Tag: Treasury Warrants

Election Law: Issuance of Treasury Warrants and Double Jeopardy

The Supreme Court in People v. Ting addressed the complexities of election offenses concerning the issuance of treasury warrants during the prohibited period. Despite finding that the respondents likely violated Section 261(w)(b) of the Omnibus Election Code, the Court ultimately upheld their acquittal based on the principle of double jeopardy. This decision underscores the importance of balancing the need to uphold election laws with the constitutional right of an accused to not be tried twice for the same offense. It serves as a reminder that while procedural errors can be significant, the protection against double jeopardy remains a cornerstone of Philippine justice.

Treasury Warrants and Election Bans: Did City Officials Cross the Line?

This case revolves around the actions of City Mayor Randolph S. Ting and City Treasurer Salvacion I. Garcia of Tuguegarao City, who were charged with violating Section 261 (w)(b) of the Omnibus Election Code. The allegation stemmed from the issuance of a treasury warrant during the 45-day election ban period as payment for land intended for use as a public cemetery. The central legal question is whether the issuance of this treasury warrant, even if payment occurred outside the prohibited period, constitutes a violation of election laws, and how this interacts with the constitutional protection against double jeopardy.

The prosecution argued that the treasury warrant, dated April 30, 2004, fell within the prohibited period preceding the May 10, 2004 elections. This, they claimed, constituted a prima facie violation of the Omnibus Election Code. The defense countered that the actual delivery of the warrant occurred outside the prohibited period, as indicated by the bank’s annotation of the payment date. They also asserted that the issuance of the title in favor of the city government did not necessarily equate to payment within the prohibited period.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted the respondents’ demurrer to evidence, acquitting them based on the interpretation of the Negotiable Instruments Law, which defines “issue” as the first delivery of the instrument. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed this decision, emphasizing that every contract on a negotiable instrument is incomplete until delivery to the payee. However, the Supreme Court disagreed with the lower courts’ narrow interpretation of the term “issue” in the context of election law.

The Supreme Court clarified that Section 261 (w)(b) of the Omnibus Election Code is violated when:

Any person issues, uses or avails of treasury warrants or any device forty-five days preceding a regular election or thirty days before a special election;
The warrant or device undertakes the future delivery of money, goods or other things of value; and
The undertaking is chargeable against public funds.

The Court emphasized that the provision penalizes not only the issuance but also the use or availing of treasury warrants during the prohibited period. Therefore, the term “issues” should be interpreted broadly to include giving or sending, rather than strictly within the confines of the Negotiable Instruments Law. The Court stated:

To the Court, this is more in keeping with the intent of the law for basic statutory construction provides that where a general word follows an enumeration of a particular specific word of the same class, the general word is to be construed to include things of the same class as those specifically mentioned. Thus, for as long as the device is issued, used, or availed of within the prohibited period to undertake the future delivery of money chargeable against public funds, an election offense is committed.

Despite this finding, the Court ultimately denied the petition based on the principle of double jeopardy. Double jeopardy, a fundamental right enshrined in the Philippine Constitution, prevents an accused person from being tried twice for the same offense. The Court explained:

Time and again, the Court has held that double jeopardy attaches if the following elements are present: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (4) the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.

In this case, all the elements of double jeopardy were present. A valid information was filed, the court had jurisdiction, the respondents pleaded not guilty, and they were acquitted based on a demurrer to evidence. The Court noted that while an acquittal based on a demurrer may be reviewed via certiorari, there was no showing that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The Court acknowledged that exceptions to the rule on double jeopardy exist, such as when the trial court prematurely terminates the prosecution’s presentation of evidence. However, these exceptions did not apply in this case, as the prosecution was given ample opportunity to present its case. The Supreme Court underscored that:

[T]he fundamental philosophy behind the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy is to afford the defendant, who has been acquitted, final repose and safeguard him from government oppression through the abuse of criminal processes.

This ruling emphasizes the high threshold required to overturn an acquittal based on double jeopardy. Only a showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction can justify setting aside an acquittal and subjecting the accused to another trial.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether the issuance of a treasury warrant during the election ban period, even if actual payment occurred later, constitutes a violation of the Omnibus Election Code, and how this interacts with the principle of double jeopardy.
What is Section 261(w)(b) of the Omnibus Election Code?	This section prohibits the issuance, use, or availing of treasury warrants or similar devices undertaking future delivery of money chargeable against public funds during the 45 days preceding a regular election.
What does “double jeopardy” mean?	Double jeopardy is a constitutional right that protects an individual from being tried twice for the same offense after a valid acquittal or conviction. This safeguard prevents the government from repeatedly attempting to convict someone.
What is a demurrer to evidence?	A demurrer to evidence is a motion filed by the accused after the prosecution rests its case, arguing that the evidence presented is insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
When does double jeopardy attach?	Double jeopardy attaches when there is a valid complaint, a court of competent jurisdiction, the defendant has pleaded to the charge, and the defendant has been acquitted or convicted, or the case is dismissed without their consent.
What is grave abuse of discretion?	Grave abuse of discretion refers to a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.
What was the Court’s interpretation of “issue” in this case?	The Court interpreted “issue” broadly, to include any act of giving or sending the treasury warrant, not just the technical definition under the Negotiable Instruments Law which requires delivery to a holder for value.
Did the Supreme Court find a violation of the Omnibus Election Code?	Yes, the Supreme Court found that the actions of the respondents likely constituted a violation of Section 261(w)(b) of the Omnibus Election Code, based on the broad interpretation of “issue, use, or avail.”
Why were the respondents acquitted despite the likely violation?	The respondents were acquitted because the Supreme Court upheld the principle of double jeopardy, as the lower court’s acquittal was not shown to be tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

The People v. Ting case offers valuable insights into the application of election laws and the constitutional protection against double jeopardy. It illustrates the complexities of interpreting legal terms within specific statutory contexts and underscores the importance of respecting an accused’s right to finality in criminal proceedings.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: People v. Ting, G.R. No. 221505, December 05, 2018

December 5, 2018

Election Law: Disbursing Public Funds and the Scope of Prohibited Public Works

In Robert P. Guzman v. Commission on Elections, Mayor Randolph S. Ting, and Salvacion Garcia, the Supreme Court clarified the scope of prohibited acts under the Omnibus Election Code, specifically regarding the disbursement of public funds and the undertaking of public works during the election period. The Court ruled that while the purchase of land for a public cemetery does not constitute ‘public works’ under the election code, the issuance of a treasury warrant for such a purchase during the prohibited period does violate the law. This distinction is critical for public officials to understand to avoid potential election offenses.

Election Ban: When Buying Land Isn’t ‘Public Works,’ But Issuing Payment Can Still Be Illegal

This case arose from a complaint filed by Robert P. Guzman against Mayor Randolph S. Ting and City Treasurer Salvacion Garcia of Tuguegarao City. The complaint alleged that Mayor Ting and Treasurer Garcia violated Section 261, paragraphs (v) and (w), of the Omnibus Election Code. These sections prohibit disbursing public funds and undertaking public works during the 45-day period before an election. The specific instance in question involved the purchase of land intended for conversion into a public cemetery, with payment made via treasury warrant during the election ban period. The COMELEC dismissed Guzman’s complaint, leading to this appeal before the Supreme Court.

The primary issues before the Supreme Court were threefold: first, whether the petition was premature due to the lack of a prior motion for reconsideration; second, whether the acquisition of the land constituted “public works” in violation of Section 261(v) of the Omnibus Election Code; and third, whether the issuance of the treasury warrant violated Section 261(w) of the same code. The Court first addressed the procedural issue of prematurity. Generally, a motion for reconsideration must be filed before seeking certiorari. However, the Court recognized exceptions to this rule, including cases involving purely legal questions. The Court determined that the case at bar fell under this exception, as it involved interpreting provisions of the Omnibus Election Code, therefore a prior motion for reconsideration was not necessary.

Turning to the substantive issues, the Court analyzed whether purchasing land for a public cemetery qualified as “public works.” The Court looked into the definition of “public works” relying on the Local Government Code and the Administrative Code of 1987, particularly concerning the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH). The Court emphasized that public works typically involve fixed infrastructures or facilities owned and operated by the government for public use, such as roads, bridges, and public buildings. The Court also invoked the principle of ejusdem generis, which states that when general words follow an enumeration of specific items, the general words are construed to include only items similar to those specifically mentioned. Therefore, the Court concluded that merely acquiring land, without any construction or adaptation, did not constitute “public works” as contemplated under Section 261(v) of the Omnibus Election Code.

However, the Court reached a different conclusion regarding the issuance of the treasury warrant. Section 261(w) of the Omnibus Election Code prohibits both the construction of public works (with certain exceptions) and the issuance of treasury warrants or similar devices during the prohibited period. The Court emphasized that the use of the disjunctive “or” in the provision indicates that these are two distinct and separate prohibited acts. The prohibition against issuing treasury warrants is not contingent upon whether the funds are intended for public works. Here is the provision:

(w) Prohibition against construction of public works, delivery of materials for public works and issuance of treasury warrants and similar devices.– During the period of forty five days preceding a regular election and thirty days before a special election, any person who: (a) undertakes the construction of any public works, except for projects or works exempted in the preceding paragraph; or (b) issues, uses or avails of treasury warrants or any device undertaking future delivery of money, goods or other things of value chargeable against public funds.

The Court found that the COMELEC had gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint because it overlooked the independent prohibition against issuing treasury warrants during the election ban. The Court stated that:

There was a probable cause to believe that Section 261(w), subparagraph (b), of the Omnibus Election Code was violated when City Mayor Ting and City Treasurer Garcia issued Treasury Warrant No. 0001534514 during the election ban period.

Therefore, the Supreme Court granted the petition, set aside the COMELEC resolution, and ordered the COMELEC to file the appropriate criminal information against Mayor Ting and Treasurer Garcia for violating Section 261(w), subparagraph (b), of the Omnibus Election Code.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether the purchase of land intended for a public cemetery and the issuance of a treasury warrant for that purchase during the election period violated the prohibitions under the Omnibus Election Code. The Court differentiated between the definition of “public works” and the specific prohibition against issuing treasury warrants during the election ban period.
Does the purchase of land constitute “public works” under the Omnibus Election Code?	No, the Supreme Court clarified that the mere purchase of land, without any construction or adaptation, does not fall within the definition of “public works” as contemplated under Section 261(v) of the Omnibus Election Code. This is because “public works” generally involves fixed infrastructures or facilities owned and operated by the government for public use.
Is the issuance of treasury warrants during the election ban period always prohibited?	Yes, the issuance, use, or availment of treasury warrants or any similar device undertaking future delivery of money, goods, or other things of value chargeable against public funds is strictly prohibited during the 45-day period before a regular election and 30 days before a special election, as stated in Section 261(w) of the Omnibus Election Code. This prohibition is separate from the restrictions on public works.
What is the significance of the word “or” in Section 261(w) of the Omnibus Election Code?	The disjunctive “or” in Section 261(w) signifies that the prohibition against undertaking construction of public works and the prohibition against issuing treasury warrants are two distinct and independent prohibitions. This means that violating either provision constitutes a separate offense.
What was the COMELEC’s error in this case?	The COMELEC erred by focusing solely on whether the purchase of land constituted “public works” and failing to recognize the independent prohibition against issuing treasury warrants during the election ban period, regardless of whether the funds were intended for public works. This oversight constituted grave abuse of discretion.
What was the outcome of the Supreme Court’s decision?	The Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari, set aside the COMELEC’s resolution, and ordered the COMELEC to file the appropriate criminal information against Mayor Ting and Treasurer Garcia for violating Section 261(w), subparagraph (b), of the Omnibus Election Code.
*What is the principle of ejusdem generis, and how was it applied in this case?*	Ejusdem generis is a rule of statutory construction which states that when general words follow an enumeration of specific items, the general words are construed to include only items similar to those specifically mentioned. In this case, it was used to interpret “public works” by relating it to specific examples like highways and flood control systems, thus excluding the mere purchase of land.
Why was a motion for reconsideration not required before elevating the case to the Supreme Court?	A motion for reconsideration was not required because the case involved a purely legal question – the interpretation of the Omnibus Election Code. The Supreme Court recognizes exceptions to the requirement of a prior motion for reconsideration when only legal issues are raised.

This case underscores the importance of strict compliance with election laws, particularly concerning the disbursement of public funds. Public officials must be aware of the specific prohibitions outlined in the Omnibus Election Code to avoid potential legal repercussions. The distinction between the actual construction of public works and the issuance of financial instruments related to such projects is a crucial one for ensuring fair and honest elections.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

August 28, 2009