a contract does not automatically qualify an act as jure gestionis, this action begins a vital inquiry: Is the foreign state engaged in the regular conduct of business? Here, the Court found no indication that the Republic of Indonesia was engaged in a regular business. Thus, the Court examined the intrinsic nature of the act. Finding that maintaining a diplomatic mission is a sovereign activity, the Court held that the maintenance agreement was also an act jure imperii, incident to a sovereign function.

    The Court analyzed whether the choice-of-law provision constituted a waiver of sovereign immunity. It stated that such submission must be clear and unequivocal either explicitly or by necessary implication. Merely agreeing to settle disputes under Philippine law was deemed insufficient. The Court also pointed out that Philippine laws encompass the principle of sovereign immunity itself. Therefore, even if Philippine law applies, it could still require the court to dismiss the case based on sovereign immunity.

    The Court reasoned that establishing and maintaining a diplomatic mission falls squarely within a sovereign state’s functions. To this end, sovereign states may enter into contracts to maintain their embassies. Concluding, the Court underscored that the Republic of Indonesia acted in its sovereign capacity when contracting with Vinzon for the maintenance of its embassy and ambassador’s residence.

    FAQs

    What is sovereign immunity? Sovereign immunity is a legal doctrine that prevents a sovereign state from being sued in the courts of another state without its consent. This principle is based on the idea that all states are equal and independent.
    What is the difference between acts jure imperii and acts jure gestionis? Acts jure imperii are governmental acts that a state performs in its sovereign capacity and these acts are protected by sovereign immunity. Acts jure gestionis, on the other hand, are commercial or private acts that are generally not protected by immunity.
    Did the contract clause in this case waive Indonesia’s sovereign immunity? The Supreme Court held that the contract clause agreeing to settle disputes under Philippine law did not automatically waive Indonesia’s sovereign immunity. For a waiver to be effective, it must be clear and unequivocal.
    Is maintaining an embassy considered a commercial activity? No, the Supreme Court ruled that maintaining an embassy is an act of sovereign function (jure imperii). Thus, related contracts are connected with the State’s sovereign rights and not commercial in nature.
    Does this ruling affect the ability of private parties to contract with foreign states? Private parties can still contract with foreign states, but they should be aware that sovereign immunity may protect the foreign state from lawsuits unless there is a clear and explicit waiver.
    Can diplomatic agents be sued in their private capacities? The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides immunity to diplomatic agents from civil and administrative jurisdiction, with certain exceptions. Terminating a maintenance agreement does not fall under these exceptions.
    What does the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations say about immunity? The Vienna Convention grants diplomatic agents immunity from criminal jurisdiction and also from civil and administrative jurisdiction, except for actions related to private immovable property, succession as a private person, or commercial activity outside their official functions.
    What was the court’s final ruling in this case? The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Republic of Indonesia, reversing the Court of Appeals’ decision. It dismissed the complaint filed against Indonesia based on the principle of sovereign immunity.

    This ruling clarifies the extent to which foreign states are protected by sovereign immunity in the Philippines, ensuring they can fulfill essential functions without undue interference. It also highlights the importance of clearly defining any waiver of immunity when contracting with foreign entities, reinforcing stability and predictability in international agreements.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA VS. JAMES VINZON, G.R No. 154705, June 26, 2003

  • Sovereign Immunity vs. Individual Accountability: Determining Diplomatic Protection in Drug Enforcement

    In the case of Minucher vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that Arthur Scalzo, an agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), was entitled to state immunity from suit for actions taken while conducting drug surveillance in the Philippines with the consent of the Philippine government. This decision underscored the principle that a foreign agent, acting within the directives of a sending state and with the consent of the host state, is protected from being sued in the receiving state’s courts for actions within their official duties. This protects foreign agents acting under state authority but raises concerns about accountability for actions that may infringe on individual rights.

    When Does a Foreign Agent’s Actions Fall Under State Immunity?

    This case originated from a drug-related charge against Khosrow Minucher, an Iranian national residing in the Philippines. Arthur Scalzo, a special agent with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), participated in a “buy-bust operation” that led to Minucher’s arrest. Minucher was later acquitted. Subsequently, Minucher filed a civil case against Scalzo, alleging that Scalzo fabricated the drug charges. Scalzo claimed diplomatic immunity as a defense, asserting that his actions were part of his official duties. The central question was whether Scalzo’s actions were covered by diplomatic or state immunity, shielding him from legal responsibility in the Philippines.

    The Supreme Court had to analyze the scope and applicability of diplomatic immunity under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the principle of state immunity. Minucher argued that Scalzo should be held personally liable for actions taken outside the scope of his official duties. Scalzo, on the other hand, maintained that as a special agent of the DEA, his actions were within his official capacity and therefore protected by state immunity. The Court acknowledged that while vesting diplomatic immunity is an executive prerogative, it requires careful scrutiny. The critical point was determining whether Scalzo’s actions were directed by the U.S. government and done with the Philippine government’s consent.

    Building on this, the Court delved into the historical and customary international law aspects of diplomatic and sovereign immunity. Traditionally, diplomatic immunity protects individuals representing a state in diplomatic roles. However, the principle of **state immunity** extends this protection to actions performed by a foreign government’s agent, acting in their official capacity. The Court emphasized that a state cannot be sued in the courts of another state, reflecting the concept of sovereign equality. Suing an agent of a state is akin to suing the state itself, therefore requiring the state’s consent before a suit can proceed.

    Moreover, the Court considered that while diplomatic immunity under the Vienna Convention is restrictive and primarily applies to diplomatic agents, state immunity offers a broader protection when the acts arise from official duties. The Court examined multiple documents submitted by Scalzo, including diplomatic notes from the U.S. Embassy and certifications from the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs. Although these documents were issued after the litigation began (post litem motam), the court reasoned the continuous series of communications indicated the Philippine government knew and allowed activities performed by agent Scalzo. Therefore, in conjunction with the participation of Philippine Narcotics Command members, there existed an implicit Philippine imprimatur, meaning permission.

    The Supreme Court recognized the limitations of state immunity, particularly when public officials act outside their authorized functions or engage in illegal activities. Referring to Shauf vs. Court of Appeals, the Court reiterated that unauthorized acts by government officials do not fall under state immunity. However, the Court found that Scalzo’s surveillance and participation in the buy-bust operation were within his duties as a DEA agent. Given that his job description tasked him to conduct surveillance on suspected drug suppliers, Scalzo’s actions did not exceed the scope of his official function. Essentially, state immunity protected Scalzo because the acts were authorized by the U.S. government and implicitly consented to by the Philippines.

    Therefore, the critical distinction lies in whether the foreign agent acted under the directives of their state and with the host state’s consent. The Court acknowledged the principle from United States of America vs. Guinto, emphasizing that officials cannot be directly impleaded for actions imputable to their principal when acting within their authority on behalf of their government. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that because Scalzo’s actions were within his assigned functions as a DEA agent combating drug trafficking with Philippine government consent, he was entitled to the defense of state immunity from suit.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether Arthur Scalzo, a U.S. DEA agent, was protected by diplomatic or state immunity from a civil suit filed against him in the Philippines for actions taken during a drug-related operation. This involved determining the extent and applicability of these immunities.
    What is diplomatic immunity? Diplomatic immunity is the privilege granted to diplomatic agents, protecting them from civil and criminal prosecution in the host country to ensure they can perform their duties without fear of coercion or harassment. It is based on international conventions and customary international law.
    What is state immunity from suit? State immunity is the principle that a sovereign state cannot be sued in the courts of another state without its consent. This immunity extends to officials acting on behalf of the state within the scope of their official duties.
    Was Arthur Scalzo considered a diplomat? The court found it contentious whether Scalzo was truly entitled to diplomatic immunity. Despite his claim to be an Assistant Attaché, his actions and the circumstances of his assignment cast doubt on his diplomatic status.
    What evidence supported the claim that Scalzo was acting within his official duties? Scalzo presented diplomatic notes, certifications, and reports of his investigation, which indicated that he was a DEA agent tasked to conduct surveillance on suspected drug activities in the Philippines. Additionally, the Philippine government consented, which was supported through documentation and the actions of Philippine authorities.
    What is the significance of the Philippine government’s consent in this case? The Philippine government’s implicit consent to Scalzo’s activities was crucial. It indicated that the U.S. DEA agent was operating with the host country’s approval, reinforcing the argument for state immunity.
    What is the difference between jure imperii and jure gestionis? Jure imperii refers to the public acts of a state, which are protected by sovereign immunity. Jure gestionis refers to private acts or commercial activities of a state, which are generally not protected by sovereign immunity.
    What are ‘post litem motam‘ issuances? ‘Post litem motam‘ issuances refer to documents or statements issued after litigation has commenced. In this case, the court viewed the diplomatic notes presented by Scalzo with caution, as they were issued after the civil suit was filed.
    What was the ruling of the Supreme Court in this case? The Supreme Court ruled that Arthur Scalzo, as an agent of the U.S. DEA, was entitled to the defense of state immunity from suit because his actions were conducted within his official duties and with the implicit consent of the Philippine government. The Supreme Court ultimately denied Minucher’s Petition.

    The decision highlights the balance between upholding the principles of state immunity and ensuring individual accountability. It reinforces the need for clear agreements between countries regarding the activities of foreign agents within their borders to avoid disputes over immunity. Furthermore, this case underscores the need to balance the state’s interest in combating transnational crimes with protecting individuals from potential abuses by foreign agents.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Khosrow Minucher v. Hon. Court of Appeals and Arthur Scalzo, G.R. No. 142396, February 11, 2003

  • Sovereign Immunity: The State’s Inherent Right to Reclaim Public Land Acquired Through Fraud

    In the Philippines, the principle of imprescriptibility dictates that the State’s right to recover its property is not lost through prescription or laches, especially when such property is acquired through fraud. This ruling underscores the government’s inherent authority to reclaim public land, ensuring that those who fraudulently obtain titles cannot benefit from their unlawful actions. The Supreme Court emphasizes that the State’s right to revert or reconvey land fraudulently titled in private hands remains valid indefinitely.

    Land Grab Reversal: When Can the Government Reclaim What’s Rightfully Theirs?

    The case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Heirs of Agustin L. Angeles revolves around a complaint filed by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) seeking the reversion of Lot No. 2744, Cadastral 241, Orion Cadastre, to the State. The DENR alleged that the late Agustin L. Angeles fraudulently acquired a free patent over the land. The pivotal legal question is whether the State’s action for reversion is barred by prescription, given that the free patent was issued in 1964, and the complaint was filed decades later.

    The Regional Trial Court (RTC) initially dismissed the complaint, siding with the respondents and ruling that the action had prescribed. The RTC reasoned that the prescriptive period of four years, as counted from the issuance of the Original Certificate of Title (OCT), had lapsed. This decision was based on the understanding that an action for reconveyance based on fraud must be filed within this timeframe. However, the Supreme Court reversed this decision, firmly establishing that the principle of prescription does not apply when the State seeks to recover its own property obtained through fraudulent means.

    The Supreme Court distinguished this case from actions for reconveyance filed by private individuals. In such cases, the property does not revert to the State but is transferred to the rightful private owner. The Court emphasized that a title issued based on a free patent is indeed indefeasible but clarified that this indefeasibility does not shield against investigations by the State, especially when fraud is suspected in the title’s acquisition. Public land fraudulently titled remains subject to reversion, as enshrined in Section 101 of the Public Land Act. This provision underscores the State’s authority to reclaim what was unlawfully taken.

    The Court referenced Article 1108 of the Civil Code, asserting the fundamental principle that prescription does not run against the State and its subdivisions. When the government acts to assert its right to recover its own property, defenses based on laches or prescription are generally untenable. This principle is rooted in the idea that the State’s rights and interests should not be compromised due to the negligence or inaction of its agents or the passage of time. This doctrine ensures that public resources are protected and that fraudulent acquisitions do not stand unchallenged.

    Respondents argued that under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, patrimonial property of the State could be subject to prescription. The Court acknowledged this possibility but emphasized that the determination of whether the land is agricultural, residential, or patrimonial is a factual matter to be resolved during trial. The Court explicitly stated that the applicability of such arguments and the question of whether a party is an innocent purchaser for value are premature at this stage. The overarching legal issue remained whether, as a general rule, prescription can be invoked against the State.

    Furthermore, the Court cited several precedents to reinforce its position. In Republic v. Grijaldo and Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court underscored that when the government seeks to assert its right to recover its property, prescription and laches do not apply. Similarly, in Republic v. Animas and Reyes v. Court of Appeals, the Court affirmed that the right of reversion or reconveyance to the State is not barred by prescription. These cases collectively demonstrate a consistent judicial stance protecting the State’s right to reclaim fraudulently acquired public land.

    The Supreme Court’s decision sends a clear message: fraudulent acquisition of public lands will not be tolerated, and the State retains the power to reclaim such properties, irrespective of the time elapsed since the fraudulent act. This ruling reinforces the integrity of the land titling system and safeguards public resources. The court’s emphasis on the State’s inherent right to protect its property ensures that individuals cannot profit from illicitly obtained titles. By setting aside the lower court’s decision, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the principle of sovereign immunity and the State’s role as the ultimate guardian of public assets.

    Ultimately, the Supreme Court granted the petition, setting aside the assailed Order and directing the Regional Trial Court of Bataan to hear Civil Case No. 6789 on its merits. The Court’s decision underscored the enduring principle that the State’s right to recover its property acquired through fraud is not subject to prescription. This case serves as a reminder of the importance of upholding the integrity of land titling processes and the State’s power to rectify fraudulent acquisitions.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The central issue was whether the State’s action for reversion of land fraudulently acquired through a free patent is barred by prescription. The court needed to determine if the passage of time could legitimize a fraudulent claim against public land.
    What is a free patent? A free patent is a government grant that allows a qualified individual to acquire ownership of public land by occupying and cultivating it for a specified period. It’s a pathway to land ownership, but subject to rules against fraud and alienation.
    What does ‘reversion’ mean in this context? Reversion refers to the process by which land fraudulently titled in private hands is returned to the ownership of the State. It is a legal remedy to correct injustices arising from illegal land acquisitions.
    Why doesn’t prescription apply to the State in this case? The principle of imprescriptibility holds that the State’s right to recover its property is not lost through prescription. This means that the government can reclaim land obtained through fraud, regardless of how much time has passed.
    What is the Public Land Act’s role in this case? Section 101 of the Public Land Act authorizes the State to recover or revert public land that has been fraudulently included in patents or certificates of title. This provision reinforces the State’s right to reclaim unlawfully acquired land.
    What did the lower court decide, and why was it overturned? The lower court initially dismissed the case, arguing that the prescriptive period had lapsed. However, the Supreme Court overturned this decision, emphasizing that prescription does not run against the State when it seeks to recover its property.
    What happens next in this case? The Supreme Court has directed the Regional Trial Court of Bataan to hear Civil Case No. 6789 on its merits. This means the case will proceed to trial to determine the factual issues related to the alleged fraud.
    Can someone be an ‘innocent purchaser for value’ in a case involving fraudulently acquired public land? The question of whether someone is an innocent purchaser for value is a factual matter that must be determined during trial. The Supreme Court did not rule on this issue but indicated it would be addressed in the lower court proceedings.
    What is the key takeaway for landowners in the Philippines? The key takeaway is that fraudulent acquisition of public land will not be tolerated, and the State retains the power to reclaim such properties, irrespective of the time elapsed since the fraudulent act. Landowners should ensure their titles are legitimate.

    This landmark decision reinforces the State’s power to reclaim public land obtained through fraudulent means, ensuring that the principles of justice and equity prevail. It serves as a reminder that those who seek to benefit from illegal land acquisitions will be held accountable, and the State will remain vigilant in protecting its resources.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Republic of the Philippines vs. Heirs of Agustin L. Angeles, G.R. No. 141296, October 07, 2002

  • Protecting Public Funds: Understanding Garnishment and Execution Pending Appeal in the Philippines

    Safeguarding Public Funds: Limits on Garnishment and Execution Pending Appeal

    TLDR: This case clarifies that public funds of government agencies like the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) are generally exempt from garnishment. It also emphasizes that execution pending appeal is an exception to the rule and requires ‘good reasons’ beyond mere financial hardship. Businesses dealing with government entities should be aware of these limitations when seeking to enforce judgments.

    G.R. No. 127851, October 18, 2000

    INTRODUCTION

    Imagine a scenario where a private company wins a lawsuit against a government agency and seeks to immediately collect the judgment, even while the agency appeals. Can the company seize the agency’s funds to satisfy the judgment right away? This was the core issue in Corona International, Inc. v. Court of Appeals and the Philippine Coconut Authority. The case highlights the crucial legal principle of protecting public funds from immediate seizure and the stringent requirements for ‘execution pending appeal’ in the Philippine legal system. At its heart, this case underscores the delicate balance between ensuring justice for private entities and safeguarding public resources essential for government functions.

    LEGAL CONTEXT: Sovereign Immunity and Execution Pending Appeal

    The bedrock principle at play here is sovereign immunity, a long-standing doctrine that generally shields the State and its agencies from being sued without consent. This immunity extends to government funds, which are considered to be held in trust for the public good. Allowing the indiscriminate garnishment of public funds could disrupt essential government services and operations. Philippine law, reflecting this principle, generally prohibits the execution or garnishment of public funds unless there is a specific legal provision allowing it.

    However, the Rules of Court provide a limited exception: execution pending appeal. Section 2, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure outlines this discretionary execution:

    “SEC. 2. Discretionary execution.

    (a) Execution of a judgment or final order pending appeal. – On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party filed in the trial court while it has jurisdiction over the case…said court may, in its discretion, order execution of a judgment or final order even before the expiration of the period to appeal.

    Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing.”

    This rule allows a trial court to order immediate execution of its judgment even if the losing party appeals, but only under specific conditions. The key requirement is the presence of “good reasons”. Philippine jurisprudence defines “good reasons” as “compelling circumstances justifying the immediate execution lest judgment becomes illusory.” These reasons must be exceptional and outweigh the potential harm to the losing party if the judgment is later reversed on appeal. Simply put, execution pending appeal is not the norm but a special remedy for truly urgent situations.

    CASE BREAKDOWN: Corona International vs. PCA

    Corona International, Inc. (Corona) sued the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City for breach of contract related to a construction project. The RTC ruled in favor of Corona, ordering PCA to pay over ₱9 million in damages. Corona, fearing its business would collapse without immediate payment, moved for execution pending appeal. The RTC granted this motion, citing the need to prevent Corona’s business collapse and deeming PCA’s appeal “patently unmeritorious.” The court required Corona to post a ₱20 million bond.

    Following the RTC’s order, Corona garnished PCA’s funds at Land Bank of the Philippines. However, Land Bank refused to release the funds. PCA then filed a Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution, arguing they hadn’t received the order for execution pending appeal and questioned the bond’s approval. The RTC denied PCA’s motion and ordered Land Bank to release the funds.

    PCA elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) via a certiorari petition. The CA reversed the RTC, ruling that PCA’s funds, being public funds, were exempt from garnishment. It also found no “good reason” to justify execution pending appeal.

    Corona then appealed to the Supreme Court (SC), raising several arguments:

    1. The CA erred in finding grave abuse of discretion by the RTC in allowing execution pending appeal.
    2. The CA improperly considered the issue of public funds immunity, as it was not raised in the RTC.
    3. The CA erred in classifying PCA as a national government agency and its funds as exempt from garnishment.
    4. The CA erred in issuing a writ of preliminary injunction against the execution.

    The Supreme Court, in its decision penned by Justice Ynares-Santiago, agreed with Corona that the issue of public funds was raised for the first time in the CA and should not have been considered. However, the SC proceeded to independently evaluate whether “good reasons” existed to justify execution pending appeal. The Court stated:

    “We note that the reason of the trial court in granting execution pending appeal was to prevent the irreparable collapse of petitioner’s business operation and that private respondent’s appeal is patently unmeritorious and would only result in the delay of the final disposition of the case.

    Does this constitute good reason to order execution pending appeal? Will this outweigh the injury or damage caused private respondent should the latter secure a reversal of the judgment against it?”

    The SC concluded that the RTC’s reasons were insufficient. It found Corona’s claim of impending business collapse “illusory,” noting evidence of business expansion and healthy financial reports. The Court also highlighted the compromised nature of the property bond offered by Corona. Crucially, the SC emphasized the potential harm to PCA and the public interest if public funds, potentially including coconut levy funds, were garnished. The Court declared:

    “Finally, it is not difficult to see the injury or damage execution pending appeal would cause private respondent which is a public corporation tasked to implement the national policy of the State…Among the funds held by private respondent which would be subject to execution pending appeal would be coconut levy funds vital both to the coconut industry and to coconut farmers, which being vested with public interest, we are duty bound to protect. Weighed against these considerations, execution pending appeal further proves unwise.”

    Ultimately, the Supreme Court denied Corona’s petition and upheld the CA’s decision, albeit on different grounds, effectively preventing the execution pending appeal.

    PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS: Protecting Public Funds and Navigating Execution Pending Appeal

    This case serves as a significant reminder that public funds are generally protected from garnishment in the Philippines. Private companies dealing with government agencies should understand this limitation when pursuing legal claims. While judgments can be obtained against government entities, enforcing them, especially through immediate garnishment, is subject to significant legal hurdles.

    For businesses considering seeking execution pending appeal, this case underscores the need to demonstrate truly compelling and extraordinary circumstances. Mere financial hardship, especially if contradicted by evidence of financial stability, is unlikely to suffice. The “good reasons” must be demonstrably urgent and outweigh the potential harm to the opposing party and the public interest. Furthermore, the security offered, such as a bond, must be unquestionably reliable and sufficient to cover potential damages.

    KEY LESSONS:

    • Public Funds Immunity: Funds of government agencies are generally immune from garnishment unless explicitly allowed by law.
    • Strict Requirements for Execution Pending Appeal: “Good reasons” must be genuinely compelling and exceptional, not just routine business concerns.
    • Burden of Proof: The party seeking execution pending appeal bears the heavy burden of proving the existence of “good reasons.”
    • Public Interest Consideration: Courts will consider the broader public interest and potential disruption to government functions when evaluating execution pending appeal against government agencies.
    • Solid Security is Essential: Bonds or security offered for execution pending appeal must be unencumbered and reliably cover potential damages.

    FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (FAQs)

    Q: Can I always garnish the funds of a losing party after winning a court case?

    A: Generally, yes, after a judgment becomes final and executory. However, there are exceptions, such as when the losing party is a government agency and the funds are considered public funds, or when execution pending appeal is sought but no “good reasons” are proven.

    Q: What are considered “good reasons” for execution pending appeal?

    A: “Good reasons” are compelling circumstances that demonstrate an urgent need for immediate execution to prevent the judgment from becoming worthless. Examples might include the imminent bankruptcy of the judgment debtor (if genuinely proven), or situations where delay would cause irreparable damage. Mere financial hardship of the winning party is generally not enough.

    Q: If a court grants execution pending appeal, is it guaranteed that I will get paid immediately?

    A: Not necessarily. Even with an order for execution pending appeal, there can still be legal challenges, as demonstrated in this case. Furthermore, if the funds are public funds, there might be additional legal hurdles to overcome.

    Q: What happens if the appealed decision is reversed after execution pending appeal has been implemented?

    A: The prevailing party who obtained execution pending appeal would be liable to return the funds and potentially pay damages to the losing party if the appellate court reverses the trial court’s decision. This is why a bond is required to protect the losing party.

    Q: Does this case mean I can never recover from a government agency until all appeals are exhausted?

    A: No. It means immediate garnishment of public funds before the finality of judgment is generally not allowed, and execution pending appeal is difficult to obtain. However, once a judgment becomes final and executory after all appeals, enforcement through regular execution becomes the standard procedure.

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